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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As for the introduction, first chapter of the dissertation is devoted to systematically 
present objectives of the dissertation and methodology that will be used in order to confirm or 
deny the basic hypothesis as well as the main thesis. This introduction will display initial 
overview of the theoretical problem that shall be thoroughly analyzed in the dissertation as 
well as the scientific mechanism by which we can confirm or reject the thesis stated in the 
dissertation. The introduction consists of five subchapters all of which are used to point out 
the objectives of the dissertation as well as the (theoretical and practical) limitations.  
 
1.1.  General overview  
 
Contemporary legal science does not dispute the immeasurable impact which the 
(European) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with 
additional Protocols (hereinafter: “the Convention”) has achieved in legal protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in all aspects of legal order in all states where the 
Convention is on force.1 Contemporary research also indicates that the Convention 
successfully assumed propulsive effect in all legal branches within national legal orders 
(whether private or public) in relation to the construction of particular minimum standards 
regarding protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.2 The Convention in modern 
legal time has become unavoidable legal instrument that qualitatively ensures fundamental 
human rights and freedoms as no other (international) legal source although the Convention, 
of course, is not the one and only international legal instrument devoted to the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Nevertheless, within agreements that are 
                                                 
1 „If it has since been joined by other regional and universal treaty-based guarantees of human rights, the 
Convention remains the most advanced instrument of this kind. It has generated the most sophisticated and 
detailed jurisprudence in international human rights law and its enforcement mechanisms are unrivalled in their 
effectiveness and achievements.“ D. Harris, M. O'Boyle, E. Bates et. al; „Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights“, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, p. 34. See also: A. Caligiuri, N. Napoletano: 
“The Application of the ECHR in the Domestic Systems”, The Italian Yearbook of International Law, 2010, 125–
159. 
2 „The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or Convention) has great impact on national law. 
Important areas of law (e.g. criminal law, family law, administrative law, immigration law, social security law) 
have changed as a result of the influence of the ECHR and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR or Court). National courts frequently refer to the EctHR's case-law and their methods of review and 
argumentation in cases about fundamental rights increasingly appear to be modelled on the standards developed 
by the Court.“ J. Gerards, J. Fleuren (ed.): „Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
of the judgements of the EctHR in national case-law“, Intersentia, Cambridge, 2014, p. 1. 
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substantially addressed to the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, the Convention is taking the main place.3    
With this common and universal legal characteristic of the Convention in all modern 
states where the Convention is on force there are further theoretical impacts as well as the 
practical consequences that need to be closely scientifically examined in order to 
systematically present one new overview of the Convention’s influence in contemporary 
(domestic and international) legal order and in modern theory of constitutional law. This shall 
be the main objective of this dissertation.  
It has to be noted that from the dawn of the modern constitutionality (which begins 
with the “Great” French Revolution and the Constitution of the United States of America in 
the late 18th century) the state and its national sovereignty presents the main political and legal 
factor that regulate all of the most significant aspects of social relations within its borders as 
well as the relation between the individuals and the state.4 Modern constitutional law as well 
as the theory of the constitutional law has been developed on such foundations, and until 
modern time has been devoted to analyze all (dis)advantages of such structure.  
From the aspects of the political sciences, especially the “classical” theory of political 
science, only states within their borders are relevant constitutional, legal, international and 
political factors. Only states possess and can possess ius puniendi, only states can prescribe 
the law that shall be binding within their territory and (ultimately) only states can regulate 
human rights and fundamental freedoms determining them substantial elements as well as the 
procedural realization and protection. Within this theoretical concept of the national 
sovereignty that was developed in the middle-age classical literature of the political science5 
supervisory court of any kind over the actions of state(s) cannot be constituted because it 
would violate state’s sovereignty. National sovereignty of one nation over its territory and 
ultimate legal and political power over the individuals who are subjected to this power (who 
reside on state’s territory) has been the prevailing political and legal concept from the Peace 
                                                 
3 See supra, footnote 1.  
4 More about historical development and the concept of national sovereignty from the aspects of constitutional 
law see in: F. Grad, I. Kaučič, S. Zagorc: „Ustavno pravo“, Pravna fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani, 2016, p. 122 
– 130. 
5 For detailed insight of the concept of sovereignty in terms of classical political science (theory of state) and 
historical development see:  H. Denzer: „Bodin“ in: H. Maier, H. Rausch, H. Denzer: Klasici političkog mišljenja 
– od Platona do Hobbesa, Golden Marketing, Zagreb, 1998, p. 265 – 287; H. Maier: „Hobbes“ in: H. Maier, H. 
Rausch, H. Denzer: Klasici političkog mišljenja – od Platona do Hobbesa, Golden Marketing, Zagreb, 1998, p. 
287 – 307; W. Euchner: „Locke“ in: H. Maier, H. Rausch, H. Denzer: Klasici političkog mišljenja – od Lockea 
do Maxa Webera, Golden Marketing, Zagreb, 1998, p. 9 – 27 and H. Maier: „Rousseau“ in: H. Maier, H. 
Rausch, H. Denzer: Klasici političkog mišljenja – od Lockea do Maxa Webera, Golden Marketing, Zagreb, 1998, 
p. 86 – 109. 
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of Westphalia in 1648 until the end of the World War II. Although prevailing idea, the 
concept of national sovereignty did not exclude ideas and possibilities for European unity 
even in the middle age. Historical research confirms that the idea of common European 
(defensive) area existed even in the 4th century B.C. First real attempts for significant political 
connections on European continent can be found in the 14th century where subsequent 
historical developments led to contemporary supra-national political entity – the European 
Union.6 
Horrors of the World War II have shown that the concept of the national sovereignty 
in which states possess ultimate power over individuals on its territory can lead to extreme 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. After the World War II the 
international community, although stressed with arising geo-political division of the world in 
Cold War era and in the light of all revealed atrocities of the Holocaust, found the strength to 
start ensuring the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms on one significantly 
higher qualitative and (more important) international level. Competence over the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms after the World War II does not lie anymore solely 
on individual states as sovereign political entities in the international community but on the 
international community as a unit. The sovereign states after the World War II have started to 
connect on the basis of multilateral international agreements as well as within international 
organizations devoted to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and to the 
protection of the world peace as the greatest value of all mankind. The post-World War II era 
represents the human rights era that has introduced international legal mechanisms for the 
protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms across the globe – the legal concept 
which has never been used in legal and political history before.  
The Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations as the foundation of the “new 
internationalized human rights era” specifically points out to these objectives.7 After such an 
unprecedented legal and political leap, numerous international agreements have been 
concluded between states – nearly all of which (agreements) have been devoted to the 
protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms. The first universal legal (but as 
well as political) source for the protection of the human rights was Universal Declaration of 
                                                 
6 See: M. Accetto: „Izgradnja Evrope od razvoja ideje Evrope do njene ustavne prihodnosti“, Uradni list RS, 
2006, p. 81 – 166. 
7 “WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED 
...... 
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights 
of men and women and of nations large and small… Charter of the United Nations, available at the official 
website of the United Nations: http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/preamble/index.html (12.04.2019.) 
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Human Rights proclaimed in Paris in 1948 which had an impact on further developments in 
international (human rights) law. The Declaration was a major contribution to the protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms worldwide because it emphasized a minimal list of 
universal human rights that must be acknowledged to every man or women in the world 
regardless of any criteria. With the Declaration human rights law has become international in 
every possible sense although some aspects of the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms have already been implemented in the international law before.8 But the Declaration 
in the context of the political and legal history can be marked as the landmark legal source 
and a starting point of the new era – the era in which the states are continuously responsible 
for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms but also are subjected to various 
international agreements with the international community that oversees their realization and 
protection.9  
 After the Declaration there are two additional main international legal sources of the 
international conventional law that can be identified as important as the Declaration on the 
universal, world-wide level. These agreements are the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
both from 1966. Given the fact that the Declaration was “just” the declaration of a minimum 
list of human rights and fundamental freedoms that must be guaranteed to every person across 
the globe, because of this characteristic there was a real danger that proclaimed human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in the Declaration stay on paper without their effective realization 
in domestic legal order of the states involved. For that reason, United Nations tried to ensure 
that human rights and freedoms as proclaimed in the Declaration really take effect in daily 
legal and political life of modern states. The Covenants will consequently become 
international legal mechanisms that will ensure realization of the proclaimed human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in the Declaration.10 After entering into force, the Covenants also 
introduced procedural mechanisms related to the protection and realization of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms on international level. For example, the Optional Protocol to the 
                                                 
8 Like e.g. Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 or Geneva Conventions of 1929 concerning the prisoners of 
war. 
9 In the modern human rights era from the aspect of the international law we can see a growing debate between 
the scholars whether human rights law has become the part of the customary international law and not only the 
part of international conventional law. See e.g. working paper of professor Anthony D'Amato: „Human Rights as 
Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for Change of Paradigms“, available at: 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1087&context=facultyworkingpaper
s (12.04.2019.) 
10 Respective internationalization of human rights will lead contemporary constitutional theory to the 
introduction of the concept of normative universality and common universal standards in human rights 
protection and realization, see infra, p. 70. 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights introduced the possibility for individuals 
to send their communications to the Human Rights Committee (which body has been set up 
with the part IV of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as body consisted 
of 18 members of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human 
rights) as well as the competence of the Human Rights Committee to consider their 
communications. In respective communications, individuals could emphasize their victim 
status, i.e. that the contracting state violated particular human rights as prescribed by the 
respective Covenants.11 Although respective Committee could and can only state its view to 
the contracting state and to the individual, this fact points out to the conclusion that particular 
attempts regarding introduction of international/supra-national procedural mechanisms in 
relation to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms have occurred prior to 
the Convention.   
 Of course, we cannot and must not be idealistic and conclude that the Declaration and 
the Covenants as well as the Human Rights Committee under the respective Optional Protocol  
have managed to erase all the violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
Cold War era – because such statement simply would not be true. The geo-politically 
extremely turbulent Cold War era from 1945 till 1990 (and later on the Balkan and Rwanda) 
introduced such atrocities and extreme violations of the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms again within state borders that can direct us to the conclusion that all proclaimed 
human rights and fundamental freedoms have never been either identified, proclaimed or 
protected. Nevertheless, this unfortunate reality doesn’t affect the conclusion that the 
Declaration as well as the Covenants had become the foundation of the modern human rights 
era – from the theoretical point of view. Practice on the other hand demands more continuous 
commitment and efforts of the international community to prevent any situation that can lead 
again to such grave breaches of human rights and fundamental freedoms like e.g. in Rwanda 
in 1994.  
 If we level down our analysis on a regional (European) level, we can conclude that the 
overwhelming universalization of human rights and fundamental freedoms after the World 
War II on a world-wide level did have effect on the regional level as well. On the European 
continent the Council of Europe, the oldest European international organization, introduced 
the Convention in 1950 in Rome, Italy. Like the Declaration and the Covenants, the 
                                                 
11 Official text of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can be found 
on the official website of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner: 
 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCCPR1.aspx (12.04.2019.) 
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Convention also contains a list of minimum human rights and fundamental freedoms that 
must be acknowledged to every person that resides or is located on the territory of a signatory 
state. But unlike the Declaration and/or the Covenants, the Convention on the other hand 
introduced the procedural legal mechanism that will ensure the protection of the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms on supra-national level. The Convention had in mind the fact that 
the responsibility for the realization of all international agreements (like the Convention) lies 
primarily on the contracting states which are subjects of the international law that can 
conclude international agreements. If the contracting states would be solely responsible for 
the realization and the protection of the guaranteed human rights and fundamental freedoms 
that have been set out in the Convention, there would always be a particular danger that 
contracting states violate human rights and fundamental freedoms which are guaranteed by 
the Convention. For that reason, special supra-national European Court for Human Rights 
(hereinafter: “The Court”) has been established with the main purpose to oversee the 
realization of the Convention’s guaranteed human rights and fundamental freedoms on the 
territory of the signatory states.12    
 The previous initial presentation set out in this introduction can lead to the conclusion 
that modern human rights and fundamental freedoms are primarily (but not solely) founded in 
the international law. This particular “brave” argument doesn’t mean, of course, that there 
were no human rights and fundamental freedoms before the Declaration or the Covenants or 
consequently the Convention. The legal history has already introduced thorough analysis of 
the e.g. Magna Charta Libertatum from 1215 or Habeas Corpus Act from 1679 and their 
meaning for the constitutionalism and the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Furthermore, we cannot close our scientific eyes and ignore the fact that the 
Constitution of the United States of America from 1789 with the Bill of Rights has become the 
model-constitution for new legal and political era. And finally, the impacts of the Great 
French Revolution and the  Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen from 1789 
are well-known to all legal scholars that analyze the concept of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in historical perspective.13 But nevertheless, for the purposes of our analysis all 
these historical legal sources will not be brought to our attention for further scientific 
                                                 
12 The path to the foundation of the special supra-national European Court of Human Rights has not been 
straightforward and it was the product of the multiannual work of the Council of Europe. More about the 
evolution of the Court from the European Commission of Human Rights to the Protocol 11 of the Convention 
can be found in the Chapter III of the dissertation.  
13 More about the importance of the above mentioned legal sources as well as about their importance in modern 
legal nad political era see Š. Kurtović: „Opća povijest prava i države; Stari i srednji vijek“, Sveučilište u 
Zagrebu, 2005, p. 182. and Š. Kurtović: „Opća povijest prava i države; Novi vijek“, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, 2005, 
p. 154. 
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examination in this dissertation. The reason for such methodology lies within the fact that all 
stated legal sources (like the Magna Charta Libertatum or the Declaration of the Rights of the 
Man and of the Citizen) have primarily been the product of internal struggles between various 
political groups but within the borders of one state (like the nobility, the Church, the King and 
the peasantry in revolutionary France or between the King John and the nobility in the 
middle-age England). With such characteristics these legal sources have primarily been for 
domestic use-only. Furthermore, the provisions and guarantees from stated legal sources were 
afterwards constitutionally transplanted to other legal and political systems and customized 
through-out the writings and criticism of various political and legal scholars but were not truly 
international like e.g. the Convention and/or the Covenants.   
In other words, the human rights and fundamental freedoms in modern era are not the 
product of just one period of time (1945, 1950 or 1966), or of the work of just one or two 
international organizations (the United Nations or the Council of Europe) or of the just one 
legal system (Continental (Civil) law or the Anglo-Saxon legal system) or of the just one 
(tragic) event in human history (World War I or World War II). The human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in contemporary time can rather be identified as the product of 
extremely difficult historical legal and political development with severe sociological, 
political and legal backgrounds which lasted for almost 800 years. And this development is 
still a continuous process to the present time given the fact that human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in modern era on domestic and international level tend to extend protection over 
other social groups on domestic and international level (like e.g. sexual minorities, 
immigrants etc.).  
 If we can conclude that the human rights and fundamental freedoms in contemporary 
legal science have become truly constitutionalized and internationalized (bearing in mind the 
proliferation of international agreements that ensure protection of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and the fact that the most important human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are nowadays protected on the constitutional level), we could also raise questions 
regarding the position of the contemporary constitutional law in respective process. The 
majority of the contemporary constitutional provisions of almost all (liberal) states world-
wide are related to the protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms. Protected on 
the constitutional level are e.g. right to life (within the states that have abolished the capital 
punishment in any case), freedom of expression and religion, protection of property, due 
process or right to a fair trial, habeas corpus, protection of privacy etc. All of these provisions 
are incorporated in relevant international agreements as well. So, there is convergent 
15 
 
grammatical and substantial content between constitutionally guaranteed human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and human rights and fundamental freedoms as prescribed in the 
majority of international agreements.14 This fact ensures introduction of particular common 
human rights standards across the globe from international and national point of view where 
human rights and fundamental freedoms are prescribed and applied in (more or less) similar 
substantial and procedural content. Second affiliated aspect in introduction of universal 
common human rights standard is conflict-solving aspect if such conflict arises between 
national and international legal sources. For that reason, theory of the constitutional law must 
on scientific level contribute with its analysis regarding foundation and impacts as well as the 
consequences of such similarity.  
 In particular, theory of the constitutional law needs to determine if there are any 
further theoretical and practical implications that evolve from the substantial similarity 
between human rights and fundamental freedoms as protected on international level and on 
domestic (constitutional) level. Furthermore, can we, on a constitutional level, determine 
some common characteristics between modern states that are devoted to the protection of the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and which states have implemented particular 
international agreements for the protection of the human rights, but have also on a national 
level ensured high protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms? And to 
conclude, is there any common substantial content within the constitutional law between 
analyzed states? Can this common substantial content, these minimum standards, if they 
actually exist, be identified as the particular constitutional law that exists between analyzed 
states that share particular common characteristics?  
 This dissertation will try to assess the answers on all stated questions on the basis of 
the Convention as well as on the Court’s case law. There are numerous reasons why the 
Convention is an appropriate legal mechanism for answering all mentioned questions. First of 
all, the Convention is multilateral international agreement that has been ratified by the 
Council of Europe member states. Implementation of the Convention in a domestic legal 
system is a basic condition for the state in order to join the Council of Europe. So, for the first 
reason, between all member states of the Council of Europe the Convention has full legal 
effect and is on force. The second reason lies within the fact that only the Convention has 
successfully installed the most effective supervisory mechanism over the violation of its 
                                                 
14 The theory of constitutional law usually identifies such convergence as the process of internationalization of 
constitutional law. See infra, p. 95.  
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provisions and supervision of the execution of all final judgements of the Court where 
violation of the Convention has been determined. Only the Convention as multilateral 
international agreement has established supra-national and special independent court that has 
developed its own autonomous judicial practice with binding effect of all final judgements. 
For that reason, the Covenants and all other international agreements cannot be subjected to 
our analysis because e.g. the Covenants did not introduce special supra-national court. The 
Covenants pursuant to the Optional Protocols have introduced the possibility to address the 
Human Rights Committee but procedural mechanisms according to the Convention are far 
more advanced than those prescribed by the Covenants. E.g. the Human Rights Committee 
cannot render its judgement regarding violation of particular human right prescribed by the 
Covenants. It can merely state its view to the state concerned and to the individual. On the 
other hand, final judgement of the Court has binding effect and concerned state must 
undertake all necessary measures in order to rectify determined violation. The third reason is 
presented with the fact that all judgements of the Court must be executed in contracting states 
and are not and cannot be subjected to any form of revision or to other domestic legal 
remedies. Simply, the execution of a final judgement of the Court is mandatory in contracting 
state and state must grant all possible remedies within their own procedural law that can 
correct infringed human right and fundamental freedom as guaranteed by the Convention and 
which infringement has been determined by the Court in special proceeding prescribed by the 
Convention itself. As it is with all significant legal systems, the system based upon the 
Convention is not idealistic and we can also identify particular reluctance as well as direct 
opposition to execute final judgement of the Court.15  
 Nevertheless, there is no other international agreement as the Convention which had 
such extensive influence on legal orders of contracting states. The Convention along its long 
years of practice has become the part of a political culture in all of the member states and the 
autonomous interpretation of the Convention in the practice of the Court assured its 
independent legal life as well as for the Convention’s rights and principles. 
 We have previously stated that the main aspect of the contemporary constitutional law 
lies within protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms. Human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are the underlying part of the relation between state and individuals as 
well as between state and social groups and this aspect assures the interest of the 
constitutional law. Given the fact that contemporary constitutional law directs and develops 
                                                 
15 For problems in execution of final judgements of the Court in the case of e.g. Russian Federation see: infra, p. 
246. 
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realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms, for that reason this doctoral analysis 
substantially is a part of the constitutional law theory.  
 With the Convention on force and throughout the independent judicial practice of the 
Court, constitutional law of contracting states has assumed a particular and extensive content. 
This particular content has been transformed to the domestic legal orders of the contracting 
states throughout the obligation of the contracting states on execution of all final judgments of 
the Court. This process, of course, has not been linear or straightforward and in modern time 
we can also witness some particular opposition of national courts in contracting states to 
implement legal understandings of the Court or even execute final judgement of the Court.16 
Nevertheless, this fact doesn’t have decisive or prevailing impact on the independent legal life 
of the Convention or the autonomous interpretation of the Convention that has been 
introduced by the Court or on the substantial effectiveness of the system in general.  
 The activism of the Court on the basis of autonomous interpretation of the Convention 
in “national” constitutional law of the contracting states had one exceptionally important 
consequence with positive and negative aspect. Positive aspect can be identified in the fact 
that the principle of autonomous interpretation in some cotnracting states introduced a process 
of harmonization between the constitutional and the Convention’s rights regarding the fact 
that the practice of (constitutional) courts in such member states rely on interpretation and 
legal understandings of the Court. Judicial activism and the principle of autonomous 
interpretation of the Convention’s rights has become that exogenous variable which unifies 
and combines national legal orders of the Council of Europe member states in the line of 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. With such argumentation we can 
conclude that the Convention itself also has supra-national or even supra-constitutional 
meaning.  
 Negative aspect is argued from the position that other member states of the Council of 
Europe (or their judicial systems) have not adjusted modern national practice and 
constitutional jurisprudence to the jurisprudence, legal understandings and practice of the 
Court. In such member states, national constitutional courts retain on national and 
autonomous interpretative methods of the national constitutions without stronger referral to 
the Convention and the interpretation of the Court. The interpretation and legal 
understandings of the Court have a secondary meaning and main legal source for the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms are national constitutional texts realized 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
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in the practice of national constitutional court(s). In such member states, the Convention 
doesn´t have a meaning of integrative, unifying factor regarding the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms on trans-national level.  
 Furthermore, the Court in its own practice did not just interpret Convention standards 
and freedoms but throughout its own activism the Court has built a content of the most 
important contemporary constitutional principles (such as the rule of law, legal security/legal 
certainty, the quality of law etc.). In that extent, the Court had high impact not only on the 
part of the constitutional law that regulates human rights and fundamental freedoms but also 
on the part that is inherently in the domain of pure theory of constitutional law and/or national 
constitutional law.  
 So, the purpose of this analysis and the main object of this dissertation is to highlight 
one new particular overview of the Convention’s impacts on national legal orders of 
contracting states within the theory of the constitutional law. In order to achieve designated 
goal this dissertation is divided in six main chapters. After this brief introductory overview, in 
this first chapter we will introduce fundamental questions of the dissertation (basic hypothesis 
and three main theses) which will be thoroughly examined. First chapter of the dissertation 
will also present methodology that will be used in order to confirm or deny (reject) basic 
hypothesis and other main thesis. And finally, in the first chapter we will explain what 
theoretical implications and main contribution we can expect in contemporary theory of the 
constitutional law if we succeed in our designated task. We will conclude the first chapter 
with presentation what similar scientific approaches have been used in order to assess impacts 
of the international agreements on the constitutional law itself as well as the critics of such 
approaches with detailed explanation why our approach in this matter is different and can be 
scientifically verified.  
 The second chapter will display theoretical framework of modern constitutional law as 
a legal discipline and a part of legal science. Within the second chapter the dissertation will 
point out substantial and procedural elements of the constitutional law according to the 
modern theory as well as the concept of the law on human rights as the constitutional law. We 
have already emphasized that human rights in modern time have been truly constitutionalized. 
Basic human rights are protected on the constitutional level which brings us to the unalienable 
relation between human rights (law) and the constitutional law in contemporary time. For 
reasons of methodological clarity, this relation in the context of our dissertation must be 
examined. In this second chapter we will also display present scientific approaches in 
internationalization of the contemporary constitutional law.  
19 
 
 The third chapter is devoted to the analysis of the Convention and its legal system. 
Given the fact that this dissertation will try to introduce one new overview of the 
Convention’s impact in the contemporary constitutional law of the Council of Europe member 
states, it is necessary from the methodological point of view to present the legal nature and 
history of the Convention, evolution of the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as prescribed by the Convention as well as the supervisory mechanism introduced 
by later Protocols to the Convention. Of course, from the historical point of view, supervisory 
mechanism of the human rights protection according to the Convention has been the product 
of numerous attempts, political sessions and negotiations between official states’ 
representatives within the Council of Europe. Given the fact that this dissertation will abstract 
and assess all common characteristics of the Convention’s impact in the constitutional law of 
the Council of Europe member states, it is absolutely necessary to analyze historical 
perspectives of the Convention’s evolution. Within historical perspectives and historical 
evolution of the Convention’s supervisory system lies the origin of our new overview of the 
Convention’s impacts in member states of the Council of Europe. After historical preview, 
further examinations of the Court’s significance in domestic or national judicial systems will 
be presented. In respective sub-chapter the dissertation will present the Court’s structure 
according to the Convention, the concept of pilot-judgements as the one new form of the 
Court’s actions and solutions in the member states regarding executions of the judgements of 
the Court in national legal systems.  
 On the foundation of the analyses systematically presented in second and third 
chapter, the fourth chapter will provide case-law analysis within the national legal orders of 
six member states of the Council of Europe: the Republic of Slovenia, the Republic of 
Croatia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Republic of France and 
the United Kingdom. With this methodological approach this dissertation will combine and 
associate one new theoretical view of the Convention’s implications with its realization in 
judicial practice of the Council of Europe member states or in their legislative. After our 
analysis in second and third chapter we will immediately subject our main hypothesis and 
other main thesis to practical verification in order to examine does our new theoretical 
overview of the Convention’s impacts in national constitutional legal order of the Council of 
Europe member states have any practical implications.  
 After the case-law analysis in the fourth chapter, the fifth chapter is devoted to 
analyzing substantial and procedural elements of the presented new theoretical concept of the 
Convention’s impacts in contemporary constitutional law. Within this chapter, the analysis 
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will present the concept of the particular constitutional law and the role of the Court in 
introduction of respective concept. Given the fact that this dissertation will present one new 
criterion of the Council of Europe member states categorization, the fifth chapter will also 
present the concept of the activist and national model of categorization. Furthermore, within 
the fifth chapter theoretical concept of the particular constitutional law will be subjected to the 
applicability analysis within additional universal (regional) human rights systems with similar 
characteristics as the system based upon the Convention (the European Union, the 
Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity). In the Conclusion, 
which will be the final chapter of the dissertation, brief overview of the dissertation will be 
presented with all main accents. After one more systematic presentation and on the foundation 
of all presented facts that are scientific verifiable in the contemporary scientific literature, the 
reasons for confirmation and/or rejection of basic hypothesis and other main thesis will be 
presented. 
 
1.2. Fundamental questions of the dissertation 
 
From the theory of the constitutional law we know that the constitutional law is a 
fundamental legal branch within a certain state. All other legal branches (such as civil law, 
criminal law, procedural law, administrative law etc.) derive from the constitutional law. The 
constitutional law sets out margins for the government and its possibility for apprehension to 
the private sphere or property of every individual that resides on the territory of a particular 
state. From the practical point of view, constitutions present the main objective for the 
analysis in the constitutional law and are a basic legal source within one state with ultimate 
legal power. All other legal sources that are produced by the legislature or the executive must 
be in the conformity with the constitution. In nearly all modern liberal states constitutions 
provide special constitutional court that renders decision regarding conformity of majority 
legal acts with the constitution. In cases where constitutional courts as special constitutional 
bodies are not constituted, Supreme Court or other specially constituted body in the 
constitution (e.g. the Constitutional Council in the Republic of France) has the power to 
render its decision in the process of abstract review of particular legislative act regarding its  
conformity with the constitution.  
In the process of passing any judgement, judicial branch must always be aware and 
consider the provisions of the constitution as the ultimate legal source for any legal dispute or 
other legal situation that needs to be resolved. If particular human right and fundamental 
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freedom should be infringed by the court in particular (civil, criminal, administrative or other) 
legal proceeding, modern constitutions commonly provide one final, extraordinary and special 
legal remedy (constitutional complaint) that can lead to the revision of a final court’s decision 
should violation of constitutionally guaranteed human right or fundamental freedom be 
determined by the constitutional court.  
These common characteristics of the constitutional law as a special legal branch within 
one state point out to one more basic characteristic of the constitutional law – that it is 
dominantly national legal branch without stronger influences of exogenous factors (like 
example the international law or (political) influences of other states). Of course, numerous 
modern states in the process of gaining independence have adjusted their constitutional 
solutions to the solutions of older, prominent states and have accepted numerous solutions 
from their constitutional texts.17  
If we level down our analysis from global point of view to the particular national 
characteristics we can conclude that the substantial content of literally all contemporary 
constitutional principles which have been written in the constitution, borrowed or transplanted  
from other constitutional legal orders (like example the concept of sovereignty, the concept of 
the rule of law, the principle of equality, the freedom of speech, protection of property, 
freedom of entrepreneurship) was built and evolved only in the practice of a national 
constitutional court. This argument can rather be self-explanatory given the fact that each 
society have been built according to its own historical, sociological, political, economic and 
legal background. And from that point of view constitutional courts have developed content 
and principles of the constitutional order but always within one state with the referral to the 
historical, political and other (domestic) origins. Lately we can witness situations where 
constitutional court of one particular state considers decisions and reasoning of other, 
(European), “model” constitutional court.18 But this process is on voluntary ground and it is 
                                                 
17 Like e.g. in the Republic of Croatia where the Constitution of the Republic of France from 1958 (the 
Constitution of the Fifth Republic) has become the model for the first modern Croatian, so-called the 
„Christmas“ Constitution of December 22nd, 1990. On the other part of the world the Constitution of the United 
States of America was a model Constitution for numerous states in Latin America (especially the concept of 
presidential government).  
18 This has been the case in e.g. the Republic of Croatia where the Constitutional Court in its practice 
emphasized on numerous occasions the practice of the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in related constitutional questions. E.g. in the Decision No. U-IP-3820/2009, U-IP-3826/2009 and 
others of November 17th, 2009 with separate opinion and the Appendix I to the Decision, Croatian Constitutional 
Court has emphasized that the practice of the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany 
can be considered as the practice with „...the universal meaning regarding all questions related to the tax policy 
in social state as well as for all questions related to the obligations of the legislature in realization of the tax 
equality principle and justice.“ The respective Decision has been published and is available in Official Gazzette 
No. 143/2009 of December 1st, 2009.  
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up to the constitutional court itself whether particular decision would be founded on 
constitutional reasoning “borrowed” from practice of other constitutional court or not.  
The other fact that brings our closer attention is the process that can be identified in 
the practice of particular constitutional courts of the Council of Europe member states where 
constitutional courts rely their practice on legal understandings and the practice of the Court. 
That process on the other hand is not on the voluntary ground given the fact that all 
judgements of the Court must be carried out in the signatory state where infringement of the 
Convention guaranteed human right has been determined by the Court. This fact (execution of 
all final judgements of the Court) presents the obligation of the contracting state under the 
Convention. With small steps in the evolution of human rights law (but also with giant leaps), 
the legal understandings and the practice of the Court has entered in common judicial practice 
of the particular Council of Europe’s member states. Respective judicial practice of the Court 
is something that is considered in matters that are brought before the highest courts of the 
Council of Europe member states. Although the respective practice is not something that 
should be considered as binding and always applicable in all possible cases that occur before a 
constitutional (or other) court of the Council of Europe member states, we can easily witness 
that the practice of the Court is in modern time something that is at least considered almost as 
the particular source of law.19 Furthermore, normative analysis and the comparison between 
the contemporary constitutional texts and the Convention indicate strong grammatical 
similarity between human rights and fundamental freedoms in both legal sources.  
When we combine those facts with the fact that final judgements of the Court need to 
be carried out in national legal system, four affiliated hypotheses can be presented for further 
scientific examination: 
 
Basic hypothesis: 
Contemporary constitutional law doesn’t have an exclusive national character given the 
fact that the principles as well as the content of the constitutional norms can have a 
trans-national character.  
 
As it has been previously stated, the common characteristic of the constitutional law is 
dominantly national orientation. Principles and norms of the constitutional law (e.g. the rule 
of law, due process, principle of equality etc.) have been evolved almost only within the 
                                                 
19 See infra, Chapter IV of the dissertation.  
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borders of one state or one national legal system or one framer of the constitution or one 
judicial system or particular national jurisprudence. The scholars and the science of the 
constitutional law were not, on the other hand, limited with borders and have been exchanging 
the ideas and particular different views on all matters related to the constitutional law until 
this day.  
  But on the other hand, the exact written or unwritten provision(s) of the constitution 
in particular cases were subjected to the interpretation, in ultima linea, of the constitutional 
court and the constitutional court as a special constitutional body empowered with the 
competence prescribed by the constitution itself, was called to interpret and apply the specific 
constitutional provisions and principles in social reality of particular state. In that process of 
interpretation and application, only written or unwritten provisions of national constitution 
and interpretation and legal understandings of national constitutional court was deemed as 
appropriate (legal) source in order to resolve particular dispute. Other provisions of law or the 
judicial practice of the foreign court could be presented in particular cases on strictly 
voluntary basics.  
 But with the Convention, the Court and the obligation of signatory states to carry out 
final judgements of the Court such “classical” national constitutional jurisprudence have 
changed, and legal understandings of the Court have become significant legal source in the 
jurisprudence of signatory states. The Court in its long years of practice extended 
interpretation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms over the limits of national 
constitutional courts and with that fact constitutional law of the Council of Europe member 
states has assumed a particular and rather extensive content. This process could be started 
given the fact that human rights and fundamental freedoms as guaranteed by the 
contemporary constitutional texts have been grammatically and normatively similar (if not 
even identical) with the human rights and fundamental freedoms as prescribed by the 
Convention. For that reason, we can witness a certain parallelism of human rights protection 
in member states of the Council of Europe.20 First of all, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are protected with the constitution in the Council of Europe member states and 
national procedural law prescribes domestic (ordinary and/or extraordinary) legal remedies 
                                                 
20 This concept of parallel protection must be considered only from the substantial point of view. From the 
procedural point of view we can not argue about the existence of parallel protection given the fact that final 
decision of the national constitututional court of particular member state is a basic assumption for procedure 
before the Court. All petitioners must first exhaust all domestic legal remedies and after that they can take their 
case to the Court. From the procedural point of view there is no parallel system (with the meaning that such 
parallel systems would be going on side by side), but from substantial point of view there is (with the meaning 
that there are separate legal sources that grants protection of particular human rights and fundamental freedoms).  
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for their protection. But on the second level, if national legal remedies should fail to protect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, the Convention presents special, international legal 
remedy (application) in order to give one last attempt to protect that same human rights and 
fundamental freedoms which are in this case guaranteed by the Convention. In all particular 
cases where the Court determines violation of a particular human right and/or fundamental 
freedom guaranteed by the Convention that will in the same time mean that national 
constitutional court of the Council of Europe member state failed to protect (in most cases) 
that same right that has been guaranteed by the national constitution. For that reason, we can 
(carefully) say that national constitutional courts of the Council of Europe member states and 
the Court have same competence (protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms 
which are substantially similar if not even identical) but within different (rules of) procedure 
and with different governing law and with different level of protection (domestic and 
international).  
 This concept of domestic and international protection on the basis of the Convention 
and substantial similarity between human rights and fundamental freedoms as prescribed by 
the national constitutions and the Convention could be brought into danger if there would be 
no prescribed solutions how to resolve “conflict” between national constitutional court and 
the Court.21 If there were no prescribed solutions should such conflict arise, the principle of 
national sovereignty would lead to the conclusion that the decision of the national 
constitutional court should be considered as final and ultimately enforceable. In that case, all 
provisions of the Convention would stay merely as pure letter on paper without any 
possibility for their realization. For that reason, the Convention under the Article 46 par. 1 
contains expressive provision that all final judgements of the Court will have binding force 
and that all signatory states will have the obligation to execute final judgement of the Court.22  
 If we can conclude that the final judgement of the Court will have a prevailing effect 
in all cases where national constitutional court have denied applicants’ (constitutional) 
complaints for the protection of particular human right and fundamental freedom, than it can 
also be concluded that the Court’s findings and the interpretation as well as the legal 
understandings regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms as prescribed by the 
                                                 
21 Like e.g. in case where national constitutional court would reject constitutional complaint of a particular 
applicant that petitioned to the constitutional court for the violation of the due process in previous stages of 
judicial proceeding before regular court(s), but the Court on the ground of application under the Convention 
determines that violation of the due process under the Convention has been committed.  
22 „The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they 
are parties.“ – official text of the Convention as amended by Protocols No. 11 and 14 and supplemented by 
Protocols No. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13 and 16 is available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 
(12.04.2019.) 
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Convention will be authoritative guidelines for national constitutional courts in all future 
cases with similar circumstances of the case. These guidelines for national constitutional 
courts (but as well as for all other courts in domestic judicial system and executive and 
legislative part of government) presented by the Court in certain case provide conclusion that 
these guidelines must in certain point of time become grounds for interpretation of domestic 
constitutional human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
This rather brave argument must immediately be levelled down with the fact that the 
process of execution of the Courts judgement in domestic legal order is anything but 
straightforward and that this process depends upon numerous (domestic) legal and political 
factors. Furthermore, the process of execution of all final judgements of the Court depends on 
the constitutional and legislative provisions of particular contracting state. As it will be 
presented later in the dissertation, contracting states are not always overwhelmed with the 
Court’s decision in particular cases where the Court determined that contracting state violated 
applicant’s particular human right or fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Convention.  
Nevertheless, this fact does not have the impact on the process which is in our main 
focus: the process of evolution of human rights and fundamental freedoms which are 
inalienable parts of the constitutional law and which process of evolution is performed 
transnationally on the basis of the judicial practice of the Court. Besides this transnational 
evolution of human rights and fundamental freedoms on the basis of grammatical similarity 
between constitutional and the Convention’s human rights and fundamental freedoms, the 
practice of the Court took into consideration and argued about particular fundamental 
constitutional principles which until this revolutionary practice of the Court had only 
domestic characteristic and substantial content. For example, the concept of the rule of law 
which has been from the beginning of the modern constitutionality one of the main principles 
of new political (liberal) and constitutional legal era, has been built solely in the practice of 
national constitutional courts. But on the other hand we can witness that modern judicial 
practice of the Court is building all required (substantial and procedural) legal elements of 
respective concept in its own practice and demands from national judicial systems to 
implement such understandings in national jurisprudence in order to protect the Convention.23 
So to repeat, this process of implementation is anything but straightforward and we can also 
witness particular opposition of national constitutional courts to implement understandings of 
the Court which will also be presented later in the dissertation. 
                                                 
23 In relation to the Federal Republic of Germany see: infra p. 197 – 202.  
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But for the purposes of our analysis this opposition is not in our primary focus but has 
to be pointed out as fact. Our main focus is to identify the process of transnational evolution 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms which are an inalienable part of the contemporary 
constitutional law on the basis of judicial activism of one supra-national judicial body that has 
been established with one particular international agreement. For that reason, we are 
presenting this basic hypothesis for further methodological and scientific examination.  
Other questions that need to be answered for the reasons of methodological clarity are 
as follows: why exactly this hypothesis? Why now? As it has been previously stated, modern 
judicial practice of the Court regarding interpretation of the Convention has exceeded the 
limits of the Court itself and had numerous impacts on legislative and judicial systems as well 
as on constitutional interpretation within the Council of Europe member states. This process 
was possible regarding three special facts: 
 
a) the fact that human rights and fundamental freedoms in contemporary time are 
grammatically and normatively similar (if not even identical) in the majority of constitutional 
texts worldwide (and of course in the majority of the Council of Europe member states) and in 
the Convention; 
b) the fact that only a system based on the Convention introduced special supra-national 
judicial body to which particular individual(s) can address his/her application stating that 
violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Convention has been 
committed by the contracting state;  
c) the fact that the Convention expressively states the obligation of contracting states to 
execute the final judgement of the Court in domestic legal order.  
 
From a comparative perspective we believe that we can identify and scientifically 
examine the existence of a special process, the inception of unification or harmonization of 
constitutional and the Convention’s human rights and fundamental freedoms from the 
substantial point of view. The consequence of this special process on the other hand is 
transnational substantial content of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Given the fact 
that the Court did not only interpret the substantial content of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as prescribed by the Convention but also the content of the most important 
contemporary constitutional principles (e.g. the rule of law, the principle of equality etc.), we 
can also state that the constitutional law of the Council of Europe member states has assumed 
particular extensive content throughout the judicial practice of the Court. If we abstract all 
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common characteristic of such (extensive) content, we are able to present and identify those 
common characteristics as the particular (regional) constitutional law.24  
 From a historical point of view (which brings us to the answer on why now question), 
the judicial practice of the Court in nowadays has become very significant for judicial systems 
of nearly all of the Council of Europe member states. In the past decades the Court’s practice 
has evolved regarding numerous constitutional questions and answers on those questions from 
the Court’s point of view are important legal source for all scholars. The Court has developed 
its own judicial practice and understandings for nearly all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and this level of developed judicial practice allows us to assess further impacts of 
such autonomous practice of the Court and the Convention itself in contemporary time.25 
Given the fact that the practice of the Court is well developed in nowadays and that legal 
understandings of the Court are becoming significant authoritative source for all domestic 
relevant constitutional questions in signatory states, this level of development today allows us 
to bring the possibility of transnational construction of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the Council of Europe member states throughout the practice of the Court to 
closer scientific examination. On the other hand, if the practice of the Court did actually 
extend the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms over the cases that usually 
have not been protected by the constitutional courts of the signatory states, this fact brings us 
to the conclusion that the constitutional law in signatory states has assumed particular and 
extensive content. If we abstract this particular and extensive content and examine it with the 
methodology of the constitutional law, we can address this content as the particular 
(regional) constitutional law.  
 So, for all stated reasons, the basic hypothesis which we are presenting here for further 
scientific examination in this dissertation in its integral form is as follows: 
 
                                                 
24 More about this new concept (particular constitutional law) is analyzed in Chapter V of the dissertation.  
25 Analysis regarding impacts of the Court's judgements and the Convention in domestic legal orders of member 
states is extensive. See e.g.: D. Anagnostou, A. Mungiu-Pippidi: „Domestic Implementation of Human Rights 
Judgments in Europe: Legal Infrastructure and Government Effectiveness Matter“, The European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 25., No. 1 (2014), p. 205 – 227, available at: http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/25/1/2483.pdf  
(12.04.2019.). 
Also M. Andenas, E. Bjorge: „The External Effects of National ECHR Judgements“, Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 07/12, available at:  
http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/JMWP07AndenasandBjorge.pdf (12.04.2019.). 
Excellent in depth analysis regarding position of the Court in national and global context can be found in: A. 
Føllesdal, B. Peters, G. Ulfstein (ed.): „Constituting Europe – The European Court of Human Rights in a 
National, European and Global Context“, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 25 – 62, 181 – 263 and 334 – 
389. 
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Contemporary constitutional law doesn’t have an exclusive national character given the fact 
that the principles as well as the content of the constitutional norms can have a trans-national 
character. This hypothesis can be proved throughout the existence of particular (regional) 
constitutional law which exists between those Council of Europe member states that rely their 
constitutional jurisprudence on legal understandings and argumentations of the European 
court.   
 
Main thesis #1  
Council of Europe member states can be classified according to one new criterion: level 
of harmonization with the judicial practice of the Court 
 
 This main thesis is a consequent fact of the basic hypothesis as stated above. As we 
have stated previously, the substantial content of the constitutional law can be constructed 
transnationally on the basis of the Court’s practice. We have also stated that not all of the 
Council of Europe member states (and their judicial systems) are overwhelmed with findings 
and legal understandings of the Court in particular cases and that we can witness particular 
opposition of national courts as well on enforcing final judgement of the Court.  
But in this case, if we accept the fact that the judicial systems of the Council of Europe 
member states and their legislature are considering legal understandings of the Court than we 
also have to assess on what particular level national judicial systems of the Council of Europe 
member states and their legislature are harmonized with the legal understandings of the Court. 
It needs to be considered that level of harmonization should not be considered mathematically 
with introduction of particular socio-econometric model. We will not introduce particular 
mathematical model or particular scale model from 1 to 10 where 10 will be total 
harmonization with the Court’s practice and 1 no harmonization whatsoever. This 
econometric approach in such particular and specific subject is not even possible given the 
fact that there are numerous and extremely different characteristics between the Council of 
Europe member states that prevent such econometric approach.26 
For that reason, we will rather limit our analysis in this question starting with the 
analysis of the harmonization concept itself. The harmonization within its basic meaning 
                                                 
26 E.g. legislative solution regarding execution of the final Court's judgement, average time for execution of the 
Court's judgement in domestic legal order, level of influence of the Court's legal understandings on all courts in 
domestic judicial system in particular cases etc. All this variables are throughout the Council of Europe member 
states extremely heterogenous and for that reason we believe that socio-econometric model in above stated 
concept in this time is still unaimaginable.  
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presents a certain process. If it really is a process, than from a logical point of view it must 
have a certain starting and ending point.27 The harmonization process in law, generally 
speaking, presents a process where different legal solutions under the particular internal or 
external influence(s)28 are becoming similar or (even) identical (ultimately unified in same 
legal solution) through particular time so that previously determined legal differences or 
distinctions on the end of that process are not significant any more.29  
In our case and for the purposes of our analysis, the harmonization process with the 
practice of the Court needs to be considered only on an initial level, i.e. can we identify that 
the practice of the Court is even considered as a source of law in particular proceedings before 
the (constitutional) courts of the Council of Europe member states or in legislature. If it is 
considered than we can also identify our starting point of the harmonization process and 
emphasize that the respective process has begun. If this respective process has really begun 
within the Council of Europe member states and their judicial and legislative practice, then 
this main thesis can be used as a control thesis of our basic hypothesis as stated above. The 
construction of particular constitutional law as a theoretical concept within the Council of 
Europe member states can be justified only if we can determine that harmonization process 
has actually begun with the meaning that legal understandings and positions of the Court 
regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms are subjected to the analysis of 
applicability by the (constitutional) courts of the Council of Europe member states or as 
authoritative guidelines in legislation procedure or in various legislative and jurisprudential 
adjustments after final judgement of the Court has been rendered in certain case.  
From pure normative point of view, ratification of the Convention in particular 
Council of Europe member state is actually a starting point of the harmonization process. 
With the ratification process particular member state accepts its new position in one 
particularly higher human rights system with supranational judicial authority that can render 
its binding judgements which must be fully and properly executed in domestic legal system. 
For that reason, finalization of domestic ratification procedure with incorporation of the 
Convention in domestic legal system is nominally, formally and normatively starting point of 
                                                 
27 Like example in the criminal procedure law where the process against the defendant also have particular 
starting point (e.g. starting of a investigation by the competent organ of the state in order to determine has 
criminal offense been committed or not) and ending point (e.g. final judgement of the criminal court).  
28 Where appearance of such influences present starting point of harmonization process.  
29 Here we can state as an example the harmonization process that have occured in all European Union member 
states prior to their accession to the European Union. E.g. the Republic of Croatia prior to the accession to the 
European Union underwent severe adjustment of its legal system to the legal solutions of the European Union in 
all relevant matter. In this process the Republic of Croatia had to implement various legal solutions from 
European public law in order to access the European Union.    
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the harmonization process. Only from that point forward, application under the provisions of 
the Convention is possible in order for individuals to bring their cases before the Court for 
thorough examination of all factual and legal circumstances of the case. If the Court finds 
violation of the Convention, final judgement will be rendered to the parties concerned in 
which legal understandings of the Court regarding the Convention will also be emphasized 
and reasoned. These legal understandings of the Court regarding human rights and 
fundamental freedoms throughout the process of execution of final judgements overflow in 
domestic legal order and are becoming the ground for interpretation and realization of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms within the Council of Europe member states and their 
national (legal) borders.  
From substantiall point of view, harmonization process is directly related to the 
openness of domestic legal system to the other exogenous legal and political factors which 
govern and develop universal human rights legal framework. Secondly, harmonization 
process is also related to the Court’s activism and execution of final judgements of the Court 
in domestic legal systems. In order to harmonize one variable to another we need different 
positions or different approaches in one particular matter. The Court is also extremely 
important in the harmonization process given the fact that the Court gives input to the new 
interpretation of actual existing human rights and fundamental freedoms. In the end, the 
Contracting parties are responsible for the execution of a final judgement of the Court in 
domestic legal order in which process the member states can choose between varieties of 
methods for implementation of final judgements. For this reason, harmonization process has 
three conditions in order to be fully functional. First of all, particular state must ratify the 
Convention and incorporate it in domestic legal order. With this first condition the 
Convention enters in domestic legal order and the Court can hold jurisdiction over violation 
of the Convention’s provisions in particular state. Second of all, there must be substantial 
differences between domestic legislative and judicial authority and the Court over 
interpretation of human right or fundamental freedom. And finally, in the process of execution 
of final judgement domestic authorities must harmonize its practice with legal understandings 
of the Court in a manner which is within the Convention’s framework as ruled by the Court. 
For all these reasons we can argue that there is a shared responsibility between the Court and 
domestic authorities for evolution of human rights framework. All domestic authorities must 
mutually interact and continuously develop their dialogue in area of protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. This has been clearly pointed out in the Copenhagen 
Declaration after High Level Conference meeting in Copenhagen on April 12th and 13th 2018 
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where the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe declared that the concept of 
shared responsibility is “…the link between the role of the Court and the States Parties. This 
is vital to the proper functioning of the Convention system and, as the ultimate goal, the more 
effective protection of human rights in Europe.”30 The concept of shared responsibility must 
also be effective which implies “…a constructive and continuous dialogue between the States 
Parties and the Court on their respective roles in the implementation and development of the 
Convention system, including the Court's development of the rights and obligations set out in 
the Convention.”31 
It is clear that respective harmonization process is multilayered and depends on 
numerous conditions, among which are finalization of ratification procedure in domestic 
legislative body, general openness to the exogenous legal and political factors in international 
legal and political arena, proper and effective execution process in domestic legal system and 
future compliance with the Court’s jurisprudence in similar legal matter in continuous 
interaction with the Court.  
Nevertheless, this doesn’t mean that the Council of Europe member states cannot be 
categorized within this criterion (level of harmonization). As we have previously stated, the 
level of harmonization as an operating term in this dissertation and within this thesis should 
be considered only as the inception of overflow of the Court’s legal understandings in the 
(constitutional) jurisprudence of the Council of Europe member states and legislature. If we 
can scientifically examine and present verifiable evidences that such inception has occurred in 
the jurisprudence of (maybe not all but) particular Council of Europe member states, then we 
have well founded theoretical ground for further development of our main concept (particular 
constitutional law). And on the other hand, if in contemporary time we can witness that 
(constitutional) jurisprudence of particular member states of the Council of Europe rely more 
or less on legal understandings of the Court, than it is also possible to systematically 
categorize the Council of Europe member states according to this criterion (inception of 
harmonization process). But this new model in which we can categorize the Council of 
Europe member states cannot be vertical (with scales and levels where e.g. level 10 would be 
total harmonization with the Court’s practice and level 1 no harmonization whatsoever as 
mentioned above) but it can be horizontal. This new model of the Council of Europe member 
states categorization from the inception point of view (of the harmonization process) can be 
                                                 
30 Copenhagen Declaration, Art. 6., available at: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Copenhagen_Declaration_ENG.pdf (12.04.2019.) 
31 Ibid, Art. 33. 
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pictured not as a scale with particular levels (what would be in vertical model) but as a line 
with two opposite ends (horizontal). In this horizontal model of categorization on the one end 
of the line is a so-called activist position and on the other end of the line is a so-called 
national position. Respective model will be examined and presented in Chapter V of the 
dissertation.  
The classification of the Council of Europe member states according to this criterion 
(the inception of the level of harmonization with the Court’s judicial practice and legal 
understandings on horizontal level) is considered only on an initial level and within this main 
thesis we will assess if this harmonization process had actually begun. Again, the term level of 
harmonization must not be considered as a concept which will consist of particular levels or 
scales of harmonization where the Council of Europe member states and their constitutional 
jurisprudence as well as their legislature should be positioned.  
Furthermore, we cannot expect that virtually all jurisprudence and legislature of the 
Council of Europe member states is harmonized with the Courts findings and legal 
understandings because that would mean that harmonization process is practically over and 
that there is nothing to harmonize anymore. We have to keep realistic approach and also 
consider the fact that domestic, national jurisprudences are not even harmonized with the 
jurisprudence of domestic (supreme or constitutional) courts. Domestic judicial practice is 
extremely heterogeneous and there are different legislative solutions implemented in practice 
in order to secure identical applications of particular legal solutions in other cases with similar 
or identical circumstances of the case.32     
Such optimistic approach where all domestic jurisprudence of any state is harmonized 
with the legal understandings of a highest court in domestic judicial pyramid and where all 
legal understandings of a highest court are harmonized and applied strictly in conformity with 
the constitution and the Convention as presented in the practice of the constitutional court and 
the Court in present time is simply not possible and it is unsure if it ever will be (such reality 
would be considered as an ideal-type). For that reason, we must take our analysis to the 
beginning and assess if the harmonization process had actually begun. If we will be able to 
identify that legal understandings and practice of the Court is something that is considered in 
                                                 
32 In the Republic of Croatia the Litigation Act (Official Gazzette No. 53/91., 91/92., 58/93., 112/99., 88/01., 
117/03., 88/05., 02/07., 84/08., 123/08., 57/11., 148/11., 25/13. and 89/14.) prescribes so-called extraordinary 
revision of a final judgement as special and extraordinary legal remedy in cases where appeal court has deviated 
from the practice without any explanation or where two appeal courts in regular judicial system have different 
understanding regarding same legislative provision (Art. 382 par. 2 of the Litigation Act). In such cases a highest 
court in particular judicial system (which is regularly the supreme court) must render its decision in order to 
secure harmonized application of law which is also one of the substantial elements of the constitutional principle 
of the rule of law.  
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national jurisprudence of the Council of Europe member states than we can easily determine 
that respective process has actually begun and is taking particular effect. As it has been 
previously emphasized, this identification of inception of respective process is the control 
thesis for our basic hypothesis regarding trans-national construction of particular 
constitutional law.  
But nevertheless, this assessment cannot stay merely on the identification that 
harmonization process did actually begin. If we can successfully identify and confirm that 
respective harmonization process has begun than we also have to consider what particular 
implications of such harmonization process are on a theoretical level. If there is a particular 
external international judicial factor that imposes particular effect on domestic judicial system 
and legislature of the Council of Europe member states than we also have to assess the 
possibility to categorize the respective member states according to the harmonization criterion 
from the inception point of view.  
 In order to systematically present the main substantial content of respective thesis 
which will be examined in the dissertation we can emphasize that: 
 
a) the concept of harmonization between domestic (constitutional) jurisprudence of the 
Council of Europe member states and the Court’s practice fundamentally presents a process; 
b) in an ideal-type all jurisprudence and legal understandings of all courts in judicial system 
of all member states would be identical with the jurisprudence and legal understandings of the 
Court – which is unimaginable from the present point of view and question is will this ever be 
possible; 
c) in this dissertation we will assess the inception of the harmonization process in selected 
member states; 
d) verification of inception of the harmonization process brings out the possibility of one new 
categorization of the Council of Europe member states on horizontal level. 
 
 Finally, we also have to note that impacts of the Court’s legal understandings have not 
been presented only in judicial practice of the Council of Europe member states. The 
legislature of the Council of Europe member states had also considered on numerous 
occasions the legal understandings of the Court regarding interpretation of particular human 
right or fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Convention in legislation process. Such 
considerations of the Court’s legal understandings can be determined in the process of 
national legislative and jurisprudential adjustments after final judgement of the Court against 
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respective state as the respondent state has been rendered. For this reason, impacts of the 
Court’s legal understandings must be and can be analyzed not only from the judicial point of 
view but also from the legislative point of view. If we can verify that the harmonization 
process has begun from the legislative point of view also, this fact ensures complete 
verification of new theoretical concept. In order to secure complete examination of basic 
hypothesis and main thesis, the legislature of analyzed states will also be subjected to the 
analysis regarding harmonization. 
 
Main thesis #2 
Introduction of this new theoretical concept as stated in basic hypothesis is possible 
considering organization of the Convention’s supervisory system (principle of 
subsidiarity, autonomous interpretation of the Convention rights and principles as well 
as the (international) obligation of member state to carry out final judgment of the 
Court 
 
 Given the fact that contemporary supervisory system according to the Convention is 
on force for approximately 20 years (after Protocol No. 11 came into force) and that the Court 
(slowly but effectively) is developing its own practice regarding human rights and 
fundamental freedoms that are protected by the Convention itself, it was expected that the 
system based on the Convention will develop its own legal life and legal perspectives on 
contemporary human rights and fundamental freedoms. As constitutional courts are 
developing their own practice regarding all constitutional questions (the substantial and 
procedural content of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and also the main principles 
of domestic constitutional order) in one particular state, so has the Court developed its own 
judicial practice regarding all questions related to the Convention. 
 For reasons of effectivity there was logical and practical obligation to position the 
Court’s final judgements in all cases where the Court has determined violation of certain 
provision of the Convention. As it has been stated above, to ensure that the Convention’s 
human rights and fundamental freedoms will not stay just as pure letter on the paper, the 
Convention implemented obligation of contracting states to execute all final judgements of 
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the Court in domestic legal order and also to undertake all legislative actions that are 
necessary to carry out final judgement of the Court.33  
 The supervisory system according to the Convention has evolved from its foundation 
and in nowadays the system lies on particular fundamental principles that have been 
developed by the Court itself in its practice.  
 In this moment we will point out particular principles that are essential for 
introduction of our main (basic) hypothesis. First of all, the principle of autonomous 
interpretation of the Convention is basic condition for the Court to develop its own and 
independent judicial practice. In all proceedings before the Court only the Court possesses the 
ultimate competence to interpret and apply relevant provisions of the Convention according to 
the determined circumstances of the case. The Court is not bind upon to any procedural or 
substantial provision of (domestic) law although usually considers all relevant (domestic) 
legal sources in order to determine all actual circumstances of the case. The Convention in 
proceedings before the Court presents the ultimate substantial legal source in order to 
determine violation of the Convention. If the Convention really presents the ultimate 
substantial legal source in proceedings before the Court where the Court itself autonomously 
interprets and applies the Convention, then it also, argumentum a fortiori, can be expected 
that the Court will have and will develop its own legal understanding regarding provisions of 
the Convention. If the Court has developed (and is developing) its own legal understandings 
and interpretation of substantial content regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms 
which are protected by the Convention itself (and which human rights are in the same time 
grammatically and normatively very similar to the constitutional rights and fundamental 
freedoms) than it can be considered that these legal understandings throughout the process of 
execution of final judgement of the Court will become a significant legal source for domestic 
courts in all future cases with similar circumstances of the case. This legal source in all future 
cases will have unifying meaning for all the Council of Europe member states and their 
judicial systems and will become common variable that connects all judicial systems of the 
Council of Europe member states. That common variable with its substantial content can be 
identified as the particular constitutional law. For that reason, the principle of the autonomous 
interpretation of the Convention’s provisions is one of basic aspect for previously stated basic 
hypothesis.  
                                                 
33 E.g. prescribe additional (extraordinary) legal remedies in domestic procedural law such as motion on retrial 
where legal understandings of the Court regarding violation of the Convention shall be binding for all domestic 
courts in such new proceeding.  
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 The other fundamental principle of the supervisory system as presented by the 
Convention is the principle of subsidiarity. The respective principle determines that the 
protection of the Convention’s provisions lies primarily on the Council of Europe member 
states and their judicial systems. The contracting states must undertake all actions in order to 
secure the Convention’s provisions. Judicial system of all signatory states must consider in 
particular judicial proceeding relevant provisions of the Convention as a source of law. This 
principle derives from the very legal nature of the Convention – multilateral international 
agreement. Given the fact that the Convention is a multilateral international agreement, it is 
the obligation of the contracting states under the provisions of the Convention (as well as 
under the provisions of the The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) to ensure its 
protection in their legal system.34 But should all domestic legal remedies fail to protect 
provisions of the Convention, the Court as supra-national instance will provide protection of a 
violated human right(s) and fundamental freedom(s). Further (international) obligation of the 
contracting states, as it has been previously noted, is to ensure execution of all final 
judgements of the Court in domestic legal system and grant determined compensation if such 
compensation should be awarded to the applicant in final judgement of the Court. 
 One of the basic assumptions to initiate the proceeding before the Court under the 
provisions of the Convention is previous exhaustion of all domestic legal remedies. In general 
terms this will regularly be final decision of a constitutional court. An individual applicant can 
address to the Court with his/her application under the provisions of the Convention only if 
he/she previously gave the opportunity to the domestic judicial system to correct committed 
violation of the Convention. The Court stands as a final (but international) legal solution in 
order to protect a particular human right and fundamental freedom. In a proceeding before the 
Court all circumstances of the actual case are determined, and the Court actually controls (to 
some extent) legal understandings of domestic courts and assesses if such legal 
understandings are in conformity with the Convention and the Court’s (autonomous) 
interpretation of the Convention’s provisions. For this reason, we can determine that the Court 
and proceeding according to the Convention come at the very end of all possible effective 
legal remedies. The contracting states are primarily responsible to secure protection and 
realization of the Convention’s human rights and principles and proceeding before the Court 
according to the Convention has substantial secondary meaning. But nevertheless, if the Court 
determines violation of a particular provision of the Convention, respective final judgement 
                                                 
34 „The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in Section I of this Convention.“ – Art. 1 of the Convention.  
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must be carried out in the national legal system. Although at the very end of entire possible 
legal procedure (which is the main aspect of the principle of subsidiarity) this is exactly what 
positions the Court to the first level of importance. The Court, according to the respective 
principle, possesses certain control function and on the end of legal procedure undertakes 
required assessment of previous domestic legal approaches in all matters related to the 
Convention and human rights protected by the Convention. Should judgement of the Court be 
rendered to the particular state with determination that particular provision of the Convention 
has been violated, such judgement will be carried out in accordance to the provisions of 
domestic procedural law under the (international) obligation of signatory state. 
 From this procedural aspect we can easily determine that the principle of subsidiarity 
is also one of the main theoretical grounds for stated basic hypothesis. Our basic hypothesis is 
directed to the trans-national character of contemporary constitutional norms in which norms 
and their common characteristic can be addressed as the particular constitutional law. In case 
of the Convention: 
 
a) there is a grammatical and normative similarity between contemporary constitutional norms 
and provisions of the Convention;  
b) there is one supra-national judicial body empowered by the one particular international 
agreement;  
c) there is a principle of autonomous interpretation of the Convention’s provision and with the 
principle of subsidiarity the Court is positioned on the very last end of all possible effective 
legal remedies. When we combine stated facts with one more additional characteristic of the 
supervisory system, theoretical ground for evaluation of our basic hypothesis has been 
established.  
 
 As it has been previously stated, the Convention is a particular and in contemporary 
constitutional time extremely important international agreement. But it is in its very legal 
essence an international agreement. Because of such characteristic the Convention as a 
particular international agreement primarily falls under the scope of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of the Treaties which is the basic legal source for all questions regarding international 
agreements world-wide (between two or more states or between states and international 
organizations). All provisions of the respective Vienna Convention apply also in the case of 
the Convention and the most important provision is prescribed in the Article 26 which 
stipulates that: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed 
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by them in good faith.”35 Respective provision presents basic international legal source for the 
effectivity of the Convention in international legal order. Given the fact that our analysis is 
not based upon the international effectivity of the Convention but rather on the implications, 
consequences and impacts of the Convention itself in domestic legal orders of signatory states 
and their constitutional law, theoretical and normative implications from the aspects of the 
international law will not be further assessed in this analysis.  
 But another point of view for the Convention as an international agreement draws our 
attention. This point of view is related to the position of the international agreements within 
the constitutional order of contracting states. From general theory of law and state we know 
that each particular state prescribes hierarchy of legal sources within its own legal system. 
Constitutions are common legal sources with ultimate legal power and all other legal sources 
on legislative or sub-legislative level must be in conformity with the constitutions. This brings 
us to the question of where international agreements are positioned within one political and 
legal order. Are international agreements positioned on supra-legislative, sub-legislative, 
legislative or constitutional level? And what are direct consequences of such categorization? 
In order to verify respective thesis, we will also have to identify the position of international 
agreements in hierarchy of legal norms in analyzed states.  
 But in this particular moment we can emphasize one additional fundamental principle 
that ensures existence of our new theoretical concept. This principle reflects in the obligation 
of the member states to carry out the final judgement of the Court. It is the international 
obligation of the Council of Europe member state to execute final judgement of the Court in 
domestic legal systems according to the Convention. In order to ensure fulfillment of such 
obligation, the Council of Europe member states must grant all legal remedies in domestic 
procedural system or undertake all required legislative adjustments which seem appropriate so 
that human rights and fundamental freedoms as guaranteed by the Convention become real 
and effective in practice.36 The consequence of respective international obligation of the 
Council of Europe member states is also the slow (but effective) entry of the Court’s legal 
understandings in domestic judicial practice and harmonization with legal understandings of 
the Court. This fact combined with other stated fundamental principles of the supervisory 
system as prescribed by the Convention ensures the existence of particular constitutional law.  
                                                 
35 The Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treatis,  available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf (12.04.2019.) 
36 What particular method will contracting state adopt in order to fulfill its international obligation on execution 
of a final judgement of the Court is entirely on discretion of that member state. Possibility on reopening 
particular procedure in which violation of particular human right has occured is certainly the most important one 
but not in the same time the one and only. See infra, p. 242 – 243. 
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Main thesis #3 
The (European) Court represents an institutional link that enables introduction of 
particular constitutional law. 
 
 Respective theoretical concept (particular constitutional law) can be introduced in the 
theory of the constitutional law only if we can identify all exogenous variables that combine 
judicial systems of the Council of Europe member states. Within our basic hypothesis we are 
trying to substantiate the existence of special or particular constitutional law as a theoretical 
concept, but the main question is what the fundamental characteristics of such concept are. 
Previously we have identified the Convention with prescribed supervisory system as main 
legal source or main legal foundation for this new theoretical concept. We have also stated 
that relying on judicial practice and legal understandings of the Court presents main 
substantial part of particular constitutional law. For that reason, the role of the Court in such 
process of introduction of the particular constitutional law must not be neglected because the 
Court and its activism regarding interpretation of human rights and fundamental principles as 
prescribed by the Convention presents main substantial element of our new concept. As it has 
previously been noted regarding harmonization process37, the European human rights 
framework is built on the concept of shared competences where domestic authorities have 
unavoidable role in the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in European 
context. Although the Court holds a particularly centered position, it cannot develop the 
concept of the particular constitutional law without the contracting states and the role of the 
latter is manifested in the process of execution of a final judgement of the Court. Contracting 
states are second pole of particular constitutional law constructors.   
 From previously stated facts it can be concluded that the Convention is the most 
important legal source for particular constitutional law and that supervisory system as 
introduced by the Convention itself allows the analysis of its impact in legal system of 
member states but from one new point of view. This position of analysis is based upon the 
role of the Court and not on the role of the Convention. For that reason, this type of analysis is 
a fresh overview of the Convention’s impacts in legal order of the Council of Europe member 
states. The Court and its judicial activism are the key substantial and procedural elements that 
enable the introduction of the respective theoretical concept. The analysis of the concept in 
this dissertation will be moved from the Convention and its impact in member states and will 
                                                 
37 See supra, p. 28. 
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be placed on the Court and its judicial activism and the analysis of respective impacts. The 
Convention will always be, of course, the fundamental legal source and legal margin in which 
the Court will evolve its practice, but we believe that the Court and its practice present the 
fundamental institutional link between the Council of Europe member states that ensures 
introduction of particular constitutional law.  
 All states world-wide have concluded numerous international agreements on various 
legal matters (e.g. on avoiding double taxation, on social or medical security of citizens of one 
contracting party on the territory of other contracting party, on international legal assistance in 
criminal matters etc.). Respective numbers of those international agreements have been 
multilateral (just like the Convention) which means that provisions of those international 
agreements are on force in legal systems of contracting states. But only the Convention has 
introduced supervisory system and special international institution with full jurisdictional 
function and international obligation of the contracting state to execute final judgement of the 
Court. This characteristic is differentia specifica of the Convention’s system that stands out in 
contemporary (international) human rights law. For that reason, the Court as a special 
international institution based upon the Convention represents institutional link between the 
Council of Europe member states and their judicial systems as well as their legislatures. And 
the judicial activism of the Court enables the introduction of our new overview of the Court’s 
impact.  
 
Final observations regarding basic hypothesis and main thesis  
 
 With introduced basic hypothesis and the three main theses we set-out margins of our 
analysis in this doctoral dissertation. We have emphasized the scope of scientific examination 
and theoretical objects of our main concern which will be examined throughout the 
dissertation.  
 Main focus of our interest presents de-nationalization of the contemporary 
constitutional law given the fact that the main substantial content of contemporary 
constitutional law (human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the main constitutional 
principles such as rule of law) can be introduced trans-nationally. Realization of such content 
ratione loci is not limited within borders of one national state and this fact is based upon the 
judicial activism of the Court. If contemporary constitutional law can be constructed trans-
nationally the main question is how this hypothesis can be verified. To verify this respective 
hypothesis, we have chosen to analyze and introduce one new overview of the Convention’s 
41 
 
impact in the Council of Europe member states. The Convention and its supervisory system 
have been chosen because only this international agreement has prescribed special 
jurisdictional function of one international judicial body with the obligation of the signatory 
states to carry out final judgement of the Court. Because of that obligation the Court’s legal 
understandings have assumed propulsive effect on the Council of Europe member states and 
their legal system (slowly but effectively).  
 The consequence of such effect in particular member states have been adjustment of 
the (constitutional) jurisprudence but as well as the legislative to the legal understandings of 
the Court. This process was possible regarding the fact that contemporary constitutional 
provisions regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms are normatively similar (if not 
even identical) to the provisions of the Convention. Such national and international provisions 
have the same sedes materiae.  
 On the other hand, we have witnessed (and in this analysis will be presented) that the 
Court in its judicial practice has expanded the protection according to the Convention on 
various cases which previously were not under the scope of national constitutional protection. 
Such expansion of the protection had direct influence on the adjustment of the legislative and 
other judicial practice in the Council of Europe member states. If we would abstract such 
expansion and systematically present its main substantial content – such content could be 
identified as the particular constitutional law for the reasons presented further in the 
dissertation.  
 Other three main theses are directly related to the basic hypothesis and are following 
respective hypothesis for combined scientific examination and verification. To begin with, we 
have stated normative and substantial similarity between contemporary constitutional human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and human rights and fundamental freedoms as prescribed 
by the Convention. Given the fact that they are normatively similar, this fact allows us to 
examine how respective human rights and fundamental freedoms have been realized in 
judicial practice of the Council of Europe member states. Legal theory has already introduced 
the concept of harmonization where different legal solutions or different legal approaches in 
same legal matter under the influence of particular exogenous factor ultimately become 
similar or identical so that previously stated differences are not significant anymore.  
 In our case and as the auxiliary thesis for the main hypothesis, we brought to our 
attention the harmonization process within the Council of Europe member states, especially 
the harmonization of the judicial and legislative system in the Council of Europe member 
states with the legal understandings of the Court. Confirmation of the existence of such 
42 
 
process brings out the conclusion that particular constitutional law has its existence in the 
practice. The existence and empirical validity of the particular constitutional law concept is 
proportional to the harmonization process, with the meaning that theoretical concept of the 
particular constitutional law will be theoretically stronger and more founded in that Council of 
Europe member states where harmonization process with the Court’s practice is more 
developed. We can say that the concept of particular constitutional law is directly related to 
the harmonization process and to validate existence of the respective concept we have to 
analyze the harmonization process itself. On the other side, should harmonization process in 
particular member states be at lower levels of development (meaning that the Court’s practice 
and legal understandings doesn’t have significant or any meaning in constitutional and other 
jurisprudence as well as the legislative of particular member state) than respective concept of 
the particular constitutional law could not be identified or verified. In such member states the 
expanded substantial content of human rights and fundamental freedoms from the Court’s 
practice doesn’t have the integrative meaning and jurisprudence, and the legislative of such 
member states doesn’t fall under the theoretical scope of the particular constitutional law. 
Given the fact that jurisprudence and the legislative of all the Council of Europe member 
states are extremely heterogeneous for that reason we limit our analysis in this dissertation 
merely for the introduction of respective concept. This is also the reason why the subject of 
our dissertation is (introduction)/construction of the particular constitutional law where the 
role of the Court is examined.  
 Other main theses which we introduced are also utilized for the confirmation of stated 
basic hypothesis. Supervisory system as presented by the Convention is unprecedented in 
contemporary (international) law and such system had wider influence than it is commonly 
presented. If the harmonization process with the Court’s practice really has begun in 
particular member states next question is why this process has begun and on what particular 
normative foundation. From our point of view the answer on those questions directly points 
out to the structure of the supervisory system according to the Convention.  
Finally, if we can construct very essence of the contemporary constitutional law trans-
nationally (substantial content of human rights and fundamental freedoms) on the basis of 
harmonization process and which process is possible because of the construction of the 
supervisory system according to the Convention, than ultimately the Court as the main 
foundation of such supervisory system necessary becomes the institutional link that utilize all 
theoretical knowledge and presented arguments in one coherent system. 
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For all stated reasons, respective inter-related hypotheses are introduced for closer 
examination in this dissertation according to the methodology used in contemporary science 
of the constitutional law.   
 
1.3. Methodology  
 
 After setting up the theoretical framework of the analysis in previous sub-chapters of 
the dissertation our (methodological) duty is to present the scientific path by which we can 
verify stated hypothesis and all main theses. Given the fact that this dissertation substantially 
is a part of the constitutional law, for that reason methodology that will be used in this 
dissertation in order to verify or reject stated hypothesis will not be any different than the 
methodology that is used in constitutional law generally.  
Scientific method in all analytical endeavors is used in order to achieve reliable and 
trustworthy conclusions. Our conclusions set out in the analysis must be objectively verifiable 
and we must fully and precisely present the thinking path from the inception of the idea to the 
conclusion (confirmation or rejection of basic hypothesis and all main theses). In order to 
achieve this goal, we must use scientific methods that are commonly used in constitutional 
law and law science in general.  
Generally speaking, constitutional law commonly uses particular methods that can 
ensure objective and verifiable conclusions. The most important method in constitutional law 
is the normative or dogmatic method by which we analyze actual constitutional and other 
normative provisions. Linguistic, logical, systematical and functional reasoning of respective 
provisions ensure positioning of particular constitutional provision in constitutional system as 
well as the intention of the framer of the constitution. With respective method additionally is 
used the comparative method by which we can compare constitutional provisions in different 
states that regulate similar or same social relations as well as realization of such provisions in 
practice. Comparative method is used to question particular solutions in one constitutional 
system and to determine the need to adjust particular solutions in respective system. With 
comparative method we transcend over all analyzed constitutional systems and compare their 
respective solutions in order to determine possible improvements. In the end there is historical 
method that is used for conceptualization of the cause of particular constitutional norms and 
political institutions in particular state. Given the fact that constitutional law is strongly 
related to other particular social sciences (sociology and political science) such strong 
relations also have influence on methodological perspectives of the constitutional law. For 
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that reason, methods that are often used in the constitutional law are also methods that are 
used in sociology and political science. With respective methods of other social sciences, we 
can determine ongoing procedures in relevant areas that are outside of the scope of 
constitutional law but are of great importance to the constitutional law (e.g. the legislation 
procedure, shaping of political decisions etc.).38  
 Given the fact that our analysis will comprehend impacts of the Convention on the 
constitutional jurisprudence and legislative in selected member states of the Council of 
Europe such characteristic of the analysis points out to the conclusion that our dissertation 
will be based primarily on the normative (dogmatic) and comparative method.39 Nevertheless, 
historical perspectives of the Convention and proliferation of the human rights protection in 
contemporary constitutional law will not be set aside given the fact that presentation of the 
historical evolution of the Convention from its inception till this day will significantly 
enlighten new theoretical concept which we are trying to confirm in this dissertation.  
 For all stated reasons and in the light of presented basic hypothesis and main theses we 
have to give answers on four related methodological questions: 
 
a) with what scientific methods can we confirm our presented basic hypothesis and four main 
theses; 
b) to what particular extent will this method be used; 
c) are respective methods useful and appropriate for confirmation of presented hypothesis and 
four main theses; 
d) on what methodological foundations have we selected the Council of Europe member 
states and their constitutional jurisprudential and legislative compliance for analysis with legal 
understandings and judicial practice of the Court and regarding which particular provisions of 
the Convention? And the most important question – why particularly these member states and 
why particularly that provisions of the Convention?  
                                                 
38 F. Grad, I. Kaučič, S. Zagorc, op.cit. (footnote 4), p. 36 – 37. We can also find an identical methodological 
approach in scientific examination of the objects of interest in the constitutional law in Croatian scientific 
literature. Professors Smiljko Sokol and Branko Smerdel also note that constitutional law is a part of legal 
science where normative (dogmatic), historical and comparative scientific method with respective methods from 
other social sciences are commonly used in order to present or verify particular hypothesis in constitutional law. 
See: S. Sokol, B. Smerdel: „Ustavno pravo“, Pravni fakultet, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, 2008, p. 9. 
39 Regarding comparative method we will use the law-in-context method trying to assess why is particular 
implication of the Convention exactly how it is determined, i.e. what are other variables that have such impact on 
present status of the Convention. More about comparative method in legal researches can be found in: M. Van 
Hoecke: „Methodology of Comparative Legal Research“, available at:  
https://www.bjutijdschriften.nl/tijdschrift/lawandmethod/2015/12/RENM-D-14-00001 (12.04.2019.)  
In respective article can also be found all (dis)advantages of comparative method in legal researches as well as 
sub-types of comparative research. 
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 As it has already been mentioned, this doctoral analysis scientifically is a part of the 
constitutional law (given the fact that contemporary regulation of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms is unalienable part of the constitutional law). For that reason, methods 
that will be used are not any different from all other methods that are used in constitutional 
law in general. As it has been previously stated, substantial, grammatical and normative 
similarity between national constitutional texts and the Convention is basic foundation for 
particular constitutional law. In this first step we will also assess constitutional position of the 
Convention in hierarchy of legal sources in selected member states of the Council of Europe. 
After determination of all normative characteristics of respective legal sources, comparative 
method shall be used in order to determine impacts of the Convention in selected contracting 
states. Impacts of the Convention shall be assessed on the basis of the influence of the Court’s 
practice in constitutional jurisprudence and legislative of the selected member states. This 
influence of the Court will be assessed in the view of national legislative and jurisprudential 
adjustments which have been undertaken after final judgement of the Court was rendered.   
 To answer the second methodological question, i.e. to what particular extent will the 
respective methods be used, we can point out that all stated methods usually are not used 
isolated from one another but rather combined. For that reason, respective methods will also 
be jointly used in order to confirm respective hypothesis and main theses.  
 Given the fact that in this dissertation we are trying to present one new theoretical 
concept and model for the Convention’s impacts in contemporary constitutional law all stated 
methods are appropriate for our analysis. Respective methods are commonly used in 
contemporary constitutional law for analysis of various relations within the theory of 
constitutional law. Our theoretical concept is a part of the constitutional law and by using all 
respective methods combined, we can determine the validity of stated basic hypothesis and 
main theses.  
 Answering the final methodological question requires further analysis. Comparative 
method of scientific research usually points out to the conclusion that there are particular units 
which are subjected to the analysis. In social (especially legal) sciences, these units are 
commonly the states and their legal systems. For the purposes of our analysis we have 
decided to bring six states and impacts of the Convention in their legal systems to our closer 
examination. These states are: Republic of Slovenia, Republic of Croatia, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Republic of Italy, Republic of France and United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland.  
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From the comparative researches in social sciences we are familiar with the fact that a 
state as a territorially defined political and legal entity represents a “measuring unit” of 
comparative analysis, i.e. within a comparative study the unit of analysis represents a state. 
Most of the phenomena motivated by contemporary social researchers occur within the state 
(political system, legislation, institutions, human rights and fundamental freedoms, impacts of 
the Convention etc.). Problems within the comparative method of scientific research today 
can easily arise in the case of heterogeneity of the state (in ethnic, political, legal or other), so 
that the differences between the basic constitutional units of a particular state (e.g. Länder in 
the Federal Republic of Germany) are greater than the difference between the states 
themselves. But on the other hand, contemporary comparative research has a very large 
argumentative power of analytical explanation of data. Contemporary comparative research 
measures views and values or particular phenomena in two or more states, and these 
phenomena are measured with the same research tool or the same research technique. The 
basic objective of comparative research is to compare societies, to determine differences and 
similarities between them in relation to our subject matter (e.g. relation to freedom, legal 
security and equality before the law, impacts of the Convention etc.). Once the researcher has 
identified differences and similarities, it is necessary to interpret the obtained data and, based 
on the obtained data and interpretation; identify a more general legality between two 
phenomena in two or more states. The choice of the states covered by the research must be 
directed towards the research goal. The analysis certainly must include “typical” states where 
the phenomena we are analyzing are going to occur. And on the other hand, the number of 
states in which we analyze particular phenomena should be on a lower level given the fact 
that the contemporary comparative research studies include lower number of states for which 
we can obtain sustainable information from greater number of sources.40 With such 
methodological approach we can provide general conclusions.  
  All stated reasons have guided us in our choice of respective states in which we will 
assess validity of stated basic hypothesis. In particular, all respective states are modern states 
with liberal constitutions in which human rights and fundamental freedoms are highly 
recognized and protected. Furthermore, all presented states have dominant political 
orientation on further development of human rights and fundamental freedoms and all 
                                                 
40 B. Malnar: „Longitudinalno in primerjalno raziskovanje kot učinkovita strategija opazovanja družbenih 
pojavov“ in: N. Toš, K.H. Müller (ed.): Primerjalno družboslovje; Metodološki in vsebinski vidiki; second 
supplemented edition, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani, 2011, p. 62 – 68. More about 
contemporary comparative research in social sciences can also be found in: D. de Vaus: „Comparative And 
Cross-National Designs“ in P. Alasuutari, L. Bickman, J. Brannen (ed.): The Sage Handbook of Social Research 
Methods, Sage, 2009, p. 249 – 264. 
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presented states don’t have (significant) regards on execution of final judgements of the 
Court. All respective states have prescribed national remedies that ensure implementation of 
the Court’s legal understandings in domestic legal order. Other auxiliary reasons for selection 
of respective six states are as follows: Republic of Slovenia and Republic of Croatia represent 
objects of interest because these two states share common legal and political history as well as  
legal and political evolution. On the other hand, these two states have a relatively modest 
constitutional jurisprudence (in comparison with other states that will be analyzed). This 
analysis will also be useful for Slovenian and Croatian constitutional law and legal science 
because it will present the level of compliance of constitutional jurisprudence and legislative 
with the jurisprudence of the Court on a scientific level regarding particular rights and 
principles set out in the Convention. Italy is also of interest regarding the fact that the present 
scientific analysis indicates essential problems in execution of final judgments of the Court 
which has influence on the harmonization process.41 Legal system of the United Kingdom is 
common law system where (domestic) law is the supreme source of whole legal order so it is 
of scientific interest to examine how the United Kingdom complies with final judgment of the 
Court and to what extent are legal understandings of domestic courts in compliance with legal 
understandings of the Court. Finally, Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of 
Germany represents the constitutional court of great judicial practice and authority in Europe. 
Regarding that fact any scientific analysis of constitutional jurisprudence compliance with 
judicial practice of the Court cannot avoid Federal Constitutional Court. In the end, France is 
usually considered as member state of the Council of Europe that encourages openness of its 
legal system to the provisions of international law and compliance to the final judgements of 
the Court.42 
Although the Council of Europe today consists of 47 member states across the 
European and Asian continent, by analyzing these six states we can identify the main goal of 
our research - existence of special theoretical concept that we have identified as the particular 
constitutional law.  
Contemporary comparative analysis regarding impacts of the Convention usually 
refers to the respective states. In one comparative analysis regarding implementation of the 
Convention as well as the judgements of the Court in national case-law, researchers also 
indicated that France, Germany and the United Kingdom (with Belgium, the Netherlands and 
                                                 
41 J. Omejec: Konvencija za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda u praksi Europskog suda za ljudska prava 
– strasbourški acquis, second supplemented edition, Novi informator, 2014, p. 424 – 428.  
42 See infra, Chapter IV of the dissertation.  
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Sweden) “…make an ideal set for assessing the interrelationship between constitutional 
mechanisms for the implementation of international law, the effects of the Convention and the 
case-law of the Court for national judicial decision-making, and the existence of the debate 
on the Convention and its impact.”43 Researchers also indicated that respective states have 
numerous common characteristics for which reasons are well founded methodological 
selection for the analysis of the Convention’s impacts in national legal orders (tradition for the 
Convention’s application, discourse on constitutional review and the implementation of 
international law by domestic courts etc.).44 All respective reasons also guided our 
methodological approach in the analysis of the Convention’s impacts in national legal orders 
but we tend to limit our analysis to the Slovenia, Croatia and Italy (instead of Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Sweden) for reasons stated above.  
 On the other hand, and after we have identified and methodologically explained why 
these respective states will be used for our research, second affiliated methodological question 
that needs to be answered is related to the selection of particular human rights and 
fundamental freedoms that are protected by the Convention and well developed in the practice 
of the Court. As it has already been suggested in the dissertation, our main goal is to confirm 
that contemporary constitutional law can be constructed on trans-national (supra-national) 
level and that trans-national substantial content of the contemporary constitutional law can be 
identified as the particular constitutional law which exists between those the Council of 
Europe member states that rely their constitutional jurisprudence and legislative to the legal 
understandings of the Court (which are harmonized with the legal understandings and judicial 
practice of the Court). This compliance between constitutional jurisprudence and the 
legislation of the particular member states of the Council of Europe with the legal 
understandings of the Court is possible regarding the fact that contemporary constitutional 
provisions regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms in analyzed states have similar  
grammatical and substantial content with the provisions of the Convention. In order to 
confirm substantial content of the particular constitutional law we have to identify particular 
human rights and fundamental freedoms prescribed, recognized and protected in the 
constitutions of the analyzed states and in the Convention. In this methodological endeavor 
we are presented with certain choices that we have to explain. In particular, can analysis of 
the stated compliance regarding the right to a fair trial bring us to the conclusion of the 
existence of the particular constitutional law and why? On the other hand, why does the 
                                                 
43 J. Gerards, J. Fleuren (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 2), p. 10. 
44 Ibid. 
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analysis of the compliance regarding the right to privacy (which is also fundamental human 
right protected in all analyzed states and in the Convention) cannot bring us to that same 
conclusion? What are methodological foundations for the selection of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms which compliance with the Court’s understandings will be analyzed 
from national perspectives? 
 For the compliance analysis we have selected three fundamental constitutional 
principles that are in the very essence of the contemporary constitutional law: the rule of law, 
the right to a fair trial and protection of property.  
 The rule of law is a constitutional principle which is enshrined in the Convention. The 
Court in its practice emphasized on numerous occasions that the rule of law principle is an 
inherent part of the Convention where all of the prescribed human rights and fundamental 
freedoms have foundation in the principle of the rule of law (e.g. case of Golder v. United 
Kingdom and Čonka v. Belgium).45 Unalienable parts of the principle of the rule of law as 
reasoned by the Court in its judicial practice are principle of lawfulness, principle of legal 
certainty and principle of procedural fairness.46 Given the fact that the rule of law is generally 
enshrined in all of prescribed human rights and fundamental freedoms set out in the 
Convention and presents particular foundation of the Convention system as a unit, with 
compliance analysis regarding the rule of law we can determine general development of the 
system based upon the Convention as well as the interactions between the system based upon 
the Convention and contracting states regarding the most important contemporary 
constitutional principle. Implementation of the Court’s legal understandings on the rule of law 
in national legal orders of contracting states will clearly point out adjustments in national 
constitutional interpretations regarding this principle on the basis of the Court’s activism 
(what was within the rule of law principle in national constitutional framework prior to the 
Court’s rulling, under the binding nature of the Court’s final judgement is not anymore in (all) 
future cases with similar circumstances of the case). Verification of respective adjustments of 
the most profound constitutional principle under the influence of the Court will point out that 
the system is effective and evolving and clearly builds transnational human rights system by 
using fundamental principle of contemporary constitutional law. The rule of law principle has 
been pointed out for the compliance analysis because the rule of law is a fundamental 
constitutional principle enshrined in the Convention but also in the national constitutional 
texts where all subsequent norms are interpreted and applied in accordance with the respective 
                                                 
45 J. Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 1088 – 1089.  
46 Ibid, p. 1089.  
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principle. This characteristic of the respective principle (its generality and universality for all 
constitutional systems of contracting states and the system based upon the Convention) 
enables general analysis and general conclusions regarding existence of particular 
supranatrional human rights system which is evolving under the influence of the Court. If 
such system (particular constitutional law) is actually existing in practice (which is one aspect 
of our basic hypothesis) than such system can be verified if the most profound constitutional 
principle (such as the rule of law) within national legal framework is adjusting under the 
influence of the Court. Generality, universality and importance of the respective principle in 
contemporary time are main reasons which guided us in the process of selection which 
particular human rights and fundamental constitutional principles will be utilized within our 
analysis.  
 In relation to the rule of law principle, procedural fairness has been pointed out by the 
Court as the unalienable part of the respective principle. The principle of procedural fairness 
has its normative form in the Art. 6 par. 1 of the Convention as the right to a fair trial. The 
right to a fair trial is emanation of the principle of the rule of law in procedural aspect. 
Considering interconnections of the right to a fair trial with the principle of the rule of law, it 
seems appropriate to consider compliance with respective procedural right in order to identify 
the existence of particular supranational human rights system.  
 Regarding reasons which guided us in selection what principle(s) and human rights 
will be subjected to the compliance analysis with the practice of the Court in selected 
contracting states, we can also emphasize that judicial practice of the Court regarding the right 
to a fair trial (Art. 6 par. 1 of the Convention) and the protection of property (Art. 1 Protocol 
No. 1 to the Convention) is most developed. As it has been pointed out by the Council of 
Europe: “The Convention provision which has been violated most is Article 6, as regards the 
right to a fair trial, then the reasonable time requirement. The next most frequent violations 
are under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) and Article 5 of the Convention 
(right to liberty and security).”47 If judicial practice of the Court is most developed regarding 
the right to a fair trial and protection of property than the existence of the supranational 
human rights system and de-nationalization of contemporary constitutional law (overflow of 
common minimum standards set out by the Court to legal framework of contracting states) is 
most visible precisely in this area. If the Court determines most violations of the Convention 
in relation to the right to a fair trial and protection of property, than impacts of the Court’s 
                                                 
47 https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-convention/landmark-judgments (12.04.2019.) 
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final judgements in contracting states will be most visible precisely in the line of protection of 
the right to a fair trial and protection of property. It can be reasonably expected that judicial 
practice of the Court in the line of protection of the right to a fair trial and protection of 
property will be most developed and that final judgements of the Court in this area will be 
generator of national constitutional development. This development, under the influence of 
the Court’s activism, could be verification of our basic hypothesis.  
   
The rule of law 
 
 As stated before, first object of our compliance analysis is the rule of law which 
presents fundamental political, philosophical but also a legal principle. All analyzed states (as 
well as the all liberal states worldwide) rest on the principle of the rule of law. Although it 
may seem that this principle can be constructed only within the borders of one national 
constitutional order, the practice of the Court has built this concept on supra-national level.48 
For that reason, the rule of law is first constitutional principle which will be analyzed 
throughout the practice of the Court and constitutional jurisprudence and legislative of 
analyzed contracting states.  
 The concept of the rule of law has its own historical background and contemporary 
idea on the concept of the rule of law consists of a number overlapping characteristics on how 
modern states should be organized. The rule of law primarily is addressed to the system of 
government which is fully founded on the provisions of constitution and limited with the 
constitution and the principle of legality. All actions of state authority as well as all actions of 
particular citizen must be performed in accordance with the constitution and with the 
provisions of all other legal sources (legislative or sub-legislative) in democratic state. This 
aspect of the rule of law concept is expressed with the principle of constitutionalism and 
legality. This is one of the most important aspect of the respective principle but not one and 
only. Other aspects of the respective concept are expressed throughout demand that 
constitution and other legal norms have particular substantial content which is appropriate in 
democratic society and which content serve for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.49 
                                                 
48 Excellent indepth analysis regarding the Court's positions on the rule of law can be found in: G. Lautenbach: 
„The Concept of the Rule of Law and the European Court of Human Rights“, Oxford, 2013. 
49 S. Sokol, B. Smerdel, op.cit. (footnote 38), p. 48. 
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 Constitutional theory in the examination of the anatomy of the concept of the rule of 
law also tends to divide respective concept into institutions, rules and procedures. All of 
respective parts are building respective concept and these parts are substantial elements of the 
rule of law. “Some writers, particularly lawyers, see the rule of law as inhering in particular 
features of legal institutions. Those who believe they have the rule of law often identify it with 
their own institutions…”50 This can be identified as rather institutionalist approach where the 
respective concept is related to the institutions which apply the law and are bounded by it. On 
the other side, legal philosophers are relying on abstract features of legal order where the rule 
of law concept is a source of guidance to its subjects and subjects must be able to realize what 
particular rule is applied in their situation when they choose how to act.51 This approach to the 
rule of law concept we can address as substantially positivistic given the fact that in this 
aspect the rule of law is a holistic totality of legal rules comprehensible to its subjects. Finally, 
the rule of law concept can be identified and analyzed from the procedural point of view 
where law as argumentative discipline must enable to its subjects possibility to speak before 
the court, possibility to present evidence, possibility to examine evidence from the counter 
side etc. In this particular concept, people/citizens have some protected legal interests and in 
order to realize those interests various procedures must be enabled to ensure realization of 
those interests. “People with interests at stake need to be able to speak for those interests, 
whether they accuse or are accused.”52 
 The concept of the rule of law can also be found in the Convention; therefore, we can 
conclude that this concept has been identified by the Council of Europe as one of the most 
important legal and political principles which can also be identified as a common 
characteristic of the Council of Europe member states.53 If the rule of law in its various 
concepts and with all correlated characteristics is common characteristic of all member states 
of the Council of Europe and the system based upon the Convention than it is 
methodologically appropriate to examine all interconnections between domestic and 
international systems for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as 
the influence of the Court in domestic legal orders. As it has been stated above, the rule of law 
                                                 
50 M. Krygier: „Rule of Law“, in: M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (ed.): „The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law“, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 235. 
51 Ibid., p. 237. 
52 Ibid., p. 239.  
53 The Preamble of the Convention expressively states that “…Being resolved, as the governments of European 
countries which are like-minded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule 
of law [underlined by the author], to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights 
stated in the Universal Declaration…” 
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has also its functional meaning where this concept must serve in democratic society as the 
protector of human rights and fundamental principles.  
 If we would point out to the exact particular elements of the rule of law principle 
which are identifiable in practice and used by the Court we can use systematization from the 
Rule of Law Checklist prepared by the European Commission for democracy through law 
(Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe from March 2016.54 In respective Checklist 
the Venice Commission identified particular benchmarks for the realization of the rule of law 
which also guide the Court in adjudication process.55 
 For the conclusion we can emphasize that the rule of law is common universal legal 
and political principle which is an inherent part of the system based upon the Convention but 
also an inherent part of political and legal systems of the Council of Europe member states. 
The concept is common value for the Council of Europe and has its own benchmarks which 
are identifiable in practice although is primarily theoretical concept. As the one of the most 
important theoretical and practical concept worldwide we selected respective concept for 
further examination on how national courts changed their view on the rule of law in particular 
case under the influence of the Court’s judicial practice and legal understandings. This can 
verify introduction of particular common values and principles on transnational level which 
we are addressing as the particular constitutional law. 
 
The right to a fair trial or due process 
 
 First fundamental human right which will be subjected to the compliance analysis is 
the right to a fair trial or due process in Anglo-Saxon legal system. Respective human right is 
a fundamental procedural human right which is protected on constitutional level and by the 
Convention. It is also procedural aspect of the rule of law principle for which reason it is 
important for the context of our analysis. As normative statetment of the rule of law principle 
and given the fact that judicial practice of the Court is most developed in this area, it can be 
and must be analysed separately of the rule of law principle. As it has been previously stated, 
the rule of law is principle enshrined in the Convention and all human rights and fundamental 
                                                 
54 European Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe, Rule of 
Law Checklist, March 2016, available at:   
http://www.venice.coe.int/images/SITE%20IMAGES/Publications/Rule_of_Law_Check_List.pdf (12.04.2019.) 
55 E.g. are the powers of the public authorities defined by law, are there clear constitutional rules on legislation 
process, is legislation accessable, are exemptions sufficiently justified etc. All these benchmarks are 
concretization of the rule of law principle which lead reasoning of the Court in adjudication process.   
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freedoms set out in the Convention (as well as all other provisions of the Convention) must be 
interpreted and applied in accordance to the rule of law principle. But the Court also 
acknowledged that the principle of procedural fairness is in the very essence of the rule of law 
principle. This fact combined with contemporary highly developed practice of the Court 
regarding the right to a fair trial leads to the necessity of separate analysis. In the context of 
our analysis and basic hypothesis it is of our interest to examine on what particular level legal 
understandings of the Court are accepted in respective member states and in what particular 
way domestic courts are harmonizing domestic judicial practice with the practice of the Court.  
 Normatively, the right to a fair trial is the right protected by the Art. 6 par. 1 of the 
Convention where it is stipulated: In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of 
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall 
be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial 
in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the 
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the 
extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity 
would prejudice the interests of justice.”56  
 The right to a fair trial is the right which is also particular common value for the 
Council of Europe member states and has in most general terms universal substantial common 
meaning across all the Council of Europe.57 As it is with the concept of the rule of law, the 
right to a fair trial is also stipulated and expressively provided by the Convention and the 
Court in its long practice developed its own autonomous interpretation of the respective right. 
In particular, the Court independently ruled on the substantial meaning of e.g. the right and 
obligations of civil matter and has not been bound upon by any national definition or 
                                                 
56 Similar substantial provisions regarding the right to a fair trial can be found in national constitutional texts of 
analyzed states. E.g. Art. 29. par. 1. of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia states: „Everyone shall be 
entitled have his or her rights and obligations, or suspicion or accusation of a criminal offence decided upon 
fairly before a legally established, independent and impartial court within a reasonable period.“ Art. 23 par. 1 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia prescribes: „Everyone has the right to have any decision 
regarding his rights, duties, and any charges brought against him made without undue delay by an independent, 
impartial court constituted by law.“ Art. 111 par. 1 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic stipulates: 
„Jurisdiction is implemented through due process regulated by law.“ 
Constitution of the Republic of Croatia on English language is available at:  
https://www.usud.hr/sites/default/files/dokumenti/The_consolidated_text_of_the_Constitution_of_the_Republic
_of_Croatia_as_of_15_January_2014.pdf  (12.04.2019.) 
Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia on English language is available at:  
http://www.us-rs.si/en/about-the-court/legal-basis/constitution/ (12.04.2019.) 
Constitution of the Italian Republic on English language is available at:  
https://www.quirinale.it/allegati_statici/en/costituzione_inglese.pdf (12.04.2019.) 
57 Cf. Art. 6 par. 1 of the Convention with substantial provisions of the Croatian, Slovenian and Italian 
Constitutions on the right to a fair trial. 
55 
 
interpretation of respective term. The Court also independently ruled what is the legal essence 
of the term legal dispute in order to invoke Art. 6 par. 1 of the Convention and what are other 
correlated substantial meanings of the respective provisions. E.g. the Court ruled that Art. 6 of 
the Convention cannot be applied in proceedings regarding tax duties, proceedings concerning 
civil servant’s employment rights etc. The Court is autonomous and independent in assessing 
how will apply Art. 6 in particular dispute.58 
 In the context of our analysis and concerning that the right to a fair trial is fundamental 
procedural human right which is also enshrined in the Convention as well as in the national 
constitutional texts in similar substantial and grammatical meaning, it is also 
methodologically appropriate in the context of our fundamental hypothesis to assess how in 
particular legal understandings of the Court regarding application of Art. 6 of the Convention 
expanded scope of application of respective human rights in national legal orders. Such 
expansion came after relevant final judgements of the Court and led to the revisions of 
national positions regarding respective human right. Common substantial and procedural 
standards developed by the Court and implemented by states is the particular constitutional 
law.   
 
Protection of property 
 
 Second fundamental human right is protection of property or the right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of one’s possessions. Protection of property presents fundamental economic and 
social constitutional right worldwide in all states with market based economy (so as in our six 
states) which is also protected by the Convention (Art. 1 Protocol 1 to the Convention). As it 
is in the case of the right to a fair trial, the judicial practice of the Court regarding protection 
of property is also well developed and in this case,  we can easily determine how expansion of 
the protection of respective economic right has entered in the jurisprudence of the analyzed 
states.  
 Historically, protection of property did not find its place in the original text of the 
Convention, but it became protected within the system based upon the Convention only a 
couple of years after the Convention came on force.59 Art. 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the 
Convention stipulates “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of 
                                                 
58 See: P. Van Dijk et.al. (ed.): „Theory and practice of the European Convention on Human Rights“, 4th edition, 
Intersentia, Antwerpen – Oxford, 2006, p. 514 et seq. For historical background and various concepts of due 
process see: R. Vogler: Due process, in: M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 50), p. 929 – 947.  
59 For historical analysis of the evolution of the Convention's rights see infra, p. 109 et seq. 
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his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and 
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international 
law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 
 As it is the case with the rule of law and the right to a fair trial, the peaceful enjoyment 
of one’s possessions or protection of property is also enshrined in national constitutional texts 
of analyzed states with similar substantial and grammatical meaning.60  
 From the aspects of the Convention main focus of the Convention’s right to the 
protection of property from Protocol No. 1 to the Convention is to secure protection from 
state’s apprehension to the private economic sphere of individuals. Nevertheless, Art. 1 of the 
Convention specifically prescribes duties of member states to ensure realization of the 
Convention’s rights and within the scope of application of respective provision member states 
have also particular positive obligations to take necessary measures for the protection of 
property.61  
 The legal understandings and the judicial practice of the Court regarding substantial 
interpretation and application of the respective right to a peaceful enjoyment of one’s 
possessions had enormous impact on national judicial and legislative practice, especially in 
Slovenia and Croatia where two extremely sensitive political issues have been resolved under 
the influence of the Court’s final judgements. In Slovenia that was the case of Ališić and 
others v. Slovenia regarding old foreign currency savings and in Croatia that was the case of 
Statileo v. Croatia regarding obsolete system of protected lessees. Both respective final 
judgements will be brought to closer consideration in Chapter IV of the dissertation. 
 By expanding the scope of application of the Convention’s right to a peaceful 
enjoyment of one’s possession or protection of property given by the Court in its practice 
                                                 
60 E.g. provision of the Art. 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia prescribes that the right of 
ownership shall be guaranteed and shall also imply obligations with the meaning that owners and users of 
particular property shall contribute to the general welfare (constitutional foundation of taxation). Art. 33 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia stipulates that the right to private property and inheritance shall be 
guaranteed. Art. 14 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany states that property and the right of 
inheritance shall be guaranteed and their content and limits shall be defined by the laws. Art. 42 of the 
Constitution of the Italian Republic states Property is public or private. Economic goods belong to the State, to 
entities or to private persons. Private property is recognized and guaranteed by law, which prescribes the ways it 
is acquired, enjoyed and its limits in order to ensure its social function and to make it accessible to all. 
Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany on English language is avaliable at:  
https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf (12.04.2019.) 
61 P. Van Dijk et.al., op.cit. (footnote 58), p. 864. For more about positive obligations of member states in the 
light of realization of the Convention's rights see: J-F. Akandji-Kombe: „Positive obligations under the 
European Convention on Human Rights“, Human rights handbook No. 7, available at: 
https://rm.coe.int/168007ff4d (12.04.2019.)  
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(especially in the case of Slovenia and Croatia) minimum common standards have been 
achieved and those standards are from the point of our analysis the particular constitutional 
law. 
 Of course, it is also possible to examine the compliance regarding other human rights 
and fundamental freedoms which are protected on the national constitutional level and by the 
Convention (e.g. freedom of expression, protection of privacy etc.). Our choice of analysis 
does not preclude us from the possibility to analyze other human rights and fundamental 
freedoms that also have been developed in the practice of the Court. But respective analysis 
regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms that are outside of the scope of our interest 
will be on auxiliary basis. Primarily, we will analyze how legal understandings of the Court 
regarding respective three fundamental constitutional human right/principles have evolved 
and to what extent these legal understandings have entered in the legal systems of the 
analyzed member states. If we can present that the Court has actually developed interpretation 
and scope of application of particular analyzed human right and that such developed 
interpretation and scope of application has entered in the legal system of the analyzed states – 
than it would be obvious that the Court is really institutional link that combines all legal 
systems of the Council of Europe member states in one coherent unity. This unity presents 
transnational existence of constitutional law and we are addressing to this unity as the 
particular constitutional law.  
 Other reasons that have motivated us in selection of particular human rights which will 
be subjected to the compliance analysis are utilized from general methodology for social 
science. As it has been stated, there is no need for general analysis regarding compliance of 
all or vast majority provisions of the Convention with the constitutional jurisprudence and the 
legislative of all or vast majority of the Council of Europe member states. Contemporary 
social sciences in comparative research are founded on a lower number of “measuring units”, 
but from which units we can obtain a greater number of information which are scientifically 
verifiable and sustainable. For that reason, if we can find verifiable proofs for our hypothesis 
and main thesis in these six member states and regarding these three constitutional principles, 
we will also be able to express general conclusions.   
Regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms which will be analyzed 
(summarized), the reasons for their choice for analysis are as follows: the rule of law is a 
basic constitutional, political and philosophical principle; the right to a fair trial is a basic 
procedural right and is protected by the Convention as well as by the constitution(s) of 
selected states; protection of property is a substantial constitutional right. Regarding 
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substantial constitutional rights it is possible to analyze compliance regarding other 
(substantial) constitutional rights that are also protected by the Convention (e.g. equality, 
protection of home, freedom of expression etc.). But we chose the protection of property 
because this constitutional and Convention right contains strong economical characteristic 
(with ethical and philosophical aspect).  
If closer scientific examination confirms compliance of judicial practice of selected 
states regarding stated constitutional rights and principle with the judicial practice of the 
Court it will prove the main hypothesis of dissertation – the contemporary constitutional law 
doesn’t have exclusively national characteristic because the content of the contemporary 
constitutional law can be constructed trans-national, supra-national in theoretical and practical 
sense. This supra-national content we can identify as the particular constitutional law which 
has effect in those the Council of Europe member states which tend to harmonize their 
judicial practice and legislature with judicial practice and legal understandings of the Court. 
For that reason, the choice which constitutional and the Convention rights and principles will 
be considered for scientific examination lies on the rule of law (which represents basic legal 
and political principle), the right on fair trial (which is fundamental process human right) and 
the protection of property (which is substantial constitutional right with strong economic 
impact). Confirmation of compliance will prove the particular content of the Convention and 
constitutional rights and principle, the process of harmonization as well as the 
“internationalization” of constitutional law and also a new theoretical concept – particular 
constitutional law. 
Within each stated member state of the Council of Europe, we will analyze no more 
than three final judgements of the Court against each of mentioned state and which 
judgements had significant impact on domestic (national) legal framework. Each of selected 
final judgement of the Court determined violation of at least one of above mentioned human 
right and in the process of execution of respective final judgement in national legal 
framework this particular judgement led to the revision of national legislative framework or to 
the adjustments of the constitutional jurisprudence. With this approach we will determine to 
what particular extent the Court had influence on national solutions with its own legal 
understandings and how exactly did the Court’s legal understandings entered in domestic 
(national) legal reality. Confirmation of national legislative and jurisprudential adjustments on 
the basis of the Court’s legal understandings and judicial practice will also verify that 
harmonization process has actually begun and that revised national positions regarding human 
rights and fundamental freedoms is introducing one supra-national human rights system 
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directed solely by the Court and its autonomous practice. The selection of the Court’s 
judgements which will be presented is based on their relevance in national legal order which 
fact can be determined on the basis of present scientific literature or on the basis that 
specifically those judgements led to the revision of national constitutions or imposed 
particular financial obligations to the state’s budget. In cases of some respective states current 
scientific literature already verified that their national legal systems are spontaneously 
adjusting to the Court’s judicial practice without severe problems. In such cases we can utilize 
respective analysis for the context of our dissertation. Synthesis will be designed after the 
analysis and the conclusions will be based on inductive and deductive method. And for all 
stated reasons, this dissertation will combine theoretical and practical approach in the process 
of confirmation of basic hypothesis and main theses.  
As for the end of respective sub-chapter it needs to be noted that stated compliance 
analysis will go from above (from the Court’s practice and presentation of actual 
circumstances of the case) and then be lowered down on national legal framework with 
presentation what particular adjustments were introduced on the basis of final judgement of 
the Court. The totality of all undertaken adjustments in national legal order is particular 
constitutional law or achieved common standards in European human rights framework. For 
that reason, presented methodological approach can be considered appropriate.   
 
1.4. Expected theoretical contribution of the dissertation to the contemporary 
theory of the constitutional law 
 
In European legal area there are only a handful of scientific papers which would 
examine the impacts of activism of the Court from the aforementioned point of view. 
Identification and systematization of common legal characteristics in those member states of 
the Council of Europe that rely its jurisprudence and legal doctrine on the Court has not been 
the main object of interest of modern legal explorers. This dissertation will be a major 
contribution to modern legal doctrine, especially for the constitutional and European public 
law, because it will prove that the de-nationalization or internationalization of constitutional 
law is possible. The dissertation will also provide models that will enable a quantitative 
analysis of the relation between constitutional courts as well as the legislative and the Court. 
 The main aspect of dissertation is convenient for scientific research today regarding 
the fact that the practice of the Court is highly developed as well as the Convention’s 
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supervisory mechanisms where final judgements of the Court are being implemented in 
respondent states (in general terms).  
 The scientific contribution of the dissertation can also be emphasized through the fact 
that this new theoretical concept is considered as neologism. In other words, contemporary 
constitutional law is not familiar with the stated concept (theoretically, grammatically or in 
any other way). The analysis of the harmonization process regarding constitutional and 
Convention’s rights on the basis of the scientific method would implement a new concept in 
constitutional theory which will prove trans-national or supra-national characteristics of the 
contemporary constitutional law named particular constitutional law which is constitutional 
law in its very essence with all requirements necessary for national constitutional law. But is 
evolving in one supranational level in mutual cooperation between the Court and member 
states. For that reason, such constitutional law is particular or special.  
 Confirmation of this new theoretical concept on a scientific level will also prove the 
existence of the harmonization process of the constitutional and Convention’s rights in the 
analyzed states. Given the fact that the activism of the Court led to the wider scope of legal 
protection regarding constitutional rights, the particular constitutional law will also prove an 
expansion of the human rights and fundamental freedoms in contemporary era, which can be 
considered as the beneficial effect of the harmonization in analyzed states. For that reason, the 
new theoretical concept is of great importance and significance for the analyzed states 
because it can prove that these states are in contemporary era part of much larger (trans-
national) system for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
  Although relatively new, the concept of internationalization or europeanization of 
contemporary constitutional law is not unknown to constitutional legal scholars. In the second 
chapter of the dissertation (subchapter 2.5.) we will present the main theoretical determinants 
in present scientific research regarding trans-national construction of all main substantial 
elements in constitutional law. The reason why our dissertation is different from present 
scientific research in trans-national evolution of the constitutional law lies within the fact that 
our main focus is primarily based on the Court and its judicial practice as well as undertaken 
adjustments in national legal order after final judgement of the Court has been rendered. As it 
will be presented later in the dissertation, present scientific researches regarding trans-national 
construction of the constitutional law have starting and prevailing ending point in the 
grammatical and normative similarity between human rights and fundamental freedoms as 
prescribed in the majority of the constitutions worldwide. Grammatical and normative 
similarity of the constitutional provisions only between constitutions of analyzed states is 
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dominant research orientation and framework for the analysis. In this dissertation the analysis 
is constructed on one particular higher level of the analysis where grammatical and normative 
similarity of the particular constitutional provisions is only the starting point for the 
construction of one new theoretical framework. The main focus is on the impact of the 
expanded Court’s legal understandings regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the constitutional order of particular member states of the Council of Europe (judicial and 
legislative). The framework of the analysis is set on the judicial activism of the Court and how 
such expanded legal understandings regarding the Convention’s provisions has been brought 
to the constitutional reality of respective six contracting states. And finally, the object of 
analysis is how can this constitutional reality with such wider scope of protection of human 
rights thanks to the Court be addressed as the particular constitutional law. For such 
methodological and scientific characteristics of respective research as set out in this 
dissertation, this dissertation will enlighten one new theoretical concept which has not been 
examined before in theory.  
 
 1.5. Objective limitations of the dissertation  
 
 Besides all stated beneficial effects of our new theoretical concept (particular 
constitutional law) which are dominantly expansion of protection of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, particular obstacles must also be noted. All of the 47 the Council of 
Europe member states have their own constitutional, legal, political, sociological, economical 
and historical background. Their legal systems are extremely heterogeneous, different and on 
different level of development. On the other hand, with this new theoretical concept and with 
trans-national construction of the constitutional law we are trying to verify that within all of 
respective states there is existing process of harmonization with the Court’s judicial practice 
and extended legal understandings regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms. The 
substantial content of respective process is addressed as the particular constitutional law.  
 But on the other hand, significant arguments have also been raised which point out 
that the process of execution of final judgement of the Court is everything but simple (Italy), 
that national courts on numerous occasions have retained on national interpretative methods 
of domestic constitutional provisions without strong or any referral to the Convention, that the 
process of implementation of the Court’s understandings is not straightforward in the 
legislative of the Council of Europe member states etc. This fact can also lead up to the 
conclusion that the Court in reality simply does not have such effect which the framers of the 
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Convention and respective Protocol No. 11 to the Convention were trying to attribute to the 
Convention and the Court. If such statement would be prevailing argument than also our 
concept of the particular constitutional law which is based on the effectivity of the 
Convention’s (supervisory) system would come into danger.  
 But we also have stated that the observation of social, political and legal relations on 
national and international level must not be with idealistic eyes or that we can expect that 
convergence between constitutional system of modern states and system as set up with the 
Convention will be easy. Of course, we have to be aware of the arguments that the principle 
of national sovereignty had, has and will have a prevailing effect and that the execution of a 
final judgement of the Court is simply the exception and not the rule. With such approach 
coherent legal framework of our concept would not be possible.  
 Nevertheless, and considering all stated arguments from both sides (figuratively), we 
believe that it is possible to identify starting point of a certain process, the inception of 
overflow of the Court’s legal understandings to the legal system of the analyzed states. For 
that reason, the title of the dissertation is set only for the introduction of such concept. 
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2. CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
 In the first chapter of the dissertation we have set up the foundation of our research. 
We have displayed relevant problems in the area of study, presented basic hypothesis and 
affiliated main theses, analyzed methodology that will be used in the research and indicated 
contribution and limitations of the dissertation. Considering that the main focus of our thesis 
is trans-national construction of constitutional law which we are addressing as particular 
constitutional law, it is necessary to analyze what constitutional law actually is today, i.e. 
what are normative, substantial, procedural and other foundations of the constitutional law. 
With presentation of substantial and procedural content of the contemporary constitutional 
law it is possible to overcome the first obstacle in the analysis and construction of our 
theoretical concept.  
 From the methodological standpoint we cannot argue about the existence of the 
particular constitutional law if we previously have not presented what is the main essence of 
the constitutional law today. Only with the presentation of the very essence of the 
constitutional law today we can have strong foundation in construction of the particular 
constitutional law on the basis of the impacts of the Court’s judgements. For that reason, 
before we present all main characteristics of the particular constitutional law let we analyze 
what are main characteristics of the constitutional law in contemporary time.  
 
 2.1. Constitutional law – general theoretical perspectives  
 
 Constitutional law as part of the legal science has been the object of many scientific 
researches as well as all other parts of legal science until contemporary time. Numerous 
scientific literature has been published in which were presented all main characteristics of 
constitutional law as well as relevant distinctions between constitutional law and other legal 
branches or other parts of legal sciences.62 Given the fact that present research regarding 
constitutional law have developed theoretical and practical framework of the constitutional 
law in many directions, there are many aspects from which we can analyze the essence of the 
constitutional law or in other words constitutional sedes materiae. E.g. we could present the 
                                                 
62 For the concept of constitutional law and its division from other legal branches in university literature see: F. 
Grad, I. Kaučič, S. Zagorc, op.cit. (footnote 4), p. 34 – 41; S. Sokol, B. Smerdel, op.cit. (footnote 38), p. 11 – 16. 
For the idea of constitutional law in comparative perspective see: A. Von Bogdandy: „Comparative 
Constitutional Law: A Contested Domain“, in: M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 50), p. 25 – 37. Also 
M. Rosenfeld: „Comparative Constitutional Analysis in United States Adjudication and Scholarship“, in: M. 
Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 50), p. 38 – 53.  
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concept of the constitutional law from pure legal aspect and address the constitutional law as 
a set of legal norms that regulate particular related social relations or particular political 
institutions. On the other hand, and regarding strong connection between constitutional law 
and political sciences we can also analyze the essence of the constitutional law from the 
standpoint of political science (especially the theory of state).63 
 On a higher level of analyses using methodological framework of legal sciences in 
general, the constitutional law can be theoretically divided into two main parts – as well as all 
other legal branches in general. First part is the substantial constitutional law which can be 
defined as a set of legal norms that regulate particular social relations within state borders and 
which social relations presents the sedes materiae of the constitutional law. On the other 
hand, there is procedural constitutional law which can be defined as a set of legal norms that 
regulate realization of the substantial constitutional law in practice. Such distinction within 
one legal branch is well familiar to all other legal branches in one coherent legal system 
within one state.64 
 Given the fact that such distinction presents main theoretical distinction according to 
the functional criterion within one legal branch in our analysis of the particular constitutional 
law, identical methodological approach shall be utilized.  
 On the highest level of analysis on which we have to present one theoretical definition 
of the constitutional law in general, the constitutional law can be defined as a set of legal 
norms regardless of the legal source where such norms can be found (on constitutional, legal 
or sub-legal level) and which norms regulate social relations of a constitutional meaning. The 
theory of constitutional law also defined the constitutional law as the set of legal norms which 
regulate relations between state and individual as well as the organization of state’s authority. 
Within such definition the constitutional law is a part of a public law which regulates human 
                                                 
63 Excellent insight regarding constitution-state relations (especially the concept of normative and real 
constitution as well as the substantial and formal constitution) from the aspects of political sciences and theory of 
state can be found in: J. Isensee: „Država, Ustav, Demokracija“, Politička kultura, Zagreb, 2004, p. 76 – 84.  
64 Such distinction between substantial and procedural aspect of particular legal branch can be found in e.g. 
criminal (penal) law where criminal substantial law is presented with the set of legal norms that prescribe 
criminal offences, felonies and misdemenaours, concept of intent and negligence, statute of limitations etc. 
Criminal procedure law on the other hand is a set of legal norms that regulate criminal procedure from the 
begining of criminal procedure (e.g. indictment of the defendant) till the end (e.g. final judgement of a court 
regarding guilty or inocence of the defendant). Respective analogy can be constructed in all other legal branches 
and mainly presents the basic theoretical distinction within one legal branch regarding legal norms and institutes 
of respective legal branch. More about the division between substantial and procedural legal norms within one 
particular legal branch from the aspect of the general theory of law can be found in: D. Vrban: „Država i pravo“, 
Golden Marketing, Zagreb, 2003, p. 395. 
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rights and fundamental freedoms, organization of state’s authority, essential elements of legal 
system and relations between the state and non-state political subjects.65, 66  
 From the traditional point of view, constitutional law has a primary and a secondary 
meaning in relation to the two meanings of the term constitution. The first and primary 
meaning is the concept that corresponds with the so-called “big-c” constitutional law which is 
presented with “…the law contained in a written, codified constitution or plausibly inferred 
from it. Typically, although not necessarily, this law has the three characteristics referred to 
above of being supreme, entrenched, and enforced through the power of judicial review.”67 
The second traditional meaning of the term constitutional law is related to the so-called 
“small-c” constitution where constitutional law “…is the subpart of the aggregate body of 
rules, practices, and understandings determining the actual allocation of power in a polity 
(and the limits on it) that have formal legal status.”68  
 Other researches in the field of theory of constitutional law take a starting point at the 
concept of the constitution itself but the final result of such approach in the analysis is no 
different from the above mentioned. As it is with the “big-c” and the “small-c” constitution, 
here we have a narrow and a broad meaning of the term constitution. Within this narrow 
meaning the constitution presents main, fundamental written document that includes basic 
rules in particular entities such as states. It can be called constitution, but it can have other 
appropriate name (e.g. the Basic Law in Federal Republic of Germany). Formal name is 
meaningless if a substantial content regulates the fundamental set of rules in a particular state. 
On the other hand, broader meaning of the constitution corresponds with the small-c 
constitution and “…comprises the entire body of fundamental rules that govern that socio-
political entity, be they contained in a central document or in many documents, be they 
                                                 
65 F. Grad, I. Kaučič, S. Zagorc, op.cit. (footnote 4), p. 35.  
66 Nearly identical definition of the substantial content of the contemporary constitutional law can also be found 
in the Croatian scientific literature. For that reason we can conclude that the Slovenian and the Croatian 
scientific literature have high level of consensus over what particular social and political relations are regulated 
by the constitutional law. The only distinction is related to the essential elements of legal system which is in the 
Slovenian scientific literature positioned as the independent part of the constitutional law. According to the 
Slovenian literature the essential elements of legal system includes various legal rules that regulates fundamental 
principles of legal order in one particular state (e.g. the principle of democratic state, the principle of social state 
etc.). As opposed to the Slovenian scientific literature, prof. Sokol and prof. Smerdel as main scientific 
authorities for constitutional law in Croatia do not stipulate essential elements of legal system as the idenpendent 
part of the constitutional law regulation. The essential elements of legal system in their view are incorporated in 
rules that regulates the organization of the state's authority. Cf. F. Grad, I. Kaučič, S. Zagorc, op.cit. (footnote 4), 
p. 36 and S. Sokol and B. Smerdel, op.cit. (footnote 38), p. 11 – 14. For simplicity and regarding the fact that this 
classification is not decisive in the context of our thesis, we will use classification as stated in the Croatian 
literature.    
67 S. Gardbaum: „The place of constitutional law in the legal system“ in: M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (ed.), op.cit. 
(footnote 50), p. 170 – 171.  
68 Ibid, p. 171.  
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written down or be they customary rules. Thus, any rule that pertains to the establishment, 
functioning, powers, and mutual relationships between organs of public authority, as well as 
the basic relationships between public authority and individuals, can be said to be a 
constitutional rule.”69 
 Whatever point of view we take in the analysis, the constitutional law would always in 
ultima linea be defined as one supreme legal source that includes various set of rules which 
are essential for common functioning of the state (big-c, narrow meaning) or as a set of rules, 
principles and legal understandings which are disseminated throughout all legal systems and 
related to the organization of the state and the relations between the state and the individual 
(small-c, broad meaning).  
 With this brief theoretical outline of the constitutional law in general, secondly, we 
have to indicate to what particular extent human rights and fundamental freedoms are a part of 
contemporary constitutional law. Present researches specifically indicate that “Human rights 
are at the core of the substantial concept of constitutional rights.”70 Human rights with 
affiliated fundamental freedoms are in the very essence of the contemporary constitutional 
rights and contemporary constitutional law in general. But as it is suggested in the research of 
the professor Robert Alexy all (human) rights which are protected by the positive law are not 
automatically the constitutional (human) rights. There are three methodological conditions 
that should be fulfilled in order to identify particular (human) right as the constitutional 
(human) right. First of all, there is a formal condition or formal concept of the constitutional 
right that needs to be fulfilled in order to set particular (human) right as a constitutional 
(human) right. This condition in concreto demands that particular (human) right is specified 
by the constitution itself or in a particular legal source of a constitutional meaning (e.g. 
particular catalogue of constitutional rights71 etc.). This formal concept or formal condition 
can also be identified as the result of pure normative approach where a constitutional right is 
the particular right which is prescribed by the constitution itself or by other legal source of 
constitutional meaning. If e.g. due process or right to a fair trial is prescribed by the 
particular constitutional provision than due process or right to a fair trial is a constitutional 
(human) right. Second condition that needs to be fulfilled in order to position particular 
(human) right on the constitutional level is procedural condition or procedural concept of 
constitutional (human) rights. From respective procedural point of view, constitutional 
                                                 
69 A.W. Heringa, P. Kiiver: „Constitutions Compared: An Introduction to Comparative Constitutional Law“, 3rd 
edition, Intersentia, 2012, p. 2. 
70 R. Alexy: „Rights and liberties as concepts“ in: M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 50), p. 289. 
71 E.g. French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen from 1789. 
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(human) rights are particular rights that are so important in contemporary state that their 
protection and practical realization, as well as the legal essence or content, cannot be 
subjected to potential revision of simple parliamentary majorities. These constitutional 
(human) rights cannot be changed with simple majority in the legislative body, and the 
constitution itself requires qualified majority (usually majority of 2/3 of all members of 
legislative body but it can be even greater majority) for any revision of substantial content of 
these constitutional (human) rights. Finally, and after the formal and procedural condition or 
concept, there is also a substantial concept or substantial condition that needs to be fulfilled 
in order so that particular (human) right can become a constitutional (human) right. As it has 
been previously stated, human rights are the basic element of the substantial concept of 
constitutional rights as well as the constitutional law in general. “Constitutional rights are 
rights that have been recorded in a constitution with the intention of transforming human 
rights into positive law – the intention, in other words, of positivizing human rights.”72  
 From this fundamental presentation of the legal framework of the constitutional law 
we can easily determine that unalienable parts of the constitutional law are also various legal 
norms that are devoted to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a 
constitutional level. For that reason, we can also easily verify the position of our analysis 
within the theory of the constitutional law.  
 After we have identified general theoretical framework of the contemporary 
constitutional law and the position of the human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
respective framework, a further formalistic analysis is required. So far, we have concluded the 
concept of the constitutional law (big-c and small-c constitution, constitution in broad and 
narrow sense) and we have also identified all necessary condition for particular human right 
to become constitutional right (formal, procedural and substantial conditions or concepts). 
With such methodological approach we have explicitly pointed out to the fact that human 
rights and fundamental freedoms are in the basic theoretical structure of the contemporary 
constitutional law. Lastly, we have to level down our analysis one more time and analyze 
specific legal source where all the previously stated characteristics of the contemporary 
constitutional law are met. This respective legal source is usually a constitution which 
presents the main formalistic object of interest for the constitutional theory.  
From the formal point of view a constitution presents a legal source (but a political 
one as well) where all interests of the constitutional theory is directed. All substantial and 
                                                 
72 R. Alexy, op.cit. (footnote 70), p. 289. 
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procedural aspects of the constitutional law derive from a constitution which can also be 
analyzed from the substantial and procedural point of view but also according to other various 
criteria.73 From a substantial point of view the constitution is related to the legal norms which 
have a constitutional meaning regardless of a legal source where respective norms can be 
found. Every contemporary state has a set of basic rules which can be implemented in one 
basic document with supreme legal significance or in various acts regardless of source and 
legal significance, but which acts regulate the matter of constitutional meaning (human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, organization of state’s authority etc.).  
Repeatedly, the matter of constitutional meaning is regulated in one basic act with 
supreme authority within one state where all other legal sources must be in conformity with 
such act (the big-c concept). But formal source of the constitutional law doesn’t have 
prevailing significance if particular act regulates the matter of constitutional meaning. For 
such reasons, the constitutional law can often be found in a constitution as one particular act 
with supreme legal significance, but it can also be found in constitutional acts, regular 
legislative, sub-legislative provisions and (which is extremely important for our dissertation) 
in ratified international agreements.74     
 Given the fact that norms and provisions of the constitutional law can also be found in 
ratified international agreements we conclude, argumentum a simile, that any ratified 
international agreement can be a part of the constitutional law if provisions of such agreement 
regulate the matter of constitutional meaning. Previously we have noted and presented that the 
matter of constitutional meaning surely presents regulation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and their realization in practice (procedural constitutional law). Given the fact that 
Convention without any doubt regulates (realization of the) human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and that the Convention is, by its very legal essence, ratified international agreement 
within the Council of Europe member states, this fact points out beyond a reasonable doubt to 
the conclusion that the Convention is substantially a part of contemporary constitutional law. 
But in order to present the concept of the particular constitutional law such brief overview of 
the content of contemporary constitutional law is not sufficient. For that reason, in next sub-
chapters we will bring stated content of the contemporary constitutional law to closer 
examination.   
 
                                                 
73 E.g. codified and non-codified constitution, rigid and soft constitution, written and unwritten constitution etc. 
See more in: A.W. Heringa, P. Kiiver, op.cit. (footnote 69), p. 3 and/or S. Sokol, B. Smerdel, op.cit. (footnote 
38), p. 21 and/or F. Grad, I. Kaučič, S. Zagorc, op.cit. (footnote 4), p. 89 – 94.  
74 F. Grad, I. Kaučič, S. Zagorc, op.cit. (footnote 4), p. 42. 
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 2.2. Substantial elements of the constitutional law 
 
 Although on general level the constitutional law can be analyzed from various aspects 
with many criteria, in order to achieve the main goal of our dissertation in verification of 
existence of the particular constitutional law, presentation of substantial and procedural 
aspects of the contemporary constitutional law seems methodologically appropriate. As it will 
be presented later in the dissertation, the concept of the particular constitutional law will also 
be analyzed from the substantial and procedural point of view. For that reason, such 
methodological standpoint is also utilized in the presentation of the contemporary 
constitutional law in general.  
 As it has been previously pointed out, there are three main substantial areas in social 
and political relations that are prescribed by the constitutional law. First and foremost, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 
  
  2.2.1. Human rights and fundamental freedoms 
 
 Previously we have stated to what extent are human rights and fundamental freedoms 
a part of contemporary constitutional law. We have pointed out what particular conditions 
needs to be fulfilled in order to position particular human right on constitutional level. Finally, 
we have concluded that human rights and fundamental freedoms are undeniably a part of 
contemporary constitutional law. In this sub-chapter we will bring the concept of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms to closer examination. 
Contemporary legal science regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms is 
theoretically diversified with the meaning that human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
the object of interest of various legal scholars within various legal branches, and not just of a 
particular legal branch.75 Realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms in practice is 
an indivisible part of all legal proceedings regardless of any criterion. It also must be noted 
that there is a particular theoretical division between human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
                                                 
75 In criminal procedure law the most important function of the legislator is to secure human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (constitutionally guaranteed) of the defendant. Particular scholars identify this new 
process in criminal procedure law as the constitutionalization of the criminal proceedure law. See: D. Krapac: 
„Postupak pred Ustavnim sudom Republike Hrvatske – ustrojstvo i proceduralni elementi ustavnog nadzora“, 
Narodne novine, Zagreb, 2014, p. 16. 
In the administrative law as well as in the administrative proceedings the principle of legality presents the 
fundamental principle in excersising administrative authority in all administrative matters. More about the 
principle of legality in administrative law see: I. Borković: „Upravno pravo“, Narodne novine, Zagreb, 2002, p. 
125.  
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Human rights on the one hand are rights for which the state ensures judicial protection and 
realization. These rights are defined by the constitution and the constitution sets legal 
possibilities for their realization (e.g. the right to vote). On the other hand, fundamental 
freedoms are all parts of individual personal domain which are not subjected to the state 
control and in which domain the state should not apprehend (e.g. the right to life, personal 
dignity, freedom etc.). But given the fact that in contemporary time human rights and 
fundamental freedoms have same level of constitutional protection, in legal sense human 
rights and fundamental freedoms can rather be identified as synonyms.76     
 In order to present the main aspect of contemporary human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as a substantial part of the constitutional law, we could be faced with particular 
methodological problems. As it has been previously noted, the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are not just a product of one period of time or one tragic event in human history but 
rather the product of extremely difficult legal, political, sociological and historical 
development. For such reason it is always difficult to systematically present substantial 
concept of contemporary human rights and fundamental freedoms because respective concept 
is so heterogeneous and may seem that common standards of human rights across the globe 
could not be constructed. But if this argument were true then our new theoretical concept (the 
particular constitutional law) would come into danger because respective concept is based 
upon the unification/harmonization of particular human rights and fundamental freedoms 
which are set by the Convention and implemented throughout the legal understandings and 
the judicial practice of the Court in the Council of Europe member states. So, in order to 
verify our stated basic hypothesis and all main theses, firstly we have to verify that a 
construction of universal human rights system on a general level is possible.  
From the substantial point of view current scientific researches have already indicated 
that a universal human rights system based on the United Nations human rights system is 
possible. There was a growing debate between the scholars regarding a possible construction 
of universal human rights on the basis of the United Nations human rights system. In this 
debate the two affiliated approaches were constructed: one so-called normative universality 
which confirms the existence of particular universal human rights principles founded on the 
United Nations human rights system and the other so-called extreme and modified relativism 
which points out that cultural differences between contemporary states prevent (any or 
significant) development of common standards in the protection of human rights. Although 
                                                 
76 F. Grad, I. Kaučič, S. Zagorc, op.cit. (footnote 4), p. 701. 
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there are strong arguments in favour for relativism, final conclusions were leading to the 
existence of universal values in the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
across the globe with the possibility for universal application. This rather brave argument 
doesn't mean of course that relativistic approach is completely erased or that particular human 
right has same meaning across the globe in every possible state (e.g. due process). It simply 
means that convergence between various human rights system is possible and that the 
respective systems are adaptable and flexible where the UN human rights system can be 
utilized as the ideal-type. “The mere fact that the present-day world does not fully reflect the 
standards contained in the UN-human rights covenants, should not give rise to doubts about 
the validity of those standards, but instead should encourage criticism of the existing 
deficiencies of their realization, and should spurn efforts to bring about changes.”77  
 If a universal approach in realization of human rights system can be constructed than 
our concept (particular constitutional law) can also be verified given the fact that it is also 
characterized with particular universalistic approach. In the case of particular constitutional 
law, we have another mitigating circumstance regarding the fact that all of the Council of 
Europe member states are modern states with strong constitutional and practical commitment 
to the rule of law as well as to the protection and realization of all constitutionally protected 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. In other words, nearly all the Council of Europe 
member states are modern liberal democracies without authoritarian political tendencies.78 
Such political and constitutional environment is substantially beneficial for ongoing 
development in the line of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
 On the other hand, it must be noted that contemporary human rights and fundamental 
freedoms do not have the same level of realization, protection or substantial meaning 
worldwide. The realization of respective human rights and fundamental freedoms which have 
being analyzed in this dissertation are (for that reason) reserved only for democratic states 
                                                 
77 E. Riedel: „Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Pluralism“, in: C. Starck (ed.): „Constitutionalism, 
Universalism and Democracy – a comparative analysis“, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1999, p. 49. 
More about normative universality and extreme and modified relativism can also be found in respective paper.   
78 Although in the case of e.g. Hungary modern constitutional analysis also indicate dangerous tendencies for 
deviation from the commonly used concept of the rule of law. See: G.A. Toth: „Illiberal rule of law? Changing 
Features of Hungarian Constitutionalism“, in: M. Adams, A. Meuwese and E.H. Ballin (ed.): „Constitutionalism 
and the Rule of Law – Bridging Idealism and Realism“, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 386-
417. Unfortunately, illiberal tendencies or open defiance to the rule of law concept is not endemic to Hungary 
only. E.g. severe objections regarding breaches of the principle of the rule of law have been raised in the case of 
Poland and new Supreme Court Act of 2017. See: S. Biernat: „The Rule of Law in Poland“, Nederlandse 
Vereniging voor Rechtspraak, No. 5/2018, available at: https://trema.nvvr.org/editie/2018-05/the-rule-of-law-in-
poland (12.04.2019.). See also: G. Corstens: „The Rule of Law in Poland. A comment on Prof. Biernat’s speech“, 
Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtspraak, No. 5/2018, available at: https://trema.nvvr.org/editie/2018-05/the-
rule-of-law-in-poland-2 (12.04.2019.)  
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with liberal political ideology for which reason the Council of Europe member states seems 
like excellent option for the analysis. Respective states are an effective guarantee of 
prescribed human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in their constitutions and only 
within those states can we find an effective realization in practice. States with an authoritarian 
government that reduces or significantly limits proclaimed human rights and fundamental 
freedoms cannot be object of our interest given the fact that in such states human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are only proclaimed in particular act but are not effectively realized in 
practice.  
 From the historical standpoint, the foundation of the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms concept can primarily be found in the theory of state and the works of theorists of 
political science as e.g. John Locke, Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacque Rousseau.79 The 
common characteristic within all mentioned theories is as follows – there are particular human 
rights that derive from universal, natural order and which are unalienable from any individual 
human being. On the basis of such foundation, every government will be limited by law and 
will not limit or deny basic human rights.80  
 Nearly all great legal sources of human rights law were the product or the consequence 
of a particular historical and political event. The Magna Charta Libertatum from 1215 was 
proclaimed by King John under the severe pressure from the nobility. For the King it was 
politically easier to proclaim the Magna Charta and subject his political power to legal norms 
rather than to risk rebellion and become a stateless King.81 Nevertheless, such political 
background of the Magna Charta doesn’t take its most important characteristics – that it is the 
first constitutional act in England and the foundation of the modern constitutionality based 
upon the rule of law. Furthermore, it is one of the first legal sources that limits the power of 
the government and sets out limits of apprehension in private sphere. Historically, nearly all 
other great sources of human rights law which were in the same time important political 
declarations enacted in the particular constitutional moment have such political and historical 
background. Also, under the severe influence of the school of natural law the United States 
                                                 
79 Although particular provisions that can from present standpoint be identified as norms that regulate human 
rights and fundamental freedoms can also be found in e.g. the Code of Hamurabi, Plato's work on the concept of 
natural law and human rights which are inherent to every human being. See more: F. Grad, I. Kaučič, S. Zagorc, 
op. cit. (footnote 4), p. 711. 
80 From legal perspective, such approach is dominantly related to the school of natural law. More about 
respective concept can be found in Š. Kurtović, op. cit. (footnote 13 in relation to the Old and Middle Age), p. 24 
– 29.  
81 More about the historical and political background of the Magna Charta Libertatum can be found in: Š. 
Kurtović, op.cit. (footnote 13 in relation to the Old and Middle Age), p. 183. For historical and political 
background of the United States Declaration of Independence and French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
the Citizen see: Š. Kurtović, op.cit. (footnote 13 in relation to the New Age), p. 86 and 154. 
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Declaration of Independence from July 4th 1776 proclaimed particular unalienable rights (in 
particular but not solely life, liberty and pursuit of happiness) which are endowed to all men 
by their Creator. Such influence of the school of natural law has also been well accepted due 
to the political struggle between the Colonies and the British Parliament. All this facts can be 
verified also in the case of Convention. The Convention itself cannot escape from its political 
background (the worldwide commitment to prevent new atrocities in peace and in (world) 
wars) and it seems that all great sources of constitutional and human rights law were direct 
consequence of particular political (and unfortunately almost always tragic) event.  
 This fact, of course, does not take away the fundamental legal essence of all respective 
acts – that they are source of the constitutional law which regulate particular human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and which have been enacted under the strong influence of the school 
of natural law.  
 But our dissertation is not committed to the analysis of historical or political 
background of human rights law as the part of constitutional law. Our analysis on the other 
hand is positivistic or normative and is based on actual, current and valid provisions of the 
human rights law which are unalienable part of the contemporary constitutional law.82 Our 
analysis starts with the present status and the substantial content of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in contemporary constitutional law and the possibility of their trans-
national construction which can be addressed as the particular constitutional law. 
Nevertheless, to achieve full level of the analysis previous brief historical and introductory 
overview should also be presented.  
 In conclusion to the respective historical presentation of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms development one additional classification should also be presented in 
order to obtain particularly wider historical preview of development in human rights law. 
Such historical preview with the presentation of the background of development in 
constitutional and human rights law will ensure methodological clarity in achieving the main 
goal of our dissertation. In addition, the historical method of analysis has great meaning in the 
constitutional law and for that reason we will utilize respective method for clarification of 
development in human rights law.  
                                                 
82 For the purposes of this dissertation the human rights law is defined as the set of legal rules that regulate 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Human rights law is a part of the constitutional law and in relation to 
the constitutional law has theoretically narrower scope. In essential and if we can define human rights law as a 
special legal branch with sufficient number of particular legal norms, human rights law essentialy is a part of the 
constitutional law. In this dissertation we will use the term human rights law only in corelation with the 
constitutional law as presented earlier in the dissertation. In other words, in this dissertation to the term human 
rights law will not be attributed wider or broader theoretical meaning but only as the part of the substantial 
constitutional law.    
74 
 
If we already have concluded that respective constitutional and human rights legal 
sources were not the product of particular idealistic orientation but rather particular political 
development (with idealistic orientation), for the purposes of our analysis we will also display 
the time frame of such development.  
Usually, the time frame of historical development in human rights law is presented 
with three generations of development in human rights law. First generation of development 
is the classical generation in which inception of constitutionality has occurred. The sources 
for this first generation are the Magna Charta Libertatum, Petition of Rights from 1628, Bill 
of Rights from 1689, Habeas Corpus Act from 1679, United States Declaration of 
Independence from 1776 and French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen from 
1789.  
Common characteristic of all stated constitutional sources is that all of them have 
prescribed particular negative aspects of prescribed human rights and fundamental freedoms 
with the meaning that the state must not intervene and violate them. The French Declaration is 
probably the best example: the Declaration enumerates particular human rights of the citizen 
which were identified by the theory of the constitutional law as the clasical human rights. 
Respective rights e.g. are: freedom and equality, principle of national sovereignty, principle of 
proportionality, inviolability of ownership, principle of legality in criminal substantial law, 
presumption of inocence etc. Respective rights are inviolable in principle and any type of 
limitation must be performed according to law which is the expression of general will and not 
the will of the King or nobility or Church. After such first wave or first generation of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms social and economic development had contributed to the 
development of the constitutional law as well. In this second wave or second generation of the 
development of human rights the main focus is on social and work security. The Weimar 
Constitution from 1919 included various rights and principles regarding social security and 
right to work. From theoretical aspect, the rights in the second generation are positive rights 
because respective rights are directed to the state and such rights establish the duty of the state 
to secure particular security or realization of particular interests. Finally, the third generation 
of human rights are rights related to the protection of the environment, rights related to the 
free access of information and other various rights which are the product of technological 
development.83 
                                                 
83 S. Sokol, B. Smerdel, op.cit. (footnote 38), p. 102 – 108.  
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 As for the conclusion of respective sub-chapter from the presented analysis we can 
easily point out arguments that are the foundation of our new theoretical concept (the 
particular constitutional law): 
 
a) human rights and fundamental freedoms were, are and will be an inalienable part of the 
constitutional law;84 
b) human rights and fundamental freedoms are subjected to the regulation of the 
constitutional law;85   
c) particular common standards in human rights regulation can be identified on universal 
level.86 
 
 If particular common standards in human rights regulation can be utilized on a 
universal level than on the pure normative foundation, in that case, argumentum a fortiori, 
those standards can also be imposed by particular international judicial authority on the basis 
of one particular legal source. We have stated that these common standards are utilized on the 
basis of the UN human rights system where the Declaration and/or the Covenants have 
presented legal and political authority in evolution and protection of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms across the globe. The practice and political and legal reality have 
shown that all these human rights were in most cases constitutionalized, i.e. recognized and 
protected on the constitutional level. On the foundation of the Declaration and the Covenants 
the majority of modern states have implemented after the World War II on the constitutional 
level great number of contemporary human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Declaration 
and the Covenants were moral, political and legal authorities that have expressed guidelines 
for new democratic states in their (political, legal, social) reconstruction after the World War 
II. Nearly all states have implemented these guidelines regarding their social, political, legal 
and historical background (mutatis mutandis). Respective guidelines from the Declaration 
and/or the Covenants as implemented in the constitutional texts were later developed and 
realized in the practice of constitutional courts and legislative also according to the political, 
social, legal and sociological background of particular modern state. The consequence of such 
                                                 
84 Professor Alexy states that „Human rights are, first, moral, second, universal, third, fundamental, and, fourth, 
abstract rights that, fifth, take priority over all other norms.“, R. Alexy, op. cit. (footnote 70), p. 290. 
85 As it has been previously stated in contemporary constitutional law an increasing number of norms are 
constitutionalized especially in criminal procedurel law which phenomenon in legal science is identified as the 
constitutionalization of the criminal procedural law. See: D. Krapac, op.cit. (footnote 75).  
86 Which fact is in direct corelation with our fundamental definition of the particular constitutional law given the 
fact that our concept is also based on particular universalistic approach throghout the practice of the Court.  
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dispersive evolution today is presented with the fact that across the globe there are as many 
substantial elements of the e.g. right to a fair trial as there are constitutional courts which 
have determined the content and implemented respective human right in particular case.  
Nevertheless, contemporary theory of the constitutional law specifically points out that 
universal characteristics and common standards in human rights law are possible.87 
 In the case of the Convention and the particular constitutional law the situation is 
reversed which is a beneficial mitigating circumstance in the construction of our new concept. 
 The Court with its legal understandings regarding substantial elements of the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms has been the main institutional link that imposed (uniform) 
legal understanding on the content of particular human rights or fundamental freedom which 
is protected by the Convention. And the imposition of uniform legal understanding of the 
Court has been brought in practice throughout the international obligation of the Council of 
Europe member states on execution of a final judgment of the Court. The Declaration and the 
Covenants did not foresee any international judicial authority competent for protection and 
determination of violation of respective provisions like the Convention. The Convention with 
introduced system for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms has overcome 
such tremendous political and legal obstacle and secured on the European continent 
qualitatively higher level of protection in human rights law.  
 Finally, this sub-chapter has been devoted to the presentation of the significance of 
contemporary human rights law in the constitutional law. We have lightened up historical 
background of the evolution in human rights law and emphasized significance of the human 
rights law in contemporary constitutional law. We also displayed the possibility regarding 
common universal standards in the line of protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. All these methodological endeavors were needed given the fact that our further 
scientific examination of the particular constitutional law is relying on the Convention which 
is one international multilateral agreement devoted to the protection of human rights and 
fundamental principles.  
 For that reason, we had to present the main substantial concept of the constitutional 
law in contemporary time and point out to the significance of human rights law in the 
constitutional law in general. Our new concept is called the particular constitutional law and 
for that reason we have to justify that our concept is substantially a part of the constitutional 
                                                 
87 „The existing system rather displays considerable capacity for adaptation and flexibility in relation to different 
cultural settings, despite the acknowledgement of universal standards, provided that the fundamental premise is 
accepted that the human rights philosophy is based on the free and self-determined individual as the centre of 
the human rights system.“ E. Riedel, op. cit. (footnote 77), p. 49. 
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law. In the next two sub-chapters further commonly used substantial elements of the 
constitutional law will be presented.  
 
  2.2.2. Organization of the state 
 
 Constitutional rules that regulate relations between highest political institutions in one 
particular state are commonly addressed as the second unalienable part of the contemporary 
constitutional law.88 Respective rules are not in primary focus of our interest and will be 
presented in this sub-chapter only in relation to the Convention and in the context of our 
dissertation. The reason for such methodological approach in the analysis of the substantial 
content of contemporary constitutional law is purely practical, i.e. if we would expand our 
analysis beyond the main focus of our dissertation (which is introduction of the particular 
constitutional law on the basis of universalistic human rights system approach and the judicial 
practice of the Court) we could weak the analytical blade of our dissertation and ultimately 
fail to verify respective concept. As it has been previously stated, contemporary constitutional 
law is a part of legal science that has its own sedes materiae. The content of contemporary 
constitutional law has been the object of numerous scientific researches and it is practically 
impossible to present in one paper (even if this paper would be or is doctoral thesis) every 
possible aspect of the contemporary constitutional law regulation. For that reason, in this sub-
chapter we will carefully present main content of the contemporary constitutional law 
regulation regarding organization of the state but only in the relation with primary focus of the 
dissertation. Although at first it can be deceiving that our new concept doesn’t have any 
relation whatsoever with the constitutional rules regarding organization of the state, closer 
analysis points out to a different conclusion.  
As it is with the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
every modern state also has a set of rules that regulate relations between fundamental political 
institutions (e.g. President, Government, judicial system, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court 
etc.). All respective rules are as similar as they are substantially different and there aren’t two 
states with identical rules regarding relations between the highest political and constitutional 
institutions. Nevertheless, contemporary constitutional theory has systemized all common 
characteristics (as it is with universalistic approach in the area of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms) and theory in general has presented presidential, semi-presidential and 
                                                 
88 See supra, p. 65.  
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parliamentary system of government. These are three most common systems of government 
and paradigmatic scheme in which all contemporary systems of government are analyzed. 
This doesn’t mean, of course, that stated systems are the only possible solutions in the line of 
organization of the state but are the usual and common analytical and methodological tool in 
the analysis of the organization of the state. Respective systems are also the primary teaching 
tool on courses regarding constitutional law on various faculties of law.89 Respective rules 
with other affiliated parts (e.g. the concept of federalism, the legal and political essence of the 
people’s sovereignty from the aspect of the constitutional law as well as the theory of state, 
organization of the regional and local self-government) are not in a primary focus of our 
interest in this dissertation for which reason, as well as all the reasons indicated above, a 
further analysis will not be presented. 
 But on the other hand, the theory of the constitutional law within respective sub-
regulation (organization of state) includes analysis of other related rules and principles which 
can be of our interest regarding strong connectivity with the human rights system. One of the 
respective sub-parts is the electoral system in one particular state. Electoral system is 
analyzed in the context of the organization of state and presents one of the most important 
parts within the theory of constitutional law. In general, electoral system is system that 
ensures election of highest political institutions which are prescribed by the constitution itself. 
With electoral system, the people (or voters) exercise their national sovereignty and empower 
particular political option to rule on limited mandate. The concept of national sovereignty 
achieves its full theoretical and practical potential only if electoral system is fair, democratic 
and utilized for the people of the people and by the people. For such reasons, organization of 
the electoral system is one of the most important constitutional questions which must be 
regulated with extreme political and legal caution. And on the other hand and despite the fact 
that the elections are not commonly subjected to the regulations of international agreements, 
the Convention nevertheless has pointed out the right to free elections in Art. 3 of the Protocol 
No. 1 to the Convention and prescribed that: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold 
free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the 
free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”  
The judicial practice of the Court regarding a respective right to free election as well 
as the respective provision of the Convention is extremely significant in the context of our 
                                                 
89 See F. Grad, I. Kaučič, S. Zagorc, op.cit. (footnote 4), p. 155 – 170 or S. Sokol, B. Smerdel, op.cit. (footnote 
38), p. 329 – 369. For further contemporary analysis of the presidentialism and parliamentarism with brief 
historical introductory overview see: H. Fix-Fierro, P. Salazar-Ugarte: „Presidentialism“ and A.W. Bradley, C. 
Pinelli: „Parliamentarism“ in: M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 50), p. 628 – 670. 
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dissertation because it directly points out to the conclusion that the Convention substantially is 
a part of the constitutional law not only because it sets out minimum standards which must be 
achieved in the line of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (in narrow 
sense) but because it also indicates minimum standards regarding elections. As it has been 
stated, electoral system is a sub-part of constitutional law regarding provisions which regulate 
organization of the state in general sense. Bearing all respective arguments in mind we can 
conclude that the Convention has propulsive legal effect on all fields of social and political 
relations that are subjected to the regulation of the constitutional law. For such reason, the 
significance of the Convention in contemporary constitutional law is even greater than it may 
seem.  
 Judicial practice of the Court regarding respective right to free elections is highly 
developed and to nowadays has given answers on various problems that have been raised 
under Art. 3 of the Protocol  No. 1 to the Convention.90  
 As it has been noted in the beginning of this sub-chapter, rules and regulations which 
are directed to the organization of particular state are diversified, politically important and 
commonly prescribed on the constitutional level as rules of identical significance and legal 
strength as rules that prescribes protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Even 
though the rules which regulate protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
rules regulating organization of the state are positioned on the same constitutional level, 
which means that respective rules in comparison have identical legal and constitutional 
strength, it can be constructed that rules regulating human rights and fundamental freedoms 
prevails over the rules regulating organization of the state.  
Art. 17 par. 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia clearly stipulates that: 
“Even in cases of clear and present danger to the existence of the state, no restrictions may be 
imposed upon the provisions of this Constitution stipulating the right to life, prohibition of 
torture, cruel or unusual treatment or punishment, and concerning the legal definitions of 
criminal offences and punishment, and the freedom of thought, conscience and religion.” 
Similar provisions can be found also in the Art. 16 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Slovenia which stipulates: “Human rights and fundamental freedoms provided by this 
                                                 
90 These problems were refered e.g. to the right of political parties on free elections (case of Russian 
Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs v. Russian Federation in 2007), types of European electoral systems 
(majority v. proportional) – e.g. Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey in 2008, electoral thresholds in proportional 
electoral systems (again Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey in 2008) etc. Throghout all respective cases the Court 
emphasized that the contracting parties have broad margin of appreciation in regulation of their electoral system 
but any regulation must not contravene to the Art. 3 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and standards set 
out by the Court in respective practice. See more in: J. Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p 1057 – 1086.  
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Constitution may exceptionally be temporarily suspended or restricted during a war and state 
of emergency. Human rights and fundamental freedoms may be suspended or restricted only 
for the duration of the war or state of emergency, but only to the extent required by such 
circumstances and inasmuch as the measures adopted do not create inequality based solely 
on race, national origin, sex, language, religion, political, or other conviction, material 
standing, birth, education, social status, or any other personal circumstance. 
 
The provision of the preceding paragraph does not allow any temporary suspension or 
restriction of the rights provided by Articles 17, 18, 21, 27, 28, 29, and 41.”91 
 
 Pursuant to the presented provisions of the Slovenian and Croatian Constitution even 
in the case of imminent danger to the territorial integrity and survival of the state, mentioned 
human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot be abolished. On the basis of stated 
arguments, we conclude that constitutional provisions regarding human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in contemporary time have prevailing effect over all other 
(constitutional) legal norms in contemporary state that position human rights and fundamental 
freedoms on one qualitatively higher legal and political level.92 
 In the line of all presented arguments we can easily determine that rules and principles 
regarding organization of the state are also inalienable and inherent part of the constitutional 
law regulation. Although it may seem that respective constitutional provisions do not and 
cannot interfere with any legal source of the international conventional law closer 
examination indicates that such statement would be too restrictive. Art. 3 of the Protocol No. 
1 to the Convention prescribes right to free elections (for legislative body) and the judicial 
practice of the Court has set out minimum standards which have to be respected in practice in 
order to preserve inviolability of respective article.  
 On the other hand, even in case of an imminent threat to the integrity of the state, 
particular human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot be derogated which brings us to the 
conclusion that rules and norms regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms have a 
prevailing effect and can overcome all other norms.  
                                                 
91 Article 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia prescribes inviolability of home. Article 18 prohibits 
any kind of torture while Article 21 explicitlly prescribes protection of human personality and dignity. 
Remaining three articles mentioned in respective Art. 16 guarantee minimum standards regarding criminal 
offences and criminal procedure (presumption of innocence according to the Art. 27, nullum crimen nulla poena 
sine lege in Art. 28 and right to a fair trial according to the Art. 29). 
92 And which fact points out to the statement of professor Alexy that: „Human rights are, first, moral, second, 
universal, third, fundamental, and, fourth, abstract rights that, fifth, take priority over all other norms.“ See 
supra, p. 75 (footnote 84). 
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 This sub-chapter of the analysis has been devoted to the presentation of second general 
theoretical part of contemporary constitutional law in the context of our main focus. Because 
of that fact this sub-chapter did not display all possible ideas and theories regarding 
organization of the state given the fact that any respective idea or theory relevant for the 
organization of the state can be the subject of separate analysis (e.g. the concept of federalism 
or unitary government). For that reason, we have limited our analysis only for a portion of 
constitutional rules that are relevant for the context of our dissertation and where respective 
rules and the Convention have particular touch points (like e.g. the right to free election for 
legislative body). On the other hand, we have also emphasized the importance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in relation to the rules and principles regarding organization 
of the state and have verified that particular human rights and fundamental freedoms can 
overcome any other legal norms. With identical methodological approach we will examine the 
final substantial part of the contemporary constitutional law as pointed out in the theory, as 
well as examine touch points between the Convention and rules that regulate relations 
between the state and non-state subjects.  
 
2.2.3. Relations between the state and the non-state subjects 
 
 Constitutional rules and principles that regulate relations between the state and the 
non-state subjects are, as indicated above, third commonly addressed substantial content of 
the contemporary constitutional law. The term non-state subject is primarily related to various 
non-governmental organizations where the constitution sets legal and political framework for 
their establishment and general activity within the borders of the state. 
A related matter of the constitutional regulation within respective substantial content is 
also the right to the freedom of assembly which historically dates back to the 18th century 
England and North America. Constitution of Pennsylvania of 1776 was the first constitutional 
enactment regarding the freedom of assembly.93 Later constitutional and political 
development (especially after the European liberal revolutions in the middle 19th century) 
incorporated respective freedom of assembly as well as all other associated rights in modern 
constitutional texts.  
                                                 
93 U.K. Preuß: „Associative Rights (the Rights to the Freedoms of Petition, Assembly, and Association)“, in: M. 
Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 50), p. 951.  
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   Nearly all contemporary constitutional texts have particular provisions regarding 
trade unions. For example, the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia clearly stipulates in 
Art. 60 freedom to form trade unions.94 
Similar provision is prescribed by the Art. 76 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Slovenia.95  
 The theory within respective sub-part of the contemporary constitutional law 
regulation has indicated that respective sub-part includes various and extremely different 
spectrum of social relations which are commonly regulated by this part of the constitutional 
law. In the most general classification associations which fall under the scope of regulation of 
this sub-part of constitutional law are: 
 
a) associations related to the economic and labor relations (e.g. trade unions, employers’ 
organizations etc.); 
b) associations regarding common welfare and non-profit organizations (e.g. charities); 
c) associations related to sport and entertainment (various sports organizations etc.); 
d) religious organizations and organizations related to the culture, science and art; 
e) non-partisan political organizations and various advocacy groups; 
f) various other private clubs.96 
 
 All respective organizations can be addressed as non-governmental organizations 
and/or non-state subjects which general legal framework is usually prescribed by the 
constitution. Keeping the same methodological approach as in the second sub-part of the 
contemporary constitutional law (rules and principles regarding the organization of the state) 
it has to be emphasized to what extent the Convention is related to this part of the 
contemporary constitutional law regulation.  
 Normatively the Convention also encompasses the freedom of assembly and 
association and stipulates (Art. 11 of the Convention) that: “Everyone has the right to freedom 
of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form 
and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.” Although the Declaration and the 
Covenants are also the source of respective freedom of association and organization of trade 
                                                 
94 “In order to protect their economic and social interests, all employees shall be entitled to form trade unions 
and they shall be free to join and leave them. Trade unions may form their federations and join international 
trade union organizations. The formation of trade unions in the armed forces and the police may be restricted by 
law. Employers shall be entitled to form associations and they shall be free to join and leave them.”  
95 “The freedom to establish, operate, and join trade unions shall be guaranteed.”  
96 U.K. Preuß, op.cit. (footnote 93), p. 959. 
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unions, only the Convention among regional human rights systems has mechanism to enforce 
respective right by the Court. And the jurisprudence of the Court is also quite developed 
regarding respective freedom. “In its jurisprudence, the ECtHR had to deal quite frequently 
with the ban on political parties in member states….Among the cases not related to political 
parties, the scope of the rights of trade unions plays a prominent role. In a recent landmark 
decision the Court has revised its former stance “that the right to bargain collectively and to 
enter into collective agreements does not constitute an inherent element of Article 11” and, 
“having regard to the developments in labour law, both international and national, and to the 
practice of Contracting States in such matters,” recognized that “the right to bargain 
collectively with the employer has, in principle, become one of the essential elements of the 
right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of (one’s) interests set forth in Article 
11 of the Convention…”97 
 From respective analysis we can verify beyond any reasonable doubt, the touch points 
of the Convention and contemporary constitutional law within respective sub-part of the 
constitutional law also (relations between the state and non-state subjects). The Convention 
specifically stipulates the freedom of association and assembly which is inherent sub-part of 
contemporary constitutional law. Regarding applicability of Art. 11 of the Convention we also 
have to emphasize Art. 34 of the Convention. Art. 34 is the fundamental procedural 
Convention’s provision and prescribes rule regarding locus standi or ius standi in iudicio 
before the Court. Pursuant to the Art. 34 of the Convention “The Court may receive 
applications from any person, nongovernmental organization or group of individuals 
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set 
forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not 
to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.” 
By considering the stated provision of the Art. 11 of the Convention, as well as the 
provision of the Art. 34 of the Convention, we can easily determine that the framers of the 
Convention wanted to exceed applicability of all freedoms set out in the Convention to all 
forms of social organizations that can mutatis mutandis be holders of rights and freedoms 
prescribed by the Convention.  
 This fact directly points out to the conclusion that the Convention regarding respective 
criterion (regulation of the relation between the state and non-state subjects) is also an 
inherent part of the contemporary constitutional law.  
                                                 
97 U.K. Preuß, op.cit. (footnote 93), p. 958. 
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 As for the conclusion of this sub-chapter in which we have been devoted to point out 
substantial part of the constitutional law in modern times we are methodologically obliged to 
emphasize once again the idea and reason for respective chapter. As it has been previously 
stated, the thesis of our dissertation is trans-national construction of contemporary 
constitutional law on the basis of the judicial practice of the Court and international obligation 
of the signatory state pursuant to the Convention on execution of all final judgments of the 
Court. If we want to construct a particular new concept in contemporary constitutional law, 
then it is methodologically appropriate to highlight the main content of the contemporary 
constitutional law in most general and abstract point of view. In this endeavor we utilized 
common differentiation in one particular branch – the division on substantial and procedural 
rules. Substantial rules regulate particular sedes materiae of respective legal branch or 
particular social relations and procedural rules regulate realization of substantial rules in 
practice.  
 The idea of this sub-chapter was not committed on presentation of (all or majority) 
contemporary theories in constitutional law or (all or majority) ideas and institutions which 
are regulated by the constitutional law. Such venture would surely be impossible for one 
dissertation in the light of all theoretical and practical scientific and professional contributions 
to the contemporary constitutional law.  
 The idea of this sub-chapter has been committed by a brief presentation and 
verification of the substantial content of the contemporary constitutional law. Utilizing 
systematization used in the teaching process of the constitutional law on various faculties of 
law we have pointed out that the main scope of interest in contemporary constitutional law is 
set on protection and realization of the human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as on 
the rules and principles related to the organization of the state or organization of state’s 
authority. Final substantial content of the contemporary constitutional law can be found in 
regulation between the state and non-state subjects. This scope of interest is fundamental 
theoretical framework of the contemporary constitutional law.  
 On the other hand, we have displayed touch points of the substantial content between 
contemporary constitutional law, as stated above, and the Convention. We have verified that 
the substantial content of the Convention is clearly devoted to the protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms (given the fact that the majority of the Convention’s provision is 
related to the human rights and fundamental freedoms), but the Convention also contains 
particular provisions that can be identified within the second and third substantial sub-part of 
the contemporary constitutional law. The Convention’s rules regarding right to free elections 
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or regarding freedom of assembly and association clearly points out to the conclusion that the 
Convention is a part of contemporary constitutional law not only because of the fact that the 
majority of its provision is related to the human rights and fundamental freedoms in narrow 
sense but also because the Convention has particular provisions which are substantially sub-
part of the regulation regarding the organization of the state (second sub-part of the 
contemporary constitutional law) and the relations between the state and non-state subjects 
(third sub-part of the contemporary constitutional law).  
 Although it would be sufficient for the context of our dissertation that we have verified 
the position of the Convention only within one sub-part of the contemporary constitutional 
law (e.g. human rights and fundamental freedoms) in order to position the Convention and our 
analysis in the constitutional law theory, we brought to our attention second and third 
substantial sub-part of the constitutional law as well and verified that the Convention contains 
particular provisions that also present touch-points with the respective substantial sub-part. 
For that reason, we conclude this sub-chapter of our dissertation with confirmation and 
verification of the substantial content of the contemporary constitutional law as well as the 
position of the Convention within the constitutional law theory.  
 
 2.3. Procedural elements of the constitutional law 
 
 After presentation of the substantial content of contemporary constitutional law and 
utilizing distinction between substantial and procedural legal norms within one legal branch 
as commonly used in general theory of law98 our analysis must also cover procedural 
elements of the constitutional law. Procedural constitutional law or totality of rules and 
principles that ensure realization of substantial constitutional law in practice and in day-to-day 
legal and political life are as important as the substantial constitutional law. Without 
procedural rules and principles substantial constitutional law would stay merely as letter on 
paper without (any) possibility for their realization.  
 Given the fact that one of the essential elements of any legal order is its enforceability 
despite the will of any involved subject, rules regulating procedure are the second inseparable 
part within one legal branch. Enforcement of particular (judicial or administrative) decision is 
not possible until a competent state or judicial body conduct procedure prescribed by 
governing law. Enforcement is the final step in application of particular legal norm in social 
                                                 
98 See supra, footnote 64. 
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relations. But application or enforcement is not possible until a competent body determines 
that a particular subject has right prescribed by law in one particular legal relation. Because of 
that fact, procedural and substantial legal norms within one legal branch present one 
unalienable unity. Substantial norms are useless without procedural norms and vice versa. In 
the context of our dissertation and in relation to our new theoretical concept, particular 
constitutional law must be analyzed not only from substantial point of view but as well as 
from the procedural one. For that reason and with the same methodological approach we have 
to identify what is common content of procedural constitutional law, what particular 
procedure is regulated by respective legal norms, and for what reason. With respective 
presentation we can utilize presented arguments afterwards in the analysis of our new 
theoretical concept given the fact that the particular constitutional law also has its own 
procedural point of view.  
 To conclude, we must emphasize the fact that procedural constitutional law is also 
well developed and there are numerous institutes that can be the object of the analysis. As it 
has been with the substantial constitutional law, we are unable to present all theoretical ideas 
and institutes regarding procedural constitutional law in one paper (even if such paper is 
dissertation). E.g. the concept of judicial review or the constitutional complaint can be the 
object of independent analysis in independent doctoral dissertation. For such reason, in 
following sub-chapter we will present only main procedural aspects of the contemporary 
constitutional law refraining ourselves from further implications. Our dissertation is devoted 
on verification of the existence of one new particular theoretical concept and for that reason 
we will display only that theoretical framework which can be utilized in the process of 
verification of our new concept.  
 
  2.3.1. Procedural rules; Realization and protection  
 
 As stated above procedural constitutional law is the second unalienable part of the 
contemporary constitutional law which contains independent legal rules and principles 
directed to the realization and protection of the substantial constitutional law in practice. The 
theory of the constitutional law has already systemized and verified the existence of the 
procedural constitutional law as the independent legal branch. According to the contemporary 
theory, the procedural constitutional law is totality of legal norms that regulate the 
competence of the constitutional court(s), procedure and legal effects of its decisions. In all 
states where independent constitutional courts are established (so-called concentrated system 
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of judicial review) the constitution usually contains (more or less) general rules regarding its 
activity. Further elaboration regarding procedure before the constitutional court is commonly 
left to other acts passed by the parliament but which acts are usually passed with so-called 
qualified majority or even with majority which is needed for the revision of the 
constitution.99,100 
 As an independent part of legal science (but also the part of the contemporary 
constitutional law in general), procedural constitutional law has its own legal sources which is 
a constitutive element for independent legal branch. The sources of procedural constitutional 
law can be found in various general legal acts from constitution to the rules of procedure of 
the constitutional court. As well as it is with the substantial constitutional law, legal sources of 
the procedural constitutional law can also be found in international agreements especially 
international agreements that regulate human rights and fundamental freedoms. According to 
the Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia (No. Up-43/96 from May 
30th 2000) in which is clearly stipulated that international agreements which regulate human 
rights and fundamental freedoms on a higher level of protection than the level of protection as 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, on the basis of the Art. 15 par. 5 
of the Constitution, have same legal level as the Constitution itself.101  
 Stated arguments can also be utilized in the context of our dissertation. We have 
already stated that legal sources of substantial constitutional law can be found in international 
agreements as well as in national legal sources.102 Now we can verify that procedural 
constitutional law can also be found in international agreements and, in particular, those 
international agreements which regulate human rights and fundamental freedoms. The 
Convention undoubtedly meets all set out criteria. The Convention is an international 
agreement devoted to the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The Convention contains particular procedural provisions which prescribe all 
required criterion for initiating a procedure before the Court. Argumentum a simile, the 
Convention as constitution provides main or basic procedural rules where further provisions 
                                                 
99 J. Sovdat: „Ustavno procesno pravo – praktikum“, Pravna fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani, 2015, p. 17. 
100 The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia in Art. 132 par. 1 and 2 stipulates: „The procedure and conditions 
for the appointment of justices of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia and the termination of their 
office, conditions and time-limits for instituting proceedings for the assessment of constitutionality and legality, 
the procedure and legal effects of its decisions, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Constitution, and other issues vital to the performance of duties and work of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia shall be regulated by a constitutional act. Such constitutional act 
shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure determined for amending the Constitution. (underlined by 
author)“ 
101 J. Sovdat, op.cit. (footnote 99), p. 18. 
102 See supra, p. 68.  
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regarding procedure are contained in the Rules of Court103 which, on a national level, can be 
identified as rules of procedure of constitutional court or as a constitutional act on a 
constitutional court. 
 Considering the above stated definition of the procedural constitutional law (legal 
norms regardless of their formal legal source that regulate competence of constitutional 
courts, procedure before respective courts and legal effects of their decision) we can easily 
determine that respective definition also has a particular institutional aspect. In the very 
essence of the procedural constitutional law is contained institutional aspect of realization and 
protection of the substantial constitutional law. This institutional aspect of the definition is to 
rely on the existence of special constitutional body empowered in ultima linea for 
determination that infringement of particular provision of substantial constitutional law has 
occurred in particular case and modality how this infringement in particular case should be 
corrected. In most contemporary states this special constitutional body is named constitutional 
court although it can have different name (e.g. the Constitutional Council in the Republic of 
France). On the other hand, in those states where constitution does not provide special 
constitutional body competent for constitutional adjudication process, regularly the highest 
court in judicial structure (e.g. Supreme Court) possess particular competence for 
constitutional disputes – determination of infringement of particular human right and 
fundamental freedom or dispute between highest constitutional organs of one particular state.  
 Nevertheless, and for the purposes of this dissertation we conclude this sub-chapter 
with the determination that procedural constitutional law has already been recognized in 
contemporary legal science, that the respective legal branch has its own set of rules which can 
be also found in international agreements, that the respective set of rules are devoted to the 
protection and realization of the substantial constitutional law in everyday life and legal, 
social, judicial as well as political practice, and that the procedural constitutional law provides 
an institutional form for constitutional adjudication process. This framework will be sufficient 
for the context of our dissertation. In the following sub-chapter, we will bring the institutional 
aspect of the realization and protection of the substantial constitutional law to our closer 
attention as well as the effectiveness of procedural constitutional law.  
 
 
                                                 
103 Rules of Court (as of August 1st 2018) are available on the official website of the Court: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf (12.04.2019.) 
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  2.3.2. Competent authorities for realization and protection  
 
 Although the procedural constitutional law provides independent and particular set of 
legal rules that regulate the competence of the constitutional court, it is the obligation of the 
whole judicial system in a particular state in any regulated proceeding to protect the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms which are protected by the constitution. In other words, the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms should not occur on the very last 
national legal instance (constitutional court) but it should be a prevailing task of all competent 
(judicial and administrative) bodies that resolve particular social conflict and/or decide on a 
particular human right and fundamental freedom. All laws and actions of competent state 
bodies regarding litigation, ownership, obligation, inheritance, criminal procedure, criminal 
offences and misdemeanors, enforcement of final judgment of the court, administrative 
procedure or administrative disputes etc. must always be interpreted and applied according to 
the constitutional provisions regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms. In such 
system, constitutional courts come at the very last end and serve only as the control factor of 
all judicial system within one state. In the case of the Convention, the Council of Europe has 
provided one additional legal remedy (the application according to the Convention) and one 
supra-national judicial body (the Court) that will serve as the final international control factor 
of all judicial systems of the Council of Europe member states – state parties of the 
Convention.  
 It must be noted that contemporary constitutional courts do not hold jurisdiction only 
over the supreme protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the procedure 
regarding constitutional complaint. From the previous analysis of the substantial 
constitutional law we have determined that contemporary constitutional law regulate not only 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also the organization of the state and relation 
between the state and the non-state subjects. For such reason, the set of rules that make 
procedural constitutional law have provisions not only regarding the constitutional complaint, 
but also about e.g. the process of judicial review of the legislature as well (abstract review) 
etc. Given the fact that the main focus of our dissertation is directed to the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, further aspects of the judicial review and other provisions in 
procedural constitutional law will not be presented. Judicial review is independent theoretical 
constitutional concept with its own theoretical and practical foundations and framework and 
in the light of our hypothesis and affiliated main thesis is not of our primary concern.  
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 From a historical point of view, development of the procedural constitutional law in 
the light of our dissertation (but also in general) can be analyzed from two substantial 
positions: the European and the American model. Particular common distinctions between 
respective models have already been identified by the theory of constitutional law. First of all, 
in the European model, constitutional courts are established by the constitutions and 
constitution itself prescribes competence of the constitutional court on judicial review 
(revocation of particular legislative provision or particular act of parliament). In the American 
model, where the Supreme Court of the United States of America serves as the model-court in 
American model, judicial review is not introduced by the constitution but is a product of the 
judicial practice of the Supreme Court (Marbury vs. Madison). Secondly, actions and decision 
of constitutional courts in European model are easier to challenge through the constitutional 
amendments. In United States of America, on the other hand, constitutional revision is 
extremely difficult given the fact that the Constitution of the United States of America for 
constitutional amendments requires a two-thirds vote in the House of Representatives as well 
as in the Senate with the subsequent ratification by three-quarters of the states’ legislatures. 
Third, and for our dissertation extremely important, the European model with associated 
constitutional courts are a part of broader European architecture of human rights with the 
Court that stands as particular supra-constitutional court for Europe.104 “Decisions of 
constitutional courts may be, and occasionally are, countered by the judgements of the 
European Court in Strasbourg… Hence, again the anxiety about the constitutional court 
taking a wrong decision is significantly lowered (because) there is another, higher, instance 
which may repair the bad decision.”105  
 From this point of view, we can argue that contemporary theory of constitutional law 
has already identified common characteristics within the European model of the procedural 
constitutional law – which characteristics directly lead to the conclusion that particular legal 
and constitutional architecture within European continent on the basis of the Convention 
actually exists.  
 Another question which is usually raised in the analysis of the procedural 
constitutional law or in the process of the constitutional review is effectiveness and impacts of 
the decision of constitutional court. “Constitutional review can be said to be effective to the 
extent that the important constitutional disputes arising in the polity are brought to the CC 
(Constitutional Court, author’s comment) on a regular basis, that the judges who resolve 
                                                 
104 V.C. Jackson, M. Tushnet: „Comparative Constitutional Law“, Foundation Press, 2014, p. 517 – 518. 
105 Ibid, p. 518.  
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these disputes give reasons for their rulings, and that those who are governed by the 
constitutional law accept that the court’s ruling have some precedential effect. On this 
definition, effectiveness is a variable: it varies across cases and across time in the same 
country.”106 If we apply stated arguments from the theory of the constitutional law in the case 
of the Convention we can easily, argumentum per analogiam, determine that the system based 
upon the Convention also meets all stated demands. For the first stated condition in meeting 
effectiveness (caseload) we can point out that the Court receives each year approximately 
50.000 new applications lodged according to the Convention against particular member state 
of the Council of Europe.107 The Court in its long judicial practice developed its own and 
independent judicial practice practically regarding all substantial and procedural provisions of 
the Convention and the Protocols. When we combine this fact with enormous proliferation of 
new cases each year (especially with accession of new states to the Council of Europe) – we 
can easily verify and confirm that the Court and the Convention has its own caseload. Second 
affiliated condition for effectiveness of the constitutional review (reasons for judgments) is 
also fulfilled in the case of the Convention. Art. 45 par. 1 of the Convention explicitly 
stipulates obligation of the Court to give reasons for rendered decision.108 Finally, the third 
condition that needs to be fulfilled in order to consider particular constitutional review 
effective is related to partial precedential effect of rendered judgments. “Thirdly, those who 
are governed by the constitutional law must accept that constitutional meaning is (at least 
partly) constructed through the judges’ interpretation and rulemaking and use or refer to 
relevant case law in future disputes.”109 This argument is in the context of our dissertation 
main theoretical framework for our new theoretical concept of the particular constitutional 
law. As it will be presented later in the dissertation, the Court’s authority and ruling regarding 
particular substantial provisions of the Convention has truly become an authoritative guideline 
in legislative and judicial system of the Council of Europe member states.110 
 As conclusion for this sub-chapter we can emphasize following verified arguments: 
                                                 
106 A. Stone Sweet: „Constitutional Courts“, in: M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 50), p. 825. 
107 R. Harmsen: „The Reform of the Convention System: Institutional Restructuring and the (Geo-) Politics of 
Human Rights“, in: J. Christoffersen and M. Rask Madsen (ed.): „The European Court of Human Rights between 
Law and Politics“, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 120. For statistics regarding caseload of the Court in 2018 
see infra, footnote 434.  
108 “Reasons shall be given for judgments as well as for decisions declaring applications admissible or 
inadmissible.“ 
109 A. Stone Sweet, op. cit. (footnote 106), p. 825.   
110 See Chapter IV of the dissertation.  
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a) the procedural constitutional law is an independent legal branch with independent legal 
sources disseminated throughout the legal system from the constitution to the rules of 
procedure as well as international agreements; 
b) the main focus of the procedural constitutional law is constitutional court as special 
constitutional body empowered for constitutional adjudication process; 
c) in those states where special constitutional body for constitutional review (of particular 
legislature or final judgement of courts in regular judicial pyramid) is not constituted, the 
Supreme Court regularly holds jurisdiction over disputes of constitutional meaning; 
d) effectiveness of a particular constitutional review can be determined on the basis of 
caseload, reasons for judgments and particular precedential effect for all future disputes.  
 
Applied in the case of the Court and the Convention following arguments, argumentum per 
analogiam, we can verify that: 
 
a) the Court has its own Rules of Procedure which are based on the provisions of the 
Convention as international agreement;111  
b) respective Rules of Court are the main procedural legal source for adjudication process 
before the Court according to the provisions of the Convention; 
c) all stated conditions regarding effectiveness of particular constitutional proceedings or the 
process of constitutional review are met in the case of the Convention and the Court; 
d) there are general liberal surroundings on the European continent in order to achieve greater 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
e) member states are, in general, open to the continuous evolution of common standards in 
human rights protection; 
f) process of execution of final judgements of the Court is, in general terms, effective. 
 
 For all stated reasons, we conclude that the Convention and the Court undoubtedly 
possess all theoretical requirements to be considered a particular and independent system of 
constitutional review – per analogiam. This verification is important for the context of our 
analysis where we consider the Convention and system introduced by the Convention as 
particular constitutional law.  
 
                                                 
111 „The European Court of Human Rights, having regard to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and the Protocols thereto, makes the present Rules...“ – Rules of Court (preamble) 
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2.4. Law on human rights as the constitutional law and position of the 
Convention 
 
This entire chapter of the dissertation has been devoted to a systematical presentation 
of the contents of contemporary constitutional law. We have been examining the main 
substantial and procedural aspects of the contemporary constitutional law and concluded that 
according to the prevailing theoretical definitions the contemporary constitutional law, from 
the substantial point of view, regulates human rights and fundamental freedoms, organization 
of state’s authority and relation between the state and non-state subjects. In this presentation 
we also have concluded that a source of the substantial constitutional law can also be found in 
international agreements. For the purposes of our analysis we have presented the main touch 
points between the common theoretical framework of the contemporary constitutional law and 
the Convention. From the procedural point of view, we have indicated strong applicability of 
procedural constitutional law as presented in the theory of constitutional law on the system 
based upon the Convention. In this sub-chapter we will conclude our analysis with exact 
verification of the Convention’s position and human rights law in contemporary constitutional 
law with empirical-normative approach. 
 The importance of the human rights law in contemporary constitutional law from pure 
normative point of view can also be verified throughout the number of constitutional 
provisions which are directed to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
For example, the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia is consisted from 174 Articles. 
Chapter II of the Slovenian Constitution is named Human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and is consisted from 51 Articles (Art. 14 – Art. 65). Nearly one third of the entire Slovenian 
Constitution is devoted to the regulation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. If we 
also include Chapter III of the Slovenian Constitution in substantial provisions that regulate 
human rights and fundamental freedoms (Economic and social relations which chapter 
regulates property, security of employment etc.), we can count up to 65 provisions of the 
Slovenian Constitution which are devoted to the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the Republic of Slovenia. And in the General provisions of the Slovenian 
Constitution (Art. 5) we can also find provisions regarding protection of human rights and 
fundamental principles. Nearly 40 percent of the provisions of the Slovenian Constitution are 
directly or indirectly related to the regulation of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
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which fact points out to the significance of the human rights law in contemporary theory of 
the constitutional law and constitutional practice.112  
 The Croatian Constitution is not any different from the Slovenian Constitution in that 
aspect. The Croatian Constitution consists from 152 Articles. With the same normative 
approach as in the case of the Slovenian Constitution we can count up to 56 articles (Art. 14 – 
Art. 70) which are directly or indirectly related to the regulation of human rights and 
fundamental principles. As it is in the case of the Slovenian Constitution nearly 40 percent of 
all constitutional provisions in the Croatian Constitution are related to the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Such high percentage of the human rights provisions directly points 
out to the significance of human rights law in contemporary constitutions and in the theory of 
the constitutional law in general.113  
 If we bring normative structure of the Convention to our closer attention, present 
analysis commonly indicates the three-part structure of the Convention from the substantial 
point of view: first part is consisted of the so-called human rights and fundamental freedoms 
catalogue; second part are norms related to the Convention’s supervisory system (rules 
regarding procedure); and third part are norms regulating the competence of the Court with 
final and transitional provisions.114 It has to be noted once more that majority of contemporary 
constitutional provisions regarding protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
grammatically and normatively similar (or even identical) with the provisions of the 
Convention. This fact is important for the context of our dissertation because it represents one 
of the starting points in introducing our new theoretical concept – particular constitutional 
law.  
 For all stated reasons, we can verify once more that human rights law in general theory 
of constitutional law has supreme value for all relevant constitutional orders world-wide. 
Protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms is an inherent part of 
substantial constitutional law where rules regarding procedure contain various provisions for 
realization of substantial constitutional law in judicial practice. The Convention from the 
aspect of constitutional law presents particular legal source of the constitutional law and 
                                                 
112 In the case of Slovenia besides the Constitution must also be mentioned The Basic Constitutional Charter On 
the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia of 1991 which is also one of the fundamental 
constitutional instrument for the Slovenian constitutional order. Art. III of the respective Charter also stipulates 
that the Republic of Slovenia guarantees the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms to all persons 
in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia irrespective of their national origin, without any discrimination 
whatsoever.  
113 Similar case can also be found in the Constitution of Italy or (especially) in the constitutional law of the 
United Kingdom.  
114 J. Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 19.  
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within three-part structure of the Convention the first part is entirely related to the 
establishment of the so-called catalogue of human rights and fundamental freedoms. On the 
other hand, the second-part is related to the procedural provisions which are a part of 
procedural constitutional law in a general theoretical sense. 
 With such methodological approach we have verified that the Convention with a 
prescribed supervisory system is really a part of the constitutional law (from substantial and 
procedural point of view) which enables theoretical framework for our new theoretical 
concept of particular constitutional law. Although it is clear that the Convention is a part of 
contemporary constitutional law there are further developments in contemporary 
constitutional law which are beneficial for our theoretical concept of the particular 
constitutional law. In other words, the fact that the Convention is substantially and 
procedurally a part of contemporary constitutional law can be verified not only throughout the 
analysis of contemporary substantial and procedural constitutional law and linking respective 
analysis with the Convention and its supervisory system (which we did throughout this 
chapter), but it can be verified also through identified trends in development of contemporary 
constitutional law – namely its internationalization. With the analysis of respective trends in 
contemporary constitutional law in the light of our new theoretical concept we will conclude 
the second chapter of the dissertation.  
 
2.5. Internationalization of the contemporary constitutional law     
 
 Current analysis of the substantial and procedural provisions of the contemporary 
constitutional law indicates strong interconnections between constitutional law and politics. 
We can state that any legal solution in every legal branch is almost always a sovereign 
expression of particular policy within one state. It is possible to identify particular legal rules 
which are purely technical but in the constitutional law all constitutional provisions regularly 
express political solutions. The constitution itself as the highest legal act is the foundation of 
an entire legal system but in the same time it is the most significant political document of a 
particular state. For this reason, constitutional law cannot be separated from politics and 
political sciences.115 
 Respective interconnections between the constitutional law and 
politics/policy/political sciences could lead to the conclusion that the constitutional law as a 
                                                 
115 S. Sokol, B. Smerdel, op.cit. (footnote 38), p. 8.  
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part of public law within one state could not be affected by provisions of the international law 
or any other exogenous influence. Given the fact that the constitutional law is regulating the 
very essence of the entire legal and political system within one state, the principle of national 
sovereignty could prevent influences by other states or international community. The 
constitutional law as the state law or the law regulating foundation of a particular state could 
be identified as the part of public law in which all adjustments must be initiated from internal 
(political, social, economic or other) source and not by international one.  
 Nevertheless, contemporary constitutional law is undergoing severe changes regarding 
its national character and is opening towards international law which would be unimaginable 
from the classical point of view. This fact has already been confirmed in the theory of the 
constitutional law. “International laws and constitutional laws are usually regarded as 
different set of laws that rarely cross paths. It thus becomes quite intriguing to even consider 
ways that domestic constitutions are becoming international or internationalized. The first – 
and perhaps most important – way that constitutions may become international or 
internationalized is by the incorporation of international human rights treaties and norms 
into domestic constitutions. As the rights guaranteed by domestic constitutions are convergent 
– or even identical – with those enshrined in international documents, constitutions are 
indeed becoming international.”116 Regarding this we can conclude that the process of 
internationalization of constitutional law primarily is set throughout implementation of 
international human rights treaties and norms (like the Convention) in domestic constitutions 
and constitutional order. The basis for inception of such process is convergence (normative 
similarity or even equality) between human rights and fundamental freedoms prescribed by 
the constitutions and international agreements – in this case the Convention. After all, 
particular constitutions have been written under strong influence of the Convention and 
particular constitutions confirmed the Convention as the unalienable part of the constitution 
itself with prevailing legal significance.117  
 Political background of such unifying development is the world-wide victory of liberal 
constitutionalism after the end of the Cold War. New constitutions across Europe and world-
wide after 1990 have been written under the influence of constitutions of prominent states. 
Liberalism, constitutionalism, the rule of law, the principle of division of power, capitalism 
                                                 
116 W-C. Chang, J-R Yeh: „Internationalization of constitutional law“, in: M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (ed.), op.cit. 
(footnote 50), p. 1167.  
117 E.g. the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina which prescribes in Art. 2 par. 2: „The rights and freedoms 
set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its 
Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These shall have priority over all other law.“ 
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and market freedoms have become new ideology accepted by nearly all (former communist) 
states. After fulfillment of respective political and general social conditions, the 
internationalization of the constitutional law as process could proceed. In most general terms, 
the theory of constitutional law highlights three additional conditions for internationalization 
of constitutional law. These conditions are the expansion of the global market, global triumph 
of rights-based discourse and the emergence of transnational networks.118 When respective 
conditions have been met with the overwhelming liberalization of political life, the 
internationalization of the constitutional law could begin.  
 After incorporation of international human rights into domestic constitutions in the 
light of new political and legal era after 1990 similarity or even equality of respective rights 
world-wide introduced “…common constitutional language across jurisdictions, permitting 
judges to look elsewhere for consultation or inspiration even in interpreting their own 
constitutional clauses. After all, free speech, due process, equality, right to life, or principle of 
proportionality is guaranteed in the majority – if not all – constitutions. Accordingly, an 
increasing number of courts have cited foreign constitutions or foreign cases in their own 
decisions.”119,120 
 Consideration of legal understandings of constitutional courts of other prominent 
states in domestic constitutional order has been the first step in the process of 
internationalization of constitutional law. But this process could be and has been on strictly 
voluntary basis of the judges included. No obligation could be imposed on the highest 
(constitutional or supreme) court in judicial hierarchy of particular state to take or not to take 
into account legal understandings and legal positions of courts in other states. Nevertheless, 
the practice has shown that such consultations were deemed appropriate in all cases where 
constitutional courts faced particular new constitutional question that needed to be resolved. 
 But further analysis has indicated that full internationalization of constitutional law is 
merely the goal that will not be fulfilled in near term. The process of constitutional 
convergence and mentioned judicial dialogue between the highest courts of particular states 
tends to limit itself within the boundaries of particular regions – especially within the 
boundaries of same civil law or common law family.121 
                                                 
118 W-C. Chang, J-R Yeh, op.cit. (footnote 116), p. 1170 – 1172. 
119 Ibid, p. 1169.  
120 Respective consultations with the practice of the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of 
Germany have been presented in the practice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia. See supra, 
footnote 18.   
121 W-C. Chang, J-R Yeh, op.cit. (footnote 116), p. 1173. Authors also give thorough analysis regarding regional 
and trans-regional convergence of constitutional design. 
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 Regarding strong connectivity between constitutional law and political sciences 
(especially the theory of state) in order to secure trustworthy verification of our main 
hypothesis the internationalization of contemporary constitutional law should also be verified 
from the position of the contemporary political science. The constitutional and legal aspect of 
internationalization of contemporary constitutional law has already been verified in scientific 
literature and based on stated arguments we can proceed in constructing our new theoretical 
concept. But in order to achieve higher level of analysis and regarding stated strong 
connectivity between constitutional law and political sciences brief overview should also be 
included in our analysis.  
 In the theory of state, the constitution and related constitutional state or state bounded 
by the constitution is a particular cultural phenomenon that has spread across the globe. After 
long state-centric development in all relevant political and legal areas within the borders of 
one state, modern constitutional state has opened its political and legal boundaries to external 
international factors. Constitutional state-centric state has become cooperative constitutional 
state within international political community. The significant factor of cooperation between 
contemporary constitutional states and foundation of the cooperative constitutional state idea 
is strong economical connection between states. Moral aspect of development from state-
centric ideological frame to cooperative constitutional state can be identified on the basis of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Cooperative constitutional state is dominantly 
constituted and legitimized throughout human rights and fundamental freedoms. On the other 
hand, cooperative constitutional state can also be identified in constitutional texts where 
provisions of the constitution specifically provide openness towards international law and 
international community, peaceful associations and cooperation with other nations and 
incorporation of international agreements devoted to the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Various international organizations and their success in the line of 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms must also be acknowledged in the 
evolution of idea of cooperative constitutional state.122  
Legal trend identified as the internationalization of constitutional law has its 
correlative idea in political sciences as cooperative constitutional state. All requirements and 
identified enhancers for internationalization of constitutional law has also been almost 
identically identified by the theory of state (economic connections, transnational 
organizations, human rights and fundamental freedoms) for introduction of cooperative 
                                                 
122 P. Häberle: „Ustavna država“, Politička kultura, Zagreb, 2002, p. 54 – 61.  
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constitutional state. On the other hand, the contemporary theory of constitutional law also 
indicated that full internationalization/globalization/universalisation of constitutional law 
would not be possible. For that reason, regionalization of constitutional law is better 
theoretical term. With same methodological approach and same methodological scores, the 
theory of state contained its vision of cooperative constitutional state on the European 
continent. Furthermore, from the aspect of political sciences European law in its broader 
meaning is a law of the Council of Europe with particular judgments of the Court. The theory 
of state identifies Austria and Switzerland as pioneers in development of European law given 
the fact that those two states position the Convention on constitutional level.123 
 In the light of all stated arguments we can now proceed to the conclusion and 
application of respective arguments on the context of our analysis in this dissertation. From 
presented ideas we can verify that constitutional law can be internationalized or regionalized 
and that this particular legal branch (although positioned as main or fundamental legal branch 
within public law which protects public order) can exceed national borders and be influenced 
by international (conventional) law. The theory of state does not differ in any way from such 
conclusion. The concept of internationalization of constitutional law presents from the aspect 
of cooperative constitutional state a particular cultural phenomenon on the European 
continent. In the case of Convention and system organized upon the Convention, the theory 
has already acknowledged that the Convention is fundamental ground of broader European 
constitutional architecture.124 The Court itself in the case of Loizidou v. Turkey stated that the 
Convention is a constitutional instrument of European public order.125 Numerous arguments 
have been presented in favor of the Court as the European Constitutional Court or that the 
Convention has achieved constitutional significance in great number of states.126,127 Of course,   
we have to take all stated arguments with due caution but through the framework of our 
dissertation we can determine that the Convention is undoubtedly an unalienable part of the 
contemporary constitutional law. Nearly all scholars of the constitutional law (from legal 
aspect and aspect of political science) agree on respective argument.  
 
                                                 
123 Ibid, p. 55.  
124 See infra, p. 118.  
125 D. Spielmann: „Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Systems of 
Europe“ in: M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 50), p. 1232. 
126 A. Stone Sweet: „On the Constitutionalisation of the Convention: The European Court of Human Rights as a 
Constitutional Court“, Faculty Scholarship Series 71;  
available at:.http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/71 (12.04.2019.) 
127 Excellent particular overview of the doctrine regarding constitutionalization of the Court can be found in: J. 
Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 1346 – 1348. 
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Final observations regarding Chapter II 
 
 Within this chapter of the dissertation we have examined the particular content of 
contemporary constitutional law. Utilizing common theoretical distinction of provisions 
within one legal branch (substantial and procedural legal norms) we have displayed 
substantial constitutional law and procedural constitutional law. Within substantial 
constitutional law we have identified rules and principles that regulate human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, organization of state’s authority and relation between the state and 
non-state individuals. Within all respective parts of substantial constitutional law, we pointed 
out specific touch-points with the Convention and verified the position of the Convention 
within the substantial constitutional law. On the other hand, we pointed out that procedural 
constitutional law is consisted of various legal rules that regulate the procedure of 
constitutional review in most general sense. Applicability of respective concept in the case of 
the Court and the Convention was also presented. With such methodological approach we 
have verified the position of the Convention within the contemporary constitutional law and 
positioned our analysis within the general framework of theory of constitutional law.  
 Furthermore, we indicated strong position of human rights law within the 
contemporary provisions of constitutional law and concluded that constitutional law in 
contemporary time is definitely human rights law. On the end of respective chapter, we have 
analyzed the possibility of internationalization of constitutional law bearing in mind that 
constitutional law is more than any other particular legal branch related to the state and 
domestic, internal political and legal conditions. Nevertheless, we have successfully verified 
that the propulsive effects from international law in the case of constitutional law are possible 
and that the scholars commonly indicate the Convention as one justified example of 
internationalization of constitutional law. We also have verified that the internationalization 
of constitutional law in the case of the Convention is also considered and confirmed from the 
aspects of political sciences and the theory of state throughout the concept of the cooperative 
constitutional state.  
 Before we take further practical and theoretical analysis of our new theoretical concept 
and present all beneficial characteristics for the theory of constitutional law with distinction 
from present scientific approaches, we have to present all legal characteristics of the 
Convention. This shall be our task in the following chapter of the dissertation.  
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3. INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERS OF THE MEMBER STATES 
   
 Within the first two chapters of the dissertation we have set up a methodological and 
theoretical framework of the analysis and presented the main characteristics of the 
contemporary constitutional law. Given the fact that our main scientific goal is to verify the 
existence of a new theoretical concept which is addressed as the particular constitutional law 
on the basis of the Convention, from the methodological standpoint we also have to indicate 
all fundamental characteristics of the Convention. Within this chapter we will analyze all 
relevant origins of the Convention (from historical point of view) as well as its provisions and 
impacts in constitutional order of the Council of Europe member states. This chapter of the 
dissertation will also present the structure of the Court, the Convention’s provisions regarding 
procedure and judgments, the concept of pilot-judgments, execution of the Court’s judgments 
in legal order of the Council of Europe member states as well as theories on the interpretation 
of the Convention and the doctrine of margins of appreciation.  
 This chapter will enrich the foundations of our new concept and on the basis of 
arguments from previous chapter will also finalize theoretical ground for a practical 
presentation of a particular constitutional law in the following chapter of the dissertation.  
 
 3.1. The Convention  
 
 As it has been previously noted and by considering the fundamental legal essence of 
the Convention, the Convention itself is one multilateral international agreement. Such 
characteristic of the Convention primarily implies that all related provisions of the Vienna 
Convention apply also in the case of the Convention. The Vienna Convention is the basic 
legal source for the Convention from the aspects of international law. But we also have noted 
that provisions of international law regarding international agreement(s) are not in the main 
focus of our interest.128 From the aspect of international law we are considering that the 
Convention is one particular international agreement which is regulated by the Vienna 
Convention and which is incorporated in domestic legal order of the Council of Europe 
member states and is on force. This determination will be sufficient for the context of our 
dissertation.  
                                                 
128 See supra, p. 37 – 38. 
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 Nevertheless, and given the fact that the Convention is a particular international 
agreement devoted to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, other 
correlated facts regarding international law can be of our interest. This interest is primarily 
addressed to the legal incorporation of the Convention in domestic legal orders. Respective 
incorporation of the Convention in domestic legal orders is conditioned by the constitutional 
rules within each the Council of Europe member states. Each member state of the Council of 
Europe (as well as all other states world-wide) prescribes rules (usually on constitutional 
level) regarding incorporation of particular international (multilateral or bilateral) agreement 
in domestic legal order. With respective constitutional provisions each member state of the 
Council of Europe positions the Convention on a particular level in the general hierarchy of 
all legal norms (formal sources of domestic law). Bearing this in mind, particular member 
state of the Council of Europe can position the Convention on constitutional level, sub-
constitutional level but on the level above general legislature, legislative level or even sub-
legislative level. Although there are common theoretical ideas regarding relation between 
domestic and international law129, for the purposes of our dissertation we can say that there 
are as many systems of incorporation of international agreements in domestic legal orders as 
there are states included in a particular analysis.130 
 In the context of our dissertation we have further mitigating circumstances that make 
our analysis easier from a respective standpoint. Our basic hypothesis and main thesis are 
positioned on implications and effects of the Convention and introduction of new theoretical 
concept on the basics of the Convention and the Court’s independent judicial practice with 
obligation of the member states to carry on all final judgments of the Court. From this 
fundamental characteristic of respective analysis, it is easy to determine that our analysis 
begins with the fact that the Convention is on force in all of the Council of Europe member 
states. Regarding incorporation systems of international law in domestic law and relations 
between the Convention and the Vienna Convention, our dissertation does not raise any 
                                                 
129 These ideas usually reffers to legal monism and legal dualism of relations between international and domestic 
law. Within legal monism international law and domestic law are considered as indivisible parts of one unified 
legal system. Such legal system contains rules for resolving conflicts between international and domestic law. 
On the other hand there are supporters of the legal dualism in which domestic law and international law are two 
paralel but separated and mutually independent legal systems. In the concept of legal dualism, international law 
is not a part of domestic legal order and doesn't have immediate legal effect. In order to secure domestic legal 
validity international law must be incorporated throghout the legislature in domestic legal order. See: J. Andrassy 
et.al; „Međunarodno pravo 1“, Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 1995, p. 4 and P. Van Dijk et.al. (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 
58), p. 26 – 27. 
130 Related analysis regarding incorporation of international law in domestic legal order within analyzed states 
will be presented in Chapter IV. 
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concerns. From a respective standpoint, our interests in this dissertation are positioned one 
step further. 
 From pure normative analysis of the Convention current scientific researches 
commonly indicate so-called three-part structure of the Convention131 where the first part is 
consisted of so-called catalogue of human rights guaranteed by the Convention and 
Protocols132, the second part is affiliated to the supervisory system as set out in the 
Convention133, and the third part is related to the provisions regarding competence of the 
Court with final and transitional provisions. Within the catalogue of human rights, numerous 
human rights and fundamental freedoms have been guaranteed but respective catalogue has 
also been amended by various Protocols to the Convention as well as it was the case with 
supervisory system (especially with the Protocol No. 11). The Convention as one particular 
international agreement came into force on September 3rd 1953 after ten instruments of 
ratification, according to the provision of Art. 59 par. 3 of the Convention, have been 
deposited.134 Subsequent legal and political development of the Convention introduced 
numerous additional Protocols to the Convention which have changed initial human rights 
framework as set out by the Convention in 1950. Respective Protocols have also introduced 
particular changes which have been revolutionary in contemporary constitutional and 
international law and also enabled theoretical framework of our dissertation (especially 
Protocol No. 11 to the Convention which have introduced permanent Court with “full” 
jurisdiction).135  
Respective Protocols present instruments on amending and changing the initial text of 
the Convention. From entering the Convention on force in 1953 till today, 17 Protocols to the 
Convention have been introduced but all of them did not came into force nor did all of the 
Council of Europe member states have ratified all introduced Protocols. Regarding this, the 
contemporary theory has introduced criteria on how we can differentiate respective Protocols. 
According to the content of previous changes and amendments to the Convention there are: 
 
                                                 
131 See supra, p. 94. 
132 E.g. right to life (Art. 2), prohibition of torture (Art. 3), prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Art. 4), right 
to liberty and security (Art. 5), right to a fair trial (Art. 6), Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege (Art. 7), right to 
respect for private and family life (Art. 8), freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art. 9), freedom of 
expression (Art. 10), freedom of assembly and association (Art. 11), right to marry (Art. 12), right to an effective 
remedy (Art. 13), prohibition of discrimination regarding enjoyment of the rights and freedoms as set forth in the 
Convention, protection of property (Art. 1 of the Protocol No. 1. to the Convention) etc.  
133 Provisions of Section II of the Convention.   
134 J. Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p 14. 
135 For detail presentation of historical development of the system based upon the Convention see infra, p. 109.  
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a) Protocols that have acknowledged new human rights and fundamental freedoms or added 
new jurisdiction of the Court (Protocol No. 1., Protocol No. 4., Protocol No. 7. and Protocol 
No. 12.); 
b) Protocols which have changed substantial provisions of the Convention from 1950 
(Protocol No. 6. and Protocol No. 13.); 
c) Protocols which have changed supervisory system (Protocol No. 2., Protocol No. 3., 
Protocol No. 5., Protocol No. 8., Protocol No. 9., Protocol No. 11., Protocol No. 14bis., 
Protocol No. 14., Protocol No. 15. and Protocol No. 16.). The initial text of the Convention 
from 1950 has been ratified by all of the Council of Europe member states but Protocols that 
have acknowledged new human rights and fundamental freedoms or added new jurisdiction of 
the Court were not ratified by all of the Council of Europe member states. Same situation is 
with Protocols that have changed substantial provisions of the Convention. This fact points 
out to the conclusion that although all of the Council of Europe member states have ratified 
initial text of the Convention, there are a different number of the Council of Europe member 
states where particular Protocols under a) and b) are on force. Given the fact that respective 
Protocols under a) and b) are independent international agreements which are not 
incorporated in the initial text of the Convention, these Protocols are usually referred to as 
additional protocols. Respective protocols have their own provisions regarding entering into 
force and consent of all the Council of Europe member states is not required. E.g. Greece and 
Switzerland till April 12th 2019 have not made any actions regarding ratification of the 
Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.136 On the other hand, Protocols under c) which have 
changed supervisory system are usually referred as amending protocols because respective 
Protocols have amended the initial text of the Convention and they are incorporated in the text 
of the Convention. For entering these Protocols into force, the consent of all the Council of 
Europe member states is required.137  
 Although only amending protocols require consent of all the Council of Europe 
member states for entering into force, Protocol No. 1 as the additional protocol is on force138 
and for which reason the right contained in respective Protocol (protection of property in 
                                                 
136 Full list regarding ratification status of the Convention and Protocols to the Convention regarding each 
Council of Europe member state can be found on the official website of the Council of Europe (status of April 
12th 2019) on:  
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/chartSignature/3 (12.04.2019.) 
137 J. Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 21 – 31.  
138 See supra, footnote 136. The only exceptions are related to the status of the Protocol No. 1. in Monaco and 
Switzerland where Protocol No. 1. has been signed but not yet ratified.  
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general sense) is eligible for our analysis within new theoretical concept of the particular 
constitutional law. We have stated that the concept of particular constitutional law will be 
introduced according to the analysis regarding the rule of law, right to a fair trial and 
protection of property and overflow of respective practice in the judicial and legislative 
branch of six analyzed states which practical consequence is introduction of the particular 
constitutional law – i.e. one coherent legal system of (primarily constitutional) substantial and 
procedural provisions introduced on supra-national, trans-national or international level. From 
a methodological standpoint, impacts of the Court’s practice must be analyzed regarding 
provisions of the Convention which are on force within all the Council of Europe member 
states. All rights and principles which are utilized for introduction of particular constitutional 
law are on force within all the Council of Europe member states.139 This fact ensures that our 
analysis is methodologically appropriate. 
 In the light of our analysis, the most important normative characteristic of the 
Convention which should be (repeatedly) emphasized is that the Convention is an 
international agreement. Although there are numerous international agreements which are 
concluded on daily basis within states and international organizations, only the Convention 
had exceptional success in the line of international protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. “The European Convention on Human Rights is generally regarded as 
the most effective and advanced international system for the protection of human rights in 
existence today, and this is largely due to the work of its supervisory organs.”140 The 
Convention itself has become ideal type on how human rights and fundamental freedoms 
should be introduced in political reality. On the other hand, initial text of the Convention has 
been amended with various Protocols to the Convention where amending Protocols 
(practically the most important ones) have been accepted nearly by all of the Council of 
Europe member states. With subsequent Protocols the Council of Europe secured adaptability 
of the Convention to new political and constitutional environment (especially after 1990 and 
collapse of communist system across the globe). On the other hand, the Court as primarily 
responsible for interpretation and application of the Convention’s provisions developed its 
own principles regarding interpretation and application of the Convention which secured an 
                                                 
139 For exception regarding status of Protocol No. 1. in Monaco and Switzerland see supra, footnote 136. 
Respective exceptions have no influence on our analysis and our concept given the fact it has negligible 
influence in the context of our analysis.  
140 A.Z. Drzemczewski: „European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law – A Comparative Study“, 
Clarendon Press – Oxford, 1983, p. 3. One can imagine on what particular level the Convention is today given 
the fact that such statement regarding effectivenes of the Conventions system has been introduced in 1983 or 
nearly 15 years before Protocol No. 11. entered into force and secured even more effectivenes of the Convention.  
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autonomous and independent development of the Convention in human rights environment 
across the European continent. The Court, on the other hand, acknowledged the political and 
legal distinctions within the Council of Europe member states and has been fully aware of the 
fact that uniform application of the Convention’s provisions in particular cases across the 
Council of Europe will be faced with severe challenges considering all political, legal, 
historical, economical, sociological and all other distinctions between the Council of Europe 
member states. But all those challenges that have been brought before the evolution of the 
Court’s judicial practice were not of any influence on the commitment of practically all the 
Council of Europe member states on evolution and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. This commitment and slow but effective introduction of reviewed 
substantial content of Convention’s rights and principles in legislature and judicial practice of 
the Council of Europe member states directly led to the evolution of constitutional law as 
well.  
 Entire human rights system as prescribed by the Convention has its foundation on 
several fundamental principles for interpretation and application of the Convention. The 
theory has systemized respective principles on primary constitutional principles for 
interpretation of the Convention and secondary constitutional principles for interpretation of 
the Convention. Within primary constitutional principles there is e.g. teleological principle, 
principle of effectiveness, democracy principle, principle of the rule of law, principle of 
lawfulness/legality, principle of procedural fairness etc. Secondary constitutional principles 
for interpretation of the Convention are e.g. principle of European commonality, principle of 
evolutive or dynamic interpretation, principle of subsidiarity, principle of autonomous 
interpretation, margin of appreciation etc.141 
 Each of the respective principles has been thoroughly examined and presented in the 
Court’s judicial practice and each of them has been introduced in order to secure effectiveness 
of the Convention considering various distinctions between the Council of Europe member 
states. Each principle is enshrined in the Convention and has been developed in the Court’s 
practice. They are the guidelines in interpretation and application of the Convention’s 
provision abstracted from the provisions of the Convention itself and reasoned in judicial 
practice of the Court.  
We could analyze the Convention from various aspects as well as all correlated 
principles, but such analysis could easily expand the scope of analysis which has been set out 
                                                 
141 J. Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 1014 – 1016. 
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in this dissertation. For that reason, we have to minimize our analysis regarding Convention 
only to those aspects and principles which are important and meaningful for our new 
theoretical concept. From presented various legal principles on which the Convention is 
founded, the principle of autonomous interpretation of the Convention’s provision and the 
principle of subsidiarity have already been pointed out as main principles that ensure 
introduction of new theoretical concept.142 As stated earlier within the principle of 
autonomous interpretation the Court has secured that the Court itself in ultima linea will be 
the competent body which will interpret and apply provisions of the Convention in particular 
cases. The Court will not be limited by the provisions of domestic law and will independently 
build all relevant substantial and procedural aspects of prescribed human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.143  
Such independence in evolving its own judicial practice positioned the Court in the 
very center of constitutionality in international legal and political community. But the Court 
from its inception, and well before the Protocol 11 has entered into force and introduced 
thorough revision of the supervisory system, determined that the area of legality in the 
Council of Europe member states is extremely diversified so partial characteristics of national 
law must also be acknowledged in proceedings before the Court. Respective acknowledgment 
of national law and local customs within the framework of the Convention’s applicability is 
verified with the idea that the Council of Europe member states hold the outmost freedom in 
regulation of human rights and fundamental freedoms as prescribed by the Convention in 
domestic legal order (margin of appreciation). But such freedom in domestic regulation must 
not be misused and applied in the way opposite to the Convention itself. The Court stands as 
the guardian of the Convention’s provision and will act under the provisions of the 
Convention should any involved contracting state limit realization of particular human right 
and/or fundamental freedom beyond limits set out by the Court itself. Respective doctrine of 
the margin of appreciation is the Court-made or judge-made doctrine.144  
                                                 
142 See supra, p. 34 - 35. 
143 The Court's judicial practice has emphasized on numerous occasions that the Court has sole competence in 
interpretation and application of the Convention's provisions. In other words, national provisions regarding 
particular legal standards and legal terms will not be mandatory for the Court in the proceedings before the 
Court. E.g. in the judgement Maaouia v. France from 2000 the Court noted that terms like civil rights and 
obligations as well as criminal charge from Art. 6 par 1 of the Convention can not be interpreted only in 
accordance with domestic law of particular state. Such narrow interpretation and mandatory application of 
particular legal terms only in accordance with dometic law could easily endanger the very purpose of the 
Convention. Such autonomous interpretation of the Convention's provisions the Court has noted regarding legal 
term property from Art. 1 Protocol No. 1. to the Convention, or lawful arrest from Art. 5 par. 1b of the 
Convention etc. See: J. Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 1294 – 1296 et seq. 
144 Ibid, p. 1267 – 1273. See also: infra, p. 152. 
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Finally, the principle of subsidiarity must also be mentioned again given the fact that 
the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms primarily falls under the scope of 
actions of the Council of Europe member states. The Council of Europe member states are 
primarily responsible to secure realization of the Convention’s rights and freedoms on their 
territory. Only if domestic legal remedies fail to ensure protection of the Conventions rights 
and freedoms, the Court on the basis of procedural provisions of the Convention can act and 
determine violation of the Conventions provision. Should such determination be rendered by 
the Court it is an international obligation of the Council of Europe member states to ensure 
the execution of final judgment of the Court in domestic legal system. Execution of the 
Court’s final judgement could be assured within retrial process in national legal orders (which 
is the most effective method to rectify violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
determined by the Court) and in which retrial process legal understandings of the Court 
should be compulsory for domestic court in such retrial process.145  
 The idea of respective sub-chapter was to point out fundamental normative 
characteristics of the Convention. In our analysis throughout the dissertation we were not 
devoted on presentation and examination of all aspects of the Convention or all principles or 
all provisions of the Convention. In fact, we needed to limit ourselves and point out only 
those verifiable arguments which are beneficial for our new theoretical concept. All stated 
arguments within this sub-chapter are sufficient in order to proceed on verification of our new 
theoretical concept. As already verified in contemporary theory, the system based upon the 
Convention is the most developed system for the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms today across the globe. It is based upon the independent legal life and the evolution 
of the Convention, a system which has evolved from its inception in 1950’s till today with 
various Protocols which have adjusted its initial framework. The Court on the other hand has 
served as international forum where violation of the Convention’s provision will be 
                                                 
145 E.g. provision of the Art. 428.a of the Croatian Litigation Act stipulates: „When the European Court of 
Human Rights finds a violation to have been committed of a human right or fundamental freedom guaranteed by 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Additional Protocols 
thereto, which was ratified by the Republic of Croatia, the party may, within a time limit of thirty days of the 
date when the judgment by the European Court of Human Rights became final, file an application with the court 
in the Republic of Croatia which heard his/her case in the first instance proceedings in which the decision 
violating a human right or fundamental freedom was rendered, and move the court to amend the decision which 
violated this right or fundamental freedom. 
In the conduct of the proceedings referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article the provisions on retrial shall be 
applied appropriately. 
In the retrial, the courts are obliged to comply with the legal stances adopted in the final judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights finding the violation of a fundamental human right or freedom.“ (underlined 
by author) 
Similar provision can be found in Art. 502 par. 2 of the Croatian Criminal Procedure Act (Official Gazette No. 
152/08., 76/09., 80/11., 121/11., 91/12., 143/12., 56/13., 145/13., 152/14. and 70/17.).  
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determined but always considering the diversity between legal orders of the Council of 
Europe member states and local customs to particular extent (the doctrine of the margins of 
appreciation). Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the Council of Europe member states 
have a particular scope in which they can regulate the realization of the Convention’s rights, 
the Court will always act according to the provisions of the Convention and will determine a 
violation of particular human right should such violation occur in particular proceeding before 
the competent body in the Council of Europe member states. There can’t be any doctrine 
which will limit the possibility of the Court to determine violation of particular provision of 
the Convention because such doctrine would directly contravene to the intention of the 
Convention. Intention of the Convention’s framers as well as general historical framework in 
which the Convention has arisen can be determined utilizing historical method of scientific 
analysis. 
 
3.1.1. Historical perspectives and objectives; Normative development 
 
  From a historical point of view, moral compass that had led framers of the Convention 
in drafting the initial text was without a doubt the already mentioned Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights from 1948. The Preamble of the Convention indicated that the Universal 
Declaration has been inspired with universalistic approach in human rights protection with 
effective recognition of particular human rights which can be addressed as the inception of 
common standards across the globe.146  
  From the Preamble of the Convention it also can be determined that the Convention as 
well as the Declaration is primarily devoted on ensuring a universal, world-wide applicability 
of the particular inalienable human rights and fundamental freedoms and which rights and 
freedoms are so politically important that reconstruction of Europe devastated by horrors of 
the World War II is simply not possible without this collective and effective enforcement. In 
the time when the Convention has been drafted and in the light of new arising geo-political 
division of the world between the West and the East, the Council of Europe as one particular 
(regional) international organization has succeeded in extremely difficult task to ensure 
                                                 
146 „The governments signatory hereto, being members of the Council of Europe, 
Considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on 10th December 1948; 
Considering that this Declaration aims at securing the universal and effective recognition and observance of the 
Rights therein declared…“ – Preamble of the Convention. 
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consent of its member states regarding the Convention. This is most certainly the biggest 
success of the Council of Europe.  
 Political origins of the Convention can be found in the Atlantic Charter in which 
Churchill and Roosevelt proclaimed freedom of life, freedom of religion, freedom from want 
and freedom from fear. These four freedoms will be the initial framework in which the 
Declaration has been drafted as well as for the Convention later (regarding strong substantial 
connectivity between the Declaration and the Convention).147 The Declaration must be 
analyzed from its global point of view meaning that it was really the first universal human 
rights act devoted to the universal approach in human rights protection. Such general climate 
oriented toward universal minimum standards regarding human rights with devotion to 
effective protection and realization has been momentarily accepted on the European level. 
European continent has been destroyed by the World War II (in every possible sense) and 
post-war reconstruction needed to start on some point. General climate in which political and 
moral factors generated the Convention can be divided into two substantial aspects: firstly, all 
the atrocities of the World War II were revealed, with unimaginable and extreme breaches and 
violations of the human rights law. Simply put, free-world could not leave it to the states to 
regulate within their borders on the principle of national or state’s sovereignty. World War II 
has proved this fact already. Second, and in relation to the first fact, awareness and devotion 
to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms has been developed on the ruins 
of European continent. European economies were in ruins with the iron-curtain coming down 
(once more) on the divided European continent. With arising European political division but 
with will to secure the creation of modern human rights law, the International Committee of 
the Movements for European Unity organized in May 1948 “Congress of Europe” at the 
Hague.148 Main result of respective meeting has been a “Message to Europeans” with explicit 
warning that Europe is once more threatened and divided and that the greatest danger comes 
from her division.149 
 Already in July 1949 the European movement published a publication named 
“European Convention on Human Rights” which contained a draft proposition of European 
Convention on Human Rights and a draft proposition of the Statute for a proposed European 
Court of Human Rights. This convention introduced a list of fundamental rights which has to 
be protected by each state, which was considered as minimum standards of human rights 
                                                 
147 P. Van Dijk et.al. (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 58), p. 3. 
148 Ibid. 
149 E. Bates: „The Birth of the European Convention on Human Rights – and the European Court of Human 
Rights“, in: J. Christoffersen and M. Rask Madsen (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 107), p. 19.  
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below which neither state can pass its legislation. Comparing the list of fundamental rights 
proposed by the respective convention it can be determined that most of these rights have 
been ultimately incorporated in the Convention itself (e.g. freedom from arbitrary arrest, 
detention and exile, security of life, freedom of speech and expression, freedom from slavery 
etc.). But the very first goal for the introduced convention was certainly to ensure “…that 
there should be no step-by-step regression in human rights standards, as had occurred with 
Germany’s slide into dictatorship in the 1930s.”150 
 Institutionally, the task for drafting final text of the Convention was taken by the new 
international organization established in 1949 – the Council of Europe. The Council of 
Europe took over conclusions of the European movement and Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (as the main body of new established organization) appointed in August 
1949 its Committee on Legal and Administrative Questions to take closer look in all 
possibilities regarding collective enforcement of human rights. From that time the Convention 
was drafted in objectively short period of time. Already in September of the same year the 
Assembly adopted the Committee’s report which stipulated ten rights which have to be 
included in future collective protection with particular views regarding establishment of a 
European Commission of Human Rights and a European Court of Justice. In November of the 
same year the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (as second institutional part 
of the Council of Europe) appointed a Committee of Government Experts which had to 
prepare draft text on the basis of respective report. Respective Committee finished its work in 
the spring 1950 and after subsequent revision of drafted text on August 7th 1950 the 
Committee of Ministers adopted final text of the Convention which will be signed in Rome on 
November 4th 1950 and enter into force on September 3rd 1953.151 
 From this survey we can determine that such unprecedented legal and political 
undertaking in the line of international protection of human rights has occurred in only four 
years (between 1949 and 1953). To narrow it down, the time frame for introduction of the 
Convention was only one year (from August 1949 till August 1950). It is quite remarkable 
and considerable that such enormous evolution within the human rights law can be achieved 
within an exceptionally modest time frame. This clearly points out to the conclusion that in 
years after World War II human rights awareness has started with a propulsive development 
which also ensured the adoption of additional Protocols to the Convention.  
                                                 
150 Ibid, p. 21. 
151 P. Van Dijk et.al. (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 58), p. 3 – 4. 
112 
 
 Nevertheless, stated arguments must not be considered as verification that adoption of 
the initial text of the Convention in 1950 wasn’t faced with severe challenges despite this 
enormous development in human rights awareness after the World War II. If one would 
compare initial text of the Convention with the Declaration (which has been used as a model 
for the Convention) it could be determined that in the initial text of the Convention only a 
particular (and small number) of human rights and fundamental freedoms were included. “It 
covers mainly those rights which would be referred to, in the later elaboration of the 
Universal Declaration in the two Covenants, as “civil and political rights”, and not even all 
of those.”152 Reasons for such narrow approach in initial text of the Convention were later 
explained by the rapporteur of the competent Committee which introduced the first draft of 
the Convention. Rapporteur Teitgen explained that in that time when the initial text of the 
Convention has been drafted it was considerably easier to limit the scope of protected human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the Convention to those rights and freedoms which have 
already been practiced in all democratic states.153 With such limited approach it was easier to 
secure approval from the states included and the implementation of the first European trans-
national or international legal instrument for the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Later Protocols significantly developed the European human rights framework and 
secured contemporary system with status of the Convention as the most important European 
international legal instrument for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
 But initially, drafters were concentrated on those fundamental rights which have been 
considered as unalienable parts of new European developing democracies. On the other hand, 
introduction of supervisory mechanism over the violation of the Convention’s provision can 
truly be deemed revolutionary from aspects of the international law and international political 
relations in the years following the World War II.154 
 As it is with nearly all significant historical documents or political developments, key 
members of the Convention’s introduction were not overwhelmed with the initial text of the 
Convention or with the Convention’s implications in new international legal order of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. It can be considered that framers of the Convention did not 
expect that the Convention will become the most significant human rights framework of the 
                                                 
152 E.g. the principle of equality before the law, the right to freedom of movement and residence, the right to seek 
and to enjoy asylum in other countries, the right to a nationality. All respective rights have not been included in 
initial text of the Convention. Later Protocols to the Convention have introduced contemporary system and have 
included all stated human rights and fundamental freedoms. Ibid, p. 5. 
153 Ibid. 
154 For exhaustive historical overview on evolution of the Convention from initial idea for international 
protection of human rights to entering the Convention on force see: E. Bates, op.cit. (footnote 149), p. 17 – 39.   
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21st century. After its introduction in relevant literature, it was not considered as something 
that will have a prevailing effect and such remarkable consequences afterwards. It was not 
considered even by the Council of Europe as something worth mentioning.155 Nevertheless, 
the Convention slowly but effectively has assumed a center position within the European 
human rights system. It has to be emphasized that the actions of the Council of Europe 
regarding the adjustment of the Convention to the new political and international environment 
were also beneficial for the development of the Convention. In other words, the Council of 
Europe did not just introduce the Convention and put all actions regarding the Convention 
aside but did quite the opposite. The Council of Europe in order to maintain its prime goal as 
set out in the Statute of the Council of Europe156 have supervised the development of the 
Convention and in a particular time introduced Protocols to the Convention.  
 As it has been previously stated, respective Protocols are considered as instruments for 
revision of the Convention’s system. All of them had their own sedes materiae and have been 
devoted to further development of human rights system on the European continent. Initially 
protected human rights and fundamental freedoms from the initial text of the Convention, as 
well as the first supervisory system from the initial text of the Convention, were later 
significantly altered. Such alterations in the Convention’s system were not a set back in the 
human rights system but it had a beneficial effect on total human rights framework. Political 
struggles and differences that prevailed introduction and protection of particular human rights 
in the beginning of 1950’s were later overcame. The speed of this development can be 
verified by the fact that the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention which has introduced new 
human rights that will be protected according to the Convention’s system has entered on force 
on May 18th 1954. After entering Protocol No. 1. on force, Protocol No. 2. and Protocol No. 
3. have been introduced and opened for signing in May 1963. These two Protocols are 
considered as amending protocols because they changed the supervisory mechanism set out in 
the initial text of the Convention. Both of them have entered into force on September 21st 
                                                 
155 „In the early 1950s there were just a handful of academic articles on the Convention published in the 
mainstream legal journals. Most pieces described the drafting process and the „nuts and bolts“ of the 
Convention machinery.“ Likewise „It was not even mentioned in a short speech delivered in 1954 by the 
President of the Consultative Assembly, Francois de Menthon, to mark the first five years of the Council of 
Europe.“ – Ibid, p. 31 – 32.  
156 “The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of 
safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their 
economic and social progress. 
This aim shall be pursued through the organs of the Council by discussion of questions of common concern and 
by agreements and common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters and 
in the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.“ Art. 1 par. 1 and 2 of 
the Statute of the Council of Europe, available at: https://rm.coe.int/1680306052 (12.04.2019.) 
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1970. Protocol No. 2. enabled the advisory opinion for the Court in all matters related to the 
interpretation of the Convention.157 Respective competence of the Court today is regulated by 
the provisions of the Art. 47 – 49 of the Convention. Protocol No. 3. has been related to the 
competence of the European Commission in individual applications but respective Protocol 
has been altered with Protocol No. 11. in 1998. Protocol No. 4. introduced new human rights 
and fundamental freedoms (prohibition of imprisonment for debt, freedom of movement, 
prohibition of expulsion of nationals, prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens). Respective 
Protocol has entered into force on May 2nd 1968, but it has not yet been signed by Greece and 
Switzerland. Turkey and United Kingdom have signed the respective Protocol, but it has not 
yet been ratified in those two countries. Protocol No. 5. entered into force on December 22nd 
1971 and it was an amending protocol given the fact that it changed provisions of the 
Convention related to the composition, election and term of the members of the European 
Commission and judges of the Court. Protocol No. 11. also affected provisions of Protocol 
No. 5. and significantly changed its provisions. Protocol No. 6. has been opened for signature 
in 1983 and entered into force on March 1st 1985. Protocol No. 6. is substantially an 
additional protocol because it covers the abolition of the death penalty. Although directed to 
the abolition of the capital punishment, it left the possibility for the state to impose the death 
penalty in time of war. It will take nearly another 20 years until Protocol No. 13. (entered on 
force on July 2003) totally abolishes the death penalty in all circumstances. But respective 
Protocol No. 13., although entered on force, has not yet been signed or ratified by all the 
Council of Europe member states (Azerbaijan and Russian Federation have not signed the 
Protocol No. 13. on abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, and Armenia has 
signed but not yet ratified). Protocol No. 7., also as an additional protocol, has entered on 
force on November 1st 1988 and introduced new human rights and fundamental freedoms 
(procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens, right of appeal in criminal matters, 
compensation for wrongful conviction, double jeopardy risk etc.). Protocol No. 8. entered on 
force on January 1st 1990 and it was an amending protocol given the fact that its provisions 
were related to the supervisory mechanism. Protocol No. 11. has also affected provisions of 
Protocol No. 8., for which reason Protocol No. 8. in nowadays has lost its legal meaning. An 
identical situation happened with Protocol No. 9. and Protocol No. 10., which have introduced 
                                                 
157 Such competence of the European Court of Human Rights pursuant to the provisions of the Protocol No. 2 is 
partially comparable with provisions of the Protocol No. 16 given the fact that both of respective Protocols 
enable the Court to render its advisory opinion regarding interpretation and application of the Convention. But 
according to the Protocol No. 2 request for such advisory opinion could be submitted only by the Council of 
Ministers where Protocol No. 16 such competence gives to the highest courts and tribunals of each contracting 
state.  
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a possibility of individual application directly to the Court (Protocol No. 9.) and aimed to 
improve the Convention’s supervision procedures (Protocol No. 10.). Both of respective 
Protocols lost their purpose by the entering into force of Protocol No. 11. Due to the 
significance of the Protocol No. 11., which has radically altered supervisory system based 
upon the Convention, normative characteristics will be presented later in the next sub-chapter 
of the dissertation. Protocol No. 12. was an additional protocol and entered on force on April 
1st 2005. It prescribes general prohibition of discrimination. Although the initial text of the 
Convention already introduced prohibition of discrimination, such prohibition was limited 
given the fact that it prohibited discrimination only in the enjoyment of one or other rights 
guaranteed by the Convention.158 Respective Protocol passes guarantee of non-discrimination 
on any ground by any authority. Protocol No. 14. has entered on force on July 1st 2010 and it 
was an amending protocol as it introduced particular changes of the supervisory system as set 
out in the Protocol No. 11. Respective Protocol was devoted to the effectiveness of the 
Convention’s supervisory mechanism and was trying to improve efficiency of the Court 
(inauguration of single-judge etc.). But its introduction was characterized with severe 
problems. Protocol No. 14 has been opened for signature in 2004 but ratification in the 
Council of Europe member states was extremely difficult. For that reason, temporary Protocol 
No. 14bis has been opened for signature in May 2009 and was on force from October 1st 2009 
till June 1st 2010 when finally Protocol No. 14. entered on force. Protocol No. 14bis was the 
only exception regarding rule that amending protocols must obtain consent of the entire 
Council of Europe member states in order to enter on force. In order for Protocol No. 14bis to 
enter force, only three states were required for ratification. A significant time frame for 
Protocol No. 14. to enter on force (nearly six years), with severe overload in everyday 
functioning of the Court, is what led to the necessity of a temporary protocol which will 
secure normal functioning of the Court until it enters on force. By its entering on force, 
Protocol No. 14bis was repealed. Finally, Protocol No. 15. and Protocol No. 16. are also 
amending Protocols aiming for further development of the Court’s efficiency. Protocol No. 
15. is introducing a more limited time frame in which an individual application must be 
submitted to the Court (from six months after all domestic legal remedies have been 
exhausted, till four months). It also tends to position the principle of subsidiarity and the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation to the Preamble of the Convention. Respective Protocol 
                                                 
158 „The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.“ – Art. 14 of the 
Convention.  
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No. 15. for entering into force as amending protocol, requires consent of all the Council of 
Europe member states and it has been opened for signing in June 2013. Protocol No. 16. has 
been opened for signing in October 2013. It opens the possibility for highest courts within 
judicial system of the Council of Europe member states to request advisory opinions from the 
Court regarding interpretation or application of human rights and fundamental freedoms as 
defined in the Convention or subsequent Protocols. While Protocol No. 15. has still, not 
entered into force159 Protocol No. 16. has entered on force on August 1st 2018 after France as 
the tenth required member state ratified respective Protocol in April 2018.160 
                                                 
159 See supra, footnote 136.  
160 Even though respective Protocol has entered on force on August 1st 2018, the Court has already received first 
request for advisory opinion under its provision. French Cour de Cassation in a judgment of October 5th 2018, 
decided to submit to the European Court of Human Rights a request for an advisory opinion on the following 
questions: 
 
“(1) By refusing to enter, in the civil register of births, the birth of a child born abroad to a surrogate mother, in 
so far as the foreign birth certificate designates the child’s “intended mother” as its “legal mother”, whereas 
the registration is accepted in so far as it designates the “intended father”, who is also the child’s biological 
father, will a State party be overstepping its margin of appreciation under Article 8 of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms? In this connection should a distinction be 
drawn as to whether or not the child was conceived using the eggs of the “intended mother”? 
 
(2) In the event of an answer in the affirmative to one of the two questions above, would the possibility for the 
intended mother to adopt the child of her spouse, the biological father, this being a means of establishing the 
legal mother-child relationship, ensure compliance with the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention? The 
Court of Cassation is adjourning its proceedings until the Court has given its opinion.”  
 
The Court considered the request and on December 3rd 2018 the panel of the Grand Chamber accepted the 
request for an advisory opinion. On December 4th a Grand Chamber was constituted in accordance with the 
Rules of Court in order to consider it. On April 10th 2019 the Court delivered Advisory opinion concerning the 
recognition in domestic law of a legal parent-child relationship between a child born through a gestational 
surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended mother (Request No. P16-2018-001). In respective Advisory 
opinion the Court examined the case in the light of the Art. 8 of the Convention and delivered the following 
opinion:  
„In a situation where, as in the scenario outlined in the questions put by the Court of Cassation, a child was 
born abroad through a gestational surrogacy arrangement and was conceived using the gametes of the intended 
father and a third-party donor, and where the legal parent-child relationship with the intended father has been 
recognised in domestic law: 
1.  the child’s right to respect for private life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention requires that 
domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of a legal parent-child relationship with the intended mother, 
designated in the birth certificate legally established abroad as the “legal mother”; 
2.  the child’s right to respect for private life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention does not require 
such recognition to take the form of entry in the register of births, marriages and deaths of the details of the 
birth certificate legally established abroad; another means, such as adoption of the child by the intended mother, 
may be used provided that the procedure laid down by domestic law ensures that it can be implemented promptly 
and effectively, in accordance with the child’s best interests.“ Respective Advisory opinion is available on: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=003-6380464-8364383 (12.04.2019.).  
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 This survey of normative development of the Convention with subsequent Protocols 
allows us to determine that the development of human rights legal frame according to the 
Convention has accelerated from the time of its inception in 1950s till nowadays. It is truly 
exceptional that one particular international organization, such as the Council of Europe, has 
been able in such a modest period of time to secure the implementation and maintain the 
course of human rights development on the European continent. From the introduction of the 
initial text in 1950, which has entered on force in 1953, and in nearly 50 years, more than 
dozen additional and amending protocols have entered on force in prevailing majority of the 
Council of Europe member states. Respective Protocols implemented new human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and aimed to secure effectiveness of the Convention’s supervisory 
system. Protocols secured adjustment of the Convention in a new geo-political world and 
have developed a legal framework of initially settled human rights protection. Although the 
respective additional protocols are on force but not in all the Council of Europe member 
states161, it clearly points to the conclusion that the European continent after the horrors of the 
World War II has set out course to the developing human rights environment with a clear 
commitment on the prevention of the atrocities committed in World War II.  
Some authors consider this evolutive trend as the existence of so-called European 
consensus from which the Court draws its legitimacy beside from the Convention in pure 
normative meaning. Such European consensus can be on the level of rules or on the level of 
principles but in any case, such consensus regarding protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in Europe can be considered as the foundation for all actions of the 
Court.162  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
161 As it has previously been stated, additional protocols which introduce new human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are independent international agreement where consent of all the Council of Europe member states is 
not required for entering on force. Respective protocols have own provisions regarding entering into force but 
this doesn't mean that by entering into force this protocols will automatically enter on force in all the Council of 
Europe member states. On the other hand, amending protocols require consent of all the Council of Europe 
member states for entering on force given the fact that they alter initially settled supervisory system. Amending 
protocols can not even enter on force if all the Council of Europe member states don't ratify respective amending 
protocols. Practical consequence of such system are various „circles“ of states where partial additional protocols 
are on force. They all are on force, but not in all the Council of Europe member states.   
162 K. Dzehtsiarou: „European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights“, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambride, 2015, p. 10 et seq. 
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  3.1.2. Contemporary legal status of the Convention and its impacts  
 
  With a normative and historical method of scientific analysis we have displayed 
normative framework of the Convention as well as historical overview of initial goals of the 
Convention’s framers. On the basis of our previous arguments we can confirm that the main 
objects of the Convention were to prevent new extreme violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and set out one modern, universally acceptable legal framework in 
which further development of human rights will be secured. Protocols to the Convention 
secured continuous evolution as well as direct and full jurisdiction of the Court on the basis of 
individual application of petitioners.  
  The theory has presented numerous terms which have later been used in scientific 
researches. The Convention’s law is referred as the Strasbourg’s acquis;163 the Court is 
attributed as the European constitutional court,164 the Court is also positioned on the top of 
broader European constitutional architecture etc. The Convention is also sometime 
considered as partial constitution in broader European legal framework165 or even as a 
shadow constitution.166 The Court itself in its own judicial practice emphasized that the 
Convention is substantially a part of European public order and constitutional instrument.167 
This all points out to the conclusion that the Convention and its system is in contemporary 
time (more than ever) considered as the unalienable part of contemporary constitutional law. 
The Convention and the Court by its very essential functions (regulation and protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms) are a part of greater European constitutional design 
with adjacent political foundations in democracy, market freedoms and other liberties 
throughout all the Council of Europe member states. Respective European constitutional 
design is evolving in cooperative mode between highest judicial authorities and legislative 
within the Council of Europe member states and the Court. Minor setbacks are always 
possible and are happening on a daily basis, but these setbacks do not provide decisive 
negative impacts on system as a unit, meaning that the system based upon the Convention is 
withdrawing.168 Quite the opposite, the system is evolving further and beyond its initial 
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judgements in national legal orders of the Council of Europe's member states or reluctance of domestic courts to 
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conception and in nowadays the practice of the Court is something which is considered in 
legislative and judicial practice across the Council of Europe member states.  
  An excellent survey regarding particular positive impacts in legislature and judiciary 
in the Council of Europe member states has been conducted by the Council of Europe in 
collaboration with the Human Rights Centre of the University of Essex, United Kingdom. It 
has been published in January 2016 with primary goal to systematically present “…an 
information document compiling selected examples of the positive impact that the European 
Convention on Human Rights has had within States Parties to the Convention.”169 The survey 
contains numerous examples on how in particular jurisprudence of the Court has had 
influence in domestic legal order. E.g. in case of Andorra after the Court’s judgment in case 
of UTE Saur Vallnet v. Andorra (Application No. 16047/10, judgment of May 29th 2012) the 
Parliament amended its Judicial Proceedings Act in order to permit the review before 
Andorra’s High Court of Justice in all cases where the Court has found a violation of the 
Convention’s provision. Other example, also in the case of Andorra, indicates that judgments 
of the Court can lead to the amendment of the Constitutional Court Act. Until the case of 
Millan and Tornes v. Andorra (Application No. 35052/97) complaint to the Andorra’s 
Constitutional Court was possible only if Andorran General Prosecutor granted permission to 
submit an empara appeal to the Constitutional Court. In this case friendly settlement was 
reached before the Court and Andorra subsequently revoked required permission of General 
Prosecutor in order to access the Constitutional Court. The applicant in this case claimed that 
his right under the Art. 6 par. 1 of the Convention (right to a fair trial which inherent part of 
respective human right is access to a court) has been violated given the fact that access to the 
Constitutional Court was possible strictly on the basis of discretion of the state’s authority.170 
 In the case of e.g. Finland legislative measures have been provoked by the judgment of 
the Court in the case of Petri Sallinen and Others v. Finland (Application No. 50882/99, 
judgment of September 27th 2005). In this case “… the Court ruled that the search of the 
applicants’ law firms and seizure of “privileged” material, i.e. material also affecting the 
rights of their clients, had been in breach of their right to respect for their privacy (Article 8 
of the Convention).”171 Subsequently, the Parliament amended applicable Coercive Measures 
                                                                                                                                                        
rely on jurisprudence of the Court etc. More regarding execution of the Court's judgements in national legal 
order will be presented in sub-chapter 3.5. of the dissertation. 
169 “Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights in States Parties: selected examples“, available at: 
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b084a095e895 (12.04.2019.) 
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Act and prescribed stricter rules regarding circumstances which must be fulfilled in each 
particular case in order to search and seize privileged material.  
 In respective survey numerous examples have been presented on the beneficial effects 
of the Court’s jurisprudence in national legal orders of nearly all of the Council of Europe 
member states. It clearly points out to the undeniable conclusion that the judicial practice of 
the Court assumed particular authoritative guidelines in providing domestic legal and political 
solutions or in rendering particular judicial decision. In fact, the survey specifically states that 
judgment of the Court in some cases is not even required for states to meet the Convention’s 
standards. Various legal and political reforms have been conducted by the states without 
formal proceeding before the Court. Occasionally, violations of the Convention’s provision 
have been settled by the particular state prior to the Court’s judgment.172 Respective survey 
has been published in a form of a book in November 2016, for which reason it can be utilized 
in the context of our dissertation. As it has been previously mentioned, the aim of our analysis 
is to point out that contemporary constitutional law doesn’t need to have exclusive national 
characteristics given the fact that all substantial and procedural aspects of the constitutional 
law can be constructed trans-nationally or internationally. With this argument, contemporary 
constitutional law loses its predominant characteristic – i.e. that it is a national legal branch of 
public law without any or significant influences from other legal and political forces. With the 
system as the Conventions we can determine that contemporary human rights law (as 
unalienable part of the contemporary constitutional law) is directed and constructed also on an 
international level, with the Court standing as an authoritative international judicial body.  
 Utilizing the survey again in Chapter IV of the dissertation, we can also verify the 
Court’s influence in national legislative and judicial systems. The survey contains 43 pages 
with numerous examples on influence of the Court’s jurisprudence in national legal orders. It 
is verifiable that judgments of the Court (or even the procedure before the Court) are leading 
or can lead to the amendments of particular legislature, or to the necessary changes in judicial 
practice. Presented survey confirms such argument beyond any reasonable doubt. Practical 
consequence of such adjustments in legislature and judicial system of the Council of Europe 
member states is harmonization. As it has been previously stated, we consider harmonization 
as a particular process in which previous differences or particular different solutions under the 
influence of particular exogenous factor become more and more similar or ultimately 
identical. Now we can verify that the harmonization process has actually begun given the fact 
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that the Court’s stable and well developed jurisprudence is leading to the amendments of the 
legislature or to the necessary changes in judicial practice under the authoritative influence of 
the Court. Overflow of the Court’s understandings regarding substantial content of the 
Convention’s human rights has actually begun and we are able to present verifiable arguments 
which directly lead to such conclusion. From the classical concept of national sovereignty, it 
is inconceivable that a particular international judicial authority can lead with its 
jurisprudence to the constitutional, legislative and/or judicial adjustments in national legal 
orders. This fact also clearly points out that the principle of sovereignty in nowadays cannot 
be considered in particular absolute sense with the meaning that no one or nothing can 
oversee actions of particular state. Atrocities of the World War II clearly pointed out to the 
necessity of such argument. And that, precisely, was the main goal of the Council of Europe 
after its establishment in 1949. This doesn’t mean, of course, that contemporary states with 
this fact lose or limit their sovereignty. This simply means that sovereignty in contemporary 
time must be analyzed with realistic methodological tool, while taking into consideration that 
contemporary states with well-developed technological, economic, transport and all other 
connections are significantly cross-linked more than ever in all human history. Such political, 
economic and sociological environment is also an environment in which systems such as the 
Conventions can develop and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms on one 
qualitatively higher and international level.  
 In the context of our analysis, respective impacts of the Court’s jurisprudence in 
legislature and judicial systems of the Council of Europe member states point out that the 
harmonization process has actually begun, and that there does, in fact, exist an independent 
substantial and procedural legal system on a non-domestic level. This system provides 
solutions in order to secure similar or identical solutions. As a legal system, it secures 
harmonized application of its provisions which can be verified with presented adjustments in 
that legal system. This harmonization has two aspects, i.e. vertical in which domestic judicial 
system and legislature is harmonizing with the legal understandings and judicial practice of 
the Court but also horizontal which aspect is the direct consequence of vertical aspect. 
Horizontal aspect of harmonization is performing between the member states by the 
developing common standards under the influence of the Court. Every time when two or more 
member states execute final judgement of the Court in similar legal matter regarding same 
human right prescribed by the Convention, these national systems are becoming more similar 
and related by common standard as ruled by the Court. Every final judgement of the Court 
properly executed in national legal system is having beneficial effect for the harmonization 
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between member states with the meaning that the substantial aspect of the e.g. the right to a 
fair trial is becoming more and more similar across the Council of Europe. This horizontal 
aspect of harmonization (between states) is directly conditioned by the vertical aspect and 
proper execution of the final judgement of the Court. Vertical and horizontal aspects of 
harmonization are interrelated given the fact that without vertical harmonization (with the 
practice and legal understandings of the Court) there would not be a horizontal one.  
 In contemporary theory respective harmonization process is also usually referred as 
reception with the meaning that impacts of the Court’s judgments in national legal orders are 
characterized with various and complex social process. Nevertheless, this reception has a 
particular mechanism that ensures sustainability of all systems; in particular, “…those stable 
procedures that national officials construct and use in order to adapt the national legal order 
to the ECHR, as it develops over time.”173 Respective procedures can be analyzed, in most 
general sense, by two complementary aspects: legislative coordination mechanisms and 
judicial and other ex post mechanisms of coordination. Affiliated mechanism which also 
ensures sustainability of coordination/harmonization system upon the Convention is also 
referred to as an informal mechanism (knowledge and practice).174 Within the legislative 
coordination mechanisms, the practice has shown that as the system based upon the 
Convention has evolved, member states have developed internal domestic procedures in order 
to secure conformity of particular legislative solutions within the framework of the 
Convention. (for example, in Austria, Belgium, France, Italy etc.) Government’s legal advisor 
that appears before the Court in particular proceeding as the representative of member state 
has the task to review proposed legislative solution and deliver his/her opinion regarding 
conformity of proposed legislative solution with the Convention. Internal legislative or 
executive authority is not bound with respective opinion and can dismiss it. Impact of 
respective legislative coordination mechanisms mostly depends on the general (political) 
commitment of state officials to the promotion and development of internal human rights 
framework. From judicial aspects and judicial and other ex post mechanism of coordination 
we can determine that the respective aspect is practically the most important one. Possibility 
to lodge a complaint or submit the petition to the Court according to the provisions of the 
Convention is directly related to the exhaustion of all domestic legal remedies in particular 
legal matter. This fact indicates that domestic courts on all prescribed instances (trial court, 
appeal court, even the highest court on the basis of extra-ordinary legal remedies if such 
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remedies are prescribed in particular member state or even the constitutional court on the 
basis of constitutional complaint) have already conducted (or should have conducted) 
thorough examination regarding applicability of the Court’s jurisprudence in a particular case. 
“Of all national officials, judges are the most systematically exposed to the direct supervision 
of the ECtHR. It is hardly surprising that, in many States, the courts have taken the lead in 
incorporating the Convention, and in strengthening other quasi-constitutional mechanisms of 
reception. Today, all national high courts have a powerful interest in closely monitoring the 
ECtHR’s activities, and in staying one step ahead of the latter when it comes to developing 
standards of rights protection. Such may be easier said than done, of course”175 In all 
theoretical examination of interconnections and judicial dialogue between domestic courts 
and the Court, risk of over-generalization should be avoided. In any theoretical analysis it 
must always be noted that the Convention and the system introduced by the Convention 
applies equally (from normative and procedural point of view) in 47 extremely diversified the 
Council of Europe member states for which reason ultimate identical solutions in legal and 
jurisprudential sense is simply not possible. But this doesn’t mean that the system based upon 
the Convention has no impact at all and that this system does not slowly (but effectively) 
connects as exogenous variable constitutional systems across the Council of Europe. Current 
scientific analysis verifies such argument and on the basis of this argument we are conducting 
our analysis in this dissertation.  
 In order to reduce the possibility of stated over-generalization in the analysis of 
interconnections between the Court and domestic judicial authorities, three points of 
respective interconnections must be emphasized. First of all, in nearly all contemporary states, 
the power of the courts on judicial review has been introduced, i.e. the power of the court to 
question constitutional validity of all (or nearly all) executive and legislative acts. In Europe, 
courts have withheld competence to question conformity of executive and legislative acts with 
the Convention as a part of constitutionality. For this reason, the Convention is also the basis 
and framework of domestic constitutionality in which the process of abstract judicial review is 
conducted. This fact also points out to the conclusion that the Convention is a legal source of 
substantial constitutional law. On the other hand, the power of the constitutional courts in 
Europe has been weakened given the fact that they (i.e. constitutional courts) do not possess 
the ultimate authority on application and interpretation of contemporary human rights 
framework. The Court now stands as the ultimate (and international) legal authority purified 
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from domestic struggles. For that reason, constitutional courts across the Europe have 
imposed the obligation to domestic courts on enforcing the Convention and following the 
Court’s jurisprudence. This obligation is considered by constitutional courts (e.g. in Spain, 
Poland, Slovakia, Germany and Italy) as a matter of constitutional duty.176 Within this 
domestic constitutional framework, judicial authorities tend to “…harmonize the substance of 
their jurisprudence to relevant judgments of the Court. Courts in most States do so 
routinely…”177 Finally, the third coordinative mechanism (knowledge and practice) remain 
primarily the duty of scholars and academic teachers. Although academic discourse regarding 
impacts of the Convention with correlative analysis has increased in the years following 
entering Protocol No. 11 on force, plenty more needs to be done. Primarily, in order to secure 
full dissemination of the Court’s jurisprudence in all judicial system across the Council of 
Europe member states, adequate translations on domestic official languages should be 
conducted. If domestic courts (from courts of first instance (trial courts) to supreme courts) 
would have access to the Court’s jurisprudence on official language of state included this fact 
would have further beneficial effect on the process of harmonization.178 Given the fact that the 
Protocol 16. came into force on August 1st 2018 it can be reasonably expected that respective 
Protocol will also have particular beneficial effect on the process of harmonization. As it has 
been stated above179, Protocol 16. has introduced possibility for highest courts of member 
states (constitutional courts or supreme courts) to address the Court for advisory opinion on 
questions related to the interpretation and/or application of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. Respective advisory opinion can be requested in the 
context of the case pending before the respective domestic court (adjudication in concreto). If 
the Court renders advisory opinion, it is not binding for the domestic court. Nevertheless, and 
considering that content of respective advisory opinion will contain legal understandings of 
the Court regarding application and/or interpretation of particular human right set out in the 
Convention, it can also be expected that domestic courts will tend to apply advisory opinions 
in related domestic contentious matters. Otherwise member states are taking chances that the 
Court’s interpretation ultimately will be applied on the basis of individual’s application 
lodged under the procedural provisions of the Convention. It has to be noted that advisory 
opinions will be published (Art. 4 par. 4 of the Protocol 16.) and interested individuals will be 
able to see what the Court’s general position in their matter is. It is highly unlikely that 
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particular individual will not lodge his/her application under the provisions of the Convention 
if highest court in domestic judicial hierarchy fails to apply interpretation of the Court 
rendered in published advisory opinion and which opinion is beneficial for the particular 
individual. For such reason, it can be expected that domestic courts will apply interpretations 
of the Court rendered in their advisory opinions.  
In general context, such advisory opinions of the Court issued under the provisions of 
the Protocol 16. can also be identified as particular preemptive domestic protection of the 
Convention. If domestic court in final domestic judicial proceeding fully applies legal 
understandings of the Court rendered in advisory opinion in that case application under the 
provisions of the Convention will most certainly be dismissed before the Court. But this fact 
at the same time means that legal understandings of the Court regarding interpretation or 
application of the Convention’s provisions regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms 
will enter in domestic judicial proceedings much faster and without (sometimes) extremely 
long execution process of the final judgement of the Court. Vertical and horizontal 
harmonization180 will be achieved in more reasonable time and final goal (development of 
common standards which standards we are addressing as particular constitutional law) will be 
achieved within domestic judicial hierarchy. 
 Nevertheless, we must emphasize that all stated coordination and dialogue between the 
Court and domestic legislature and judicial system is performed within the relation between 
domestic and international law. Such relation (within monistic or dualistic approach in 
regulation between domestic and international law) falls within the scope of domestic law. 
Domestic law and (usually) domestic constitutional provisions regulate relations between 
domestic and international law. Domestic provisions prescribe whether a particular state is 
adopting monistic or dualistic system in relations between domestic and international law. But 
in spite of that, the present overview of the Convention’s and the Court’s impacts clearly 
points out to the conclusion that the respective distinction is meaningless for the effectiveness 
of the Convention in contemporary times. Respective survey presented in the beginning of 
this sub-chapter has verified that adjustments in domestic legal orders were performed in 
nearly all the Council of Europe member states despite their monistic or dualistic approach in 
regulation between domestic and international law. The Convention and jurisprudence of the 
Court have evolved on such level that respective propulsive effects of the Court’s 
jurisprudence in national legal orders were not conditioned with monistic or dualistic 
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approach. The Convention has assumed particular constitutional meaning and overflow of 
jurisprudence of the Court in domestic legal orders was not facilitated or aggravated by the 
fact that particular member states adopted a monistic or dualistic approach. The Convention 
and system based upon the Convention has overcome such obstacle and erased respective 
criterion. This also points out to the conclusion that contemporary impacts of the Convention 
in domestic legal order have created a sustainable legal framework in which human rights and 
fundamental freedoms will continuously develop. Social processes within each member state, 
political commitment to the protection of human rights, existing European consensus on 
human rights and availability of the Court’s jurisprudence can therefore primarily be 
identified as factors which can facilitate or aggravate evolution of the human rights system 
created by the Convention and developed by the Court and its jurisprudence. 
 All presented impacts of the Convention in domestic legal orders of the Council of 
Europe member states clearly point out that the Convention, which provisions have been 
reasoned by the Court’s jurisprudence, has set up a particular and coherent legal system which  
is in constant dialogue with domestic courts and legislature. This system is basically devoted 
to the protection and evolution of human rights and fundamental freedoms and all presented 
adjustments in legislature and judicial system undoubtedly verify the existence of one 
coherent interactive international legal framework, which ensures effectiveness in the line of 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.181 In the context of our analysis, this 
fact is a decisive characteristic for our new theoretical concept – the particular constitutional 
law.   
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committee-of-ministers-goes-nuclear-infringement-proceedings-against-azerbaijan-in-the-case-of-ilgar-
mammadov/ (12.04.2019.) 
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 3.2. The European Court of Human Rights 
 
 In previous sub-chapter we emphasized normative structure as well as the normative 
development of the Convention, historical overview of the Convention and contemporary 
impacts of the Convention and its status in domestic legal orders of the Council of Europe 
member states on particular general level. It is clear from the previous presentation that the 
Court is the main institutional provider and interpreter of the Conventions provisions. The 
Court possesses central role in application of the Convention’s provisions in particular cases 
that appear before the Court according to the procedural provisions of the Convention. Given 
the fact that one of our main thesis is that the Court is fundamental institutional link which 
enables introduction of the particular constitutional law, in following sub-chapters we will 
bring the organization of the Court and its judgments to a closer analysis.  
 
  3.2.1. Organization according to the Convention 
 
 Evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence as well as the Court’s authority was not 
straightforward. Initial text of the Convention signed in 1950 did not foresee the Court as 
particular international court which will have the authority to independently review particular 
cases on the basis of individual petition. From a historical point of view, supervisory system 
over provisions of the Convention can be divided into two main periods: the period between 
September 1953 (entering of the initial text of the Convention on force) and November 1998 
(entering of Protocol No. 11 on force) and the period from entering Protocol No. 11 into force 
until contemporary time. Historical analysis indicates that contracting states, original 
signatory states of the Convention (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey and United Kingdom) in 
negotiations which have preceded the signing of the Convention, had great concerns and 
reservations regarding organization and functioning of the Court. All of them had been fully 
aware that introduction of special international court with its own jurisdiction according to the 
particular international agreement could lead to the introduction and development of stateless 
“European human rights jurisprudence”.182 For such possibility, particular states wanted to 
specify as to what extent such European human rights law would be possible. Consequently, 
the initial text of the Convention was substantially alleviated restraining itself in general terms 
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with frequent referring to standards which would be difficult to apply in particular cases (like 
e.g. inhuman and degrading treatment from Art. 3 or respect for private and family life from 
Art. 8 and etc.). On the other hand, introduction of supervisory mechanism has also been 
alleviated to that extent that quasi-judicial and quasi-political body was established – the 
European Commission of Human Rights.183 Painful compromises between the Council of 
Europe member states established a supervisory mechanism over application of the 
Convention’s provision which was, from a contemporary standpoint, the only possible one.  
 Such supervisory mechanism, before the introduction of the Protocol No. 11, was 
considered to have a three-part structure and a double-track. Before Protocol No. 11 the 
Convention established two independent procedures before competent bodies established by 
the Convention itself. Firstly, there was the procedure before the European Commission of 
Human Rights as special procedure and in the next step (eventually) there was the procedure 
before the European Court of Human Rights (not the Court!).  The European Commission of 
Human Rights (hereinafter: “The Commission”) consisted of members equal to the number of 
member states of the Council of Europe (every state had one member in the Commission). 
Members of the Commission were appointed by the Committee of Ministers and respective 
Commission was considered as particular quasi-judicial and quasi-political institution. It 
considered admissibility of particular applications, determined facts of the case and was 
devoted to achieving friendly settlement with the state involved. All cases had to go to the 
Commission where the Commission’s conciliatory functions had primary importance. Cases 
which were brought before the Commission were usually between two states where one state 
initiated proceeding before the Commission against another state claiming that particular state 
violated the Convention’s provision. Such state to state cases could be brought before the 
Commission without any limitations according to the initial text of the Convention. Individual 
petitions from any person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals could be 
brought before the Commission, on the other hand, only if state involved in such cases made 
declaration on recognition of the Commission’s competence to receive such individual 
petitions pursuant to the Art. 25 of the initial text of the Convention. Such declaration could 
be made for a specific period of time and when the initial text of the Convention has entered 
on force in 1953 only three states recognized the right on individual petition according to the 
Art. 25 of the initial text of the Convention. Until 1990 subsequently all the Council of 
Europe member states (22 of them in 1990) recognized the right of individual petition. But 
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initially, numbers of states were opposed to the possibility of individual application and 
compulsory competence of the Commission in such cases.184  
If a particular state made a declaration pursuant Art. 25 of the initial text of the 
Convention and individual petition was submitted to the Commission regarding alleged 
violation of the Convention’s provision, the Commission determined all circumstances of the 
case and tried to reach friendly settlement with the state included. If a friendly settlement 
would not be possible, the Commission would made report and deliver respective report to all 
concerned states, Committee of Ministers and Secretary General of the Council of Europe for 
publication. Then the Commission would present circumstances of the case and its opinion 
regarding violation of the Convention. If the state involved had recognized compulsory 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (which was option for the Council of 
Europe member states until Protocol No. 11.) the state could then bring the case before the 
European Court of Human Rights within three months after respective report was delivered to 
the Committee of Ministers. The European Court of Human Rights in such cases could render 
its final judgment regarding violation of the Convention’s provision in particular case. If the 
case was not brought before the European Court of Human Rights within stated deadline, the 
Committee of Ministers would then decide whether the violation of the Convention did occur 
in the particular case (by two-thirds majority of all members of the Committee). If the 
Committee of Ministers had determined violation of the Convention, particular deadline was 
given to the state in question in order to make all required measures for rectifying the 
infringed provision of the Convention. The Committee of Ministers would then supervise the 
execution of its decisions. So, the three part structure of the supervisory mechanism includes 
the Commission as the main institutional body which had competence in determining actual 
circumstances of the case, the European Court of Human Rights as judicial body which could 
act only if its compulsory competence was acknowledged by the state in question and the 
Committee of Ministers as main political body of the Council of Europe which supervised 
execution of the Commission’s decision.  
 From this brief overview of supervisory mechanism prior to entering Protocol No. 11 
on force we can determine that the compulsory jurisdiction of the Commission or the 
European Court of Human Rights in individual petitions was in fact optional for the Council 
of Europe member states. States had to recognize the competence of the Commission for 
individual petitions and then separately, the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. For such 
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reasons, the main function of the Commission until 1990 (when nearly all states have 
recognized competence of the Commission in individual petitions) was resolving state to state 
disputes and conciliatory measures in order to achieve friendly settlements between the states 
involved. Individual petitions have been placed at very end of the Commission’s functions. 
Considering that the Commission was a quasi-judicial and a quasi-political institution, 
significant steps in evolution of human rights law could not be achieved.  
The European Court of Human Rights, on the other hand, could act only if its 
jurisdiction was recognized by the states with separate declaration pursuant to the Art. 46 of 
the initial text of the Convention. The European Court of Human Rights was not in permanent 
session, it was consisted of number of judges equal to the number of the Council of Europe 
member states (one from each member state). Judges were appointed by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe on nine-year terms, and they could be re-appointed. 
Individual petition to the European Court of Human Rights was not granted and until Protocol 
No. 9. only member states and the Commission could bring a particular case to the European 
Court of Human Rights. Situation has evolved after Protocol No. 9. entered on force on 
October 1st 1994, given the fact that individual petitions of individuals, non-governmental 
organizations or groups of individuals were granted. Although this fact was a noteworthy step 
in the development of individual petitions, respective individual petitions could be effectively 
utilized only within those states that had recognized compulsory jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Human Rights or expressed consent to the compulsory jurisdiction in a particular 
case.185 Nevertheless, the Commission continuously served as a filter for all cases that would 
eventually be brought before the European Court of Human Rights. The Commission had 
competence in determining circumstances of the case, which means that the European Court 
of Human Rights ultimately decided on the basis of the facts determined by the Commission. 
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On the other hand, access to the European Court of Human Rights was possible only within 
three months after the publication of declaration passed by the Commission that friendly 
settlement could not be reached in a particular case.  
Statistics have shown that in early years of the Convention number of claims 
submitted to the Commission was relatively meaningless and number of cases where the 
European Court of Human Rights was included was even less. But after 1980 number of cases 
increased and such proliferation of cases before the Council of Europe’s structure influenced 
on acceptable time-frame in which particular case must be resolved. Respective problem 
“exploded” throughout 1990’s in which number of the Council of Europe member states 
increased on 47 and when nearly all member states have recognized the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Commission. The idea on merging the Commission and the European Court 
of Human Rights in one judicial body of full jurisdiction was introduced in July 1982 on the 
8th meeting of the Committee of Experts for the Improvement of the Procedure under the 
European Convention on Human Rights (usually referred as the Committee of Experts). From 
that moment until December 1987, the Committee of Experts have considered and elaborated 
on this idea and made necessary reports for the Committee of Ministers. On the basis of the 
decision passed by the Committee of Ministers, heads of the Council of Europe member states 
have gathered on the summit in Vienna on October 9th 1993 and passed the so-called Vienna 
Declaration. The Declaration made clear that the number of the Council of Europe member 
states has tripled from entering the Convention on force in 1953 and that such expansion of 
the Council of Europe must be accompanied with improvement of effectiveness of the 
supervisory mechanism as well as with continuous development in human rights law. The 
Vienna Summit empowered the Committee of Ministers on drafting of respective protocol 
which final text will be made by the Committee of Experts.186 Protocol No. 11. to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on restructuring 
the control machinery established thereby was passed by the Committee of Ministers on April 
20th 1994 and was opened for signing on May 11th 1994. As amending protocol, consent of all 
the Council of Europe member states was required. Pursuant to the Art. 4 of the Protocol No. 
11. “This Protocol shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration 
of a period of one year after the date on which all Parties to the Convention have expressed 
their consent to be bound by the Protocol…”187 This day was November 1st 1998 after which 
                                                 
186 J. Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 100. 
187 Official text of the Protocol No. 11. is available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/155 (12.04.2019.) 
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date the Court has begun with its work and the (old) European Court of Human Rights and the 
Commission stopped working. The Court therefore became the main institutional supervisory 
mechanism.  
After Protocol No. 11. entered on force, the contemporary institutional and procedural 
legal framework of supervisory mechanism has been established. This Protocol introduced 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court for all the Council of Europe member states, individual 
petition of individuals after exhausting all of domestic legal remedies within six months after 
the final domestic decision of competent domestic judicial body (usually domestic 
constitutional court) has been rendered and delivered to the individual. The Court is 
established in permanent session with its own Rules of Procedure. Individual application can 
be lodged to the Court alleging violation of particular provision of the Convention. By virtue 
of Protocol No. 11, when such individual petition was delivered to the Court, a committee of 
three judges by unanimous vote could declare individual application inadmissible in all cases 
where such a decision can be made without further examination of the case. Respective 
decision was final. If such decision was not passed, the Chamber of five judges decided on 
admissibility and merits of individual application. After proceeding respective Chamber 
passed its judgment regarding alleged violation of the Convention’s provision. The judgments 
of the Chamber were final, but within a period of three months from the Chamber’s judgment 
any party involved in the case could request (in exceptional cases) that the case is referred to 
the Grand Chamber of 17 judges. Such exceptional cases were related to individual cases 
where serious questions were raised regarding interpretation or application of the Convention 
or a serious issue of general importance. The judgment of the Grand Chamber is final. 
Protocol No. 11. imposed an obligation to the Court to give reasons for its judgments as well 
as for the decisions declaring applications admissible or inadmissible. This fact, with 
affiliated compulsory jurisdiction of the Court according to the Protocol No. 11., and with 
specifically stated obligation of the member state on execution of all final judgments of the 
Court, will become nucleus of subsequent evolution in human rights law and introduction of  
a particular coherent legal framework in which a particular constitutional law is evolving. 
Further interventions in organization of the Court have been made with Protocol No. 14. 
which entered on force on June 1st 2010.  
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  3.2.2. Procedure and judgement(s)  
 
 As it can be determined from present analysis, evolution of the system based upon the 
Convention underwent severe substantial, procedural and political adjustments with affiliated 
negotiations in order to secure contemporary developing human rights framework. This 
evolution was affiliated with particular oppositions from various member states who tried to 
secure their particular political interests. In general sense, member states tried to ensure that 
their sovereignty will not be affected by the provisions of the Convention and that member 
states will have the ultimate competence in resolution of particular disputes. Nevertheless, 
commitment and awareness of the necessity in continuous development of the human rights 
law enacted current supervisory mechanism. Protocol No. 11. was, in actuality, a breaking 
point from which the Court assumed full position of international guardian in human rights 
law. It allowed the Court to develop its own jurisprudence regarding various substantial and 
procedural aspects of applicability of the Convention’s provisions in particular cases. This 
fact combined with the obligation of the Council of Europe member states to execute all final 
judgments of the Court introduced a new legal framework.  
 Enormous proliferation of the Strasbourg’s case-law highlighted all the problems with 
which domestic courts are being faced on a daily basis. In particular, the question of how can 
the effectiveness of a particular legal system be secured with increasing caseload each year? 
The Council of Europe recognized such obstacle and presented further amending Protocols 
(No. 14. in particular) which will ensure continuous effectiveness of the system.  
 In present time, the procedure before the Court is prescribed in Section II of the 
Convention where Art. 19 specifically prescribe: “To ensure the observance of the 
engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the 
Protocols thereto, there shall be set up a European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter 
referred to as “the Court”. It shall function on a permanent basis.” The Court is, by virtue of 
Art. 19, a main institutional supervisor of actions undertaken by the Council of Europe 
member states. This fact positions the Court in the very essence of the application and 
realization of the Convention’s provisions. Further amendments to the Convention were made 
with Protocol No. 14 regarding adjudication process before the Court. In place of the 
committee of three judges, a Chamber of five judges and a Grand Chamber of 17 judges, 
Protocol No. 14. introduced a single-judge, committees of three judges, Chambers of seven 
judges and the Grand Chamber of 17 judges. Pursuant to the Art. 27 of the Convention a 
single-judge may declare an inadmissible individual application or strike out any individual 
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application of the Court’s list of cases in all cases where such decision can be undertaken. 
This decision is final. If such decision of a single-judge will not be rendered, a single-judge 
will forward particular individual application to a committee or to a Chamber for further 
examination. Implementation of a single-judge panel who can pass declaration on 
inadmissibility was provoked by the fact that the Court received 50 000 new applications 
under the Convention’s provisions each year. Additional filters due to the enormous 
proliferation of caseload needed to be established.  
If an individual application is forwarded to the committee, the committee can by 
unanimous vote declare application inadmissible or declare it admissible and simultaneously 
render a judgment on the merit of a particular case that has already been resolved in well-
established case-law of the Court (Art. 28 par. 1b of the Convention).  If no decision is passed 
by a single-judge or a committee, the application is referred to the Chamber which will decide 
on admissibility and merit. Pursuant to the provision of the Art. 30, the Chamber can 
relinquish its jurisdiction in favor of the Grand Chamber if a particular case raises serious 
questions affecting the interpretation of the Convention, or where the resolution of a question 
might have a result which is inconsistent with previous judgment of the Court. Such 
possibility is provided for the Chamber until the Chamber renders its judgment and only if 
parties do not object. From this provision we can determine that the Council of Europe 
considered the proliferation of case-law of the Court, so necessary measures had to be 
undertaken in order to secure a uniform application of the Convention’s case law. Securing 
uniform application of particular provisions is characteristic of all coherent legal branches and 
is usually referred as a part of the rule of law. The Court also withholds jurisdiction in state to 
state disputes or interstate cases in which one member state is addressing to the Court with 
statement that another member state allegedly violated particular provision of the Convention 
(Art. 33 of the Convention). 
 But undoubtedly, the most important instrument in securing application and realization 
of the Convention is individual application under the provision of Art. 34 of the Convention. 
Pursuant to respective provision “The Court may receive applications from any person, 
nongovernmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation 
by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the 
Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the 
effective exercise of this right.” Respective provisions proclaim substantial right to address 
the Court in all cases where violations of the Convention have occurred. But this right is not 
limitless and is subjected to certain limitations. In order for the individual to lodge his/her 
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application he/she must first exhaust all domestic legal remedies and lodge respective petition 
within period of six months from the date in which the final domestic decision was taken.188 
The Court will not deal will individual applications which are anonymous or are dealing with 
a matter previously resolved by the Court. The Court will also declare inadmissible any 
application which is manifestly ill-founded or from which can be determined that applicant 
has not suffered significant disadvantage unless respect for human rights as defined in the 
Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the 
merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly 
considered by a domestic tribunal (Art. 35 par. 3b of the Convention). From respective 
provision it can be determined that the Convention has tried to find a fair and justifiable 
balance between demands on the effectiveness of the system and full protection of human 
rights in all cases.  
 If a particular application is not declared inadmissible (which can be declared in any 
part of proceeding) a public hearing will be held unless the Court decides otherwise in 
exceptional circumstances. In the adjudication process the Court is faced with challenges as 
all other domestic courts in domestic proceedings. 
Supervisory mechanism established by the Convention places an obligation on the 
Court to determine whether violations of the Convention’s provisions have occurred in a 
particular case. Only an accurate determination of all relevant circumstances of a particular 
case can be substantial ground for decision whether a violation of a particular provision of the 
Convention has occurred. False determination of relevant circumstances can lead to 
misleading conclusions and ultimately to wrongful application of the Convention. In 
judgment El-Masri vs. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Application No. 
39630/09) the Court noted that in all cases with opposed representations of relevant facts, the 
Court is faced with the same problems as any other domestic court of any judicial instance. In 
respective judgment the Court emphasized particular principles in determining relevant facts 
on which it will base its decision whether a violation of the Convention has occurred.189 
                                                 
188 Protocol No. 15. is proposing that this six month time limit be reduced to four months.    
189 “B. The Court’s evaluation of the facts 
1. General principles 
151. In cases in which there are conflicting accounts of events, the Court is inevitably confronted when 
establishing the facts with the same difficulties as those faced by any first-instance court. It reiterates that, in 
assessing evidence, it has adopted the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”. However, it has never been 
its purpose to borrow the approach of the national legal systems that use that standard. Its role is not to rule on 
criminal guilt or civil liability but on Contracting States’ responsibility under the Convention. The specificity of 
its task under Article 19 of the Convention – to ensure the observance by the Contracting States of their 
engagement to secure the fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention – conditions its approach to the issues 
of evidence and proof. In the proceedings before the Court, there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility 
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 In other words, circumstances determined by national courts will be the frame in 
which the Court will examine a case under the Convention’s provisions. But the Court will 
not be limited by national rules regarding determination of relevant facts of the case and will 
examine a particular case in accordance with standards developed in its own case law. Also, 
new material can be presented in the proceeding before the Court if such material is relevant 
for the case. The fact that new material was not presented to the domestic courts is of no 
influence for the Court to examine such material if it is important for the adjudication process 
before the Court. The Court is only limited by the scope of the Convention’s application 
rationae materiae, rationae personae, rationae loci and rationae temporis. Other limitations 
regarding admissibility of particular application or determination of all relevant facts or 
application of the Convention could not be imposed to the Court.  
 After completion of respective proceeding according to the Convention’s provision the 
Court will render its final judgment in which it will determine that a violation of particular 
provision of the Convention has occurred or has not occurred. Special provisions are 
prescribed by the Convention in order for the judgment to become final. If a judgment 
regarding merit has been rendered by the Chamber, such judgment will become final pursuant 
to the Art. 44 of the Convention. Judgment rendered by the Chamber can be referred to the 
Grand Chamber if within a period of three months from the date of the judgment of the 
Chamber any party to the case request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber. 
Provision of the Art. 43 par. 2 of the Convention prescribes that a panel of five judges of the 
Grand Chamber will decide about this request if the case raises a serious question affecting 
the interpretation or application of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, or a serious issue 
of general importance. If respective panel of five-judges accepts the request, Grand Chamber 
will pass final judgment.  
 In order for the judgment of the Chamber to become final, the Convention prescribes 
three alternative conditions (Art. 44); first, the judgment of the Chamber will become final if 
                                                                                                                                                        
of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. It adopts the conclusions that are, in its view, 
supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the 
parties’ submissions. According to its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently 
strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of 
persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden 
of proof, are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the 
Convention right at stake. The Court is also attentive to the seriousness that attaches to a ruling that a 
Contracting State has violated fundamental rights (see Creangă v. Romania [GC], no. 29226/03, § 88, 23 
February 2012, and the cases cited therein).“ 
Respective principles on determination of facts in particular case the Court also noted in judgement Ilaşcu and 
others v. Moldova and Russia (Application No. 48787/99). Relevant case law cited according to: J. Omejec, 
op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 453 – 454. 
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the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber. 
Second, the judgment of the Chamber will become final after three months from the date 
when the Chamber rendered its judgment. Third, when the panel of the five judges of the 
Grand Chamber rejects the request to refer to the Grand Chamber.  
 Final judgment of the Court only determines the that violation of the Convention’s 
provisions has occurred in a particular case. Final judgment of the Court is regarding its 
procedural characteristics only declaratory with the meaning it only determines violation. It is 
an (international) obligation of a member state to undertake all necessary measures in order to 
rectify infringed human rights and fundamental freedoms determined by the Court in its final 
judgment. The Court doesn’t have cassational or appellate jurisdiction over final domestic 
decision of a highest domestic court because such competence has not been given to the Court 
according to the procedural provisions of the Convention. The Court will render its judgment 
determining that violation has occurred in particular case and to what extent. The final 
judgment of the Court determining a particular violation of the Convention’s provision will 
not annul the particular domestic decision or declare it null and void. The Court will only 
determine in its declaratory final judgment that a violation has occurred, after which the state 
involved will take all necessary measures in order to rectify determined violation. Usually, 
member states prescribe domestic extraordinary legal remedies (e.g. motion on retrial) against 
domestic final judgment which has been questioned before the Court. Respective legal 
remedies can lead to a re-opening of a particular case in which a retrial, legal understandings 
of the Court, regarding violation of particular human right which are expressed in the Court’s 
final judgment, will be binding for domestic courts.190    
 Although final judgment of the Court is purely declaratory, the Court has particular 
condemnatory competence. According to the provision of Art. 41 of the Convention, the 
Court may grant just satisfaction to the applicant/injured party if the Court finds that there has 
been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the 
included member state allows only partial reparation to be made. The Court is partially 
limited with provisions of domestic law regarding reparation of damage but can award 
compensation.191  
 In order to secure efficiency of the procedure before the Court, one further aspect must 
be emphasized in the context of our analysis. Although not regulated by the Convention, the 
                                                 
190 See supra, footnote 145.  
191 For detailed insight on reparation scheme pursuant to the Court's judgements in the context of legal certainty 
and predictibility of the system based upon the Convention see: O. Ichim: „Just Satisfaction under the European 
Convention on Human Rights“, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, p. 98 – 173.  
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Court pursuant to Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court can even issue interim measures. Rule 39 
specifically states: 
 
1. The Chamber or, where appropriate, the President of the Section or a duty judge appointed 
pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Rule may, at the request of a party or of any other person 
concerned, or of their own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which they 
consider should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the 
proceedings. 
2. Where it is considered appropriate, immediate notice of the measure adopted in a 
particular case may be given to the Committee of Ministers. 
3. The Chamber or, where appropriate, the President of the Section or a duty judge appointed 
pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Rule may request information from the parties on any matter 
connected with the implementation of any interim measure indicated. 
4. The President of the Court may appoint Vice-Presidents of Sections as duty judges to 
decide on requests for interim measures. 
 
The Court’s well-established practice granted interim measures only in cases where 
imminent threat of irreparable harm exists. Motion regarding interim measure is analyzed in 
the light of all circumstances of the applicant’s case but should the Court grant interim 
measure this fact will not prejudice in any way final judgment of the Court.192 From the 
contemporary analysis it is visible that in majority of cases member states will comply to the 
Court’s order expressed in granted interim measure and will take interim measure seriously.193 
From the stated facts we can easily determine and verify that the Court undoubtedly 
holds all required legal instruments which can secure evolution of its own jurisprudence. As it 
                                                 
192 „In practice, interim measures are applied only in a limited number of areas and most concern expulsion and 
extradition. They usually consist in a suspension of the applicant’s expulsion or extradition for as long as the 
application is being examined. The most typical cases are those where, if the expulsion or extradition takes 
place, the applicants would fear for their lives (thus engaging Article 2 (right to life) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights) or would face ill-treatment prohibited by Article 3 (prohibition of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment) of the Convention. More exceptionally, such measures may be indicated in 
response to certain requests concerning the right to a fair trial (Article 6 of the Convention) and the right to 
respect for private and family life (Article 8 of the Convention). In the Court’s case-law as it currently stands, 
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is not applied, for example, the following cases: to prevent the imminent demolition 
of property, imminent insolvency, or the enforcement of an obligation to do military service; to obtain the 
release of an applicant who is in prison pending the Court’s decision as to the fairness of the proceedings; to 
ensure the holding of a referendum or to prevent the dissolution of a political party.“ – Factsheet – Interim 
measures, p. 2, available at the official website of the Court at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Interim_measures_ENG.pdf  (12.04.2019.) 
193 P. Van Dijk et.al. (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 58), p. 113. Respective analysis also give extensive historical 
overview of the practice regarding interim measures and its evolution.  
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is with all other (domestic) courts, the Court can issue an interim measure, independently 
determine and evaluate all relevant circumstances of the particular case where the principle of 
autonomous interpretation of the Convention secures the full autonomy of the Court. All 
respective facts round up the system based upon the Convention in one coherent legal system 
with its own set of rules and independent evolution. The Court in this system stands as the 
fundamental institutional link between the Convention and member states. Although the Court 
does not possess competence on annulling or declaring null and void particular domestic 
decision of a (highest) court of particular member state, final judgment of the Court must be 
executed with all necessary measures undertaken by a member state included in the case. 
Furthermore, the Court can grant compensation to the injured party.194  
All stated facts clearly point out to the conclusion that a coherent legal system based 
upon the Convention has been instituted where institutions of such system (primarily the 
Court) are making continuous efforts on further evolution of main substantial elements of 
respective system – i.e. on the evolution of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Before 
we analyze how judgments of the Court are being executed in domestic legal order and are 
expanding the substantial content of human rights, one further procedural aspect of the 
Convention must be analyzed. Respective procedural aspect is the Courts response to 
enormous proliferation of cases that appear before the Court with similar (if not even 
identical) circumstances of the case and the impossibility of those particular states to solve 
their own systematical problems in their legal systems. This response is called pilot-
judgments and its relevance is in verifying devotion of the Court on improvement of the  
efficiency of the system based upon the Convention. If a system based upon the Convention is 
improving itself and is efficient, then our new theoretical concept of particular constitutional 
law can be verified.  
 
  3.2.3. Pilot-judgements 
 
 A relatively new procedural mechanism which enabled effective dealing with similar 
cases which appear before the Court on daily basis is the concept of pilot-judgement. The 
practice has shown that in particular cases a great number of individual applications which are 
brought before the Court pursuant to the Art. 34 of the Convention are connected with similar 
                                                 
194 See also: Mark E. Villiger: „Binding Effect and Declaratory Nature of the Judgements of the European Court 
of Human Rights: An Overview“, in: A. Seibert-Fohr, M. Villiger (ed.): „Judgements of the European Court of 
Human Rights – Effects and Implementation“, Studies of the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, 
European and Regulatory Procedural Law, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2017. 
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legal and/or factual background of case. This fact pointed out that in case of particular 
member states exists structural or systemic problem or other similar dysfunction which has 
given rise or may give rise to similar applications (Rule 61 of the Rules of Court). With 
evolution of pilot-judgement procedure the Court has gained procedural mechanisms to 
examine general implications of repetitive cases that appear before the Court against 
particular member state. Respective procedural mechanism also enabled the Court’s 
determination addressed to the particular member states that their legal systems have 
structural problems which, on the basis of pilot-judgement, should lead to adequate legislative 
measures in order for their elimination. 
  In the context of our analysis, the Rules of Court enabled interim measures where one 
international court orders a particular state to refrain from particular actions which should be 
undertaken on the basis of domestic final judgement. The contemporary theory has verified 
that member states in nearly all cases have accepted the order of the Court regarding interim 
measure and delayed execution of domestic final judgement until the Court rendered its final 
judgement or other circumstances have happened which eliminated decisive reasons for 
interim measure (e.g. member states has granted asylum or permanent residence to the 
applicant for which reason interim measure or individual’s application regarding extradition 
from member state were no longer necessary in order to secure human rights and fundamental 
freedoms prescribed by the Convention195). Now we can determine further evolution of the 
system based upon the Convention where system itself is adjusting to new challenges. It could 
be expected that enormous proliferation of individual applications with compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court will eventually reveal particular domestic legal and political 
problems which are in the core of domestic system. In order to secure effective legal answer 
based upon the Convention, necessary amendments to the Rules of Court have been made 
which have introduced the pilot-judgement procedure. 
 As it has been with interim measures, the pilot-judgement procedure is also instituted 
with the Rules of Court and not the Convention. Nevertheless, member states have accepted 
respective institute and did not raise any concerns from any standpoint (constitutional, 
political etc.).  
 Historically, the term “structural problem” within legal systems of member states has 
been noted by the Court for the first time in judgement Martins Moreira v. Portugal in 1988. 
In respective judgement the Court has determined violation of applicant’s right to a fair trial 
                                                 
195 See e.g. the case W.H. v. Sweden (Application No. 49341/10), available at:  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-5057310-6220291 (12.04.2019.) 
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due to the excessive length of domestic procedure. In respective case the Court emphasized 
that the particular judge who decided regarding the applicant’s claim had over one thousand 
unresolved cases and was a judge in five different courts in the county. On respective basis, 
the Court determined the existence of a structural problem in Portugal regarding excessive 
length of courts proceedings which requires appropriate remedial action given the fact that 
such excessive length violates a right to a fair trial protected by the Art. 6 par. 1 of the 
Convention. In 2003 the Court has for the first time introduced the idea of a pilot-judgement 
procedure in The Court’s 2003 Position Paper in the context of drafting of the Protocol No. 
14. The Court emphasized in respective Paper that an adequate procedural mechanism for 
treatment of repetitive well-founded applications should contain power of the Court to remove 
examination of case where the Court has previously identified the existence of structural 
violation in pilot-judgement. The Court also noted that such pilot-judgement would accelerate 
execution proceedings before the Committee of Ministers given the fact that the Committee 
would supervise the obligation of the member state in dealing with determined violations in 
all cases pro futuro as well as how a particular member state has removed previous violations 
in all cases where victims of violations of the Convention’s provisions have suffered damage 
from same systematic problem (e.g. has extra-ordinary legal remedy with retroactive effect 
been implemented etc.). While waiting for execution of pilot-judgement, the Court would 
cease all activities on pending cases related to the rendered pilot-judgement in expectation 
that all raised objections in those cases will subsequently be covered with such retroactive 
legal remedy. Should concerned member state fail in fulfilment of stated obligation within 
reasonable time, the Court would have power to proceed with pending cases.196 Such idea on 
implementation of pilot-judgement procedure did not fall on perspective ground within 
negotiations regarding introduction of the Protocol No. 14 but it has been subsequently 
introduced with stated Rule 61 of the Rule of the Court. The Court’s Registrar has issued 
information factsheet regarding pilot-judgement procedure and stated that if the Court should 
determine that a significant number of applications are deriving from the same root cause 
(same substantial legal or factual applications) the Court may select one or more such cases 
for priority treatment. Examining a particular case or cases the Court will try to achieve more 
general solution applicable to all similar cases which are raising same issue. The end result of 
such procedure will be pilot-judgement.   
 
                                                 
196 J. Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 333. 
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“In this judgment the Court will aim: 
- to determine whether there has been a violation of the Convention in the particular 
case; 
- to identify the dysfunction under national law that is at the root of the violation; 
- to give clear indications to the Government as to how it can eliminate this 
dysfunction; 
- to bring about the creation of a domestic remedy capable of dealing with similar 
cases (including those already pending before the Court awaiting the pilot judgment), 
or at least to bring about the settlement of all such cases pending before the Court.”197 
 
 The Court also noted that the pilot-judgement procedure must be considered merely as 
a help to national authorities in order to eliminate determined systematical problems in their 
legal systems. Pilot-judgement procedure is not to attack the national sovereignty, but it is to 
help the international court to member states in order to perceive determined systematical 
dysfunction, and due to the commitment on protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of all the Council of Europe member states, to apply necessary legislative and all 
other measures in order to eliminate such systematical problem. First pilot-judgement 
procedure was rendered in the case Broniowski v. Poland also known as the Bug River case 
where Poland’s legislative framework regarding compensation of damages for properties was 
determined as insufficient in order to meet all demands from the provision of Art. 1 of the 
Protocol 1 to the Convention (protection of property). The Court has rendered pilot-judgement 
in respective case and Poland undertook all necessary legislative adjustments in order to meet 
demands expressed by the Court.198  
 Pilot-judgements have later been evolved in the Court’s practice and the Court has 
been dealing with various systematical problems of numerous member states.199 They have 
                                                 
197 The Pilot-Judgment Procedure, Information note issued by the Registrar; available at:  
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Pilot_judgment_procedure_ENG.pdf (12.04.2019.) 
198 Detail presentation of the particular case and measures undertaken by the Polish government is available in: J. 
Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 343 – 346. 
199 E.g. in pilot-judgement in the case M.C. and Others v. Italy (application No. 5376/11) the Court determined 
„systemic problem resulting from the authorities’ unwillingness to adjust the supplementary part of a 
compensation allowance paid to them following accidental contamination as a result of blood transfusions or the 
administration of blood derivatives. The Court notably held that the Italian Government’s enactment of the 
emergency legislative decree, which ruled on the disputed issue of adjustment of the supplementary part of the 
allowance, had infringed the principle of the rule of law and the 162 applicants’ right to a fair hearing, had 
imposed “an abnormal and excessive burden” on them and, lastly, had disproportionately infringed their 
property rights.“ The Court demanded adequate measures to be undertaken i.e. to set, within six months from the 
date on which the judgment became final, a specific time-limit within which the State undertakes to secure the 
effective and expeditious realisation of the entitlements in question. The Italian Government is called on to pay a 
143 
 
also been the object of scientific analysis and the theory has already introduced their various 
interpretations and systematizations.200  
  In order to connect respective analysis with our main focus – transnational 
introduction of constitutional law from pure theoretically point of view which is effective in 
practice – we have to emphasize the significance of pilot-judgement procedure for the context 
of our dissertation. Throughout all of respective analysis, we are trying to round-up a coherent 
legal system based upon the Convention which has its own legal source (the Convention), its 
own set of substantial and procedural provisions (the Convention and the Rules of Court), its 
own territorial applicability (the Council of Europe member states), its own inherent 
constitutional essence (human rights and fundamental freedoms), its own institutional 
supervisor (the Court) etc. For all legal systems one of the main characteristics is their 
potential for adjustment to new technological, sociological, political and other conditions and 
challenges as well as securing continuous effectiveness of system in general. Both stated 
conditions have been fully met in the case of Convention. The system based upon the 
Convention is evolving, new techniques and mechanisms are introducing in order to secure 
effectiveness of the system based upon the Convention and the concept of pilot-judgement 
procedure is the answer of the Court (not of the Council of Europe but the Court itself!) to the 
proliferation of cases with similar circumstances of the case which enlighten structural 
deficiencies in particular member state. Such possibility for the Court (which is very 
significant from the procedural point of view) clearly indicates the existence of independent 
procedural mechanisms by which the Court can intervene in domestic legal orders on general 
level, i.e. with determination of systematical or structure deficiencies which endanger human 
rights and fundamental freedoms prescribed by the Convention. Of course, with pilot-
judgement procedure, the Court gained better procedural mechanisms in dealing with annual 
case-load that appear before the Court. For such reason, pilot-judgement procedure has been 
beneficial for the system based upon the Convention for two reasons: first, respective 
procedure points out the existence of particular structural problem to the member state. 
                                                                                                                                                        
sum corresponding to the adjusted supplementary allowance to every person eligible for the allowance provided 
for as soon as that eligibility is recognised. See: 
 http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Pilot_judgments_ENG.pdf (12.04.2019.) 
200 Like e.g. „full“ pilot-judgements and quasi pilot-judgements; than full pilot judgements which can be 
systematically divided according to the two criteria: first, according to the violated provisions of the Convention 
which were determine by the Court; or second, according to the causes of structural deficiencies which have 
been determined by the Court etc. See: J. Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 338 – 384. 
Pilot-judgement procedure has also been the object of systematical analysis within doctoral dissertations; See 
e.g.: M. Lazarova-Trajkovska: „Pilot judgements procedure before the European Court of Human Rights“, 
doctoral dissertation, Pravna fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani, 2012.   
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Secondly, the Court can improve its own statistics given the fact that all cases connected or 
affiliated with pilot-judgement proceeding are staying still until respective procedure is final. 
Should pilot-judgement procedure be rendered, all affiliated cases will fall under the scope of 
rendered pilot-judgement. For all stated reason, pilot-judgement procedure has improved 
proceedings before the Court in general securing its effectiveness which characteristic is 
extremely important for the context of our analysis.     
 
 3.3. Interpretation of the Convention and the activism of the Court     
 
 As it has been shown in previous sub-chapters of the dissertation, the Convention is 
written document which originated within the Council of Europe. As one particular 
multilateral international agreement it is a source of international conventional law which has 
binding legal effect in contracting states. From normative point of view the Convention 
prescribes particular human rights and fundamental freedoms which are common 
(legal/constitutional) ground for wide range of European states. Initial text of the Convention 
has been amended with various protocols which have broadened scope of the human rights 
protection on the European continent.201  
 As any other legal source of customary or conventional (national/international) law the 
Convention also must be interpreted in order to apply its provisions to particular case. After 
determination of all relevant circumstances of particular case, relevant provisions of the 
Convention (if applicable) must be applied in order to protect infringed human right or 
fundamental freedom. Interpretation and application of the Convention’s provisions lie solely 
on the Court. The Court is autonomous and independent in the process of interpretation and 
application of the Convention in particular cases.  
 Previously we have indicated strong substantial, grammatical and normative similarity 
between particular human rights and fundamental freedoms prescribed and protected in 
national constitutional texts and human rights and fundamental freedoms prescribed and 
protected with the Convention (in particular due process or the right to a fair trial and 
protection of property). Such grammatical and normative similarity serves as the foundation 
for substantial harmonization across the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, such similarity is 
only one side of the harmonization process. Other side of the process is visible throughout the 
implementation of the Convention in particular cases and in this process of implementation 
                                                 
201 See supra, p. 113 – 116. 
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the Court achieved its position as the most important European guardian of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Any similarity between national constitutional human rights and 
fundamental freedoms with human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the 
Convention without evolutive interpretation of the Court would be just a fact of life and 
would not overcome national legal boundaries in construction of European common legal 
standards in the most important contemporary human rights and fundamental freedoms. For 
that reason, procedural aspect of harmonization visible in broader applicability of the 
Convention’s provisions (in comparison to national constitutional provisions and reasons of 
national constitutional courts) is the second fundamental key aspect that ensures introduction 
of common legal standards which standards we are addressing as the particular constitutional 
law. Third key aspect which ensures construction of particular constitutional law is execution 
of all final judgements of the Court in national legal orders in which process contracting states 
have decisive role. 
 Retaining the analysis (for the time being) on the position of the Court it has to be 
noted that the Court could also retain its practice on pure grammatical interpretation of the 
Convention’s provision and deny protection to various applicants with explanation that 
particular case is not under the scope of applicability of the Convention’s provision.202 
Instead, the Court took another way and developed the principle of autonomous interpretation 
of the Convention’s provision with the basic meaning that the Court is autonomous and 
independent in interpretation and application of the Convention if all procedural conditions 
for action of the Court are fully met (exhaustion of all domestic legal remedies, compliance 
with the six-months deadline for lodging the application under the provisions of the 
Convention etc.). On the basis of the principle of autonomous interpretation, the Court has 
developed its own substantial meaning of nearly all grammatical terms in the Convention (e.g. 
civil rights and obligations from Art. 6. par. 1 of the Convention where the Court determined 
what particular rights and obligations can be deemed as civil rights and obligations203; 
                                                 
202 Even from its beginning, supervisory system set out in the Convention was struggling between conservative 
(grammatical) approach in the Convention's interpretation and application in particular cases and liberal, flexible 
interpretation and application. In the beginning of the Court's jurisprudence, various questions regarding 
interpretation of the Convention have arised and the Court was facing challenges on how particular provision of 
the Convention should be applied. In the famous case Golder v. United Kingdom (1975) dispute regarding 
interpretation and application of Art. 8 of the Convention arised. See case Golder v. United Kingdom and 
separate opinion of judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (p. 28 – 57 of the judgement). Available at: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=001-57496&filename=001-57496.pdf 
(12.04.2019.) Such struggle between activist and conservative method of the Convention's interpretation is still 
visible in contemporary time. See: H. Molbæk-Steensig: „In Defence of Dynamic Interpretation Tradition at the 
EctHR“, in: The Universal, vol. 2, No. 1, 2018, p. 37-50.  
203 See supra, p. 53.  
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property or possession from Art. 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention where the Court in 
its judicial practice determined that e.g. enforceable claim from particular obligations can also 
be under the scope of applicability of Art. 1 to the Protocol No. 1 and consequently 
protectable by the Convention204 etc.).  
The idea of autonomous concept of the Convention's provisions first emerged in the 
case of Engel and Others v. the Netherlands in 1976 where five conscript soldiers lodged an 
application claiming a violation of the Convention in the imposition of penalties for 
disciplinary offences rendered by military courts. Applicants claimed that procedure before 
military courts and imposition of penalties did not meet requirements prescribed by the Art. 5 
(right to liberty and security) and Art. 6 of the Convention. Although respondent state argued 
that disciplinary procedures before military courts are not under the protection of Art. 6 of the 
Convention (because such procedures are not related to any civil rights and obligations or to 
any criminal charges but merely disciplinary which are not criminal charges) the Court in its 
analysis stated: „Does Article 6 cease to be applicable just because the competent organ of a 
Contracting State classify as disciplinary an act or omission and the proceedings it takes 
against the author, or does it, on the contrary apply in certain cases nothwithstanding this 
classification?“205 The Court noted that if such possibility could be possible purpose and 
objects of the Convention could be endagered and for the reasons of protection of general 
purpose and objects of the Convention „Since the Engel case, the Court has developed the 
theory of autonomous concepts to make it a significant doctrine of its jurisprudence.“206  
 Concerning all stated arguments we can conclude that effective success of the 
harmonization process where common standards which we are addressing as the particular 
constitutional law can be constructed is directly influenced by two interrelated and indivisible 
aspects: substantial aspect visible in strong grammatical and normative similarity between 
                                                 
204 “The concept of “possessions” has an autonomous meaning which is independent from the formal 
classification in domestic law (see Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece [GC], no. 25701/94, § 60, 
ECHR 2000-XII). Tax dutie“Possessions” can be “existing possessions” or assets, including claims, in respect 
of which an applicant can argue that he has at least a “legitimate expectation” (which must be of a nature more 
concrete than a mere hope) that they will be realised, that is, that he or she will obtain effective enjoyment of a 
property right (see, inter alia, Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 39794/98, 
ECHR 2002-VII, § 69; and Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 35, ECHR 2004-IX). A claim may be 
regarded as an asset only when it is sufficiently established to be enforceable (see, inter alia, Kopecký v. 
Slovakia [GC], cited above, § 49; and Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, judgment of 9 
December 1994, Series A no. 301-B, p. 84, § 59). No “legitimate expectation” can come into play in the absence 
of a claim sufficiently established to constitute an asset. By way of contrast, a conditional claim cannot be 
considered an asset (see Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], cited above, §§ 42, 51 and 58). In the Court's view, a claim 
is conditional where it depends upon a future uncertain event.“ – case of Gavella v. Croatia (application No. 
33244/02, Decision of the Court on the admisibility of the application from July 11th, 2006. 
205 G. Letsas: „A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights“, Oxford University 
Press, London, 2009, p. 41. 
206 Ibid, p. 42. 
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human rights and fundamental freedoms protected in national constitutional texts with those 
protected by the Convention and procedural aspect visible in the Court’s commitment to 
expand protection to those cases which were not under the protection of national 
constitutional provisions although respective provisions are grammatical and normatively 
similar with those contained in the Convention. The Court could also take rather conservative 
approach and retain on national interpretation given by national constitutional courts and 
verify that such national interpretations are in conformity with the Convention. In such case 
there would not exist that exogenous variable which would link national constitutional orders 
on one higher international level with broader protection of human rights and consequently 
there would not be any particular constitutional law. European human rights law would be a 
totality of national constitutional laws where all national apprehensions in private sphere of 
individuals and their human rights and fundamental freedoms would be justified within the 
doctrine of the margins of appreciation207 from the Convention’s point of view.  
 But the Court has undertaken opposite approach and on the basis of the autonomous 
interpretation has developed independent substantial and procedural meaning of the 
Convention’s provision with strong commitment to develop own autonomous and 
independent judicial practice free from any national inputs (as reasonably possible given the 
fact that the Court cannot simply ignore provisions of relevant domestic law in determination 
of all relevant circumstances of particular case). For such activist approach contemporary 
research indicate creativity of the Court in the European human rights law but with constant 
awareness that contracting states are key policy makers and primary responsible for effective 
realization of the Convention’s rights.208 
 After determination that the process of (creative) interpretation of the Convention is in 
the very essence of the procedural aspect of harmonization what ensures development of 
regional European common standards, additional characteristics of interpretation of the 
Convention must be emphasized for the context of our analysis. First of all, it must be noted 
that in the process of interpretation the Court itself is not limitless but also must conform to 
the general principles of international law. The Convention as international agreement where 
the Court is autonomous and independent in interpretation of its provisions, but such 
interpretation must be performed in accordance and within the framework of international 
                                                 
207 For the concept of the margin of appreciation see infra, p. 152. 
208 See: A. Mowbray: „The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights“, Human Rights Law Review, 
No. 1, vol. 5 (2005), p. 57 – 79. 
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law. In other words, the Court is independent and autonomous in interpretation and 
application but is not boundless with any rules whatsoever.  
The Convention itself does not provide any rules regarding interpretation of its 
provision and for which reason for interpretation of the Convention’s provisions primarily are 
applicable general provisions of international law, i.e. the Vienna Convention. The Vienna 
Convention as the main source of international law regarding international agreements 
prescribes in Art. 31 that international agreement (international treaty) must be interpreted in 
good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its objects and purpose. Regarding respective provision we 
can conclude that as regard to the Convention this provision prohibits the Court to interpret 
the Convention in a manner that would ultimately create new human rights which contracting 
states did not have in mind when signing or accessing the Convention. The Court as any other 
domestic court in liberal democratic society must always consider that its competence is 
rather limited on interpretation and application of particular legal source and never on 
legislative creation of law throughout judicial actions. Legislative enactments of legal sources 
are in competence of other branches of government (on national level) or on contracting states 
(on international level).  
In general theory of interpretation of the Convention’s provisions interpretative 
principles can be divided in two main groups pursuant to the direction in which judicial 
creativity led. In the first group which is called judicial self-restraint principles of 
interpretation judges of the Court use one of the four interpretative principles: intentionalism, 
textualism, doctrine of margin of appreciation and the doctrine of the fourth instance. On the 
other side of the scale there are judicial activist interpretative principles where judges of the 
Court use the principle of living instrument doctrine or evolutive principle, the doctrine of 
effectiveness or innovative interpretation and the doctrine of an autonomous concept.209  
Intentionalism primarily considers the origins of particular legal source and what were 
particular intentions of contracting parties in the time when original text was drafted and 
accepted. It places particular legal source in historical perspective and questions what were 
truly drafter’s intentions in passing particular legal document or legal source. In general 
theory of law such method of interpretation can be identified as historical and teleological 
method of interpretation. In the case of Convention although rarely used the Court emphasizes 
preparatory works on the original text of the Convention whenever such invocation is 
                                                 
209 M. Marochini Zrinski: „The Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights“, Zbornik Pravnog 
fakulteta u Splitu, vol. 51, br. 1/2014, p. 67. 
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necessary or appropriate but always as a supplementary principle. Second judicial self-
restraint principle on interpretation of the Convention is textualism where substantial meaning 
of particular provision is placed on the meaning which particular provision had at the time 
when it was drafted or enacted or within the usual meaning of its terms. Such interpretative 
principle is fully in accordance to the mentioned provisions of the Vienna Convention given 
the fact that respective provisions clearly prescribes necessity for the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its objects and purpose.210 
Some authors address intentionalism and textualism as two types of originalism which 
theories “wish to tie interpretation back to the time when the law was enacted.”211 Such 
historical methods for the interpretation of the Convention’s provision are nowadays set aside 
but not completely abandoned.212 
  Nowadays, the most common interpretative principle in judicial self-restraint is the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation. This doctrine will be further presented in the next sub-
chapter of the dissertation for which reason and for the time being we will address this 
doctrine only as limits or boundaries in which contracting states can regulate human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in their territory and which regulation is acceptable for the Court 
and within respective framework the Court interprets and applies provisions of the 
Convention. It has to be noted that contracting states as primarily responsible for protection 
and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms set out in the Convention have 
particular area of discretion (margin of appreciation) within which area contracting states can 
regulate human rights and fundamental freedoms without infringement of the Convention’s 
provisions. In other words, any limitations or restrictions of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms prescribed by the Convention and undertaken by contracting state do not 
automatically lead to the violation of the Convention. The Court acknowledges that 
contracting states have particular framework in which they can regulate human rights and 
fundamental freedoms on domestic level without violating the Convention. “However, the 
width of the margin of appreciation allowed to states varies in degrees of discretion, 
depending on the context. For that reason, the margin of appreciation can sometimes be 
narrow and then states will be granted little discretion. No strict conclusion can be drawn as 
to when the Court will use broad and when it will use a narrow approach. Even when it 
comes to the same case, it was sometimes decided differently by the Grand Chamber then it 
                                                 
210 Ibid, p. 68 – 69.  
211 G. Letsas, op.cit. (footnote 205), p. 60.  
212 Ibid, p. 68 – 72 and M. Marochini Zrinski, op. cit. (footnote 209), p. 69.  
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was by the Chamber. Nevertheless, it can be said that more often the Court uses this doctrine 
to stress the Convention’s subsidiary role and thereby as a self-restraint principle.”213   
 Final judicial self-restraint method of interpretation of the Convention is the doctrine 
of fourth instance.214 Basically, this method of interpretation and application of the 
Convention blocks action of the Court in all cases where errors of fact or law have really 
occurred, but such errors have not ultimately led to the violation of the Convention. The Court 
will not determine that any possible error in application of law or in determination of facts 
within domestic proceedings will automatically lead to the violation of the Convention, but 
only when such errors really and effectively lead to the infringement of the Convention. Such 
interpretation is consistent with the provision of Art. 35 par. 3b which prescribes that the 
Court shall declare inadmissible any application if considers that the applicant has not 
suffered a significant disadvantage unless respect for human rights as defined in the 
Convention and Protocols requires examination. For this reason, the Court will not deal with 
every possible error in law but only when such errors in law or in determination of facts lead 
to a significant disadvantage, i.e. that such errors constitute violation of the Convention which 
will be determined by the Court itself.  
 When it comes to the judicial activist principles of interpretation of the Convention 
theory indicates the doctrine of an autonomous concept, the living instrument doctrine (the 
evolutive interpretation) and the doctrine of effectiveness.215 Although previously briefly 
elaborated here we can also point out that respective principle of interpretation “…prevent 
provisions of the Convention from being subordinated to the interpretation of a term or 
principle in domestic law of the contracting parties.”216 The Court must consider relevant 
provisions of domestic law and assess are all actions of the state in particular case have been 
within the framework of the Convention’s provisions (have respective actions been 
undertaken within the margin of appreciation doctrine). But in assessing have there been a 
violation of the Convention, the Court will interpret provisions of the Convention 
independently and autonomously and will not be bound upon any domestic interpretation 
and/or provision of domestic law. The living instrument doctrine or the doctrine of evolutive 
interpretation is the doctrine of interpretation that directly opposes intentionalism and 
textualism. This doctrine of interpretation doesn’t consider historical and teleological 
perspectives of the original text and drafters’ intentions but standards and perspectives in 
                                                 
213 M. Marochini Zrinski, op. cit. (footnote 209), p. 70 – 71.   
214 Ibid, p. 74. 
215 Ibid, p. 75.  
216 Ibid. 
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contemporary time. This principle of interpretation emphasizes that the Convention is a living 
instrument which evolves through time and in course of its application must consider present 
time conditions.217 This principle of interpretation ensures that the Convention will never be 
considered as obsolete legal source in present day conditions and that will have ability to 
adjust to new legal, political and life circumstances in contemporary time.  
 Finally, there is principle of innovative interpretation or the doctrine of effectiveness. 
“The essence of this approach is that states cannot be in compliance with the Convention 
simply by prohibiting conduct that contravenes the Convention, but they might have to take 
positive action to protect its rights. Therefore, the general idea under this approach is to 
impose positive obligations on the Contracting States. The principle of effectiveness is used by 
the Court either when it decides whether a provision is applicable or whether a clearly 
applicable provision has been violated.”218 This activist approach in interpretation of the 
Convention demands also activism from contracting states in order to effectively ensure 
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. 
 Although the most important, respective principles or guidelines in interpretation and 
application of the Convention are not at the same time the only ones. Theory also introduced 
systematization on primary and secondary constitutional principles for interpretation of the 
Convention. Within primary constitutional principles there are teleological principle, 
democracy principle, principle of lawfulness/legality, principle of procedural fairness, 
principle of “priority-to-rights” and “balancing” principle. Secondary constitutional principles 
for interpretation of the Convention are principle of European “commonality”, principle of 
subsidiarity, principle of proportionality, principle of non-discrimination etc.219  
 In the context of our analysis, division between judicial activist principles and judicial 
self-restraint principles can be indicated as the main division which we can also utilize for the 
construction of the particular constitutional law. Judicial activist principles and subsequent 
                                                 
217 This dotrine has been revealed in the case Tyrer v. United Kingdom in 1976 „...where the Court had to decide 
whether judicial corporal punishment of juveniles amounts to degrading punishment within the meaning of art. 3 
of the Convention. The punishment, having the form of bare-skin birching carried out by a policeman at a police 
station, was prescribed by law and practiced in the Isle of Man, a dependent territory of the United Kingdom 
with a significant degree of legislative autonomy. At that time, judicial corporal punishmenthad been abolished 
in the rest of the United Kingdom and was neither to be found in the vast majority of the other Contracting 
States. 
..... 
The Court then went on to relate its reasoning with a different category of common beliefs. It said: The Court 
must also recall that the Convention is a living instrument which, as the Commission rightly stressed, must be 
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions. In the case now before it the Court cannot but be influenced by 
the developments and commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of the member States of the Council of 
Europe in this field.“, G. Letsas, op.cit. (footnote 205), p. 75 – 76. 
218 M. Marochini Zrinski, op. cit. (footnote 209), p. 80.    
219 J. Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 1015 – 1016.  
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application of the Convention are beneficial for the concept of the particular constitutional 
law. By interpreting the Convention with those principles, the Court is continuously 
developing common standards that are entering in domestic legal orders by the process of 
execution of the Court’s final judgement. Such activist approach of the Court is important 
theoretical foundation for the construction of the particular constitutional law. Each time 
when the Court takes activist approach in particular case and expands the scope of 
applicability of particular human right to cases which were not under the scope of national 
constitutional protection and that at the same time means that common standards have been 
adjusted and expanded to all future cases with similar circumstances of the case (generally 
speaking). For this reason, first step in achieving European common standards is activist 
approach in interpretation and application of the Convention and for which reason such 
interpretation is of a paramount importance for the construction of the particular constitutional 
law.220 
 
 3.4. Margin of appreciation  
 
  Other theoretical concept which has significance for the construction of the particular 
constitutional law is the doctrine of margin of appreciation. As stated above, this concept 
generally has foundation in the idea that contracting states are primarily responsible to ensure 
effective realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms prescribed by the Convention. 
Within such responsibility the contracting states possess particular freedom (within general 
framework of the Convention as determined by the Court) on how such effective realization 
should be achieved. Legislative and other domestic legal and political methods on realization 
of the Convention lie solely on the contracting states and the Court performs final control on 
the basis of individual application lodged according to the Art. 34 of the Convention. The 
Court acknowledges the fact that legal systems of contracting states are diversified and that 
national particularities have to be recognized in the process of realization of the Convention. 
Nevertheless, such national particularities and sovereign freedom of contracting states in 
                                                 
220 Activist approach of the Court has been the object of various scientific researches in contemporary time. One 
of the newest is related to the promotion of horizontal positive obligations of contracting states. Application of 
the Convention in horizontal relations (between private parties within one contracting state) has never been 
intention of the framers of the Convention. But under the Court's activism and by invoking Art. 1 of the 
Convention, application of the Convention in horizontal relation has practically become a standard. See: M. 
Florczak-Wator: „The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Promoting Horizontal Positive 
Obligations of the State“, in: International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 17, No. 2 (2017), p. 39 – 53. 
Also: T. Sarikaya Güler: „Positive Obligations Doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights: Is it Cogent or 
Obscure?“ in: European Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies, vol. 6, No. 1, Sep-Dec 2017, p. 358 – 364.  
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realization of the Convention must not endanger the Convention itself. It is up to the Court to 
determine are potential restrictions of human rights and fundamental freedoms in particular 
cases due to the special national characteristics within the margins of appreciation and 
acceptable for the Convention’s system. If not, the Court will determine violation of the 
Convention with all subsequent consequences that derive from such violation. “The margin of 
appreciation doctrine has been developed in an attempt to strike a balance between national 
views of human rights and the uniform application of Convention values. It is inherent in, and 
naturally derived from, the original understanding that the Convention should serve as a 
system complementary but subsidiary to national systems.”221 
 The doctrine of margin of appreciation as accepted by the Court is court-based 
doctrine and has been developed by the Court without any reference to the original text of the 
Convention or subsequent Protocols which are on force.222 It has to be noted that Protocol No. 
15 to the Convention for the first time expressively institutes respective doctrine which fact 
points out to the conclusion that after long year of court-based practice on the respective 
doctrine the Council of Europe decided to acknowledge this doctrine as fundamental principle 
of the Convention’s system. Something that has been constituted and developed by the Court 
in its jurisprudence finally found the way to become positive law on high normative level 
given the fact that respective doctrine pursuant to the provision of Art. 1 of the Protocol No. 
15 to the Convention will be recognized in the Preamble of the Convention.223  
 Respective doctrine in theory has also been analyzed according to two different ways 
as it has been used by the Court. First concept of the margin of appreciation is substantive 
concept where point of analysis is based on the relation between human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and collective goals which had to be achieved pursuant to the theory of 
political morality. “In the Court’s case law, the margin of appreciation is usually linked to the 
                                                 
221 Y. Arai-Takahashi: „The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECHR“, Intersentia, Antwerp-Oxford-New York, 2002, p. 3. 
222 A. Legg: „The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law“, Oxford University Press, 2012, 
p. 3. Also: M. Marochini Zrinski, op.cit. (footnote 209), p. 70 and G. Letsas, op.cit. (footnote 205), p 80. For 
relations of the respective doctrine in the case of the Court and the American doctrine of the levels of scrutiny 
developed by the Supreme Court of the United States of America see: K. Lemmens: „The Margin of 
Appreciation in the EctHR's Case Law – A European version of the Levels of Scrutiny Doctrine?“ in: European 
Journal of Law Reform, vol. 20, No. 2-3, 2018, p. 78 – 96.  
223 Art. 1 of the Protocol No. 15 prescribes: „At the end of the preamble to the Convention, a new recital shall be 
added, which shall read as follows:“Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this 
Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights established by this Convention (underlined by 
author),”. Respective Protocol as amending protocol for entering on force requires ratification of all the Council 
of Europe member states. Until April 2019 all member states have signed respective Protocol, but Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Italy have not yet ratified the Protocol. For full status regarding ratification of the Protocol No. 
15 see supra (footnote 136).  
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following two propositions: first, that state authorities are justified in taking measures, 
prescribed by law, in order to advance collective goals; and secondly, that although such 
measures may interfere with fundamental freedoms of the individual, such interference may 
not amount to a violation of his or her rights.”224 This concept of the respective doctrine 
recognizes the fact that state authorities in domestic political regulations must in necessity 
regulate human rights and fundamental freedoms. Such regulation must be prescribed by law 
and must not reveal any arbitrary or other non-democratic treatment of groups (addressees) 
concerned. In such domestic regulation and application of positive law human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be and usually are (by regulation itself) interfered or limited. But 
such interference or limitations of human rights and fundamental freedoms will not 
automatically lead to the violation of the Convention itself. The Convention is basic legal 
source for the European common legal standards and also the ultimate limit for state’s 
apprehension to the private sphere of individuals. This limit which the Court acknowledges to 
contracting states is exactly the margin of appreciation. If contracting state in particular case 
goes beyond this limit (which will ultimately be determined by the Court) violation of the 
Convention will be determined.   
 Second concept of the margin of appreciation is structural concept that “…imposes 
limits on the powers of judicial review by virtue of the fact that the ECHR is an international 
convention. It is the idea that the Court’s power to review decisions taken by domestic 
authorities should be more limited than the powers of a national constitutional court or other 
national bodies that monitors or review compliance with an entrenched bill of rights.”225 This 
concept of the doctrine recognizes the fact that national authorities are in better position than 
international judges to decide on human rights issues which was raised by the individual. 
Complementary view of the respective structural concept of the doctrine is the principle of 
subsidiarity of the Convention system given the fact that the Court must protect human rights 
and fundamental freedoms but on subsidiary basis.226 
 In the context of our analysis, margin of appreciation is outer boundary for 
development of the particular constitutional law. In line with the margin of appreciation 
concept, particular constitutional law is developing under the supervision of the Court. If the 
Court determines in particular case that no violation has occurred due to the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, that at the same time mean that final decision of national court is within 
                                                 
224 G. Letsas, op.cit. (footnote 205), p. 84.  
225 Ibid, p. 90. 
226 Ibid, p. 91. 
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the Convention’s system. Should national authorities exceed the limits or margin of 
appreciation the Court will determine violation of particular human right(s) and practically 
send a signal to national authorities to take one step back in application of relevant law which 
will be within the Convention’s system.227 Considering all stated arguments, we can conclude 
that margin of appreciation is also outer theoretical limit of the particular constitutional law. 
Within margin of appreciation the particular constitutional law is developing and achieving 
common European standards considering national particularities.  
 Nevertheless, when the Court determines violation of particular human rights and 
expands scope of applicability of particular human right or fundamental freedom particular 
constitutional law is also developing given the fact that such intervention of the Court also is 
constructing European common standards. For this reason also, particular constitutional law is 
inter-dependent between contracting states and the Court. Contracting states are constructing 
particular constitutional law within the margin of appreciation. On the other side, the Court is 
constructing and building particular constitutional law each time when determines violation of 
particular human right prescribed by the Convention. Legal understandings of the Court will 
ultimately in the process of execution of the Court’s final judgement enter in national legal 
reality which will expand European common standards. On the other hand it has to be pointed 
out that recognition of a certain margin of appreciation to the contracting states in their 
national legal framework (which can ultimately lead to the determination of non-violation of 
the Convention in a specific case and specific field) also recognizes that the horizontal aspect 
of harmonization (reception of the Court’s judgements between contracting states) is less 
likely attainable due to the lack of European consensus in this field. Strong vertical 
harmonization under the influence of the Court and under supervision of the Committee of 
Ministers in the execution process is still (unfortunately) the best method to secure 
recognition and realization of minimum European standards. 
 Finally, margin of appreciation doctrine is well developed in the application of Art. 6 
of the Convention (right to a fair trial) and Art. 1 of the Protocol 1 (right to a peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions). The Court has established three criteria which will be thoroughly 
examined in each particular case in order to determine whether national authorities exceeded 
                                                 
227 Taking one step back can occur in retrial process where legal understandings of the Court will be binding for 
domestic courts (e.g. the provision of Art. 428.a of the Croatian Litigation Act; see: supra footnote 145). But 
how will contracting state rectify infringed human right and fundamental freedom is sole responsibility of the 
contracting state. It can be within retrial process but contracting state can also cease with disputable practice in 
order to fulfill its obligation on full execution of all final judgements of the Court. Also various types of 
compensation can be awarded, immediate release of prisoner can be granted etc. For more about how contracting 
states can rectify infringed human right determined by the Court see infra, p. 242 - 243. 
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beyond acceptable limits of margin of appreciation in application of the right to a fair trial. 
First, any limitations and regulations of the right to a fair trial protected by the Art. 6 of the 
Convention must not restrict or reduce access to courts (which is inherent part of the right to a 
fair trial) in such a way or to such an extent that the “very essence” of the right is impaired. 
Secondly, limitations must pursue a legitimate aim. Finally, there must always be a reasonable 
relation of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.228 
 Similar criteria have been established for determination have national authorities 
exceeded margin of appreciation in the case of application and realization of the right to a 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions from Art. 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. First 
of all, undertaken measure by which respective right is limited must be lawful and prescribed 
by law. Furthermore, such limitation must pursuit legitimate aim in the general interest. 
Finally, there must be proportionality between means undertaken and the legitimate aim.229  
   If the Court determines that all three criteria have been respected in particular case, no 
violation whatsoever will be determined given the fact that national authorities in such case 
have acted within the Convention’s system. But if national authorities fail to comply with 
these standards developed and supervised by the Court, violation of Art. 6 of the Convention 
or Art. 1 of the Protocol 1 to the Convention will be determined.  
  Review of the Convention’s system as presented so far indicates a structure of the 
system from the internal aspect, i.e. from the aspect of the Court and application of the 
Convention in individual cases. Although extremely important for the context of our analysis 
this aspect is only the inception in the process of construction of particular constitutional law. 
It has to be noted that all presented facts regarding normative characteristics of the 
Convention, reasoning of the Court, structure of the Court’s system etc. would be merely an 
object of theoretical analysis in case if all efforts in protection of the Convention system 
should fail in one crucial step – implementation of the Court’s final judgement in national 
legal systems. For this reason, process of execution of the Court’s final judgement in national 
legal orders is as important as all efforts of the Court in line of achieving sustainable common 
standards across Europe.   
 
 
 
                                                 
228 Y. Arai-Takahashi, op.cit. (footnote 221), p. 35.  
229 Ibid, p. 158. 
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 3.5. Execution of judgements in national legal orders of the member states 
 
 Within this chapter of our analysis we presented main normative, historical as well as 
the political evolution of the Convention. We have also indicated main operational and 
procedural provisions of the Convention and the Rules of Court which are main procedural 
legal source for proceeding before the Court. In order to verify the existence of independent 
procedural mechanism regardless of domestic (national) legal and political influences we have 
emphasized the principle of autonomous interpretation of the Convention’s provision, 
possibility regarding interim measures as well as the pilot-judgement procedure. In order to 
closely examine the normative and other characteristics of the Convention, we also need to 
clarify execution of the Court’s judgements. We can (carefully) state that respective process 
of execution of a final judgement in member states with (subsequent) implementation of the 
Court’s legal understandings of domestic legal procedures (judicial and legislative) is the 
main framework for introduction of our new theoretical concept which goes hand-by-hand 
with earlier stated activist position of the Court in the interpretation and application of the 
Convention’s provisions. Overflow of the Court’s legal understandings in domestic legal 
order with affiliated implementation in all future cases leads to the conclusion that there is a 
particular human rights system with an independent legal source and an independent 
institutional guardian.  
Throughout the execution of a final judgement of the Court legal understandings 
(usually binding for domestic courts in retrial proceeding) are becoming an inherent part of 
domestic legal order. Every time when domestic legal order carries on final judgement of the 
Court, domestic constitutional order assumes particular wider substantial content with the 
meaning that previous scope of application of particular constitutional provision (rendered by 
the domestic constitutional court) will pro futuro be expanded in all similar cases where the 
Court determined violation of the Convention. The final judgement of the Court with 
determination of a violation of a particular human right or fundamental freedom in the same 
time means that domestic courts in previous domestic proceedings have not interpreted or 
applied provisions of human rights law (prescribed by the constitution and the Convention) in 
conformity with the Convention and jurisprudence established by the Court. For that reason, 
we can determine that domestic courts and the Court are in constant communication and 
within such communication is the independent human rights system evolving.  
Given the fact that implementation of the Court’s legal understandings rendered in the 
final judgement of the Court is of outmost importance for our theoretical concept, it is 
158 
 
methodologically necessary to examine the process of execution of the Court’s final 
judgement.  
We can analyze the process of execution from two independent aspects: from the 
aspect of international law on the basis of the Convention’s provisions as well as the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention. Also, we can analyze it from the aspect of internal 
domestic law, i.e. from the aspect of domestic procedural remedies provided by the legislature 
which can lead to re-opening of particular case on the basis of the Court’s judgement which 
determined violation of the Convention’s provisions. In the international law aspect there are 
two main legal sources (the Convention and the Vienna Convention) and in the domestic 
aspect there are 47 legal sources. Each member state provides its own domestic procedural 
remedies (legislative if needed and judicial) in order to implement a final judgement of the 
Court so there is a variety of possible domestic legal solutions.230 Nevertheless, the most 
important feature of such solutions is that a member state must not in any way interfere with 
the international obligation of particular member state on execution of a final judgement of 
the Court. This fact clearly indicates that member states have also margin of appreciation in 
methods by which will fully and properly implement (execute) final judgement of the Court. 
Member states are free to undertake all measures deemed necessary and appropriate in order 
to execute final judgement of the Court and consequently comply with their international 
obligation on full execution of the Court’s final judgement. Given the fact that member states 
are free and partially autonomous in the process of execution of the Court’s final judgement 
we can conclude that member states are on the other hand inalienable part in construction of 
particular constitutional law.231 The Court on the one hand is taking propulsive position in 
                                                 
230 For detailed insight on possible methods on execution of final judgements of the Court see infra, p. 242 - 243. 
231 Although free and partially autonomous, the system based upon the Convention must not set aside the fact 
that contracting states are subjected to the international obligation on full execution of all final judgement of the 
Court. Given the fact that effectiveness of the system is one of the main concern of the Council of Europe, 
particular control, assistance and help to the contracting states in the process of execution of final judgement of 
the Court should have been provided and expected. For this reason the practice of the Council of Europe 
highlighted so-called judgements with indications of relevance for execution. „As reflected in the constant 
practice of the Committee of Ministers and as underlined by the Court, the respondent State remains free, 
subject to the supervision of the Committee of Ministers, to choose the means by which it will discharge its legal 
obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions set 
out in the Court’s judgment (see the case Gülay Çetin v. Turkey, No. 44084/10, final on 05/06/2013, §143, cited 
below). The Committee of Ministers has, in this context, invited the Court to identify, as far as possible, “in its 
judgments finding a violation of the Convention, what it considers to be an underlying systemic problem and the 
source of this problem, in particular when it is likely to give rise to numerous applications, so as to assist states 
in finding the appropriate solution and the Committee of Ministers in supervising the execution of judgments” 
(Resolution Res(2004)3). In the same spirit, the Court has added that “with a view to helping the respondent 
State to fulfil its obligations under Article 46, (it) may seek to indicate the type of individual and/or general 
measures that might be taken in order to put an end to the situation it has found to exist” (see the case Suso 
Musa v. Malta, No. 42337/12, final on 23/07/2013, §120, cited below). Whereas such indications were 
sporadically given in the past34, over the last years, the Court has given them more regularly. In the framework 
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European human rights law building and expanding common standards in its judicial practice 
and on the other hand member states by implementing those standards in their daily legal and 
political life are confirming such common standards (particular constitutional law) in 
everyday practice. Member states are second pole (along with the Court) of particular 
constitutional law. 
According to the provision of Art. 46 of the Convention all member states undertake 
to abide by the final judgement of the Court in any case to which they are parties. Supervision 
on execution of a final judgement of the Court is vested to the Committee of Ministers as a 
political body of the Council of Europe. Should the Committee of Ministers consider that 
execution of a final judgement of the Court is hindered by a problem of interpretation of 
particular judgement, the Committee can then refer this matter to the Court for a ruling on the 
question of interpretation. Decision on referring respective matter to the Court must be 
rendered by a majority vote of two-thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the 
Committee. On the other hand, should the Committee consider that particular member state 
failed to abide by a final judgement it may, after serving formal notice to respective member 
state, also refer to the Court with the question whether respective member state failed to abide 
final judgement of the Court.232 Respective decision on referral to the Court must be rendered 
by a majority vote of two-thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee. If the 
Court determines that member state failed to abide to a final judgement of the Court, the 
Court will refer the case back to the Committee of Ministers for consideration which 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the pilot judgment procedure (see Rule 61 of the Rules of Court), these indications receive expression also in 
the operative part of the judgments. This has usually not been the case in judgments where the Court has not 
applied this procedure. Pilot judgments and other Judgments with indications of relevance for the execution of 
general measures (under Article 46) are normally identified, in view of their importance for the execution, as 
leading cases.“ 7th Annual Report on Supervision of the execution of judgments and decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights, p. 66, available at: 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680592a
c9  (12.04.2019.) By introducing judgements with indications of relevance for execution the Council of Europe 
(Committee of Ministers as competent body of the Council of Europe for supervision of the execution of 
judgements of the Court) assures particular control in the process of execution, limits maneuverable space for 
contracting states in the process of execution and gives priority to dealing with structural deficiencies which are 
determined in leading cases before the Court.  
In exceptional circumstances the Court itself may issue so-called consequential order determining individual 
measure which must be undertaken in order to rectify infringed human right. In the case of Brumărescu v. 
Romania (just satisfaction) from 2001 the Court issued alternative consequential orders. The Court rulled that in 
order to rectify infringed human right, Romania must return asset to the applicant or (in case that this is not 
possible or is not fulfilled) the applicant must be compensated. That leads to the conclusion that in (such 
exceptional) cases where determined violation of the Convention does not leave any margin of appreciation in 
the execution procees, the Court itself can declare individual (only possible) measure which must be udertaken in 
order to execute the Court's final judgement. See: J. Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 322.  
232 Such proceeding is currently undergoing in the case of Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, see supra, footnote 181. 
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particular measures must be undertaken in order to secure execution of a final judgement of 
the Court.  
Regarding execution of a final judgement of the Court, the Committee of Ministers 
adopted Rules for the supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly 
settlements233 in order to standardize procedure which is undertaken by the Committee of 
Ministers in exercising jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 46 of the Convention. In practice, 
supervision over the execution process is done by Action Plans and Action Reports which are 
delivered to the Committee of Ministers by respondent state in particular time limits. With 
Action Plan member state express measures which will be undertaken in order to fully 
execute final judgement of the Court as well as expected time-frame for implementation of 
respective measures. With Action Reports member state informs the Committee of Ministers 
on measures that have been implemented for full execution of final judgement of the Court in 
domestic legal order.234  
The Committee of Ministers also determined that particular final judgements must 
have priority in execution as well as in the supervision. According to the Rule 4 of respective 
Rules for the supervision: The Committee of Ministers shall give priority to supervision of the 
execution of judgments in which the Court has identified what it considers a systemic problem 
in accordance with Resolution Res(2004)3 of the Committee of Ministers on judgments 
revealing an underlying systemic problem. In other words, supervision over execution of so-
called pilot-judgements will have priority before the Committee of Minister given the fact that 
respective judgements reveal systematic dysfunctions in legal system, which must be 
eliminated in a short period of time.235  
Although idea on implementation of Action Plans and Action Reports has been 
motivated with the desire to speed up execution of final judgements, the practice clearly has 
shown increase of caseload before the Committee of Ministers regarding execution of final 
judgements of the Court. Mainly for this reason in 2010 High Level Conference on the Future 
of the European Court of Human Rights has been held in Interlaken, Switzerland, where 
representatives of the Council of Europe member states have adopted so-called Interlaken 
Declaration. Respective Declaration indicated problems in implementation of the Court’s 
judgements and excessive timeframe of execution. Within Interlaken Declaration and among 
                                                 
233 Respective Rules are available at: https://rm.coe.int/16806eebf0 (12.04.2019.) 
234 J. Omejec, op. cit. (footnote 41), p. 410. 
235 Cf. judgements with indications of relevance for execution, supra (footnote 231). 
161 
 
other conclusions directed to the evolution of the Convention’s efficiency, the Conference 
clearly urged the Committee of Ministers to: 
 
a) develop the means which will render its supervision of the execution of the Court’s 
judgments more effective and transparent. In this regard, it invites the Committee of Ministers 
to strengthen this supervision by giving increased priority and visibility not only to cases 
requiring urgent individual measures, but also to cases disclosing major structural problems, 
attaching particular importance to the need to establish effective domestic remedies;  
 
b) review its working methods and its rules to ensure that they are better adapted to present-
day.236 
 
 On the basis of mandate indicated by the Conference, the Committee of Ministers has 
developed a so-called twin-track supervision system which is consisted of standard 
supervision and enhanced supervision. Within standard supervision a respondent state will 
submit its Action Plan to the Committee of Ministers. Secretary General will assess proposed 
measures and proposed timeframe on execution of indicated measures. The Committee of 
Ministers will adopt its decision regarding applicability of proposed Action Plan. When 
respondent state notifies Secretary General that all measures as indicated in Action Plan have 
been implemented and that corresponding obligation from Art. 46 of the Convention has been 
fulfilled, Secretary General will assess undertaken measures and if Secretary General finds 
that implemented measures have really been undertaken and that previously determined 
violation of the Convention has been rectified with those measures, Secretary General will 
pass its report to the Committee of Ministers with proposition on adoption of final resolution 
which will close supervision procedure over the execution process.  
On the other hand, if particular judgement is pilot-judgement or judgement which 
require urgent measures or judgement related to the inter-state disputes, enhanced supervision 
will be imposed. Enhanced supervision basically means that the Secretary General will 
closely monitor execution process and have intensive and more active cooperation with 
competent state authorities. In order to secure execution of a final judgement of the Court in 
enhanced supervision the Secretary General will provide help to a respondent state in drafting 
                                                 
236 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken Declaration, 19. 
February 2010, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2010_Interlaken_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf 
(12.04.2019.) 
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or implementing of Action Plan(s), provide professional help in assessing which particular 
measures would have to be undertaken and organize bilateral or multilateral cooperation 
programs (round tables seminars etc.). Respective enhanced supervision means that the 
Committee of Ministers determined necessity that a particular judgement of the Court should 
have priority in implementation in a respondent state. For that reason, all possible instruments 
and assets of the Council of Europe will be placed on disposal of respondent state in order to 
eliminate particular structural problem or to undertake urgent measures.237  
 As for the conclusion of respective sub-chapter as well as the Chapter III of the 
dissertation in which normative and historic analysis of the Convention and corresponding 
system based upon the Convention has been presented, we can emphasize statistical data 
regarding execution of final judgements of the Court. The Committee of Ministers each year 
issues Annual Report regarding supervision of the execution of judgements and decisions of 
the Court. Although there are continuous problems in implementation of final judgements of 
the Court, 11th Annual Report clearly states in Introduction that 
 
Pending those results, the 2017 Annual Report continues to confirm the positive impact of the 
reform process on the execution of judgments. Indeed, it demonstrates that the execution 
process functions, and functions well in most situations. As a result of new initiatives to 
improve the dialogue with States, the number of pending cases has been reduced to 7 500 at 
the end of 2017 as compared to almost 11 000 at the end of 2014.238   
 
 This progress is confirmed annually given the fact that relevant statistics clearly 
indicate that number of pending cases is decreasing.239   
 From standpoint of our analysis with all presented arguments in this sub-chapter we 
can verify that although confronted with various problems and excessive time frame of 
execution of final judgements, the system based upon the Convention is evolving 
                                                 
237 J. Omejec, op. cit. (footnote 41), p. 412 – 423. For possible coercive measures (in generale sense) that are at 
disposal to the Committee of Ministers in the execution process see: E. Lambert Abdelgawad: „The execution of 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights“, Human rights files No. 19, 2nd edition, 2008,, p. 40 – 45. 
Available at:  
https://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-EN-HRFILES-19(2008).pdf (12.04.2019.) 
238 11th Annual Report on Supervision of the execution of judgements and decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights, 2017, p. 10, available at: https://rm.coe.int/annual-report-2017/16807af92b (12.04.2019.)  
239 “In total, in 2018, the Committee was able to close 2,705 cases and the total number of cases pending before 
the Committee is currently its lowest since 2006.” 12th Annual Report on Supervision of the execution of 
judgements and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, 2018, p. 5, available at: 
https://rm.coe.int/annual-report-2018-web/168093c7f8 (12.04.2019.). In respective Report can be found 
exhaustive statistical data for each member on status of execution of judgements, undertaken actions and time 
frame of judgements' execution. 
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continuously securing implementation of the Court’s legal understandings in domestic legal 
orders. Numerous achievements have been introduced in process of implementation of all 
final judgements of the Court and the Committee of Ministers is analyzing what further 
measures should be introduced in order to bring more efficiency to the system.240 On the other 
hand, respondent states tend to apply final judgements of the Court and undertake all 
necessary legislative and other measures and actions in order to meet level of protection 
guaranteed by the Convention and reasoned by the Court in its practice.  
 The system is growing up and evolving from substantial, procedural and enforcement 
point of view. Member states on the other hand do not view execution process of a final 
judgement of the Court as the attack on their sovereignty, but rather as a part of evolution of 
human rights framework which has clear beneficial effects for all member states and their 
citizens. On the level of our analysis, historical, empirical and normative analysis has been 
provided in this Chapter of the dissertation. We have presented normative characteristics of 
the Convention, historical goals which original member states of the Council of Europe have 
tried to achieve, evolution of the system, procedure before the Court and execution process. 
Verifying that execution process is effective and in most of cases will lead to necessary 
adjustments in respondent states we can proceed further in verification of our new theoretical 
concept. But before we undertake this task, further presentation regarding supervision of 
execution of judgements of the Court is needed in order to round up the system in one 
coherent unity.  
 
 3.6. Supervision of execution of judgements 
 
 In order to secure full and proper execution of all final judgements of the Court, the 
Committee of Ministers supervises the execution process. Supervision is necessary in order to 
assure effectiveness of the system which is one of the most important features of any legal 
system. Contemporary researches indicate that “Although the Committee of Ministers’ initial 
practice was relatively timorous, supervision has now become quite rigorous.”241 The 
Committee of Ministers developed normative mechanisms242 which are used frequently and in 
detail in order to rectify infringed human right or fundamental freedom. First of all, in the 
process of supervision the Committee of Ministers will require that respondent state present 
                                                 
240 Ibid, p. 19 – 27.  
241 E. Lambert Abdelgawad, op.cit. (footnote 237), p. 36. 
242 See supra, p. 159. 
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all necessary evidence that it had undertaken all general and individual measures in its 
national legal framework. Respondent state will be required to present e.g. written proof of 
payment of just satisfaction awarded by the Court to the applicant and the Committee of 
Ministers can even verify such payment with the applicant. Furthermore, the Committee of 
Ministers require evidence from a respondent state that all necessary general measures have 
been adopted “…and has no hesitation in asking a state to take further measures if the 
situation has not improved.”243 Such supervision is also exercised if a friendly settlement has 
been reached. If rectifying infringed human rights and fundamental freedom require adoption 
of amendments to the legislature of respondent state, the Committee of Ministers will require 
evidence that such amendments have been implemented in national legal framework and 
prevented further violation of the Convention. In case that respondent state argues that direct 
effect of the Convention and the Court’s final judgement is sufficient in order to prevent 
future violations of the Convention for which reason changes in the legislature are not 
necessary, the Committee of Ministers require proof that this is sufficient. Such proof can be 
in the form of changes in the practice of domestic courts following the final judgement of the 
Court. In the case of Pauwels v. Belgium a legislative reform was expected in order to rectify 
infringed human right, but the Committee of Ministers relied on existing evidence that 
national courts would avoid any comparable new violations. In respective case, the 
Committee of Ministers closed supervision and adopted final resolution 13 years after the 
judgement. In the case of individual non-pecuniary measures which have to be undertaken in 
order to achieve restitutio in integrum, the Committee of Ministers encourage states to 
institute motion on retrial in all cases where it is possible or to institute other appropriate 
measures such as removal of a conviction from the applicant’s criminal record.244 
 In particular cases, the Court itself can overload supervisory position of the Committee 
of Ministers. For example, in the case of Burmych and others v. Ukraine (application No. 
46852/13 et al., judgement of the Grand Chamber (striking out) from October 12th 2017)245 
the Court decided to strike out 12 148 applications of the Court’s list of cases and transfer all 
applications to the Committee of Ministers to be dealt with in the framework of the general 
measures. Respective case was related to the pilot-judgement in the case of Yuriy 
Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine (application No. 40450/04, judgement of 15 October 2009) 
where the Court determined structural problem related to the outspread non-enforcement of 
                                                 
243 E. Lambert Abdelgawad, op.cit. (footnote 237), p. 37. 
244 Ibid, p. 38.  
245 Available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-178082%22]} (12.04.2019.)  
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final judgements of the domestic courts in Ukraine. As it has been reported, the Burmych case 
shifted institutional balance in the Council of Europe between the Court and the Committee of 
Ministers given the fact that the Court decided to back off from the situation of mass non-
execution of domestic and the Court’s final judgements. The Court determined in the Ivanov 
case that there is structural problem in Ukraine regarding enforcement of domestic final 
judgments which fact clearly violates provisions of the Convention (right to a fair trial, right 
to effective legal remedy as well as the protection of property). Given the fact that Ukraine 
did not execute at all respective pilot-judgement in the Ivanov case with increasing number of 
applications due to the same respect, the Court simply decided to determine that all 12 148 
applications fall under the scope of pilot judgement in the Ivanov case which should be 
transferred to the Committee of Ministers directly to the supervision of execution. Such 
enormous proliferation of cases was not beneficial for effectiveness of the supervisory 
function of the Committee of Ministers.246 
 But despite that fact and enormous proliferation of cases before it, the Committee of 
Ministers continuously exercises its function regarding supervision of execution of the 
Court’s final judgements. In order to encourage the execution process, the Committee of 
Ministers can also adopt various decisions and interim resolutions with adequate 
recommendations and suggestions. Respondent states can ask for support from the 
Department for the Execution of Judgements of the European Court of Human Rights which 
will provide support in various forms (suggestions, legal expertise, organization of round 
tables on selected topics etc.).247 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
246 See https://strasbourgobservers.com/2017/10/26/non-execution-of-a-pilot-judgment-ecthr-passes-the-buck-to-
the-committee-of-ministers-in-burmych-and-others-v-ukraine/ (12.04.2019.)  
247 J. Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 421. 
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4. ANALYTICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAME OF THE PARTICULAR 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
 In the first three Chapters of the dissertation we have presented fundamental 
characteristics of our analysis, contemporary constitutional law and the system based upon the 
Convention. We have verified on the basis of scientific literature that contemporary 
constitutional law has main focus on protection and development of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and that legal source of contemporary constitutional law can be found 
in international agreements as well if respective agreements substantially regulate human 
rights framework. Furthermore, we clearly indicated that the system based upon the 
Convention has gained extensive implications in domestic legal order of the Council of 
Europe member states. Most importantly, the system based upon the Convention is effective 
and is evolving. Member states are willing to implement final judgements of the Court in 
most cases which implementation is adjusting their legal and political system. Throughout the 
Court’s judicial practice (which is developed on the basis of autonomous interpretation of the 
Convention’s provisions) constitutional law and constitutional practice within member states 
are becoming increasingly similar.  
 From the standpoint of our analysis, the first three Chapters of our dissertation had 
more general characteristics given the fact that respective chapters presented (in general) 
contemporary content of constitutional (substantial and procedural) law as well as the 
normative and historical perspectives of the Convention. Final two chapters of the dissertation 
will level down the analysis from general theory to particular cases and implications of those 
cases in national legal orders. The task of this Chapter is to present in concreto particular 
judgements of the Court which were, from a national standpoint, extremely significant. 
Respective judgements led to significant legal and political adjustments where a particular 
judgement has led even to the amendments of the constitution itself.248 With such 
methodological approach and verification of adjustments in national legal orders on the basis 
of the Court’s judgements, we can also verify legal and political propulsive effects of the 
Convention and the Court in member states which are rounding up in one coherent and 
particular legal system. As previously stated, such independent and autonomous legal system 
on international level we are addressing as the particular constitutional law.  
 
 
                                                 
248 See infra, sub-chapter 4.3.3. 
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 4.1. Introductory overview of the Chapter  
 
 In the first Chapter of the dissertation (sub-chapter 1.3.) it has been presented with 
which particular methodological approach the concept of the particular constitutional law will 
be presented. In respective sub-chapter we indicated reasons which guided our analytical 
selection of the Council of Europe member states which will be subjected to further analysis. 
It also displayed reasons for selection of the Convention’s provisions which will be examined 
regarding applicability in selected member states of the Council of Europe. As for the brief 
recapitulation, respective sub-chapter emphasized that introduction of the particular 
constitutional law will be based upon the legal and political effects in domestic legal orders of 
selected member states which effects were brought in legal arena by judgements of the Court. 
Respective effects are examined throughout the Court’s judgement in which the Court ruled 
on the substantial content of the rule of law, a right to a fair trial and the protection of 
property. With every judgement of the Court, which is subsequently implemented in domestic 
legal orders, the system based upon the Convention is taking particular effect in domestic 
legal order. This particular effect can be determined by various legislative, judicial and other 
actions which must be undertaken by the particular member state in order to fulfill obligation 
under Art. 46 of the Convention (execution of a final judgement of the Court). Practical 
consequence of respective effects on general level is introduction of particular constitutional 
law given the fact that national legal orders are becoming more and more similar throughout 
the Court’s practice. This similarity of national legal orders and their mutual approach to the 
minimal standards of human rights law is governed by the Court and prescribed by the 
Convention. If all those beneficial effects of the Court’s judgements in national legal orders 
would be abstracted on a general theoretical level with establishment of corresponding 
minimal standards in the line of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms – this 
would present the main aspects of the particular constitutional law. 
 Respective Chapter will analyze national legal effects of particular judgements of the 
Court in which the selected states were the respondent states. We will take closer analysis as 
to which particular legislative and judicial measures had been undertaken in order to execute 
the final judgement of the Court. With each implementation of the Court’s judgement which 
is determined appropriate and adequate by the Committee of Ministers national legal orders 
are becoming more and more similar rounding up coherent human rights law framework. This 
aspect is in the main focus of our analysis. 
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 Within each subchapter relevant constitutional and legislative provisions of particular 
member state will be presented regarding legal position of the Convention in particular 
member state. Impacts of the Convention on legal order will be displayed on the case law 
basis. Selections of cases which will be presented in this Chapter are based upon their 
significance for member state, which is determined on the basis of scientific literature. It has 
to be noted that throughout the case law analysis, our primary focus is on execution of final 
judgement of the Court and which particular adjustments have been performed by particular 
member state in order to execute final judgement of the Court. To limit our analysis on 
essential elements of the case, exhaustive presentation of circumstances of particular case will 
not be presented. Case law analysis will only indicate determined circumstances of a case and 
legal problems from the aspects of the Convention as indicated by the Court in its final 
judgement. The essential and unalienable part of case law analysis is adjustments which have 
been undertaken in national legal systems after final judgement of the Court was rendered. 
These adjustments with correlating common human rights framework established by the 
Court in its judicial practice are essential elements for introduction of particular constitutional 
law.  
 
 4.2. Republic of Slovenia 
 
 The Republic of Slovenia signed the Convention on May 14th 1993 with subsequent 
ratification on June 28th 1994 when the Convention entered on force in the Republic of 
Slovenia.249 Numerous approaches in scientific analysis of the Convention and its legal status 
in Slovenia have been presented. The Slovenian scientific literature expresses a clear 
argument that the Convention must be considered as a minimum standard in the line of 
protection of human rights which must be secured in each member state. Member states have 
the autonomy to bring a more developed human rights framework in their practice, but in 
anyway not less than the Convention.250  
                                                 
249 See: supra, footnote 136. 
250 C. Ribičič: „Človekove pravice in ustavna demokracija“, Ljubljana, Študentska založba, 2010, p. 118. Same 
author also considers that the Convention is facing challenges in contemporary time which challenges could 
weaken the effectivity of the system. See: C. Ribičič: „Vzpon ali oslabitev ESČP“, Pravna praksa, No. 4/2008, p. 
18. Also: C. Ribičič: „Poslednje zatočišče“, Pravna praksa, No. 5/2015, p. 33, C. Ribičič: „Izsiljevanje“, Pravna 
praksa, No. 74/2017, p. 23, C. Ribičič: „Pilotne sodbe ESČP zoper Slovenijo in vloga Ustavnega sodišča RS“, in: 
A. Zidar, S. Štiglic (ed.): Slovenske misli o mednarodnih odnosih in pravu, Prispevki ob 80-letnici dr. Ernesta 
Petriča, Zbirka Mednarodno pravo, Fakulteta za družbene vede i Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve Republike 
Slovenije, 2016, p. 173 – 177. The author emphasizes that recent activities in the European human rights 
framework based upon the Convention must be a wake-up call for actions in order to preserve contemporary 
common standards in the line of human rights protection (situation in the Russian Federation regarding open 
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 Impacts of the Convention in the Republic of Slovenia have been noted even prior 
entering the Convention on force in 1994. “In five cases the Constitutional Court referred to 
been directly cited in more than 300 decisions of the Constitutional Court, and in 
approximately 80 cases the Constitutional Court has referred to the case-law of the ECrtHR. 
While alleging the violation of rights, constitutional complainants more and more often refer 
not only to constitutional provisions but also to the provisions of the EConvHR, and partly to 
the case-law of the ECrtHR, and the Constitutional Court prior to any important decision 
regularly studies the case-law of the ECrtHR.”251  
 Referral to the Convention and the Court’s practice is increasing in contemporary 
time, and the courts in regular judicial system (e.g. the Supreme Court of the Republic of 
Slovenia) are using the Court’s practice in resolution of particular dispute.252 Given the fact 
that the Court is continuously developing respective minimum standards of human rights law 
which must be acknowledged to every person that reside on the territory of member states of 
the Council of Europe these standards are becoming binding for all the Council of Europe 
member states.253  
 By all presented statistics and scientific ideas, we can easily determine that the 
Convention in the Slovenian scientific literature is considered as minimum human rights 
standard which have great effect on constitutional and other judicial practice. On the basis of 
this argument we can proceed in examination of legal status of the Convention in 
constitutional order of the Republic of Slovenia.    
 
  4.2.1. Relevant constitutional and legislative provisions 
 
 Legal position of the Convention within Slovenian legal system is regulated by the 
Art. 8 of the Constitution which stipulates: “Laws and other regulations must comply with 
                                                                                                                                                        
refusal to implement the Court's judgement in the Yukos case (see, infra, p. 223), significant overload of cases 
before the Court, continous possibility for the United Kingdom to cancel the Convention with return to the 
classical system of human rights protection based upon the Bill of Rights from 17th century etc.  
251 C. Ribičič: „The European Dimension of the Decision-Making of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Slovenia“, in: Ein Jahr EU Mitgliedschaft; Wien, Institut für Europäische Integrationsforschung, 2005, p. 4. 
Excellent overview of particular cases where the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia referred to the 
Convention and the Court can also be found in: A. Mavčič: „Vpliv Evropske konvencije na judikaturo 
slovenskega Ustavnega sodišča“, in: Dignitas: slovenska revija za človekove pravice, No. 2 (1999), p. 144 – 179. 
252 According to one analysis, the Civil Department of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia has cited 
the Convention in 63 cases and referred to the Court's practice in 224 cases. Respective numbers are increasing 
in contemporary time. See: N. Betetto: „Vpliv Evropske konvencije za človekove pravice na slovensko sodno 
prakso“, in: Conference of Slovenian lawyers of October 11th and 12th 2012 held in Portorož, Conference 
Proceedings, p. 1238. 
253 C. Ribičič: „Evropsko pravo človekovih pravic – izbrana poglavlja“, Pravna fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani, 
2007, p. 19. 
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generally accepted principles of international law and with treaties that are binding on 
Slovenia. Ratified and published treaties shall be applied directly.” Pursuant to the provision 
of Art. 153 par. 2 of the Constitution laws must be in conformity with generally accepted 
principles of international law and with valid treaties ratified by the National Assembly, 
whereas regulations and other general acts must also be in conformity with other ratified 
treaties. For such constitutional provision, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Slovenia is entitled to sanction any case where non-conformity between laws and the 
Convention shall be determined. This positions the Convention in general hierarchy of legal 
sources above general legislature and below the Constitution (sub-constitutional position). For 
that reason, “…the Slovenian Constitutional Court as well as regular judicial system must 
determine conformity of individual acts with provisions of the Convention…” where 
“….judicial practice of the European Court of Human Rights is directly applicable in 
proceedings before the Constitutional Court and other courts in Slovenia.”254  
 Finally, Art. 15 par. 5 of the Slovenian Constitution acknowledges and protects every 
other human right and fundamental freedom which is not directly prescribed by the 
Constitution itself.255 Human right or fundamental freedom which is regulated by the 
governing law in Slovenia (e.g. in the Convention) cannot be limited on the basis that the 
Constitution doesn’t recognize respective right or recognizes it in particular limited amount. 
For this reason, human rights and fundamental freedoms in Slovenia (actually and 
substantially) have particular supra-constitutional meaning.  
After we have determined the (constitutional) position in legal order of the Republic of 
Slovenia, according to our methodological framework indicated in Chapter 1 of the 
dissertation, two final judgements of the Court which had exceptional significance in the 
Slovenian legal order shall be presented. Both of them led to legislation interventions 
adjusting the Slovenian legal framework to the Convention’s standards pursuant to the direct 
influence of the Court rendered in its final judgement which also had significant financial 
indications. First case is related to the realization of a right to a fair trial (Art. 6 of the 
Convention) and pilot-judgement in the case Lukenda v. Slovenia (Application No. 23032/02, 
judgement of October 6th 2005). Second case is of a newer date and is related to the so-called 
old-currency savings in former Ljubljanska banka where the Court found violation of Art. 1 
of the Protocol I to the Convention (case of Ališić and others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
                                                 
254 A. Mavčič, op.cit. (footnote 251), p. 147. 
255 “No human right or fundamental freedom regulated by legal acts in force in Slovenia may be restricted on the 
grounds that this Constitution does not recognise that right or freedom or recognises it to a lesser extent.“ 
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Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Application No. 
60642/08, final pilot-judgement of the Grand Chamber from July 16th, 2014).256  
 The case Lukenda v. Slovenia is usually referred in the Slovenian scientific literature 
as an important judgement which brought necessary legislative adjustments to secure 
reasonable time in judicial proceedings and subsequent realization of a right to a fair trial.257 
Given the fact that the Slovenian scientific analysis has verified the importance of respective 
judgement such verification also confirms that respective case is suitable for the analysis in 
the context of our dissertation. The case Ališić and others v. Slovenia is, as stated, of a newer 
date, but its significance in the Slovenian legal order is commonly known. Furthermore, its 
execution had exceptional financial implications, making it suitable and very significant for 
our analysis given the fact that it clearly confirms that final judgements of the Court will be 
executed, but simultaneously impose a financial burden for particular member state and its 
state budget.  
 
  4.2.2. Dealing with systemic problems – case of Lukenda v. Slovenia258 
 
 As it has been noted in the Slovenian literature, (pilot) judgement in the case of 
Lukenda was not unexpected given the fact that the Court prior to the respective judgement 
already determined violation of the right to a fair trial in numerous cases.259 Mr. Franjo 
Lukenda, a Slovenian national, lodged an application under the provisions of Art. 34 of the 
Convention  alleging that the length of proceedings before the Slovenian courts had been 
excessive which fact violates his right to a fair trial prescribed by the Art. 6 par. 1 of the 
Convention. Determined circumstances of the case were as follows: Mr. Lukenda worked in a 
lignite mine where in January 1994 was injured at work. Respective injury placed him in 
system of social security where he had been granted with disability benefits. Given the fact 
that Mr. Lukenda was insured in the time of the accident by his employer, his disability was 
assessed at 13% and insurance company in 1995 and 1996 paid partial disability benefits. 
Given the fact that Mr. Lukenda’s disability has increased in the following years, on 
December 30th 1998 he initiated civil proceeding before the Celje Local Court against 
                                                 
256 Both of respective judgements are also indicated as noteworthy Court's cases by the Court itself. See: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Slovenia_ENG.pdf (12.04.2019.) 
257 See: C. Ribičič: „Človekove pravice in ustavna demokracija“, op.cit. (footnote 250), p. 116 – 117.  
258 Final judgement in respective case is available at official website of the Court (HUDOC): 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=home (12.04.2019.) 
259 C. Ribičič: „Pilotne sodbe ESČP zoper Slovenijo in vloga Ustavnega sodišča RS“, op.cit. (footnote 250), p. 
177. 
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insurance company claiming a 7% increase in his disability benefits on the basis of an expert 
medical opinion. Final judgement of competent domestic court has been rendered on February 
19th 2004.  
 The Court examined all circumstances of the particular case and presented relevant 
domestic legal sources. The Court noted in its judgement that protection of infringed human 
right to a fair trial within reasonable time (prescribed also by the Constitution of the Republic 
of Slovenia in Art. 23 of the Constitution) can also be (nominally) administered throughout 
the action before the administrative court pursuant to the Art. 157 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Slovenia.260 The Court also examined relevant judicial practice of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia as well as case-law of administrative courts 
regarding protection of a right to a fair trial within reasonable time. In proceeding the Court 
has been presented also by other possible legal remedies which, according to the view of the 
Republic of Slovenia, could ensure effectiveness and protection of a right to a fair trial within 
reasonable time. Respondent state emphasized that e.g. beside administrative actions, 
applicant could also seek compensations under the provisions of The Code of Obligations for 
excessive proceeding and also claimed supervision under the provisions of the Judicature Act. 
Stated supervision has been prescribed in section 72 of the Act prescribing that any party may 
lodge a request for supervision with the president of particular court. The president of 
respective court is granted by the respective Act to request by the presiding judge all 
necessary reports on progress in the proceedings and set deadlines for procedural measures 
which must be undertaken. The respondent state claimed that its legal system provides 
sufficient number of effective legal remedies to ensure reasonable time of court proceedings 
and ultimately each party claiming that there have been violation of a right to a fair trial 
because of excessive time period could seek compensations against the state in regular courts. 
 The Court on the other hand expressed opposite opinion assessing that all provided 
remedies as presented by the respondent state are not sufficient to be considered as effective 
legal remedies to ensure protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Court 
also noted that trial proceedings before competent Court in Celje was not complicated on a 
level that would eventually justify excessive length of proceeding. For that reason, the Court 
found violation of Art. 6 par. 1 of the Convention but also violation of Art. 13 of the 
                                                 
260 “A court with jurisdiction to review administrative decisions shall determine the legality of final individual 
decisions by State or local authorities or holders of public office concerning the rights or obligations or legal 
entitlement of individuals and organisations, if no other legal protection is specifically provided. If no other 
legal protection is provided, the court with jurisdiction to review administrative decisions shall also determine 
the legality of individual acts and decisions which encroach upon the constitutional rights of the individual.” 
173 
 
Convention which prescribes the right to effective legal remedy. Respective judgement has 
been rendered on October 6th 2005 and become final on January 6th 2006. But also, the Court 
noted that “It is intrinsic to the Court's findings that the violation of the applicant's right to a 
trial within a reasonable time is not an isolated incident, but rather a systemic problem that 
has resulted from inadequate legislation and inefficiency in the administration of justice. The 
problem continues to present a danger affecting every person seeking judicial protection of 
their rights.”261 Given the fact that the Court has determined particular systemic problems and 
omissions in general legislation framework the Court also ruled that the respondent state must 
throughout appropriate legal measures and administrative practice secure the right to a fair 
trial within a reasonable time.262  
 The case was subsequently referred to the Committee of Ministers in order to 
supervise execution of the Court’s judgement. The Republic of Slovenia on October 28th 2016 
submitted to the Council of Ministers a Revised Action Report in which all undertaken 
measures have been enumerated in order to meet standards required by the Convention for 
ensuring a right to a fair trial within reasonable time. Revised Action Report clearly indicates 
that the majority of cases related to the Lukenda case were ended, just satisfaction has been 
awarded, alternate dispute resolutions have been introduced, mediators have been appointed, 
amendment to the Civil Procedure Act have been introduced in order to reduce possibility of 
multiple remittals, administration within the courts has been informatized etc.263 
 The Republic of Slovenia emphasized that all undertaken measures have been 
performed according to the Court’s judgement in the Lukenda case and that with those 
measures Slovenia has successfully met demanded standards as prescribed by the Convention 
and suggested by the Court. Respective judgement brought multiple legislative interventions 
adjusting legislative and judicial framework of the Slovenian legal order to the Convention’s 
standards. By this very first presented judgement of the Court we can determine severe 
implications which respective judgement has presented in Slovenian legal order. From the 
aspect of our analysis it is clear that judgement of the Court has expanded scope of previous 
application of a right to a fair trial (within reasonable time) and upgraded it on higher level as 
demanded by the Court in the Lukenda case judgement.   
 
 
                                                 
261 Case of Lukenda v. Slovenia, judgement, par. 93. 
262 Case of Lukenda v. Slovenia, judgement, par. 5.  
263 Revised Action Report of the Republic of Slovenia from October 28th 2016, available at: 
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=09000016806b7ee1 (12.04.2019.) 
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4.2.3. Fiscal implications of the Court’s activism - case of Ališić and others 
v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia264 
 
 This case is probably the most significant case that has ever occurred before the Court 
in relation to the Republic of Slovenia. Execution of the final judgement imposed severe 
financial obligations on the state’s budget where competent state’s authorities specifically 
emphasized that even though the Republic of Slovenia does not agree with the judgement, it 
will respect it and undertake all necessary actions in order to eliminate infringed human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.265  
 The respective case was extremely factually and legally difficult given the fact that it 
also raised numerous questions regarding dissolution of the former Socialist Federative 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). In other words, the Court in respective case has been dealing 
with provisions of the international law regarding succession of states as well as the 
provisions of socialist legal order in former SFRY. Furthermore, the case was eventually 
referred to the Grand Chamber in accordance to the Art. 43 of the Convention on the basis of 
issued request by the Slovenian and Serbian Government. For all stated reasons and in the 
light of all undertaken measures for full execution of the Court’s final judgement we consider 
respective (noteworthy) case as the case in which we can clearly determine the severe 
adjustments in domestic legal order to fully meet the Convention’s demands rendered in the 
final judgement of the Court. 
 Respective case originated in 2008 (Application No. 60642/08) by three citizens of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ms. Emina Ališić, Mr. Aziz Sadžak and Mr. Sakib Šahdanović) 
alleging that all of them have been deprived of their human rights and fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed (among all) also by the Art. 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The Court 
determined that all applicants prior to dissolution of SFRY had deposited particular amounts 
of foreign currencies in Ljubljanska banka, Sarajevo and in Tuzla branch of Investbanka 
which was a Serbian bank prior to the dissolution of SFRY. Given the fact that the applicants 
                                                 
264 Final judgement in respective case is available at official website of the Court (HUDOC): 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=home (12.04.2019.) 
265 “While Slovenia does not agree with the judgment, since it places a disproportionate financial burden on 
Slovenia relative to other successor states of the former SFRY, it respects the decision of the court and is duly 
and properly eliminating the violations of savers’ human rights.“  
http://www.vlada.si/en/projects/implementation_of_the_case_alisic_and_oth/ (12.04.2019.) 
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were unable do withdraw their deposit from the respective banks, the applicants claimed that a 
violation of the Convention’s provisions has occurred. In determining whether the breach of 
the Convention’s provisions really occurred, the Court introduced its analysis of banking 
system in SFRY and background of SFRY’s monetary system. The Court emphasized a 
reform of 1989/1990 regarding commercial banking system where Ljubljanska banka, 
Sarajevo has become Ljubljanska banka with seat in Ljubljana and Investbanka has become 
an independent bank seated in Serbia with branches all over Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Nevertheless, the applicants were unable to withdraw their savings/deposits due to the fact 
that the involved states wanted to declare the issue as the succession matter subjected to the 
negotiations between newly formed independent states. The Grand Chamber noted that 
Governments of all involved states tried to declare applicants claims incompatible rationae 
materiae with Art. 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. In other words, involved 
Governments stated that the scope of application of the respective right to a peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions under Art. 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention cannot be 
applied in the case of the old-currency savings given the fact that this question is a succession 
matter and must be resolved within succession negotiations between new states. The Chamber 
determined that new independent states failed to settle respective issue within succession 
negotiations, which had direct consequences for the applicants, in which they were unable to 
withdraw their deposits out of the involved banks for more than twenty years. All involved 
states emphasized their commitment to settle respective issue in due course, but in any case, 
failure of involved states to settle this issue in appropriate time cannot constitute any 
violation. The Chamber and the Grand Chamber dismissed such arguments and stated that in 
order to determine whether violation of respective right to a peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions has really occurred, the Court examines the case from three correlated aspects set 
out in its judicial practice. First, the Court must examine whether the respondent states 
respected the principle of lawfulness which is the first and most important requirement of Art. 
1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.  
 “The second sentence of the first paragraph authorizes a deprivation of possessions 
“subject to the conditions provided for by law” and the second paragraph recognizes that 
States have the right to control the use of property by enforcing “laws”. Moreover, the rule of 
law, one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, is inherent in all the Articles 
176 
 
of the Convention. The principle of lawfulness also presupposes that the applicable provisions 
of domestic law are sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application.”266 
 To that extent, the Court determined that principle of lawfulness has been respected in 
the case given the fact that all respondent states have enacted a necessary legislature in order 
to freeze old currency savings in respective banks. Inability to withdraw savings had legal 
basis in domestic law and for this reason, first aspect of respective right from Art. 1 of the 
Protocol No. 1 has not been infringed.  
 Second demand from respective right to a peaceful enjoyment of possession is directed 
to the legitimate aim of interference. Any interference or limitations regarding the 
Convention’s rights must pursue legitimate aim which can be assessed by the Court. In 
respective case, the Court noted that all respondent states had legitimate aim in order to freeze 
old currencies. “According to the Serbian Government the aim was to protect the liquidity of 
the State funds in the light of the difficult economic situation and financial collapse the 
country was going through (see paragraph 91 above). The other respondent Governments did 
not comment on this issue. However, the Court is prepared to accept that following the 
dissolution of the SFRY and the subsequent armed conflicts, the respondent States had to take 
measures to protect their respective banking systems and national economies in general. In 
view of the overall size of the “old” foreign-currency savings, it is clear that none of the 
successor States was able to allow the uncontrolled withdrawal of such savings.”267 
 The third and final demand is directed to the respondent states and impose obligation 
to respondent states to strike fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the 
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental right. On 
this final demand the Court determined violation of respective right to a peaceful enjoyment 
of possession of the applicants. Firstly, the Court noted that in the case of Ljubljanska banka 
Slovenia can be ultimately held liable for the obligations of Ljubljanska banka, Sarajevo 
where two applicants had their old-currency savings as well as it is the case with new 
independent Investbanka seated in Serbia where Serbia can ultimately be held liable for 
obligations of previous Tuzla branch to the third applicant. On the basis of this fact and legal 
continuity of respective banks the Court examined whether there are good and sufficient 
reasons why those two states did not repay the applicants for so many years. The Court finally 
noted that: 
                                                 
266 Case of Ališić and others v. Slovenia, final judgement, par. 103. 
267 Case of Ališić and others v. Slovenia, final judgement, par. 107. 
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“123. However, the succession negotiations did not prevent the successor States from 
adopting measures at national level aimed at protecting the interests of savers, such as the 
present applicants. The Croatian Government have repaid a large part of their citizens’ 
“old” foreign-currency savings in the Zagreb branch of Ljubljanska Banka Ljubljana (see 
paragraph 43 above) and the Macedonian Government have repaid the total amount of “old” 
foreign-currency savings in the Skopje branch of that bank (see paragraph 52 above). Despite 
that, the two Governments have never abandoned their position that Slovenia should 
eventually be held liable and have continued to claim compensation for the amounts paid at 
the inter-State level (notably, in the context of succession negotiations). At the same time, the 
Slovenian Government have repaid the total amount of “old” foreign-currency savings in 
domestic branches of Investbanka and other foreign banks (see paragraph 48 above) and the 
Serbian Government have agreed to repay the “old” foreign-currency savings in foreign 
branches of Serbian banks (such as the Tuzla branch of Investbanka) of those who had the 
citizenship of any State other than the successor States of the SFRY (see paragraph 45 above). 
This shows that solutions have been found as regards some categories of “old” foreign-
currency savers in the impugned branches, but not with regard to the present applicants. 
124. Whereas some delays may be justified in exceptional circumstances (see Merzhoyev, 
cited above, § 56, and, mutatis mutandis, Immobiliare Saffi, cited above, § 69), the Court 
finds that the present applicants have been made to wait too long. It is therefore not satisfied 
that the authorities of Slovenia and Serbia, notwithstanding their wide margin of appreciation 
in this area, as mentioned in paragraph 106 above, struck a fair balance between the general 
interest of the community and the property rights of the applicants, who were made to bear a 
disproportionate burden. 
125. For all the reasons set out above, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 by Slovenia in respect of Ms Ališić and Mr Sadžak, that there has 
been a violation of that Article by Serbia in respect of Mr Šahdanović, and that there has been 
no violation of that Article by any of the other respondent States.”268  
 Respective reasoning of the Court in the case had significant impact in Slovenia and 
Serbia due to its precedential characteristic. In other words, respective final judgement had 
impact not only to the applicants but to all other citizens who were in the same legal position 
as applicants and were unable to withdraw their old-currency savings. Ultimately, the Court 
determined that it is the obligation of Slovenia and Serbia to repay all citizens who had 
                                                 
268 Case of Ališić and others v. Slovenia, final judgement, par. 123 – 125. 
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deposits in all branches of domestic banks across former SFRY as it has been done with 
citizens who had deposits in the territory of Slovenia and Serbia. The question on how this 
compensation should be rendered is not a succession matter what has been the main argument 
of Slovenia and Serbia.  
 It imposed severe financial obligation on Slovenia and subsequently Slovenia enacted 
the Act on the Method of Execution of the Judgement of the European Court of Human Rights 
in case No. 60642/08. Respective Act has set up operative procedure regarding compensation 
of all unpaid old foreign-currency savings which were deposited in Ljubljanska banka, Main 
Branch Zagreb and Main Branch Sarajevo. By enacting the Act Slovenia considers that its 
obligation on full execution of respective final judgement pursuant to the Art. 46 par. 1 of the 
Convention has been properly carried on.269  
 From the first presented final judgement in Lukenda case we can determine that the 
legal order of Slovenia in general sense has been subjected to various amendments in order to 
meet requirements determined in the final judgement of the Court. Various legislative and 
other interventions have been undertaken in order to secure a right to a fair trial. In the case of 
Ališić and others we can determine that Slovenia properly executed respective final 
judgement by enacting special legislature which has significant financial obligations for 
Slovenia. In other words and despite the fact that particular judgements can have, and are 
having, severe financial impacts, member states in most cases will not question the Court’s 
reasoning. This clearly indicates that scope of application of human rights are expanding on 
the basis of the Court’s practice and that final judgement of the Court are being properly 
executed in domestic legal order despite the fact that execution will bring new financial 
obligations to the state.  
 Although there are countless examples where adjustments in Slovenia legal order have 
been rendered in order to properly execute final judgement of the Court270, we briefly 
presented Lukenda case and case Ališić and others due to their significance identified in the 
Slovenia’s scientific literature and their financial implications for Slovenia’s states budget. 
The facts of the case were not so important for the context of our analysis and for that reason 
we presented only main factual aspects of the case. For the context of our dissertation it was 
                                                 
269 See Action Report of October 25th 2017; available at: 
 https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=090000168076548a (12.04.2019.) 
270 Like in the case Rehbock v. Slovenia (application No. 29462/95) where the Court ruled that the use of force 
during the applicant's arrest had amounded to inhuman treatment violating the Art. 3 of the Convention. In order 
to execute respective judgement Slovenia adopted measures to prevent ill-treatment (police force training and 
regular inspections) as well establishment of special division within the State Prosecutor's Office mandated to 
carry out investigations regarding allegations about police ill-treatment of detainess. See: Impact of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in States Parties: selected examples, op.cit. (footnote 169). 
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more important to present the Court’s reasoning with subsequent expanding of scope of 
application of particular human right guaranteed by the Convention. And the most important 
aspect was to present subsequent adjustments in domestic legal order. If we combine all 
respective facts, we can clearly determine that there is existing process of upgrading human 
rights framework within the Council of Europe member states under the decisive influence of 
the Court and its final judgements.  
 
  4.3. Republic of Croatia 
 
 The Republic of Croatia signed the Convention on November 6th 1996. After its 
ratification in the Croatian Parliament the Convention entered on force in Croatia on 
November 5th 1997.271 As well as it is in the Slovenia, Croatian scientific literature also 
considers the Convention as a particular core of broader European human rights law. Besides 
the Convention in pure normative sense, Croatian scientific literature also emphasizes that the 
respective core of broader European human rights law is consisted not only from the 
Convention but also of jurisprudence and case law of the Court and previous European 
Commission accumulated throughout its practice which will radically change the mindset of 
Croatian lawyers in protection and evolution of human rights in Croatia. The Croatian 
scientific literature also points out to the fact that normative provisions of the Croatian 
Constitution regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms are in total compliance with 
guarantees prescribed by the Convention given the fact that framers of the Croatian 
Constitution have taken careful consideration of the Convention’s provisions.272  
  
  4.3.1. Relevant constitutional and legislative provisions 
 
 Pursuant to the Art. 141 of the Croatian Constitution international treaties, which have 
been concluded and ratified in accordance with the Constitution, are published and have 
entered into force shall be a component of the domestic legal order of the Republic of Croatia 
and shall have primacy over domestic law. Their provisions may be altered or repealed only 
under the conditions and in the manner specified therein or in accordance with the general 
rules of international law. Therefore, we can determine that once the Convention has been 
ratified and entered on force in the Republic of Croatia it had supra-legislative meaning which 
                                                 
271 J. Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 32. 
272 S. Sokol and B. Smerdel, op.cit. (footnote 38), p. 111 – 113. 
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imposes an obligation on Croatian courts and other competent state bodies to apply provisions 
of the Convention directly. If provisions of domestic legislature are not in conformity with the 
Convention, competent state bodies must apply provisions of the Convention directly and set 
aside legislature and other sources of domestic law.273  
 A constitutional foundation of direct applicability of the Convention in Croatian 
judicial system is prescribed in the Art. 118 par. 3 of the Constitution which stipulates that 
Courts shall administer justice according to the Constitution, law, international agreements 
and other valid sources of law. With respective provisions we can round up constitutional 
framework of the Convention’s applicability in domestic legal order. 
 Regarding legislative provisions which are ensuring effectiveness of the Court’s final 
judgements in domestic legal order we have already emphasized provisions regarding 
Litigation Act and Criminal Procedure Act which allow a reopening of a particular case in 
which violation of the Convention’s provisions have been determined by the Court. In such 
retrial domestic courts must conform to legal understandings of the Court expressed in final 
judgement where violation of the Convention has been determined.274  
 From all presented arguments we can conclude that legal position of the Convention in 
the Republic of Croatia is above general legislature (it has supra-legislative meaning), 
conformity of general legislature with the Convention must be secured in order to fulfill 
demands regarding constitutionality and if violation of particular human right prescribed by 
the Convention should be determined by the Court, Croatian legal system has introduced 
procedural mechanisms to reopen particular proceeding where legal understandings of the 
Court will be mandatory for domestic courts.   
 As it has been conducted in the case of the Republic of Slovenia, in the case of the 
Republic of Croatia we will present three exceptionally important final judgements of the 
Court which had significant impacts in domestic legal order. One of them (the final judgement 
in the case Olujić v. Croatia) led to the amendments of the Croatian Constitution which from 
methodological standpoint raises our attention. In other words, one final judgement of the 
Court led to the revision/amendments of the Constitution itself and there cannot be a more 
important decision than the decision of one international judicial body which in the process of 
the execution in domestic legal order led to the amendments of the most important legal and 
political document in one state. The second final judgement is also related to the similar issue 
for which reasons we can conclude that two final judgements of the Court led to the revision 
                                                 
273 Ibid, p. 111. 
274 See supra, footnote 145. 
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of the Croatian Constitution in broader sense. Finally, third final judgement of the Court (case 
of Statileo v. Croatia) has been dealing with politically extremely sensitive matter on 
protected lessees where the Court found violation of Art. 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the 
Convention. Respective judgement is from domestic point of view rather revolutionary given 
the fact that the Court practically solved domestic highly intense political issue which has not 
been resolved by domestic authorities for more than 20 years.  
 
 4.3.2. Application of the Convention in disciplinary proceedings – the 
case of the President of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia 
(Olujić v. Croatia275) 
 
 Respective case has been significant not only because subsequently it led to the 
amendments of the Croatian Constitution, but as well as for the reason that the Court 
determined that Croatia has violated the right to a fair trial of its own President of the 
Supreme Court – the most important court in judicial system in the Republic of Croatia. 
Political background of the case is of no importance for our analysis and for which reason we 
will briefly present only key (normative) aspects of the case.  
 The applicant (Krunislav Olujić) was a President of the Supreme Court of the 
Republic of Croatia and a member (ex officio) of the National Judicial Council – state body 
competent for appointing and dismissal of judges from their duty as well as for disciplinary 
proceedings against judges in all cases of their misconduct and for imposing disciplinary 
measures. The Government of the Republic of Croatia initiated a disciplinary proceeding 
against the applicant before the National Judicial Council sometime in 1996 alleging that the 
applicant had conducted sexual relationships with minors and that he was using his position as 
the President of the Supreme Court in order to protect suspect financial activities of two 
individuals who were known for their criminal activities. On this factual basis the 
Government claimed that the applicant caused damage to the reputation of judicial system and 
thus committed serious disciplinary offence for which reasons the Government proposed that 
the applicant be immediately (during proceedings before the National Judicial Council) 
removed from the office and that permanent removal from the office of the President of the 
Supreme Court as a President and as a judge be imposed as disciplinary sanction. In late 
November 1996 the National Judicial Council initiated disciplinary proceeding against the 
                                                 
275 Final judgement in respective case is available at official website of the Court (HUDOC): 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=home (12.04.2019.) 
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applicant and the applicant immediately filed a motion seeking withdrawal from the case of 
three members of the National Judicial Council on the ground that they had shown their bias 
in interviews published in various national newspapers. Respective motion has been denied as 
being unfounded. The applicant also filed a motion seeking that respective proceeding be 
open to public, but the National Judicial Council also dismissed such motion. 
 The applicant was subsequently held disciplinary liable for his contacts with particular 
individuals although he had known that they (the individuals) have been known as 
delinquents. Allegations regarding sexual relations with minors were dismissed. But in 
proceedings before the National Judicial Council the applicant could not present a single 
witness regarding allegations against him given the fact that National Judicial Council 
rejected all his proposals on witnesses for defense and heard only witnesses of disciplinary 
prosecutor.  
 The Court noted that a right to a fair trial under the provision of Art. 6 par. 1 of the 
Convention provides that in the determination of civil rights and obligations everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing. Although in disciplinary proceedings the public is in 
principal excluded, in the light of present case where the applicant himself wanted to ensure 
public hearing there were not substantial grounds to deprive the applicant of this right. The 
Government in the proceedings before the Court also tried to avoid applicability of Art. 6 of 
the Convention due to the fact that its scope of applicability is only for civil and criminal 
proceedings where disciplinary proceedings are not civil or criminal. The Court rejected such 
argument on the basis that the National Judicial Council can be considered as particular 
adjudication tribunal which decisions can be challenged before the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Croatia. Taking into consideration all substantive characteristics of the case, the 
Court determined applicability of a right to a fair trial in the applicant’s case regardless the 
fact that respective proceeding stricto sensu is not civil not criminal. “In the applicant’s case, 
the National Judicial Council thus exercised judicial powers in determining his disciplinary 
responsibility. Against this background, the Court considers that the National Judicial 
Council is to be regarded as an independent tribunal established by law for the purposes of 
Article 6 of the Convention and that therefore the disciplinary proceedings against the 
applicant were conducted before a tribunal for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the 
Convention. It follows that the applicant had access to a court and that Article 6 is applicable 
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both to the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant before the National Judicial 
Council and the proceedings following from the applicant’s constitutional complaint.”276 
 Regarding stated bias of the three members of the National Judicial Council against 
the applicant the Court determined lack of their impartiality which was clearly expressed in 
their public appearances which fact also constituted violation of Art. 6 par. 1 of the 
Convention. Regarding a right to a public hearing the Court noted that the National Judicial 
Council excluded the public from the respective disciplinary proceeding despite the applicants 
claim that the public should be included in the proceeding. The National Judicial Council 
explained the exclusion of the public for reasons of protecting the applicant’s dignity and 
dignity of the judiciary as such, but it did not provide any reasons for such standpoint. The 
Court noted that the applicant claimed a public hearing by which he clearly expressed his 
opinion that protection of his dignity doesn’t need to be achieved in such manner. Given the 
fact that the reasons for exclusion of public in respective proceeding were not explained at all, 
the Court also determined a violation of a right to a fair trial regarding the exclusion of the 
public. Finally, the Court also determined a violation of a right to a fair trial regarding the 
equality of arms given the fact that the National Judicial Council did not hear any witness 
proposed by the applicant for which reason “…the Court finds that the national authorities’ 
refusal to examine any of the defence witnesses led to a limitation of the applicant’s ability to 
present his case in a manner incompatible with the guarantees of a fair trial enshrined in 
Article 6…”277 
Finally, the Court also determined a violation of a right to a fair trial regarding the 
length of proceeding given the fact the proceeding before the Constitutional Court upon the 
applicant’s constitutional complaint against the decision on his dismissal has exceed the six 
years time limit, which in the light of all circumstances of respective case appears excessive. 
For all stated reasons, the Court determined violation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial 
guaranteed under the provision of Art. 6 par. 1 of the Convention.  
 The case was subsequently referred to the Committee of Ministers in order to 
supervise execution of final judgement. Croatia submitted Information about the measures to 
comply with the judgement in the case of Olujić against Croatia278 and informed the 
Committee of Ministers on significant legislative adjustments which were undertaken 
pursuant to the Court’s judgement in respective case. Croatia emphasized that amendments 
                                                 
276 Case of Olujić v. Croatia, final judgement, par. 42 and 43. 
277 Case of Olujić v. Croatia, final judgement, par. 85. 
278 Available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-108090 (12.04.2019.) 
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and revision of the National Judicial Council Act have been performed in order to secure a 
public hearing in disciplinary proceedings, equality of arms and full impartiality of the 
National Judicial Council. Due to the excessive length of proceedings, Croatia informed the 
Committee of Ministers that “…the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (OG 85/10) was 
amended specifically in that respect. Relevant Article 123 paragraphs 4 and 5 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Croatia provide: 
 
“Article 123 
(4) A judge shall have the right to lodge an appeal against a decision by the National Judicial 
Council on disciplinary accountability with the Constitutional Court within 15 days after the 
date on which the decision has been served. The Constitutional Court shall decide on the 
appeal in the manner and by applying the procedure as determined by the Constitutional Act 
on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia. 
  
(5) In the cases specified in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this Article, the Constitutional Court 
shall rule within no more than 30 days from the day the appeal has been lodged. Such ruling 
of the Constitutional Court shall exclude the right to a constitutional petition."279 
 
For the context of our analysis respective verification is extremely important given the 
fact that it undoubtedly confirms the possibility of constitutional revision pursuant to the final 
judgement of the Court. For this reason, the Court is positioned in the very center of our new 
theoretical concept of the particular constitutional law which will be presented in the final 
Chapter of the dissertation.  
 
4.3.3. Impacts of the Court’s final judgements on revisions in 
constitutional law – case of Radoš and others v. Croatia 
 
 The second case that has appeared before the Court was also related to the violation of 
Art 6. par. 1 of the Convention on the basis of extensive proceedings without any justifiable 
reasons which fact constitutes violation of respective right to a fair trial as determined by the 
Court. This case has been noted by the Committee of Ministers in its 9th Annual Report on the 
Supervision of the Execution of Judgements and Decisions of the European Court of Human 
                                                 
279 Information about the measures to comply with the judgement in the case of Olujić against Croatia, op.cit. 
(footnote 278), part 4.  
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Rights from the year 2015280 as a noteworthy case and we need to bring it to closer attention, 
given the fact that a direct consequence of implementing respective Court’s decision in 
domestic legal order led to the revision of the Croatian Constitution - again.  
 The application was submitted in 1999 against the Republic of Croatia by six Croatian 
nationals all of which claimed that violation of their right to a fair trial has been committed 
due to extensive proceedings before national courts. The Court in its assessment regarding 
violation of a right to a fair trial initiated thorough analysis regarding length of the 
proceedings from the beginning until the point when applicants lodged their application to the 
Court. In the case of first applicant Mr. Zvonimir Radoš the Court determined that the 
applicant initiated a procedure before the Municipal Court in Zagreb on October 18th 1993. 
The preliminary hearing in respective proceeding was scheduled for January 24th 1994 but 
was adjourned. On February 15th 1994 the presiding judge resigned from the office causing a 
transfer of the case to the new judge but only in October 1996. The next hearing in this case 
was scheduled for December 6th 2000 but was also adjourned because the presiding judge was 
absent. A hearing was again scheduled for April 20th 2001 but was also adjourned because the 
defendant in respective case has not appeared before the court. The Municipal Court 
determined that the defendant has changed his name and address and demanded from the 
competent state body (Ministry of Interior) notice regarding new address of the defendant. 
The Ministry of Interior delivered notice regarding new address of the defendant and the 
Court decided to hold next hearing on September 21st 2001 and April 4th 2002. Both of 
scheduled hearings were adjourned because the defendant had not collected a notice of the 
hearing date.281 
 In other five cases the Court also determined time-frame of the proceedings and stated 
that “…the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the 
circumstances of the case and having regard to the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, 
in particular the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant 
authorities, and the importance of what is at stake for the applicant in the litigation…”282 
 In five cases the Court determined that an extensive period of proceedings is 
attributable to the domestic authorities. In other words, the Court determined that domestic 
authorities failed to provide to the applicants the proceedings within reasonable time and that 
applicant’s conduct in this proceedings did not delay proper conduct of proceedings. Reasons 
                                                 
280 Respective Report is available at: https://rm.coe.int/168062fe2d (12.04.2019.) 
281 Case of Radoš and others v. Croatia, final judgement (application No. 45435/99), available at:  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60738 (12.04.2019.) 
282 Ibid, „B. Applicable criteria“ 
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for such extensive proceedings were only on the side of Municipal Court in Zagreb and its 
inefficiency to secure reasonable time of the proceedings. For this reasons, the Court 
determined a violation of the right to a fair trial from Art. 6 par. 1 of the Convention in five 
cases and awarded pecuniary damage to the applicants.   
 When respective judgement became final, the case was referred to the Committee of 
Ministers for supervision of execution of the Court’s judgement. The Republic of Croatia 
informed the Committee of Ministers that, in order to secure a reasonable time of court’s 
proceedings, undertook various constitutional and legislative actions and that the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia has adjusted its practice and harmonized it 
with the practice of the Court regarding excessive length of the proceedings before domestic 
courts.  
 The Committee of Ministers identified that following the Court’s judgement in all 
cases related to the excessive length of the proceedings (cases like Radoš and others v. 
Croatia) the Republic of Croatia amended the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court 
from 1999 in 2002 and provided that: 
 
“(1) The Constitutional Court shall examine a constitutional complaint even before all legal 
remedies have been exhausted in cases when a competent court has not decided within a 
reasonable time a claim concerning the applicant's rights and obligations or a criminal 
charge against him (...) 
  
(2) If the constitutional complaint ... under paragraph 1 of this Section is accepted, the 
Constitutional Court shall determine a time-limit within which a competent court shall decide 
the case on the merits (...) 
  
(3) In a decision under paragraph 2 of this Article, the Constitutional Court shall fix 
appropriate compensation for the applicant in respect of the violation found concerning his 
constitutional rights (...). The compensation shall be paid from the State budget within a term 
of three months from the date when the party lodged a request for its payment.”283 
  
                                                 
283 Resolution ResDH(2005)60 concerning the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of 
Horvat and 9 other cases against Croatia (see Appendix I) relating to the excessive length of certain civil 
proceedings and the right to an effective remedy, available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-69922 
(12.04.2019.) 
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Respective competence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia was not 
prescribed until judgements of the Court in cases like Radoš and others have appeared. Given 
the fact that the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia has 
a legal force of the Constitution itself284, respective judgements of the Court, like in the 
previous case of Olujić v. Croatia, led to the revision of the substantial constitutional law in 
the Republic of Croatia. This fact clearly indicates the significance of the Court and its 
judgements in national legal orders. Furthermore, judgements of the Court in the case of 
Radoš and others led not only to the revision of the Constitution, but also to the adjustment of 
the judicial practice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia.  
 
“2) Direct effect of the Convention and European Court's judgments in Croatian law 
  
According to Article 140 of the Croatian Constitution, the European Convention on Human 
Rights, ratified by Croatia on 17 October 1997, is part of the domestic legal order and its 
provisions take priority over provisions of domestic law. Several examples of national courts' 
decisions were submitted to show the development of the direct effect of the Convention and of 
the European Court's case-law at national level, in particular with regard to the right to a 
fair trial (decisions of the Constitutional Court Nos. U-III-727/1997 of 10/01/2000, U-I-
745/1999 of 08/11/2000 and U-IIIA-829/2002 of 24/03/2004). 
  
Following the legislative reform of 2002, the European Court's judgments were also granted 
direct effect in cases of excessive length of judicial proceedings, including enforcement 
proceedings. The Constitutional Court thus found several violations of plaintiffs' rights under 
Article 29, paragraph 1, of the Constitution on account of the excessive length of judicial 
proceedings. Accordingly, it ordered the courts concerned to give a decision within certain 
time-limits and awarded compensation for the delays that have already occurred (see, for 
example, decisions No. U-IIIA/1128/2004 of 02 February 2005 and U-III/A/1978/2002 of 24 
February 2005). The Constitutional Court considered the reasonable character of the length 
of proceedings in these cases in the light of the criteria laid down in the European Court's 
                                                 
284 Art. 132. par. 1 and 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia prescribes: „The procedure and 
conditions for the appointment of justices of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia and the 
termination of their office, conditions and time-limits for instituting proceedings for the assessment of 
constitutionality and legality, the procedure and legal effects of its decisions, the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, and other issues vital to the performance of duties and 
work of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia shall be regulated by a constitutional act.  
Such constitutional act shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure determined for amending the 
Constitution.“  
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case-law, in particular the complexity of the case, the conduct of the parties and that of the 
relevant authorities.”285 
 
For all stated reasons, we can determine that in the case of the Republic of Croatia (as 
it is the case in the Republic of Slovenia) legal system pursuant to the final judgements of the 
Court will take all necessary adjustments in order to meet human rights standard as prescribed 
by the Convention and determined by the Court. Respective cases have been selected for a 
brief presentation given the fact that both of them led to the revision of the fundamental 
constitutional legal sources although there are countless examples determined by the 
Committee of Ministers where final judgements of the Court initiated substantial adjustments 
in domestic legal order (from legislative and judicial standpoint).286 As well as it is the case of 
the Republic of Slovenia, the Republic of Croatia also positions the Convention on a higher 
constitutional level where scientific research of constitutional law scholars clearly indicate its 
special constitutional status like no other valid international agreements which are on force in 
those two states.  
 
4.3.4. Battling the ghosts of the past – case of Statileo v. Croatia 
 
 Final case which will be presented in this sub-chapter as regard to the Republic of 
Croatia is Statileo v. Croatia (application No. 12027/10287). Respective case has been dealing 
with the protection of property and indicated severe legislative reforms which Republic of 
Croatia should have undertaken immediately after the Court’s judgement in respective case 
has become final (October 10th, 2014). But unfortunately, execution of respective judgement 
was excessive for which reason the Committee of Ministers subjected the execution process in 
respective case to the enhanced supervision procedure.  
 Legislation of former Yugoslavia in 1959 enacted The Housing Act with introduction 
of “specially protected tenancy”. This was legal concept that enabled to its holders (and to the 
members of his or her household as well) permanent (usually lifelong) unrestricted use of 
particular flat (apartment) with the payment of only maintenance cost and depreciation. 
Respective right was awarded in administrative proceeding by competent authority to various 
                                                 
285 Resolution ResDH(2005)60, op.cit. (footnote 265). 
286 See 9th Annual Report on the Supervision of the Execution of Judgements and Decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights from the year 2015, op.cit. (footnote 280), p. 26 and Impact of the European Convention 
on Human Rights in States Parties: selected examples, op.cit. (footnote 169), p. 8. 
287 Case of Statileto v. Croatia, final judgement (application No. 12027/10), available at:  
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individuals. Until 1974 and new Housing Act, specially protected tenancy could be awarded 
on socially and privately owned flats (apartments). Once awarded, respective tenancy could 
be terminated only on the basis of judicial decision rendered in judicial proceedings and on 
limited grounds. The most important reason which could ultimately lead to the termination of 
specially protected tenancy was failure of the holder to use awarded apartment for living 
purposes for a continuous period of at least six months without justified reason. After 1990 
and dissolution of the former Yugoslavia only private ownership has been recognized and 
protected in the new Croatian (so-called Christmas) Constitution. Social ownership has been 
set aside in new constitutional order and inviolability of ownership has been instituted as the 
highest value of the constitutional order in the Republic of Croatia and as the foundation for 
the interpretation of the Constitution (Art. 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia). 
Given the fact that after 1990 social ownership has been put out from legal order in the 
Republic of Croatia and that particular number of specially protected tenancies were awarded 
on privately owned flats there was practical need to resolve such situation in which private 
individuals as owners of apartments have in their apartments other individuals with granted 
special protected tenancy. Individuals as owners wanted to reclaim possession of their 
apartments and on the other hand holders of former specially protected tenancies wanted to 
protect their granted rights and their home. In 1996 legislator tried to overcome this politically 
sensitive issue by enacting the new Lease of Flats Act creating a new type of lease named 
protected lease. In this new type of lease former holders of specially protected tenancy will 
become protected lessees where owners of the apartments must by law conclude lease 
agreement on indefinite period of time with small amount of rent which is determined by the 
Government and not by the market. If owners of the apartments do not conclude lease 
agreement with protected lessees voluntarily, protected lessees can claim such agreement on 
the court. In the light of this new legal institute severe limitations of ownership have been 
imposed on the owners of the apartments with protected lessees. First of all, owners could not 
take possession of their ownership on the apartments while protected lessees have valid lease 
agreement. Second, amount of rent that protected lessees were paying to the owners was 
excessively low in relation to the amount of rent that could be achieved on the market for 
same apartments. Finally, such lease agreement was concluded for indefinite period of time 
which meant that owners could not take possession of their apartments while protected lessees 
are alive. This fact combined with the fact that status of protected lessees could also be 
awarded to the children of protected lessees clearly indicated that owners will not take 
possession of their apartments in their lifetime. And for all that time they will be paid with the 
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amount of rent which is significantly below the amount of rent that can be achieved on the 
market. Finally, the Lease of Flats Act also imposed significant limitation for termination of 
the lease agreement with protected lessees. Considering all stated limitations imposed on the 
owners of the apartments with protected lessees it was clear that majority of owners will not 
live to take possession of their apartments.288 
 Mr. Statileo was the owner of a flat in Split in which specially protected tenancy has 
been awarded. After entering on force of the Lease of Flats Act individual to whom special 
protected tenancy has been awarded asked from Mr. Statileo to conclude lease agreement in 
protected lease scheme. Mr. Statileo refused and claimed from the individual to vacate the 
respective flat in Split. The individual brought this matter to court in Split and claimed for 
judgement of the court ordering to Mr. Statileo to conclude such agreement or otherwise the 
judgement of the court will substitute such agreement. Mr. Statileo initiated proceeding before 
the court in Split also claiming that the individual did not meet requirements pursuant to the 
Lease of Flats Act in order to be considered as protected lessee. Those two proceedings were 
joined and Mr. Statileo did not succeed in proceeding. Eventually he was ordered by the 
judgement of the Court in Split to conclude such agreement; otherwise it will be substituted 
by the respective judgement. Mr. Statileo appealed but on June 2006 Požega County Court 
dismissed his appeal and upheld the judgement from the Municipal Court in Split. Mr. 
Statileo then lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia 
alleging violations of his right to equality before the law, right to a fair trial and his right of 
ownership under the Croatian Constitution. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Croatia dismissed the complaint of Mr. Statileo on 2009 after which Mr. Statileo lodged his 
application to the Court.289  
 The Court in its assessment whether violation of the Convention has occurred on the 
ground of Art. 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention first of all had to answer whether 
there was interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of possession in order to 
constitute applicability of the Art. 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in respective 
case. The Court noted: “In the Court’s view, there was indisputably an interference with the 
applicant’s property rights in the present case as the protected lease entails a number of 
restrictions that prevent landlords from exercising their right to use their property. In 
particular, landlords are unable to exercise that right in terms of physical possession, as the 
flat remains indefinitely occupied by the tenants, and their rights in respect of letting the flat, 
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including the right to receive the market rent for it and to terminate the lease, are 
substantially affected by a number of statutory limitations…”290 
 In order to assess whether the interference was justified or not the Court analyzed such 
interference from the aspects of legality, general interest and proportionality. From the aspect 
of legality, the Court noted that such interference and imposition of obligation to Mr. Statileo 
to conclude lease agreement with protected lessee was prescribed by law (the Lease of Flats 
Act) so condition on legality as required by the Art. 1 of the Protocol I to the Convention has 
been fulfilled. The law strictly prescribed that owners of the apartments were obliged to 
conclude such unfavorably lease agreement and for which reason interference could be under 
margin of appreciation. The Court also accepted that such interference was also in accordance 
with the general interest, i.e. social protection of tenants. But on the third demand, 
proportionality, the Court determined that imposed obligation does not meet required fair 
balance between the demands of the general interest of the public and requirements of the 
protection of individual’s fundamental rights given the fact that such restrictions “…imposes 
a disproportionate and excessive burden on the applicant.”291 Here the Court determined that 
pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Lease of Flats Act fair distribution of financial and 
other legal burden has not been achieved and that excessive burden on owners of the 
apartment has been placed pursuant to the provisions of domestic law. The Court explained its 
standpoints on basis of small amount of protected rent which was significantly 
disproportionate to the amount of rent that could be achieved on the market; indefinite 
duration of protected lease scheme; significant limitation on legally allowed termination of 
such agreement etc. All this limitations imposed to the owners cannot be justified in general 
interest for which reason the Court determined violation of the Art. 1 of the Protocol I to the 
Convention.292 
Respective judgement was truly revolutionary for the Croatian legal reality given the 
fact that no political option for nearly 20 years wanted to resolve this highly intense political 
matter. The case dealt with numerous constitutional and political issues in Croatia as well as 
with socialistic heritage (specially protected tenancy). The Court practically ended status quo 
and highlighted respective area as unacceptable from the aspects of the Convention. The 
Court determined violation of the Art. 1 of the Protocol I to the Convention and expanded the 
scope of applicability of respective right to a peaceful enjoyment of one’s possession to the 
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owners of apartments with protected lessees although such restrictions were prescribed by law 
and confirmed by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia.  
More importantly, the Court noted that effects of its judgement expand the case 
concerned and that there is underlying deficiency in legislation itself.293 In other words, the 
Court sent a signal to the Croatian authorities that Croatia could easily face pilot-judgement 
procedure if necessary measures in legislature will not be performed and fair balance achieved 
between opposite interest of owners as landlords and lessees in protected rent scheme. Such 
direct instruction made by the Court led owners to the conclusion that actions of the Republic 
of Croatia in amending relevant legislation will be swift and in full accordance to the final 
judgement of the Court. 
Unfortunately, national authorities haven’t taken swift actions in execution of the 
Court’s final judgement in the Statileo case. The judgement became final in October 2014 and 
transferred to the Committee of Ministers for supervision of execution. In June 2015 the 
Republic of Croatia has submitted Action Plan and in July next year updated Action Plan. In 
the Action Plan the Republic of Croatia has noted that legislative reforms have already been 
on the way but due to the parliamentary elections and process of forming the government 
further actions could not be undertaken.294 
Next Action Plan has been submitted in April 2017 where, in general, the Republic of 
Croatia notified the Committee of Ministers that new parliamentary elections have been held 
in 2016 which fact (again) prevented legislative actions in the execution process due to the 
dissolution of the Croatian Parliament. But nevertheless, the Republic of Croatia emphasized 
that legislative reform in general sense is ongoing and the results of public debate have been 
analyzed which will guide national authorities in drafting amendments to the Lease of Flats 
Act.295 
                                                 
293 „Whilst in finding a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in the present instance the 
Court has primarily focused on the particular circumstances of the applicant’s case, it adds by way of a general 
observation that the problem underlying that violation concerns the legislation itself and that its findings extend 
beyond the sole interests of the applicant in the instant case (see paragraph 77 above). This is therefore a case 
where the Court considers that the respondent State should take appropriate legislative and/or other general 
measures to secure a rather delicate balance between the interests of landlords, including their entitlement to 
derive profit from their property, and the general interest of the community – including the availability of 
sufficient accommodation for the less well-off – in accordance with the principles of the protection of property 
rights under the Convention (see, Edwards (just satisfaction), cited above, § 33).“ – Ibid, par. 165. 
294 See updated Action Plan of July 5th 2016, par. 12 – 20, available at:  
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806884
54 (12.04.2019.) 
295 „However, due to the dissolution of the Croatian Parliament on 15 July 2016 (which was a consequence of a 
decision to oust the Prime minister) new parliamentary elections were held in September 2016. The Parliament 
was constituted in October 2016, and the new Government took office five days later. The legislative process 
continued immediately. Comments on the content of the Draft received from the relevant domestic authorities, as 
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Throughout all this time the Committee of Ministers continuously emphasized the 
necessity of carrying out the final judgement of the Court without any delay. On its 1265th 
meeting held in September 2016 the Committee of Ministers noted that the judgement in 
respective case has become final in 2014 and “…strongly encouraged the authorities to 
intensify their efforts with a view to finding a global solution to the problem it revealed.”296 In 
March 2017 on 1280th meeting the Committee of Ministers expressed their concern regarding 
the fact that the Court found violation in similar cases297 and urged national authorities to take 
necessary actions in compliance with the Court’s understandings without any further delay.   
Finally, the Republic of Croatia submitted to the Committee of Ministers proposed 
amendments to the Lease of Flats Act in order to execute final judgement of the Court in the 
Statileo case. These amendments were considered by the Committee of Ministers on their 
1294th meeting in September 2017. In general, in order to rectify infringed right to a peaceful 
enjoyment of one’s possession for all owners of apartments within protective rent scheme and 
to fully execute final judgement of the Court in the Statileo case, the Republic of Croatia 
initially in 2017 decided to: 
a) terminate protected lease scheme no later than June 1st 2022 when all protected 
lessees will have to give possession of the apartments to their owners and vacate respective 
apartments; 
b) incrementally increase the amount of protective rent in order that such rent in the 
next five year term will reach full market rent; 
c) modify restrictive conditions for the termination of protected leases. 
 
The Secretariat analyzed proposed amendments to the relevant legislation and noted 
that such revision of the legislation will strike fair balance and secure global solution to the 
issue of protected lessees. But nevertheless, the Secretariat noted that the Republic of Croatia 
                                                                                                                                                        
well as the general public (following the public debate process) had to be analyzed so that the final text of the 
Draft can be prepared. Currently, the Ministry of Justice is preparing an additional statement on compatibility 
of the Draft with the Criminai Law. Once this statement is received the Draft will be forwarded to the 
Government and the legislative process will begin.“ – Action Plan from April 2017, par. 25 – 27, available at:  
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016807074
6e (12.04.2019.) 
296 Decisions adopted by the Committee of Ministers, compilation 2014 – 2017, p. 184, available at: 
https://rm.coe.int/compilation-decisions-2014-2018-en-/168077e33a (12.04.2019.) 
297 Cases indicated by the Committee of Ministers were Mirošević-Anzulović v. Croatia (application No. 
25815/14, judgement of October 4th 2014, final on October 4th 2014), Bego and other v. Croatia (application 
No. 35444/12, judgement of November 15th 2016, final on November 15th 2016) and Gošović v. Croatia 
(application No. 37006/13, judgement of April 4th 2017, final on April 4th 2017). See H46-8 Statileo Group v. 
Croatia, supervision of the execution of the European Court's judgement, available at: 
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=0900001680737c4d (12.04.2019.) 
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did not indicate concrete time-frame for the adoption of legislative amendments and that it is 
crucial to give highest priority to the adoption of proposed amendments.298  
Nevertheless, necessary revisions of relevant legislation have not been enacted until 
July 2018 which fact directly influenced on the deadline on which protected lessees must 
vacate apartments and give possession of the apartments to the owners. Amendments to the 
Lease of House Act have been published in Official Gazette in No. 68/2018 and enacted on 
August 4th 2018. Although the Republic of Croatia communicated to the Committee of 
Ministers that June 1st 2022 will be the date when protected lease scheme will cease to exist in 
domestic legal order, excessive legislative procedure from 2016 – 2018 caused that respective 
deadline had to be shifted on September 1st 2023 (Art. 28.c of revised Lease House Act). Due 
to the legislative delays in the execution process owners of the apartments now have to wait 
one additional year to take possession of their apartments. But nevertheless, the fact is that 
this situation is now final, and the Committee of Ministers will in following period adopt final 
resolution which will confirm that final judgement of the Court in the Statileo case has been 
duly and properly executed.  
This case was important for the context of our dissertation given the fact that the Court 
in this process indicated structural deficiencies which arise from systematical legislative 
defects. The Court noted that such displacement of burden solely on the owners of apartments 
cannot be in accordance with the guarantees enshrined in Art. 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the 
Convention. The Court practically solved extremely sensitive political issue in Croatia and 
gave directions in which legislative reform should be undertaken.  
On the other hand, excessive period in the process of execution is also visible in 
respective case. The judgement has become final in October 2014 and nearly four years 
expired until relevant legislative reforms have been enacted. It can be considered that Croatia 
in relevant period underwent two parliamentary elections but despite that fact revision of the 
relevant legislature should have been conducted with more efforts in order to achieve 
acceptable time period from the time when the judgement have become final to the entering 
on force revised legislation (August 2018) which finally rectified infringed human right. 
Such extensive and unnecessary delays in execution of final judgement of the Court 
certainly are leading to further delays in achieving common standards. The execution process 
of final judgement of the Court must be swift where respondent state must be in constant 
dialogue with the Secretariat and the Committee of Ministers. With this characteristics of the 
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execution process final judgement of the Court can lead to the establishment of common 
standards which we are addressing as the particular constitutional law. But if execution 
process is characterized with unnecessary delays (or even open opposition from respondent 
state299) than common standards will eventually be achieved with unnecessary difficulties, 
and final judgement of the Court will only serve as a fact of legal life without effective 
realization in practice.   
 
4.4. Federal Republic of Germany 
 
Federal Republic of Germany and its constitutional order with Federal Constitutional 
Court as the guardian of the Basic Law are usually referred to as a prominent constitutional 
order in Europe with the Constitutional Court of great influence. The Federal Constitutional 
Court possesses great authority and its decisions are cited and referred to in the proceedings 
before other European constitutional courts.300 Federal Republic of Germany has signed the 
initial text of the Convention on November 4th 1950, ratified on December 5th 1952 and the 
Convention came into force in Federal Republic of Germany on September 3rd 1953.301 From 
that point until nowadays, federal constitutional order underwent severe legal and 
constitutional adjustments as well as adjustments in federal constitutional jurisprudence under 
the influence of the Court.  
  
  4.4.1. Relevant constitutional and legislative provisions 
 
 As for the position of the Convention in the German constitutional order, current 
scientific research indicates that the Convention in German has constitutional status of non-
constitutional federal law. “The Convention has been assigned the status of federal law, thus 
overriding all laws enacted by the Länder.”302 For this reason, we can determine that status of 
the Convention in German constitutional order is sub-constitutional on the level of ordinary 
federal legislature. Nevertheless, and as from 1987 Federal Constitutional Court indicated that 
the Convention is a part of German constitutional order and must be considered as relevant 
source of constitutional law when deciding on the scope of human rights and fundamental 
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302 D. Spielmann: „Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Systems of 
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freedoms. “The German doctrine had suggested that the Federal Constitutional Court have 
recourse to the European Convention in order to interpret the fundamental rights set forth in 
the Federal Constitution. In an important decision dated 26 March 1987 the Constitutional 
Court approved this approach stating that: “when interpreting the Fundamental Law, the 
Court must have regard to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
the case law which ensues therefrom.” That is to say the fundamental rights set forth in the 
Fundamental Law (the Fundamental Law being, of course, the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of German) must be interpreted having regard to the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights.”303 
 Although the Federal Constitutional Court stands as the most important national 
guardian of German’s constitutional order, the Constitutional Court itself noted that when 
interpreting and consequently applying particular constitutional provision regarding human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, conformity with corresponding human rights set out in the 
Convention must be achieved. In all cases of constitutional adjudication or legal proceedings 
before lower national courts, only a uniform approach and consideration of the Convention’s 
provision (and subsequently the Court’s judicial practice) can fulfill all demands regarding 
constitutionality in the Federal Republic of Germany. For this reason, we conclude that 
although on the position of ordinary federal legislature, the Convention indeed has great 
constitutional significance in constitutional order of the Federal Republic of Germany.304 
 Contemporary research also indicates significant impact of the Court’s judgement on 
domestic judicial decisions even more in contemporary time. Should domestic court fail to 
abide or apply jurisprudence of the Court in particular case that fact could lead to the 
intervention of the Federal Constitutional Court with determination that particular 
constitutional right prescribed by the Basic Law (and interpreted in accordance with the 
correlating right prescribed in the Convention) has been violated. “In fact, after some early 
hesitation, the German courts refer with increasing frequency to the Convention and the 
European Human Rights Court’s judgements. Between 1 January 2005 and 21 January 2012 
alone, the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) referred in 127 cases to judgements 
                                                 
303 J. Frowein: „The Federal Republic of Germany“, in: M. Delmas-Marty (ed.): The Euroean Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights: International Protection Versus National Restrictions, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
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fundamental rights guaranteed by the Basic Law are complemented by an interpretation in conformity with the 
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of the ECtHR, and the Federal Constitutional Court referred to 83 judgements between 14 
October 2004 and 7 February 2012.”305  
 Other researches regarding connectivity between German legal order and legal order 
as established by the Convention indicate that Federal Constitutional Court directly refers to 
the Court’s judgements very seldom. Within this methodological approach researches 
emphasize that after more than 60 years of modern constitutional jurisprudence in Federal 
Republic of Germany human rights and fundamental freedoms prescribed by the Basic Law 
have reached high standards and that jurisprudence of the Court is used only in preparatory 
work prior to the publication of decision of the Federal Constitutional Court. Federal 
Constitutional Court uses the Convention in order to harmonize, to particular extent, 
substantial content of human rights prescribed by the Basic Law and the Convention and to 
avoid intervention of the Court.306  
 But in any case, we can conclude on the basis of presented analysis that Federal 
Republic of Germany and Federal Constitutional Court generally accept the Convention and 
the Court’s reasoning as interpretative guideline in domestic adjudication process. For this 
reason, it is visible that our new theoretical concept of the particular constitutional law can be 
verified in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany and for which reason we decided to 
bring Federal Republic of Germany to closer analysis regarding compliance with the Court’s 
judicial practice and legal understandings.  
 
  4.4.2. Changing features of the rule of law – case of M. v. Germany 
 
 In the case of Federal Republic of Germany, the Court’s case of M. v. Germany 
(application No. 19359/04307) will be presented given the fact that it had a significant effect in 
constitutional practice of the Federal Republic of Germany. The respective case is significant 
for various reasons, e.g. it led to the revision of the standpoints of the Federal Constitutional 
Court regarding the preventive detention – one legal institute prescribed by the German’s 
substantive criminal law which was limited after the Court’s judgement in respective case. 
Furthermore, the Federal Constitutional Court after the judgement of the Court in respective 
case invoked the rule of law as primary constitutional principle which must be observed in the 
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analysis of the preventive detention. Finally, respective case is also of great importance given 
the fact that the Federal Constitutional Court revised its constitutional standpoints taking into 
account the possibility of pilot-judgement if necessary adjustments will not be performed. For 
all this reasons and considering broader impacts of respective judgement, a brief presentation 
of the case will be displayed in our analysis given the fact that it clearly indicates adjustments 
regarding the rule of law in domestic constitutional jurisprudence.  
 The applicant was born in 1957 and in the time of lodging his application has been 
detained in Schwalmstadt prison. He has been considered by the German authorities as a 
dangerous prisoner given the fact that he has been convicted at least seven times and escaped 
from prison four times. In all respective proceedings, the expert appointed by the criminal 
court confirmed that the applicant had diminished criminal responsibility given the fact that 
he suffered from a serious pathological mental disorder. On November 17th 1986 Marburg 
Regional Court convicted the applicant of attempted murder and robbery and sentenced him 
to five years’ imprisonment. The Regional Court also ordered his placement in preventive 
detention (Sicherungsverwarhung) pursuant to the Art. 66 of the German Criminal Code.308 
The Regional Court emphasized that having regard to the report of neurological and 
psychiatric expert, the applicant still suffered from a serious mental disorder, but which 
disorder cannot be qualified any more as pathological and for which reason the medical 
interventions regarding applicant’s disorder are no longer needed. For this reason, the 
Regional Court determined that the applicant’s intention for committing the crime in the time 
of offense has not been interfered with any medical condition for which reasons his criminal 
responsibility has not been diminished. Considering that legally it was not possible to place 
the applicant to psychiatric institution the Regional Court ordered preventive detention after 
serving his five years sentence. The Regional Court noted that the applicant “…had a strong 
propensity to commit offences which seriously damaged his victims’ physical integrity. It was 
to be expected that he would commit further spontaneous acts of violence and he was 
dangerous to the public. Therefore, his preventive detention was necessary.”309 
  The applicant served his sentence on August 18th 1991 and was placed in a preventive 
detention pursuant to the order of the Regional Court. At the time of the offense and the 
                                                 
308 Preventive detention is an legal institute in German's criminal substantial law which empower the criminal 
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applicant’s conviction (1986), maximum duration of the preventive detention, in addition to 
the imposed penalty, was 10 years pursuant to the Art. 67d of the Criminal Code. In the case 
of the applicant, he should be released no later than August 18th 2001. But while on the 
preventive detention, Federal Criminal Code has been amended and enacted on January 31st 
1998. The revised provisions regarding preventive detention abolished maximum duration of 
the preventive detention and prescribed obligation of the competent state authorities to 
examine in particular time-limits (every two years) if there are still any ongoing reasons 
prescribed by law to secure offenders in preventive detention even if they served their 
convictions.  
 Respective amendments to the Federal Criminal Code had to be applied not only to the 
preventive detentions, which will be imposed after entering respective amendments of the 
Federal Criminal Code on force – January 31st 1998 (for which reason could not be applied on 
the case of applicant), but also onto all offenders/convicted persons who are at the time of 
entering of respective amendments on force (January 31st 1998) already in a preventive 
detention. Although provisions of German Criminal Code at the time of the applicant’s 
offense and conviction prescribed that preventive detention could not be longer than 10 years 
after the conviction has been served, respective amendments abolished maximum duration 
and were to be applied equally in all cases where preventive detentions have been imposed 
prior to the respective amendments.  
 Respective legislative solutions raised severe constitutional issues, especially 
regarding prohibition on retroactivity (retrospectivity). Common constitutional principle in all 
modern liberal states is that the legislative provisions can only be applied on those social 
relations that occurred prior to the enactment of a particular legislature. In the case of 
preventive detention, German legislators enacted an abolishment of maximum duration of 
preventive detention to all cases of preventive detention in the time of enactment of respective 
amendments, and not only to those preventive detentions which will be imposed after the 
enactment of respective amendments to the German Criminal Code.  
The applicant made continuous efforts to be released on probation and not to be placed 
in preventive detention. All his efforts were rejected by the competent German courts. Finally, 
the Federal Constitutional Court examined the constitutionality of such solution within the 
constitutional complaint of the applicant but did not determine any inconsistencies with the 
German Basic Law (Fundamental Law, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany).  
The Federal Constitutional Court noted that within the limits set out by the Constitution “The 
absolute ban on the retrospective application of criminal laws imposed by that Article did not 
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cover the measures of correction and prevention, such as preventive detention, provided for in 
the Criminal Code.”310 
 The Federal Constitutional Court examined the constitutional complaint, inter alia, 
from the rule of law standpoint (principle of legitimate expectations) and from the aspects of 
protection of human dignity and did not found any violation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms set out in the Basic Law. From the aspects of the rule of law, the Federal 
Constitutional Court claimed that abolishment of maximum time limit of preventive detention 
is in conformity with the principle of legitimate expectations (which is fundamental part of 
the rule of law) given the fact that “…the ten-year maximum duration of preventive detention, 
like all other measures of correction and prevention, had been subject from the outset to 
changes in the law.”311  
 The Court on the other hand disagreed with the reasoning of the Federal Constitutional 
Court and pointed out that the concept of the preventive detention falls under the scope of the 
Convention’s applicability and that respective amendments to the German Criminal Code did 
not meet requirements of the Convention’s standards. For all reasons thoroughly presented in 
respective final judgement of the Court, the Court found violation of Art. 5. and Art. 7 of the 
Convention.  
More importantly, respective case had a particular precedential meaning regarding 
preventive detention in Germany. The statistics have shown that nearly 80 offenders were in 
the same situation as the applicant in the respective case. After the judgement, the Court has 
been dealing with the preventive detention with identical circumstances of the respective case 
also in the case Kallweit v. Germany (2011), Mautes v. Germany (2011) and Schummer v. 
Germany (2011) to which cases can also be added the case Haidn v. Germany (2011). In all 
respective cases the fundamental issue was the continuation of preventive detention beyond 
the time-limit as prescribed by law at the time of the offense. For this reason, Federal 
Republic of Germany faced the possibility of pilot-judgement with determination of 
systematic dysfunctions in German penal system regarding preventive detention. In all of 
those cases, the Court noted that in cases of Kallweit v. Germany and Mautes v. Germany 
domestic courts have prolonged preventive detention, although they were aware that with 
such prolongation they are violating the Court’s legal understandings emphasized in the case 
of M. v. Germany. The Federal Constitutional Court identified the possibility of initiating the 
pilot-judgement procedure, and in 2011 (four months after final judgements of the Court in 
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cases of Kallweit v. Germany, Schummer v. Germany and Mautes v. Germany), on the basis 
of four constitutional complaints lodged by the applicants in preventive detention passed its 
decision determining that retroactive imposition of preventive detention beyond maximum 
time limit which has been prescribed by the law in the time of offense violate the Basic Law 
and human rights and fundamental freedoms of the applicants. The Federal Constitutional 
Court expressively noted that although the Convention has sub-constitutional meaning in 
German constitutional order provisions of the Basic Law must be interpreted and applied in 
manner open to the international law (völkerrechtsfreundlich). The Convention and judicial 
practice of the Court have, in that sense, a supreme constitutional value and the impacts of the 
Court’s case law can lead to overcoming of final decisions of Federal Constitutional Court. In 
the light of the Court’s legal understandings regarding the rule of law expressed in the final 
judgement in the case of M. v. Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court adjusted its 
constitutional practice and determined that prolongation of preventive detention in all cases 
where such possibility was not prescribed by law in the time of offense does not meet 
requirements, inter alia, of the principle of the rule of law as prescribed by the Basic Law.312 
From respective case and its subsequent impact on the Federal Constitutional Court 
which led to the revision of constitutional practice in Federal Republic of Germany, we can 
easily determine to what particular extent the Court’s ruling can be important in domestic 
constitutional order. This aspect is essential in the construction of particular constitutional 
law. 
Nevertheless, we must always take in consideration that reflection of the Court’s 
reasoning and legal understandings in domestic legal order is related to numerous internal and 
external factors which are not always beneficial for the system based upon the Convention. 
There are also particular characteristics which can prevent overflow of the Court’s judicial 
practice in domestic legal and political reality (in particular case in the Federal Republic of 
Germany) for which reason construction of the particular constitutional law can be faced with 
problems. The most radical one is certainly if the Federal Republic of Germany would repeal 
the Act of ratification of the Convention. The Convention has been incorporated in German 
legal order with the federal ordinary law and subsequent federal law could be able to repeal it. 
Such legal action on federal level would be valid within national legal order although it would 
violate international law. From the political point of view, such radical solution is still highly 
unlikely but is possible.313 Secondly, dualistic approach in relation between internal German 
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law and international law is to a particular extent a barrier to full internal compliance with the 
Court. Such dualistic approach substantially contains a demand to all courts (and Federal 
Constitutional Court on the top of domestic judicial hierarchy as well) to interpret and apply 
national laws in the light of international treaties. Application of national laws must be in 
conformity with international agreements and such approach has been enacted by the Federal 
Constitutional Court in the case of Convention.314 It seems that monistic approach in relation 
between domestic and international law would erase such barrier but nevertheless the Federal 
Constitutional Court in its practice clearly has shown tendency “…to attenuate the 
consequences of dualism in order to avoid a violation of the international law obligation.”315 
Finally, although there are theoretical possibilities that system based upon the 
Convention could have a setback, widespread criticism or even direct opposition to the Court 
does not exist in the Federal Republic of Germany. Particular cases and individual judgements 
of the Court from time to time can be subjected to the general interest. “However, this effect 
was probably based more on the celebrities involved than on legal and institutional issues 
concerned.”316 The Federal Constitutional Court accepts jurisprudence of the Court, the Basic 
Law is open to the international law (völkerrechtsfreundlich), and resistance from courts in 
regular judicial hierarchy is improbable. “The courts generally enjoy rather a good reputation 
in Germany, and the ECtHR is included in this assessment.”317 
For all stated reasons, we can conclude that Federal Republic of Germany with its 
legal order is a part of supranational legal order based upon the Convention and the Court’ 
activism as well as the effective (in general terms) system for the execution of the Court’s 
final judgements. Respective supranational legal order of constitutional significance offers a  
framework for development of the concept of particular constitutional law. 
 
 4.5. Republic of Italy 
 
 Further analysis of the impacts of the Convention and the Court’s judicial practice can 
be examined within the Italian constitutional system. Italy signed initial text of the 
Convention on November 4th 1950, but the ratification took place five years later. The Italian 
Parliament ratified the Convention on October 26th 1950 when the Convention entered on 
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force in Italy.318 In earlier scientific literature scholars of the Italian constitutional law pointed 
out the fact that the Convention within the Italian constitutional system has not been deemed 
as something of special constitutional meaning. Although particular final judgements of the 
Court also led to the revision of the Italian Constitution, Italy is more often pointed out as the 
Council of Europe member state that has some problems regarding execution of the Court’s 
final judgement. Respective aspects will be presented within this sub-chapter.  
 
  4.5.1. Relevant constitutional and legislative provisions 
 
 “Italy has not had much regard for the Convention. Numerous elements witness the 
difficulties that the Convention has experienced in affirming its status in the Italian legal 
system.”319 From general hierarchy of norms within Italy, the Convention does not possess a 
supra-legislative position. According to the Italian constitutional law international agreement 
must be ratified and executed by the legislature in order to become an integral part of 
domestic legal system. All of these legislative techniques in order for the Convention to 
become an integral part of domestic legal system had been undertaken in 1955. But 
nevertheless, the Convention within Italian constitutional system has a legal position of 
ordinary legislature.320  
 The Italian scholars usually emphasize that to a particular extent the Italian Supreme 
Court and the Italian Constitutional Court reveal a particular resistance to the Convention. “It 
being given that the Convention is a source of domestic law, the tendency of part of the 
doctrine and the case law to consider certain provisions of the Convention to be non self-
executing also demonstrate Italy’s disregard for the Convention.”321 
 Despite the fact that the Convention has a position of ordinary legislature and despite 
to the respective disregard for the Convention, there are growing tendencies within Italian 
constitutional law theory that “…not only would the Italian legislation conform to the 
minimum level of protection provided by the Convention for individual rights and liberties, 
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but this legislation would afford better protection than the Convention.”322 This fact still 
needs to be verified in contemporary scientific researches.  
 Researches also verified that on a daily basis individuals have been invoking in regular 
proceedings before the Italian courts their human rights and fundamental freedoms which 
were prescribed by the Convention. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Italy (Corte 
Suprema di Cassazione) always rejected the possibility that the Convention could have a 
particular constitutional significance in Italy. The Constitutional Court of Italy (Corte 
Costituzionale) also accepted such view but, in the light of expanding Community Law, had 
to level down expectations of traditional dualism and acknowledge a direct applicability of 
Community Law. This fact had great influence for the Convention and its status in Italy given 
the fact that the Constitutional Court has opened the possibility for Italian courts to recognize 
superior status of international agreement to statute law.323 
 Finally, Italy is usually considered as the Council of Europe member state which has 
severe obstacles regarding execution of the Court’s final judgements. On December 1st 2010 
the Committee of Ministers monitored execution of 2.481 final judgements against Italy. Of 
whole cases which were monitored by the Committee of Ministers, 27% in 2010 were related 
to Italy. But it has to be noted that more than 2.000 of those cases were related to one and 
only problem – unreasonable length of proceedings before the Court.324 
 
 4.5.2. The Convention’s substantial guarantees in criminal proceedings – 
case of Craxi No. 2 v. Italy and others 
 
 From the analysis of the already mentioned 9th Annual Report on the Supervision of 
the Execution of Judgements and Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights from the 
year 2015325 numerous examples of constitutional and legislative adjustments can be 
determined in the case of Italy, as well as for all the other Council of Europe member states. 
But one particular case which has appeared before the Court must be brought to our closer 
attention, given the fact that the respective case to some extent led to the revision of the 
Italian Constitution. As it was with the case of Olujić v. Croatia and Radoš and others v. 
Croatia, the respective case also initiated a revision of the Italian Constitution in order to 
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323 A.Z. Drzemczewski: „European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law – A Comparative Study“, op.cit. 
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secure the Convention’s standards. The second case which will be presented has also been 
noted in respective Report as a noteworthy case and it is of great importance given the fact 
that Italy in the process of execution of the final judgement of the Court also pointed out that 
adjustments in judicial practice have been made in order to meet the Convention’s standards. 
Despite the fact that the researches have indicated particular opposition of the Italian judiciary 
and legislature to the Convention, particular beneficial effects can be determined. Both of 
respective cases are substantially related to the right to a fair trial from Art. 6 of the 
Convention. 
 First case of great constitutional impact was the case of Craxi No.2 v. Italy 
(application No. 34896/97). Mr. Benedetto Craxi, an Italian national that has been convicted 
in 1994 for a felony to five years and six months imprisonment. All Italian courts upheld his 
conviction and have not found any violation of legislative or constitutional provisions. His 
conviction was based exclusively on statements that co-accused persons made before 
authorities in pre-trial proceedings where Mr. Craxi could not cross-examine co-accused 
persons. In addition, the applicant claimed that he was deprived from adequate time to prepare 
his defense. The applicant also claimed that the press did not objectively cover his case, so the 
campaign against him had an influence on trial judges in the process of deliberation. The 
applicant died while the proceeding was pending before the Court, but his widow and two 
children decided to continue the proceedings. The Court in its final judgment from 2002 
unanimously determined that there had been a violation of a right to a fair trial given the fact 
that it was impossible for the applicant to cross-examine prosecution witnesses who had died 
or exercised their right to remain silent. Violation of a right to a fair trial has also been 
determined on the account of rapid succession of hearings for which reason the applicant did 
not have enough time to prepare his defense.326,327  
 In the process of execution of the Court’s final judgement, Italy noted that even prior 
to the Court’s judgement Italian Constitution “…as modified in November 1999, gave 
Constitutional rank to a number of requirements contained in Article 6 of the Convention and, 
in its new wording, it provides in particular that: 
1…. 
2… 
                                                 
326 Resolution ResDH(2005)28 concerning the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 5 December 
2002 (final on 5 March 2003) in the case of Craxi No. 2 against Italy, available at:  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-68986 (12.04.2019.) 
327 Final judgement of the Court in respective case on Italian language is available at:  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-150396 (12.04.2019.) 
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3. In criminal proceedings, the law shall guarantee that the person accused of an offence is 
informed promptly and in confidence of the nature and grounds of the charge against him; 
that he shall have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; that he shall 
be given an opportunity before the court to examine or to have examined anyone giving 
evidence against him, to obtain the attendance and examination of any defence witnesses on 
the same conditions as witnesses called by the prosecution and to obtain the production of 
any other evidence in his favor; and that he will have the assistance of an interpreter if he 
cannot understand or speak the language used at the trial…”328 
 With respective constitutional adjustments in order to meet standards of a fair trial as 
prescribed by the Convention, Italy also underwent legislative reforms (in particular the Code 
of Criminal Procedure) in order to remove disputable provisions which have been the 
foundation of violations determined in respective case. “As a result of these measures, it is no 
longer possible that a person is convicted exclusively on the basis of statements that he/she 
could not examine or have examined.”329 Finally, Italy in its report pointed out that respective 
judgement of the Court in the case of Mr. Craxi has been translated and delivered to the 
Appeal Court of Milan for dissemination to district judicial authorities. “The government has 
strong hopes that dissemination of the judgment will enable the Italian courts to give full 
effect to the European Court's case-law when applying the above-mentioned new 
constitutional and legislative provisions. The direct effect of the Court's judgments in Italian 
law was recently confirmed by the Court of Cassation, which held that “the European Court 
of Human Rights’ interpretation of the provisions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights is binding on the Italian courts" (joint divisions, judgment of 26 January 2004 (No. 
1339)); this position was upheld in judgments delivered on 10 June 2004 (Nos. 15393/04 and 
15400/04). The government welcomes these advances in the case-law and encourages this 
trend in order to give full effect to the Strasbourg Court's judgments in Italian law.”330 
 Although particularly opposed to the Convention (as determined in the literature) from 
respective report of the Italian government regarding measures undertaken in order to secure 
an execution of the Court’s final judgement, we can determine that on a practical basis Italy is 
trying to implement minimum standards as prescribed by the Convention. 
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 Second case which will be briefly presented is related to the execution of the Court’s 
judgements in case F.C.B. v. Italy331 and four other similar cases.332 All of respective cases 
are related to the possibility of proceedings in absentia. In all of five notable cases the 
applicants have been convicted in absentia before competent Italian courts but subsequently 
were arrested in other countries, extradited to Italy and placed in prison for serving their 
sentences which were imposed with final judgements of competent Italian criminal courts. 
Given the fact that all of the applicants have been sentenced in absentia they had little or no 
possibility to question the final judgement of competent courts, given the fact that all 
deadlines for effective legal remedies against their judgements have expired. The only legal 
possibility was the application for suspension of the time-limit for appeal against his sentence 
(istanza di rimessione in termini) pursuant to the provision of Art. 175. of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. But effectiveness of this legal remedy has been put to question given the 
fact that granting respective remedy was solely on the discretion of the Italian courts. In other 
words, offenders sentenced in absentia did not have any effective legal remedy against final 
judgements which originated in proceeding in which they were not taking any part. Istanza di 
rimessione in termini as one and only possible legal solution to question prior final judgement 
was completely put to the discretion of competent court who usually denied this remedy.  
 The Court determined a violation of the right to a fair trial pursuant to the Art. 6 of 
the Convention because Italy with legislative provisions regarding trial in absentia did not 
secure any possibility for the offenders to question final judgements. Substantially, there were 
no legal remedies for the offender’s disposal, and should they be arrested on the ground of 
e.g. international warrant they could only be put to prison in Italy for serving their sentence.  
 In order to meet the Convention’s standards, Italy underwent legislative and 
jurisprudential adjustments. From a legislative point of view, Italy adopted a new Code of 
Criminal Procedure improving the guarantees in case of in absentia proceedings. After 
respective legislative adjustments it became possible for the offenders to appeal against 
                                                 
331 F.C.B. v. Italy, application No. 12151/86, final judgement available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
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332 Ay Ali v. Italy, application No. 24691/04, final judgement available on French language at: 
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Pititto v. Italy, application No. 19321/03, final judgement available on French language at: 
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judgements rendered in absentia proceedings even if deadlines for appeal have expired.333 
From a jurisprudential point of view, the Court of Cassation after judgements of the Court in 
respective cases adjust its practice and “…reaffirmed the direct effect of the Convention and 
of the case-law of the European Court in Italian law…”334 
 From all presented case laws, we can easily determine a great influence and the 
authority of the Court in Italian legal system. Although particularly opposed to the 
Convention (which was determined on the basis of scientific literature), the every-day life of 
the Convention in Italian legal system secure meeting the Convention’s standards as required 
by the Court in its practice. As it has been with the case of the Republic of Croatia, 
amendments to the Italian Constitution have been made in order to meet the Convention’s 
standards which verifies once more the fact that the Convention and the Court’s judgements 
can even lead to the revision of the constitution – the most important political and legal 
document within one the Council of Europe member state.  
 This development and positioning the Convention in the Italian legal system as a part 
of constitutional matter was not straightforward and was challenged with severe legal 
obstacles (even from the Constitutional Court of Italy itself). Problems with application of the 
Convention in Italy, in general, has been related with formalistic approach regarding position 
of the Convention in hierarchy of legal norms given the fact that the Convention has been 
incorporated (as in the Federal Republic of Germany) with ordinary law of the Italian 
Parliament.335 But from two landmark decisions of the Constitutional Court of Italy from 
2007 it can be concluded that legal system in Italy accepted the fact that the Convention is a 
matter of constitutional significance where exact substantial content can be ascertained only 
in the conformity with the Court’s interpretation. Such obligation the Constitutional Court of 
Italy imposed on regular judiciary and on itself in 2009 emphasizing that “…the 
Constitutional Court itself is prevented from putting in discussion the interpretation that the 
European Court of Strasbourg, in its case law, has given to the ECHR.”336  
 Although facing with numerous problems in the process of execution of final 
judgements of the Court, we can conclude that Italy in general shifted its position on to 
general openness to the Convention and the Court’s case law. Such openness like in the case 
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(12.04.2019.) 
335 See P. Popelier, C. Van De Heyning, P. Van Nuffel, op.cit. (footnote 306), p. 273 – 282. 
336 Ibid, p. 283.  
209 
 
of the Federal Republic of Germany is generally well founded theoretical ground for 
construction of the particular constitutional law.  
 
 4.6. Republic of France 
 
 From the analysis of the Convention’s impacts within previous four states we could 
carefully determine that the Convention and especially the Court’s practice have particular 
propulsive effects on national legal orders of analyzed states. Fifth state of the Council of 
Europe which will be brought to our closer attention is the Republic of France – the state 
which introduced modern constitutionality to the European continent. From 1789 and 
onwards, the principle of national sovereignty as introduced in French constitutional reality 
with unavoidable principles of liberté, égalité, fraternité and semi-presidential type of 
government have served as model principles with great influence on all modern states which 
gained their independence after 1990 and the fall of the Berlin Wall.   
 Although the Republic of France was one of the original states which have signed the 
initial text of the Convention, the Convention entered on force in the Republic of France 
nearly 25 years later, on May 3rd 1974.337 But as it has been the case with previous four 
analyzed states, the Convention in France also assumed particular broader and extremely 
significant legal and constitutional effect.  
 
  4.6.1. Relevant constitutional and legislative provisions 
 
 Pursuant to the provisions of the French Constitution (Art. 55) treaties and agreements 
duly ratified or approved shall, upon publication, have an authority superior to statutes, 
provided that the relevant agreement or treaty is applied by the other party. As scientific 
research suggests, the French courts, on the other hand, presented particular opposition to 
apply the respective principle regarding the Convention. One decision of the French Conseil 
Constitutionnel from 1975 regarding constitutionality of particular statute clearly points out to 
such conclusion. Respective case has been dealing with abortion where the applicants claimed 
that possibility for abortion in French legal order would breach provision of the Art. 2 of the 
Convention, which prescribes the right to life. Constitutional judges in deliberation made a 
significant distinction between the controle de constitutionnalité (review of the 
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constitutionality) and controle de conventionnalité (review of the conventionality). While the 
review of the constitutionality is prescribed by the French Constitution to the Constitutional 
Council’s competence, the review of conventionality is not, for which reason the 
Constitutional Council is not able to invoke the Convention in the process of judicial review 
of the legislature as a binding constitutional source because in such case the Constitutional 
Council would go beyond its original constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction. For all stated 
reasons, the Constitutional Council did not mention the Convention in its decision and 
determined that the respective statute is constitutional on the basis of the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen from 1789.338 
 This, rather conservative, approach to the Convention continued and in 1978 Conseil 
d'Etat rendered its judgement rejecting the argument of the applicant based on the provision 
of Art. 6 of the Convention. The applicant was a doctor who appealed to the Conseil d'Etat 
and requested that his disciplinary sanction imposed on him by competent authority (French 
Chamber of Medicine) be set aside given the fact that he had not been judged publicly. The 
Conseil d'Etat rejected his argument based on the Convention and noted that the disciplinary 
proceedings and sanctions are not within the scope of applicability of the Art. 6 of the 
Convention. Within respective proceeding neither penal sanctions are imposed (only 
disciplinary) neither such proceeding can determine rights and obligations of civil nature.339  
 For effectivenes of the Convention within French legal order evolution of European 
public law based upon the Community Law has been of great importance. Evolution of the 
Community Law directly led to the recognition of the Convention on supra-legislative level. 
French court's reluctance to apply the Convention on supra-legislative level has been 
overcome after famous judgement in case of Administration des Douanes v. Société Jasques 
Vabre. In respective case the French Cour de Cassation determined that Article 95 of the EEC 
Treaty regarding prohibition of all barriers on competition must prevail over domestic 
legislative (statutory) provisions regulating taxation of imported coffee. The Cour de 
Cassation determined that „...the EEC Treaty was of a greater authority than both prior and 
subsequently enacted legislation, that it established its own legal system, which was 
incorporated into that of member states and, as a result of the specific characteristics of the 
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legal system created,certain of its norms were directly applicable to the nationals of member 
states and binding upon the domestic courts.“340 
 From this point onwards French courts have consistently followed the possibility of 
primacy of international law over domestic legislation which fact has been brought throghout 
the Community Law. On the basis of primacy of European public law the Convention also 
assumed directly applicable status within French legal system. „The Cour de Cassation has 
regularly mentioned the Convention in its rulings since 1975 and has even examined ex 
officio the compatibility of French provisions with it. The Conseil d'Etat, since 1989, has also 
accepted the direct effect of many Convention provisions. Both Courts are less reluctant to 
disapply national legislation in order to ensure the primacy and direct effect of European 
instruments, and in particular, the Convention.“341  
 As it is the case with the rulling of the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in so-called preventive detention case where the Federal Constitutional 
Court held that the Basic Law must be interpreted in a manner open to the provisions of the 
international law (völkerrechtsfreundlich), the French Constitution is also considered as a 
constitution open to the provisions of international law where provisions and principles of the 
Convention are integrated in bloc de constitutionnalité. For this reason, the French Conseil 
Constitutionel always takes into account the provisions of the Convention in the process of 
judicial review.342  
 Further scientific research also confirma this general acceptance of the Convention and 
the Court in France. French legislator as well as courts will set aside, declare null and void or 
disapply national law if conflict with the Convention arise. „French courts, when interpreting 
and applying ECHR provisions, refer to judgements or decisions of the EctHR almost 
standardly.“343  
 
  4.6.2. The Convention as a part of bloc de constitutionnalité 
  
 As it has been the case with previously analyzed member states, the already mentioned 
9th Annual Report on the Supervision of the Execution of Judgements and Decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights from the year 2015 stipulates particular beneficial effects of 
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the Court's judicial practice within the French legal order. Multiple legislative adjustments on 
the basis of the Court's final judgements against the Republic of France have been identified 
and noted as a positive example. As for the example, legal guarantees were improved 
regarding entry prohibitions, for which reason the Republic of France amended it's Code of 
entry and residence. Subsequent legislation has been adopted to ensure that appeals against 
prohibitions have an automatic suspensive effect. As regard to the right to a fair trial „A 
number of reforms have been adopted to improve the fairness of different types of 
proceedings, including: better reasons in Assize courts judgments, improved protection 
against self-incrimination as persons arrested or in detention are no longer compelled to 
testify under oath as witnesses with ensuing risks of perjury, improved guarantees of fairness 
when accused do not surrender to justice, including right to be represented by counsel and to 
lodge appeals, important changes of the procedure before the Court of Audit in 2009, changes 
in the organization of the supervisory authorities of the banking and insurance licensing 
preventing certain problems caused by the absence of clear separations between the functions 
of prosecution, investigation and sanction, better equality of arms in the evaluation of the 
value of expropriated lands between those expropriated and the Government 
Commissioner.“344 
 Beside all stated undertaken reforms, various additional legislative measures had been 
undertaken in order to secure reasonable time in civil and criminal proceedings and possibility 
to obtain compensation for unreasonably long proceedings has been legislatively granted.345 
 Also, in the case of the Republic of France, it has already been scientifically verified 
and determined that French legislation, as well as the judiciary, will without any problem 
adjust its practice or legislative framework practically immediately after ruling of the Court in 
particular case. “In principle, French ordinary courts tend to comply “spontaneously” with 
the ECtHR by following its case law and generally the judgements of the ECtHR lead to 
amendment of legislation if need be.”346 Although Conseil Constitutionnel has never been put 
in the position to decide about any conflict between the Convention and the French 
Constitution, the Conseil Constitutionnel will consider the Convention in the process of 
judicial review. As noted by the scholars, special characteristics of adjudication process 
before the Conseil Constitutionnel is that the Conseil will not indicate from which source of 
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international law was inspired in passing its decision. But “More and more frequently, it 
defines and interprets the rights and freedoms secured by the Constitution by reference – 
implicitly – to the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR.”347 
 Given the fact that scholars have already indicated “spontaneous” adjustments of the 
French courts and legislative to the Court’s judicial practice, it is not necessary to thoroughly 
analyze a particular case which has appeared before the Court like it has been the case with 
previously analyzed states. In the case of the Republic of France scientific research has 
already verified commitment of the French legal system to all necessary adjustments to the 
Court’s judicial practice. For that reason, we can utilize the previously verified facts in the 
context of our analysis.  
 As for the example of the Court’s impact we can emphasize three judgements of the 
Cour de Cassation from October 2010 where it has been specifically stated that the current 
French system of garde à vue (police custody) does not meet all necessary requirements 
pursuant to the Art. 6 of the Convention as interpreted by the Court. In order for the system of 
police custody to meet the necessary requirements, particular principles must be respected, i.e. 
the right to a lawyer should be restricted only in exceptional cases, detainees must be 
informed of their right to remain silent etc. The practice of the Conseil d’Etat is equally 
important and scholars have verified that the Conseil d’Etat also considers provisions of Art. 
6 of the Convention.348      
 Numerous additional examples of legislative and judicial adjustments for conformity 
with the Convention’s standards, as well as with the judicial practice of the Court, have been 
presented in contemporary research, as well as previous research regarding impacts of the 
Convention of French legal order.349 In all of respective analysis there is an undisputable fact 
that all four relevant political/judicial instances in France (the National Assembly, Conseil 
Constitutionnel, Conseil d’Etat and Cour de Cassastion) will perform any action which is 
deemed appropriate or demanded in order to meet the Convention’s standards, as interpreted 
and applied by the Court in its case law. This fact clearly presents sustainable argument that 
based upon the openness of the French Constitution to the provisions of international law the 
Convention incorporated in bloc de constitutionnalité will in any relevant case present 
significant legal source of domestic law but also, what is more important, relevant national 
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authorities will voluntarily adjust its practice to the judicial practice of the Court. And this 
process of adjustments will not be considered as any kind of attack on the national 
sovereignty.   
 Nevertheless, it has to be noted that in particular cases reluctance to the Convention 
made by French courts has been revealed. Although this fact is not of significant impact to the 
harmonization process and consequently particular constitutional law it has to be stated a fact.  
 E.g. the Court in case Asnar v. France stated that a magistrate’s statement must be 
communicated to the plaintiff even when no new element is contained in this statement. 
Subsequently, national administrative courts have not adjusted their practice with explanation 
that such extensive procedure could slow down proceedings without significant reason. In 
another example the Conseil d’Etat openly rejected requirements from the Court’s practice 
where the Court required that only doctor with medical certificate can be competent to 
compulsory hospitalize a person with mental disorder. The Conseil d’Etat on the contrary 
upheld its practice by which the Prefect can authorize an “expert doctor” to make such 
decision on hospitalization which expert doctor doesn’t need to have medical certificate. All 
this examples clearly indicate that French courts do not blindly follow the Court’s reasoning 
and sometimes will stand on national autonomous interpretation.350 
 Finally, and for the conclusion we can determine that in the case of France exist strong 
reliance on the Convention and the Court’s case law but there are examples in which national 
authorities deviated from the Court’s understandings and retained on national interpretative 
methods. Such deviation in particular cases still does not indicate open opposition to the 
Convention or the Court and any danger for the implementation of the Convention in France. 
“Moreover, it is clear that French courts have found ways to apply judgements of the 
European Court of Human Rights in order to duly comply with the Convention, without 
impending their own constitutional competences and without really limiting their judicial 
autonomy.”351 For this reason, France also can be indicated as prominent European state 
which is constructing the particular constitutional law in cooperation with the Court.   
  
 4.7. United Kingdom 
 
 We conclude our analysis regarding impacts of the Convention on national legal 
orders within selected states with United Kingdom – one of the oldest constitutional 
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democracies in the entire human legal and political history. United Kingdom is of interest for 
the analysis in the context of our dissertation given the fact that it has substantially different 
legal and political characteristics from all earlier presented states. United Kingdom is a 
constitutional democracy without written constitution, it has common-law based legal system, 
judges are creators of law, the doctrine of stare decisis is basic foundation for the 
effectiveness of legal system, the acts of Parliament are of supreme significance which cannot 
be overridden with any legal and political act of anyone except the Parliament itself, judicial 
system is extremely diversified etc.352 Given the fact that United Kingdom is also one of 
prominent constitutional democracies it can be of our interest to examine to what particular 
extent the Convention has impacts on judicial and legislative practice in United Kingdom. 
 The United Kingdom was one of first states which have signed the initial text of the 
Convention on November 4th 1950. Ratification in the Parliament took place on March 8th 
1951 and the Convention entered on force on September 3rd 1953.353 Based on the strict 
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty as well as on the strict dualistic approach in relation 
between domestic and international law, the Convention after ratification did not assume 
domestic status given the fact that for its domestic efficiency and application, the Parliament 
would first have to transform the Convention into domestic law by its own act. Such 
transformation in the case of Convention was not considered necessary due to the fact that at 
the time of ratification, the domestic authorities assumed that all domestic law is in 
conformity with the Convention. It was the view of the government that it was not necessary 
to transform the Convention into domestic law because all human rights and principles have 
already been protected by the domestic human right’s legal framework. For this reason, the 
Convention (even ratified) did not acquire any domestic status and was not applicable in 
proceedings before the courts. Nevertheless, on the basis of principle that the international law 
is also a part of internal law and that judiciary, considering all overriding effects of Acts of 
Parliament, must interpret legislation in a manner to avoid conflicts with international 
agreements ratified by United Kingdom (so-called rule of construction). On the basis of 
respective rule, the courts mentioned the Convention already in 1974.354 
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  4.7.1. Relevant constitutional and legislative provisions 
 
 As mentioned before, United Kingdom does not have written constitution like other 
analyzed states where fundamental legal and political essence of one state (protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, organization of state’s authority and relation 
between state and non-state individual) are entrenched in one particular document of supreme 
legal and political significance. Constitutional provisions are disseminated throughout various 
documents and Acts of Parliament of constitutional significance.  
Contemporary constitutional theory indicates that not even constitutional theory in 
United Kingdom has identical standpoint regarding sources of the constitutional law in United 
Kingdom. But the main sources of constitutional law are undoubtedly historical constitutional 
documents (e.g. Magna Charta Libertatum, Habeas Corpus Act and Act of Settlement etc.), 
statutes, common law, case law, constitutional conventions and Parliamentary Conventions.355  
As regard to the Convention, a crucial moment has occurred in 1998 when the 
Parliament passed the Human Rights Act. The Human Rights Act is an Act of Parliament 
specifically rendered “…to give further effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Convention. The Act does not simply give statutory recognition to an international treaty, it 
creates positive actionable rights based on human rights grounds.”356 
 With Human Rights Act of 1998 (entered on forcer on October 2nd 2000) the 
Convention assumed a domestic legal status and subsequently all legislation must be 
interpreted and applied in the framework set out by the Convention. Human Rights Act 
specifically imposes obligation on judges that in “…determining a question which has arisen 
in connection with a Convention right must take into account any 
(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human 
Rights, 
(b) opinion of the Commission given in a report adopted under Article 31 of the Convention, 
(c) decision of the Commission in connection with Article 26 or 27(2) of the Convention, or 
(d) decision of the Committee of Ministers taken under Article 46 of the Convention, 
whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the court or tribunal, it is relevant to the 
proceedings in which that question has arisen.”357 
                                                 
355 F. Grad, I. Kristan, A. Perenič: „Primerjalno ustavno pravo“, op.cit. (footnote 352), p. 17. 
356 D. Spielmann: „Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Systems of 
Europe“, in: M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 50), p. 1234. 
357 Section 2 of the Human Rights Act of 1998 with subsequent amendments, available at: 
 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/crossheading/introduction (12.04.2019.) 
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 Such unprecedented and explicit legislative provision gave to the Convention first-rate 
legislative meaning and created an obligation for all courts in United Kingdom to follow the 
legal understandings of the Court. For the process of judicial review, the respective Human 
Rights Act also enacted the possibility for a higher court to render a declaration on 
incompatibility which declaration is considered as notification to the Parliament that its own 
Act is not compatible with the provisions of the Convention. Although such declaration 
cannot revoke particular legislative provisions which have been determined incompatible with 
the Convention (the principle of the Parliamentary sovereignty) statistics have shown that the 
Parliament in most cases amended legislation on which courts have rendered declaration on 
incompatibility. In ten years from entering Human Rights Act on force (2000 – 2010) 26 
declaration of incompatibility have been submitted to the Parliament. Of 26 of them, 18 have 
become final and nearly all of them have been remedied with subsequent legislation of the 
Parliament.358 
 Although the state with prevailing principle of Parliamentary sovereignty United 
Kingdom implemented the Convention throughout subsequent legislature and practically 
positioned the Convention as a source of domestic constitutional law.  
 
  4.7.2. The Convention and the mirror principle 
 
 Given the fact that the Parliament transformed the Convention in domestic legal order 
with the Human Rights Act with specific instructions to the courts to conform to the 
Convention and the Court’s practice and legal understandings, it is of no surprise that impacts 
of the Convention to the legal order of the United Kingdom have been severe. As it was in the 
case of the Republic of France, scholars have already thoroughly examined and verified 
particular domestic judgements which have been under the influence of the Convention or the 
Court. For this reason, we can utilize those verifications in the context of our dissertation. 
Respective 9th Annual Report on the Supervision of the Execution of Judgements and 
Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights from the year 2015 also indicate to what 
extent the Court’s judgements have influenced domestic judicial practice regarding all 
provisions of the Convention. The Report brings various adjustments in domestic legal order 
after a final judgement has been rendered by the Court. “New criminal legislation was 
adopted in 2010 in England and Wales as well as in Scotland, making the holding of a person 
                                                 
358 D. Spielmann: „Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Systems of 
Europe“, in: M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 50), p. 1235. 
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in slavery or servitude or requiring the person to perform forced or compulsory labor a 
criminal offence. 
Specific provisions were included in the Data Protection Act 1998 and supplemented by the 
Information Commissioners CCTV Code in 2008 to limit the retention and to restrict 
disclosure of images to third parties. Legislation requiring the destruction of the vast majority 
of DNA profiles gathered from persons in respect of whom charges had been dropped or who 
had been acquitted entered into force in 2013. The broad powers granted the police notably 
through the right to issue so called “Stop and search orders” were circumscribed by new 
legislation in 2012 which only allows stop and search of peoples and vehicles without special 
suspicion in exceptional circumstances (where a senior police officer reasonably suspects that 
an act of terrorism will take place and the measure is necessary to prevent the act).”359 
 Respective survey covers only a small fragment of all measures which have been 
undertaken in order to meet the Convention’s standards in legislative framework as well as for 
proper execution of final judgements of the Court. Interestingly, scholars verified that the 
Convention had influence on judges within the United Kingdom even prior enactment of the 
Human Rights Act. First case was the case of Waddington v. Miah in 1974 where particular 
provisions of section 34, paragraph 1 of the 1971 Immigration Act were disputable from the 
Convention’s standpoints as regard to the prohibition on retrospective penal legislation. The 
Court of Appeal together with the House of Lords (which acted as the Supreme Court of 
United Kingdom until 2009 constitutional reform when newly constructed Supreme Court for 
the United Kingdom assumed competence from House of Lords), made reference to the 
provision of Art. 7 of the Convention on prohibition of retrospective penal legislation.360 
Respective case was considered as regard to the international obligations of the United 
Kingdom given the fact that the Convention has been ratified, but did not in that time have 
direct applicability in United Kingdom. 
 In Birdi v. Secretary of State for Homme Affairs from 1975 Lord Denning stated that 
all acts of Parliament should be in conformity with the Convention’s provisions and should 
act of Parliament contravene to the Convention’s provisions judges could hold the particular 
act as invalid. There have been numerous additional examples prior to the Human Rights Act 
where provisions of the Convention have been consulted or cited even in the Northern Ireland 
and Scotland. (e.g. Ahmad v. Inner London Education Authority from 1978 or R. v. Deery 
                                                 
359 9th Annual Report on the Supervision of the Execution of Judgements and Decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights from the year 2015, op.cit. (footnote 280), p. 51.  
360 A.Z. Drzemczewski: „European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law – A Comparative Study“, op.cit. 
(footnote 140), p. 179 – 180.  
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from 1977). From early analysis of the Convention’s impact within legal order of the United 
Kingdom it has been noted that “…it is undeniable that this instrument has had a substantial 
impact upon the UK: changes have been made in prison rules (Knechtl, Golder); immigration 
procedures have been ameliorated (Alam, Khan, the East African Asian cases); certain 
interrogation techniques used with detainees in Northern Ireland have been abandoned 
(Ireland v. UK); compensation has been paid for various degrees of administrative 
miscarriages of justice (Amekrane, A. v. UK); the Contempt of Court Act 1981 has been 
enacted, in order, among other reasons, to comply with the Strasbourg Court’s judgement in 
the Sunday Times case…”361 
 Such brave consideration of the Convention’s provisions prior to the enactment of the 
Human Rights Act in 2000 continued, and after the enactment of the Human Rights Act 
propulsive effects of the Court assumed an even wider scope of applicability. Given the fact 
that provisions of the Human Rights Act clearly impose an obligation on judges to conform to 
the Court’s case law, it is of no surprise that only a small number of application against 
United Kingdom before the Court are declared admissible and finished with final judgement 
of the Court against the United Kingdom. One research conducted in 2012 clearly confirms 
such argument. “Of all the applications lodged against the UK, a very small percentage 
passes the initial threshold of admissibility. Between 1999 and 2010, only around three per 
cent of applications allocated for a decision were declared admissible. This trend has been 
consistent over time, as the figure is about the same for the period 1966-2010. The vast 
majority of cases, then, are declared inadmissible or struck out (for example, because they 
are found to be ‘manifestly ill-founded’). Figures for 2011 indicate a downward trend in the 
proportion of applications lodged against the UK which are declared admissible. In 2011, 
less than two per cent of applications allocated for a decision were declared admissible. The 
UK has a very low ‘rate of defeat’ at Strasbourg. Of all the applications brought against the 
UK and allocated for a decision (i.e. before the admissibility stage), only 1.8 per cent 
eventually result in a judgment finding at least one violation. Put another way, the UK ‘loses’ 
only around one in fifty cases brought against it in Strasbourg.”362 
 It is clear that pursuant to the provisions of the Human Rights Act the United 
Kingdom endorse reasoning of the Court as valid constitutional reasoning within United 
Kingdom’s constitutional system. Although based upon the principle of the Parliamentary 
                                                 
361 Ibid, p. 186 – 187. 
362 A. Donald, J. Gordon, P. Leach: „The UK and the European Court of Human Rights“, Human Rights and 
Social Justice Research Institute, London Metropolitan University, 2012, p. 34 – 35; available at: 
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/83._european_court_of_human_rights.pdf (12.04.2019.) 
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sovereignty, United Kingdom didn’t raise any objections regarding implementing the 
Convention in domestic legal order. In the light that only small number of applications lodged 
against the United Kingdom lead to final judgement of the Court with determination of 
violation of particular provisions of the Convention, we can fully confirm statement of Lord 
Bingham stated in the case of Ullah v. Special Adjudicator from 2004 where he “…expressed 
the view that, absent good reasons to the contrary, a claimant in a British court can expect to 
obtain the same result as he or she would in Strasbourg: no more, but certainly no less.”363 
 This so-called mirror principle demands that application of law in domestic legal 
reality meet requirements of the Convention and its standards. But also, particular reluctance 
to blindly apply the Court’s judicial practice is also visible in the case of the United Kingdom. 
In some cases, supreme judicial authority in United Kingdom deviated from the Court’s 
reasoning due to the special circumstances of the case concerned. In particular, House of 
Lords has held that application of the Convention can be avoided if domestic court considers 
that the Court has misunderstood or been misinformed about some aspect of English law. 
Lord Hoffman stated such exculpation possibility in case R v. Lyons.364 Nevertheless, it can be 
determined that as it comes to the United Kingdom, Supreme Court and the Court are 
developing mutual dialogue in particular cases where the Court also can response 
constructively to concerns raised at the national level and consider all national particularities 
(within the doctrine of margins of appreciation).365  
 Respective mirror principle by which the applicant can expect to obtain same level of 
legal protection as it would be obtained by the Court also raised question of the necessity of 
the Human Rights Act and the Convention itself. In continuously developing common law 
environment judges indicated that they would come to the same decisions in particular cases 
like the Court even if there would not be the Human Rights Act that compels them to abide by 
the case law of the Court “…and in a recent interview the Deputy President of the UK 
Supreme Court implied that if the HRA were to be repealed it might not make much difference 
because the common law could still protect Convention rights.”366 
 Although it would be too excessive to determine that the United Kingdom has reached 
total level of harmonization with the Court it is quite intrigue that representatives of the 
highest judicial authority in the United Kingdom consider that common law system has 
                                                 
363 D. Spielmann: „Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Systems of 
Europe“, in: M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 50), p. 1244 – 1245. 
364 J. Gerards and J. Fleuren (ed.), op.cit. (footnote 2), p. 322 – 323. 
365 Ibid, p. 323. 
366 P. Popelier, C. Van De Heyning, P. Van Nuffel, op.cit. (footnote 306), p. 356. 
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developed in such manner that make the Convention for daily life of human rights protection 
unnecessary. Nevertheless, and for the context of our dissertation, even challenged with 
particular deviations from the Court’s practice the Convention in the United Kingdom is 
placed within the very essence of the common law (which fact is confirmed by the Deputy 
President of the UK Supreme Court himself) and is continuously developing in dialogue with 
the Court. For this reason and despite the fact that the United Kingdom is common law legal 
system, development of common standards harmonized with the Court’s understandings is 
ongoing reality and for which reason our theoretical concept of the particular constitutional 
law can also be confirmed. Minor setbacks and deviations from the Court’s reasoning don’t 
have significant influence on the existence of common standards and harmonization process 
which is main element for the construction of our new theoretical concept.  
 
 4.8. Conclusion 
 
 As it has been stated in the Introductory overview of this Chapter (sub-chapter 4.1.) 
the idea of this Chapter was to display impacts of the Convention in domestic legal order of 
six selected member states of the Council of Europe. Impacts of the Convention have been 
analyzed from the view of legislative and jurisprudential adjustments which were made in 
order to meet standards guaranteed by the Convention and reasoned by the Court in particular 
cases which have been raised under the procedural provisions of the Convention. 
 As it has been presented, impacts of the Court’s judgements within domestic legal 
orders were significant: in the Republic of Croatia led to the revision and amendments of the 
Croatian Constitution, in the Republic of Slovenia the judgement of the Court in the case of 
Ališić and others v. Slovenia led to new financial obligations of the state’s budget to the 
individuals, in Federal Republic of Germany the Federal Constitutional Court adjust its 
practice and what was prior to the Court’s judgement within the rule of law after the 
judgement of the Court is not anymore which fact led to the revision of the constitutional 
standpoints on the rule of law in the practice of the Federal Constitutional Court. Although 
Italy is commonly used as an example where severe problems exist regarding implementation 
of the Court’s judgement, we have determined that judgements of the Court can lead to the 
revision of the Italian Constitution. The Republic of France and its openness to the provisions 
of the Convention led to the conclusion of scholars that French legislature and judiciary will 
spontaneously adjust its legislative and jurisprudential framework in order to meet and 
properly execute final judgements of the Court. Finally, even in the case of United Kingdom 
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which political system is based solely upon the principle of the Parliamentary sovereignty, the 
Parliament, as well as the courts, tend to comply with the reasoning of the Court and Human 
Rights Act specifically impose obligation to follow the Court’s jurisprudence.  
 In a broad-spectrum sense we can state that one particular international agreement 
takes all necessary effects in national legal orders and is without the doubt of a great 
constitutional significance. Every time when the Court rules that violation of particular human 
right set out in the Convention has been infringed by a respondent state that in the same time 
mean that respondent state in domestic legal proceedings interpreted and applied particular 
constitutional and the Convention’s provision in rather conservative, narrow sense. The Court 
then stands as a final arbitrator on an international level who will expand the scope of 
applicability of particular human right on new particular case. When a respondent state duly 
and properly executes the Court’s final judgement (with required legislative and 
jurisprudential adjustments) this fact, at the same time, means that the constitutional law 
within a particular respondent state assumed a particular and rather extensive content under 
direct influence of the Court and its judgement. Argumentum a contrario, if the Court did not 
render its judgement, the scope of applicability of particular constitutional or the 
Convention’s human right would stay limited under the conservative interpretation and 
application passed by the domestic judicial authorities. But if the Court finds a violation of 
particular human right prescribed by the Convention, after necessary legislative and 
jurisprudential adjustments on national level national constitutional law will assume 
particularly extended content with the meaning that social relations and/or social situations 
which previously were not under the protection of particular human right set out in the 
national constitution after direct influence of the Court will become protected in subsequent 
legislative and jurisprudential actions. 
 This Chapter presented and verified that final judgements of the Court in particular 
cases led to subsequent compliance of domestic judicial and legislative practice with the 
Court’s practice. This fact is very important for the introduction of our new theoretical 
concept. Nevertheless, and once more, we must not stay on pure idealistic position and claim 
that the Court and its practice have supreme influence in any case. All presented adjustments 
in national legal framework in order to meet the demands set out in the Court’s final 
judgement are only one side or one part of the Convention’s Janus. There is also a second part 
or another side of the Convention’s impacts by which we can also determine major structural 
problems in the process of execution of final judgements of the Court for which reason the 
execution of the Court’s judgements is prolonged for years in particular member states (e.g. 
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Italy and Ukraine). In the case of United Kingdom there is also a growing debate to what 
particular extent should domestic courts follow and apply jurisprudence of the Court 
especially in those cases where judgements of the Court are too unclear to implement which 
fact is put to a discretion of domestic courts. Particular opposition to the Court’s case-law can 
also be determined in the case of R v. Horncastle and others (Appellants) (on appeal from the 
Court of Appeal Criminal Division)367 where the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 
directly deviated from the practice of the Court regarding anonymous witnesses and took 
standpoint that the Court’s “…case law appeared to have been developed largely in cases 
relating to the civil law without full consideration of the safeguards against an unfair trial 
that exist under the common law procedure.”368 Finally, as the latest example of deviating 
from the human rights framework established by the Convention and the Court we can 
emphasize the position of the Russian Federation regarding execution of particular 
judgements in domestic legal order. In particular cases the Russian Federation and its 
Constitutional Court specifically denied the possibility of execution of final judgement of the 
Court with explanation that executing of final judgement of the Court would violate the 
Russian Constitution.369  
 For all stated reasons, we must not observe the Court’s impacts on national legal 
orders with idealistic eyes and note that mutual communication and understandings between 
relevant state authorities of the Council of Europe member states and the Court is not 
straightforward and is related to various obstacles and particular oppositions to the Court and 
its autonomous interpretation of the Convention’s rights and principles. But in any case, all 
presented beneficial effects have a well founded theoretical ground for a systematical 
presentation of one new theoretical concept which will be presented in the next and final 
Chapter of the dissertation.   
 Prior to this task and for the conclusion of this data-driven Chapter which is utilized 
for verification of the existence of the concept of the particular constitutional law, we can also  
point out to the following facts. The concept of the particular constitutional law is a 
                                                 
367 Available at the official website of the Supreme Court of United Kingdom:  
https://www.supremecourt.uk/decided-cases/docs/UKSC_2009_0073_Judgment.pdf (11.09.2018.) 
368 D. Spielmann: „Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Systems of 
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theoretical concept evolving in the human rights arena across the Council of Europe. It is 
evolving each time when the Court determines violation of the Convention and the Committee 
of Ministers adopt final resolution which contains confirmation that respondent state actually 
fulfilled its obligation under the provision of the Art. 46 of the Convention. Prior to the 
adoption of such resolution, respondent state to which final judgement of the Court is 
addressed will undertake general or individual measures in order to fulfil its obligation on full 
execution of the final judgement of the Court. What particular measure will be undertaken by 
a respondent state is a matter of internal law of respective state and states possess particular 
margin of appreciation in execution process. But from the case of Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy 
the Court itself instituted the obligation of respondent states that in the process of execution of 
the Court’s final judgements undertake general and individual measures beyond financial 
retributions that are awarded by the Court.370 Generale measures that can be applied in order 
to rectify infringed human rights and fundamental freedoms are amendments to the 
legislature, changes of judicial and administrative practice, publication and dissemination of 
judgements of the Court (for direct application of the Court’s legal understandings in 
domestic proceedings), practical measures (material acts) like appointment of judges (in cases 
where small number of judges in particular contracting state cannot administer justice within  
reasonable time which fact leads to infringement of the right to a fair trial) or construction of 
new prisons that improve living conditions of persons convicted on prison sentence or 
specialization of police officers etc. Individual measures that can be undertaken in order to 
rectify infringed human rights determined by the Court are e.g. finalization of the national 
proceeding where violation of the right to a fair trial (within reasonable time) has been 
determined, special refunds, special individual measures like transfer to adequate prison cell, 
modifications in criminal records (deletion of criminal charges). In the case of R.R. and others 
v. Hungary (2012) the Court itself issued specific individual measure that must be applied in 
order to secure identity of the applicants (i.e. to rectify determined violation of the 
Convention). In respective case, Hungarian authorities granted to the applicants status of 
collaborators of justice in actions against international organized crime (drug trafficking). But 
Hungarian authorities excluded applicants from the witness protection program without 
verification that the applicants are no longer in danger. Furthermore, the Hungarian 
authorities did not undertake all necessary actions for the protection of applicants’ lives so the 
                                                 
370 By which action the Court actually limited margin of appreciation of Italy in the execution process and 
pointed to measures that must be undertaken in order for full and proper execution of the Court's final judgement 
in respective case. For more regarding limitations in the execution process of the Court's final judgement 
(especially regarding consequential orders) see supra, p. 158.  
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Court ruled that all necessary protection must be provided to the applicants (including full 
identity protection) until verification that such measures are no longer required. It must also 
be noted that violation of the Convention can be committed not only with insufficient 
domestic legislature but also (more oftenly) with judicial and administrative practice 
(insufficient interpretation and application of the domestic law and the Convention in national 
legal framework) where changes of the respective practice is practically the only way to 
rectify infringed human rights (and execute the Court’s final judgement). In cases where 
domestic courts adjust their practice with the practice of the Court in order to fulfil the 
Convention’s demands, domestic courts make final judgements of the Court directly 
enforceable by virtue of their domestic law which happens in contemporary time in almost all 
of the Council of Europe member states.371 Final judgements of the Court are translated and 
disseminated throughout the domestic judicial and administrative system in order to 
familiarize domestic judges and administrative personel with the legal understandings of the 
Court and consequently adjust domestic practice to the practice of the Court.372  
 All respective general and individual measures, actual material acts, revision of current 
procedures and implementation of new procedures in domestic legal framework are leading to 
the ultimate goal – to rectify infringed human rights guaranteed by the Convention, fully and 
properly execute final judgement of the Court and harmonize domestic legal framework with 
the Convention as reasoned and applied by the Court. These actions on harmonization (as 
presented in respective Chapter IV within selected contracting states) on general level are 
leading to the construction of one supranational human rights system which we are addressing 
as the particular constitutional law. Finally one additional (not legal but political) condition 
for the construction of respective concept must also be added in the analysis. All analysed 
states are liberal states open to the influence of the international law regarding protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. All analysed states have liberal, modern and 
democratic constitution and are positioning human rights on high constitutional level of 
protection. Such general political characteristic must be mentioned given the fact that it is also 
one of general requirement for the construction of particular constitutional law. If general 
domestic political environment is in favour for human rights awareness, such political 
environment will be beneficial for the propulsive actions of one supranational human rights 
court. But if domestic political environment is struggling with internal authoritarian 
tendencies of particular political groups or individuals or if political institutions are 
                                                 
371 J. Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 315 – 322.  
372 Like in the case of Craxi No.2 v. Italy. See supra, p. 205. 
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monopolized and don’t have necessary independence for perfoming their constitutional duties, 
in such political environment the respective concept will not be able to develop. In such state 
propulsive actions of the Court will be seen as the attack on the national sovereignty and not 
as an expansion of the human rights framework. In such states political institutions will 
openly defy to the Convention’s obligation on full execution of the Court’s final judgement 
and will consider actions that can prevent execution of final judgements of the Court. This 
political prerequisite is also the main condition for the development of the concept. Only in 
those democratic and liberal states where general awareness and commitment to the human 
rights protection is on high political and constitutional level, the concept of the particular 
constitutional law can evolve in harmonization with the Court and the Council of Europe.373 
But in those states where commitment to the human rights protection is generally proclaimed 
but in the same time is not effectively guaranteed in practice and where political institutions 
are not independent and limited by law, in such states deviation from the concept can be 
determined. General liberal political surroundings with wide social awareness on the 
importance of the human rights and their protection is equally important (political) demand 
for construction and evolution of the concept of the particular constitutional law. For this 
reason, the concept and the strength of the particular constitutional law is not on the same 
level across the Council of Europe member states. In those states where general political 
liberal environment is beneficial for human rights development, the particular constitutional 
law will be easier to determine. But in those states where authoritarian or illiberal political 
tendencies are trying to reduce or level down human rights framework, the concept of the 
particular constitutional law will be weaker or even impossible to determine.374  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
373 For similar approach in the case of the Organization of American States and the system based upon the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights see D. A. Gonzalez-Salzberg: „Do States comply with the compulsory 
judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights? An empirical study of the compliance with 330 
measures of reparation“, Revista do Instituto Brasileiro de Direitos Humanos, 13, p. 27. Available at: 
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374 For illiberal tendencies in human rights framework see supra, p. 71 (footnote 78). For open defiance to the 
Court's final judgement and obligation on execution under the provisions of the Convention see infra, p. 246 
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5. PARTICULAR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS A THEORETICAL CONCEPT 
AND THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT 
 
 After we have successfully presented contemporary theoretical content and concept of 
constitutional law (Chapter II), analyzed normative, historical and contemporary aspects of 
human rights system based upon the Convention and the judicial practice of the Court 
(Chapter III), impacts of the Convention on legal order of selected member states of the 
Council of Europe (Chapter IV), in this final Chapter of the dissertation the primary task will 
be to round up all verified arguments in one coherent unity. 
 On the basis of previously stated arguments as well as with the logical principle of 
induction and conclusion a minori a maius, this chapter will present main theoretical 
determinants of new theoretical concept which is addressed as the particular constitutional 
law. As working presumption and definition for further verification in this Chapter particular 
constitutional law can be defined as totality of all norms and principles which are derived 
from the Convention and affiliated legal sources (Rules of Court) and which regulate human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as prescribed by the Convention and are applied by the 
Court in particular cases where such norms and principles throughout the process of 
execution of final judgements enter in domestic legal orders of the Council of Europe member 
states with harmonization consequences. In the very core of respective theoretical definition is 
the Court as main institutional provider of interpretation and application of the Convention in 
(legislative and judicial) practice of the Council of Europe member states. The particular 
constitutional law is a coherent legal system based upon the Convention as independent legal 
source which is applied on the basis of independent and autonomous judicial practice of the 
Court. By aggregating all presented impacts of the Convention in legal orders of the member 
states on one theoretical level and taking into account the expansions of human rights 
protection which have been initiated solely on the basis of the Court’s practice – the totality of 
respective impacts and expansions in human rights framework is the particular constitutional 
law, i.e. one independent and autonomous legal framework devoted to the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms which are a substantial part of contemporary 
constitutional law. This legal framework is not separated from member states and is evolving 
in continuous communication between the Court, the Council of Ministers and competent 
authorities of member states.  
 Every time when the Court determines that a violation of particular provision of the 
Convention has occurred, by implementing the Court’s legal understandings in domestic 
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legislative and judicial practice, the domestic constitutional legal framework will assume a 
particular extensive context. This extension in protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms on the basis of the Court’s ruling is a substantial part of the particular constitutional 
law. First of all, without rulings of the Court the subsequent legislative and jurisprudential 
adjustments would not have been made and domestic constitutional law would retain on 
domestic constitutional framework without any exogenous interference. With the Court and 
its autonomous rulings as well as with subsequent adjustments in constitutional framework in 
order to meet standards prescribed by the Convention and reasoned by the Court, all the 
Council of Europe member states have a common institutional link on a supranational level 
which connects all of domestic legal order in one new theoretical framework. This framework 
is autonomous, independent and is evolving on daily basis. But this framework can be 
effective only in relation to readiness of member states on implementing its norms and 
principles in domestic legal order. Without such readiness, respective framework in which 
human rights are evolving on international/transnational/supranational level would stay 
merely a concept. But from the analysis concluded in Chapter IV we can verify that this 
theoretical framework introduced on supranational level (proceedings before the Court) is 
transported in domestic legal orders of the member states throughout the process of execution 
of the Court’s final judgement. This transportation in domestic legal orders by way of 
adjustments in legislature and judiciary secures effectiveness of the system and allows 
scholars to round up all system in one coherent legal framework.  
 Each time when the Court determines a violation of particular human right prescribed 
by the Convention this fact in the same time mean that the Court expanded the scope of 
applicability of particular human right prescribed by the Convention as well as the national 
constitution. It has been noted that internationalization of constitutional law can be 
constructed given the fact that provisions regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the Convention and in national constitutions are normatively and grammatically similar if 
not even identical. The proceedings before the Court are possible only if all domestic legal 
remedies have been exhausted, which means that applicant prior to the application under the 
Convention has lodged his/her constitutional complaint to national constitutional court. If an 
applicant eventually lodges his/her application under the provisions of the Convention, it 
indicates that the national constitutional court rejected applicant’s constitutional complaint 
and determined that no violation of constitutionally guaranteed human rights or fundamental 
freedoms have occurred in proceedings before ordinary courts. But if the Court eventually 
finds that a violation of a particular human right prescribed by the Convention (which is 
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normatively and grammatically similar or even identical to the provisions of that same or 
other human right prescribed by the national constitutions) has occurred, it clearly indicates 
that the Court expanded the scope of applicability of particular human right on those cases 
which are not covered by national constitutions or reasoning of national constitutional courts. 
Given the fact that member states must execute the final judgement of the Court with all 
required legislative and jurisprudential methods at their disposal it can be reasonably expected 
that in all future similar cases national authorities will expand scope of applicability pursuant 
to the reasoning of the Court rendered in its previous final judgements. This is indicative of 
the fact that on an international level and under the influence of the Court, a new legal 
framework of human rights protection is evolving and is governed by the authority and 
jurisprudence of the Court, a legal framework we are addressing as the particular 
constitutional law. 
 
 5.1. Is it really a (constitutional) law? 
 
 As it has also been previously noted, the fact that on European level particular new 
human rights legal framework is evolving on the basis of the Convention and the Court’s 
impact on domestic legal orders has also been previously verified by the contemporary theory 
of constitutional law. As previously stated, the law based upon the Convention is addressed 
also as the Strasbourg’s acquis, the Convention is considered as a part of broader European 
constitutional architecture or as partial constitution in broader European legal framework or 
even as a shadow constitution.375 As presented, contemporary constitutional theory already 
verified the existence of particular qualitatively independent and autonomous human rights 
framework in the European legal area. This framework can also be considered as the 
European human rights law where the process of achieving respective European human rights 
law is addressed as the harmonization or even europeization process. All of respective 
analyses and definitions are, of course, true and accurate. The law based upon the Convention 
is really a partial constitution in broader European legal framework as well as it is a shadow 
constitution etc.  
 But all of those definitions and analysis do not rely upon the fundamental theoretical 
essence of the Convention and its impacts – that the law based upon the Convention is a 
constitutional law. Our analysis is governed by the essence of theoretical characteristics of the 
                                                 
375 See supra, p. 118.  
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contemporary constitutional law and the possibility to construct constitutional framework on 
the basis of the Convention and its impacts from a pure theoretical aspects. From the analysis 
concluded in Chapter II we have verified that constitutional law has two main theoretical 
definitions. The first, so-called “big-c” constitutional law is the law contained in a written and 
codified constitution with three special characteristic: it is supreme, entrenched and enforced 
throughout the judicial review. The second theoretical definition of the constitutional law is 
that it is the subpart of the aggregate body of rules, practices and understandings determining 
the actual allocation of power. Related to respective definitions, in broader sense 
constitutional law is also addressed as the entire body of fundamental rules that govern 
particular socio-political entity.376  
 If respective theoretical definitions would be applied in the case of the Convention, an 
absolute applicability and conformity can be determined. The Convention is a written and 
codified document from which emanate aggregate body of rules, practices and 
understandings. The system based upon the Convention is also consisted of body of 
fundamental rules that governs particular socio-political entity (the Council of Europe 
member states). If we aggregate all rules and principles which have been applied by the Court 
in cases presented in Chapter IV of the dissertation we would come to the verification of the 
Convention and case law of the Court as the constitutional law. 
 In any case, the process of meeting the Convention’s standards as applied by the Court 
in particular proceedings can also be addressed as harmonization or europeization process 
which process is leading to a uniformed and coherent legal framework within the Council of 
Europe member states. This legal framework is the European constitutional architecture or 
European human rights law etc. But from the theoretical point of view, it is also a 
constitutional law – a special and independent coherent legal system constructed on an 
international level which has all the required characteristics in order to be considered as 
constitutional law, i.e. it has written and codified document from which emanates an 
aggregate body of rules, practices and understandings. Given the fact that contemporary 
constitutional theory also verified that relevant sources of constitutional law (from substantial 
and procedural point of view) can also be found in international agreements (what the 
Convention undoubtedly is) by virtue of that fact our new system can also be constructed. 
 Furthermore, our new theoretical framework is based upon the Convention which is a 
part of international conventional law and for which reason it also must be analyzed what is 
                                                 
376 See supra, p. 63 – 64. 
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relation between the particular constitutional law and (general) international law or (in 
particular) international human rights law. International law generally is defined as the totality 
of legal norms which are contained in international agreements or international customary law 
and which regulate relations between states or between states and international organizations. 
International law consists from various international agreements and customs, which have 
through time become law.377 International law can consist of various international agreements 
and customs, which can regulate various relations between states and between states and 
international organizations (e.g. international agreements on avoiding double taxation, on 
health and social security issues, on cultural cooperation and on protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms). Given the fact that the Convention is an international agreement, 
which regulates relations between the Council of Europe member states (as well as between 
the Council of Europe as international organization and particular member state) by imposing 
obligations on the member state for effective realization and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms prescribed by the Convention itself, the Convention is a part of 
(general) international law. On the other hand, the Convention is substantially addressed to 
the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms which fact positions the Convention 
in sub-part of general international law, i.e. international human rights law. For the purposes 
of this analysis, we will define international human rights law as the set of legal rules, which 
derive from international law and are substantially addressed to the protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. These legal rules can have source in international agreements and 
in international customary law. But such (pure normative) theoretical definition by which the 
Convention (and correlated theoretical concept of particular constitutional law) is only a part 
of general international law or a sub-part of international human rights law is accurate, of 
course, but does not reveal or combine all subsequent effects of the Convention. In other 
words, respective normative definition does not fully reveal all legal characteristics of the 
system based upon the Convention. Although the Convention is a part of international (human 
rights) law it is also the fundamental legal source for realization and development of the 
particular constitutional law. The system based upon the Convention is substantially a 
constitutional law because it is addressed on the protection and realization of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, which are an inherent part of constitutional law in general. The 
Convention and the system for the protection of the Convention’s human rights has developed 
in the past 60 years in such manner that it in nowadays has autonomous environment in which 
                                                 
377 J. Andrassy et.al, op.cit. (footnote 129), p. 1. 
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human rights and fundamental freedoms are continuously developing. Although a part of 
international human rights law or international conventional law or international law in 
general, the Convention and the Court have initiated development of new standards in human 
rights protection which are unprecedented in legal and political history. All this developments 
would be only an idealistic view on contemporary human rights if respondent states would 
fail to apply such standards in domestic legal orders pursuant to the final judgements of the 
Court. Effectiveness on execution of final judgements of the Court has same meaning in 
introduction of particular constitutional law as the activism of the Court in the line of 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Democratic foundation of majority of 
the Council of Europe member states and commitment to the human rights and their 
protection is main political aspect of the construction of the particular constitutional law. We 
can conclude that the Convention is in general a part of international human rights law, but it 
is also the most important legal source and the foundation of new theoretical concept (the 
particular constitutional law). This concept is within the margins of constitutional law because 
it is substantially addressed to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
which are in general theoretical sense an inalienable part of constitutional law.  
 In previous analysis regarding constitutional law we utilized common theoretical 
distinctions within one legal branch between substantial and procedural constitutional law. 
Identical methodological approach can be used in the case of particular constitutional law.    
 
  5.1.1. Substantial elements  
 
 As stated, the law based upon the Convention is a constitutional law. It has all 
necessary theoretical requirements to be considered as the constitutional law. As stated in 
Chapter II of the dissertation, constitutional law can be divided and analyzed (as well as all 
other legal branches) from substantial and procedural point of view. Within substantial 
elements of the constitutional law, theory has already verified that, substantially, 
constitutional law is addressed to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
organization of state’s authority and relation between the state and non-state individual. The 
fact that the Convention is related to the human rights and fundamental freedoms is generally 
known and already mentioned and verified in this analysis. But what differentiates our new 
concept of constitutional law based upon the Convention from all other “national” 
constitutional law is visible from the fact that substantial elements of the constitutional law 
based upon the Convention (provisions of the Convention related to the protection of human 
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rights and fundamental freedoms) are evolving independently of national constitutional law 
and national constitutional courts. Scope of applicability of particular human rights provision 
set out in the Convention is determined solely on the basis of the Court’s reasoning without 
any interference by the national constitutional texts or national authorities (the principle of 
autonomous interpretation of the Convention’s provisions) although normative and 
grammatical similarity between those provisions clearly exists and has already been verified. 
To such extent, theory of constitutional law emphasized that the Court’s reasoning in 
application of particular provision of the Convention can also be over-expanding.378     
 We can conclude that within this particular, special and independent coherent legal 
framework based upon the Convention which can be identified as constitutional law in any 
possible sense, independent and autonomous substantial elements are evolving regardless of 
national constitutional provisions and/or interpretative methods of national constitutional 
courts. As independent theoretical concept it has own and independent substantial elements. 
These elements are clearly visible in relation to the human rights and fundamental freedoms 
as protected by the Convention given the fact that respective rights have substantial meaning 
as rendered by the Court, and not national constitutional authorities.  
 On the other hand, from the case law analysis conducted in Chapter IV we have 
determined that adjustments which have been performed in the Croatian constitutional order 
after the judgement in the case Olujić v. Croatia were made on the constitutional level. In 
particular, the consequence of final judgement in case Olujić v. Croatia was revision of the 
Croatian Constitution in order to secure fairness in the proceedings before the National 
Judicial Council. The National Judicial Council is substantially a part of the organization of 
the Croatian state’s authority, and despite that fact the ruling of the Court in respective case 
led to revision of the position of the National Judicial Council on constitutional level. This 
fact also confirms the position of the Convention within the constitutional law (rules 
regarding organization of state’s authority). Although respective case originated within 
violation of human rights (right to a fair trial) impacts of the Court’s judgement in respective 
case led to the revision of the organization of state’s authority (in broader sense).  
 From substantial point of view, particular constitutional law possesses other necessary 
characteristics in order to be considered as the law or legal system based upon the law. It has 
its own and autonomous legal source (the Convention), it has own line of reasoning and 
application standards as presented by the Court in particular cases, it has autonomous 
                                                 
378 See: N. Weber: „ESČP (preveč) širi koncept družinskega in zasebnega življenja?“, in: Pravna praksa, No. 
46/2011, p. 21. 
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procedural demands in order to initiate procedure before the Court, it has own and 
independent judges who must meet standards prescribed by the Convention379, it has own 
standards of proof for determination of relevant facts of the case380, final judgements are 
limited only on determination of violation of the Convention (if such violation has really 
occurred) and cannot directly annul decision of final national judicial authority381 and finally, 
judgements of the Court are executed in national legal order of respondent state. All stated 
characteristics are main characteristics of the system based upon the Convention which in 
theoretical sense is particular constitutional law. The system has all requirements to be 
considered as the law and within theoretical framework it is constitutional law (given the fact 
that regulates human rights and fundamental freedoms).   
 To conclude, the law based upon the Convention is the constitutional law with 
independent and autonomous legal framework which is continuously evolving on the basis of 
the Court’s practice and interactions with respondent states. It has its own substantial 
elements which are also identical for “national” constitutional law framework (human rights 
and fundamental freedoms etc.).  
 
  5.1.2. Procedural elements  
 
 Constitutional law based upon the Convention, beside its own substantial elements 
which evolved on the basis of the Court’s judicial practice, also has its own procedural 
provisions or procedural elements. Respective procedural elements of the constitutional law 
based upon the Convention are contained in procedural provisions of the Convention 
(provisions regarding procedure before the Court) as well as in the Rules of Court. The 
totality of provisions which regulate procedure before the Court are procedural elements of 
constitutional law based upon the Convention. With determination of procedural provisions of 
constitutional law based upon the Convention we rounded up respective concept in one 
coherent legal framework. 
                                                 
379 Judges of the Court must meet in general very high standards in order to be elected as a judge of the Court. 
Art. 21 par. 1 of the Convention prescribes: „The judges shall be of high moral character and must either 
possess the qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognised 
competence.“ Usually this mean that judges of the Court meet requirements for appointment in Supreme Court of 
their state or in Constitutional Court. This fact ensures that judges of the Court prior to the appointment to the 
Court have extensive legal practice which fact also ensure competence and professionalism of judges of the 
Court.   
380 See: supra, footnote 189. 
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 Procedural aspects of constitutional law based upon the Convention must also be 
examined from the aspect of judicial review. The process of judicial review is commonly 
related to the procedural point of view of the national constitutional law. In constitutional 
theory there have already been particular achievements to verify that the Court stands also as 
the European Constitutional Court. Although such achievements remain controversial (with 
main argument that the Court cannot annul national legislation which is the most important 
feature of national constitutional courts) with the words of professor Alec Stone Sweet who is 
supporter of the idea that the Court should be considered as the European Constitutional Court 
“But the fact that the constitutional status of the Convention and its Court are now being 
actively debated by judges, elected officials, and scholars across Europe tells us that some 
profoundly important is, indeed, happening.”382          
 Although limited with possibility to directly annul national legislation, the Court can 
be considered as the effective actor in the area of judicial review. We already stated that the 
effectiveness of the constitutional review can be analyzed by three affiliated facts: the 
competent authority has regular caseload in which important constitutional issues are arising, 
the reasons for a particular ruling are rendered by judges in their judgements, and the 
particular precedential effects can be attributed to the rulings of competent authority. All of 
respective characteristics and theoretical demands can be determined in the case of the 
Convention as we have previously analyzed and determined.383 But in the verification stated 
in Chapter IV by which all required adjustments in national constitutional (legislative and 
judicial) framework will be conducted after the Court’s determination of violation, we can 
argue that in proceedings before the Court particular concealed process of judicial review will 
occur. This process is referred as concealed given the fact that examination of 
constitutionality or conventionality of national law is not the subject of proceedings before the 
Court – only examination regarding violation of particular human right or fundamental 
freedom is. But we verified in Chapter IV that final judgements of the Court will subsequently 
lead to the adjustments in national legislature in order to meet the Convention’s demands as 
reasoned by the Court in its final judgement. Despite the fact that the Court in its final 
judgement will not rule on conventionality of particular provision of domestic law, national 
authorities will adjust its legislative framework and amend disputable legislation which is 
                                                 
382 A. Stone Sweet: „On the Constitutionalisation of the Convention: The European Court of Human Rights as a 
Constitutional Court“, op.cit. (footnote 126), p. 14. See also: J. Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 1347. 
383 See supra, p. 91.  
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practically a same end result as it would be in the case of annulment of particular legislative 
provision by national constitutional court.   
 Willingness of national authorities to meet the Convention’s standards and adjust their 
own domestic legislative framework is leading to the same consequence as it would be in the 
case that national constitutional court rule on conventionality of domestic legislative 
provisions and subsequently annul disputable national legislative provisions regarding its 
conventionality. Furthermore, domestic constitutional courts have also developed mechanisms 
in order to preserve sub-constitutional status of the Convention in national legal framework 
but in the same time to secure conventionality of internal domestic legislature or incorporation 
of the Convention into the constitutional yardstick. The Convention and domestic 
constitutions are counterbalances of same ultimate goal – protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms where domestic constitutional courts will save their constitutional 
status and not become pure agents of the Court.384  
 For all stated arguments, we can conclude that constitutional law based upon the 
Convention with required substantial elements also has all necessary procedural elements. 
 
5.2. Why is it particular? 
 
 If all aggregate body of rules and principles reasoned by the Court in its judicial 
practice and applied throughout the international obligation of the Council of Europe member 
states on execution of all final judgements of the Court can be addressed as constitutional law 
in its very theoretical essence final characteristic which must be analyzed is why such 
constitutional law is addressed as particular. Particular is used in a theoretical definition in 
order to position such constitutional law on qualitatively different level and to make 
distinction to the “ordinary” or “domestic” or “national” constitutional law as the totality of 
norms which regulate matters of constitutional meaning within one state.  
 It is visible that constitutional law is primarily a domestic legal branch. It is the 
fundamental and also the most important one but primarily domestic. Each modern state has 
its own constitutional law with domestic constitution in the center of interest with affiliated 
body of rules and principles. In the case of Convention such national characteristic cannot be 
constructed given the fact that area of applicability of the Convention is over 47 the Council 
of Europe member states. The Convention for such characteristic and in the light of its very 
                                                 
384 See: D. Paris: „Constitutional Courts and the European Court of Human Rights: A Comparative Perspective“ 
in: Heidelberg J Int'l L (2017) p. 623 – 645.  
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legal essence (international agreement) is expanding beyond limits and borders of one 
(national) state and is effective throughout the entire European continent and even beyond. 
This fact clearly points out that theoretical framework of constitutional law as presented 
earlier in this Chapter cannot be methodologically verified with methods of “national” 
constitutional law. Such constitutional law which has independent and autonomous substantial 
and procedural elements applicable beyond borders of national state must be separated from 
previous definitions of constitutional law and their predominantly national characteristics. 
 The constitutional law based upon the Convention, beside the fact that it in every 
possible theoretical sense is a constitutional law is also particular given the fact that it 
constructed on international/supranational/transnational level. This particular constitutional 
law is not limited by borders of national states (member states of the Council of Europe) and 
is evolving and expanding without any referral to the national boundaries. Propulsive effects 
of such particular constitutional law are going into the member states from above (vertically), 
from the Court and are spreading throughout the all area of applicability. Such particular 
constitutional law is nominally purified from influence of states concerned and is evolving 
and applying within a framework set out by the Convention and the Court. It is a particularly 
high level of theoretical construction of constitutional law where particular national 
characteristics do not have a prevailing effect on the content of constitutional law. The 
substantial and procedural elements of this type of constitutional law are solely constructed on 
international level. For this reason, this coherent legal system with all affiliated aggregate 
body of rules and principles is addressed as the particular constitutional law.  
 It is also particular given the fact that such coherent legal system (although of 
constitutional significance and meaning) does not raise concerns by its members regarding 
national sovereignty. As determined from arguments in the Chapter IV, member states in most 
cases will follow the Court’s judicial practice and make all required adjustments within 
national legal system. Although concerning vital national constitutional issues (e.g. human 
rights and fundamental freedoms) member states will follow up the Court’s rulings and the 
implementation of the Court’s final judgement in national legal order will not be challenged 
from the aspects of national sovereignty. This fact is really unprecedented in legal and 
political history and presents one of the most important features in contemporary theory of 
constitutional law. In the process of execution of final judgement of the Court, member states 
possess margin of appreciation regarding concrete method by which final judgement of the 
Court will be carried out. But whatever particular method will be, legal understandings of the 
Court will enter domestic judicial and legislative reality. For significant interconnections 
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between the Court that renders final judgements and member states (which are solely 
responsible for execution of a final judgement of the Court), the particular constitutional law 
is evolving in this mutual cooperation. Member states are second significant factor in 
constructing particular constitutional law. Their ability to execute final judgements of the 
Court and openness to the legal understandings of the Court (and subsequent implementation 
in national legal orders) is second unalienable factor without which the particular 
constitutional law cannot be constructed. 
From the analysis concluded in Chapter IV it can be determined that legitimacy of the 
Court is not questioned from the member states and that, in general, member states accept 
final judgements of the Court and undertake all actions in order to execute final judgement of 
the Court. All member states incorporated the Convention in internal legal order and national 
act on incorporation/ratification of the Convention confirms legitimacy of the Court in 
national legal orders. With voluntary acceptance of the Convention and the Court in domestic 
legal order, member states also emphasize that final judgements of the Court are not attack on 
their sovereignty but only confirmation of their commitment to the protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in contemporary era.385   
 To conclude, numerous additional identifications of the concept can be emphasized. 
Particular constitutional law can be identified also as the European human rights law etc. But 
we stated that our analysis is initiated from a pure theoretical point of view. And from it, all 
respective rules and principles related to the Convention and the Court’s actions are 
fundamentally constitutional law but also the particular one, given the fact that this 
constitutional law does not have dominantly national characteristics. In the case of the 
particular constitutional law, a coherent legal framework can be achieved on an international 
level covering all of the Council of Europe member states. While national constitutional law 
or national constitutional order is governed by national constitutions and other national 
provisions of constitutional law (which can also be international agreements) in the case of 
particular constitutional law the situation is in other way around. In the case of particular 
constitutional law based upon the Convention, the Convention as a particular international 
agreement is main legal source which is comparable with national constitutions considering 
strong normative, substantial and grammatical convergence between provisions of national 
                                                 
385 For extensive analysis regarding legitimacy of the Court see: B. Çalı, A. Koch and N. Bruch: „The Legitimacy 
of the European Court of Human Rights: The view from the ground“, University College London, Department of 
Political Science, 2011, available at:  
https://ecthrproject.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/ecthrlegitimacyreport.pdf (12.04.2019.) 
See also: K. Dzehtisarou, op.cit. (footnote 162). 
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constitutions and the Convention in respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms. But 
its evolution transcends national borders and is evolving in a dialogue between the Court and 
contracting states in the procedure before the Court as well as within the dialogue between the 
Committee of Ministers and respondent states in the process of execution of the Court’s final 
judgements.  
 For all stated reasons mentioned in this sub-chapter, we address respective theoretical 
concept as the particular constitutional law. It has all required characteristics to be considered 
as the constitutional law and is the constitutional law. But in this case this constitutional law 
is developing in international environment in mutual dialogue between the Court and member 
states on the basis of international agreement. For this reason is particular given the fact that 
essential ground is not in national constitution but in international agreement.  
As regard to the harmonization, the particular constitutional law is harmonizing on 
vertical as well as on horizontal level. On vertical level particular member state is 
harmonizing its legal practice with legal understandings and practice of the Court pursuant to 
the final judgement of the Court where the Court determined violation of the Convention and 
after which determination respondent state is undertaking all necessary adjustments in legal 
order in the process of execution of final judgement of the Court. This vertical harmonization 
is direct consequence of the execution process of the final judgement of the Court where the 
Court determined violation of the Convention. But horizontal harmonization or harmonization 
and unified application of the Court’s legal understandings across all the Council of Europe 
member states or harmonization between the states is also very important for the particular 
constitutional law. In this analysis we can determine that horizontal harmonization can be 
applied from two levels: one, from the Court with uniform application of its judicial practice 
in any case regardless of respondent state but with considering margins of appreciation where 
national particularities can be considered. And the second level, the level of member states, 
which level of harmonization can be characterized with openness of member states to apply 
the Court’s standards although they haven’t been respondent state in particular case. First 
level of harmonization, the Court level, is characterized with the doctrine of stare decisis 
where the Court relies on its own practice without deviation apart significant and compelling 
reasons and special characteristics of the case. This means that the Court will apply and 
follow its own previous judicial practice in subsequent similar cases. Deviation from 
established judicial practice will be justified with other compelling reasons or with general 
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development of common standards, i.e. the particular constitutional law.386 Uniform 
application of the Convention’s standards and reliance on previous case law ensure 
sustainability of the system as well as predictability. All this characteristics will be beneficial 
factors for harmonization on vertical level (the Court – member state). Horizontal level of 
harmonization is level of harmonization between member states where we meet substantial 
aspects of common standards, or particular constitutional law. These common standards are 
particular constitutional law in practice. With vertical level of harmonization, uniform 
application of legal standards and case law the Court directly influences on establishment and 
development of common standards across the Council of Europe member states. With vertical 
level of harmonization, human rights standards on the basis of the Convention are becoming 
more and more similar across the Council of Europe member states for which reason we also 
can determine horizontal level of harmonization between member states. But horizontal level 
of harmonization can also be realized without the direct influence of the Court. Theory 
already indicated that particular member states are open to apply standards as set out in the 
Court’s case law although those states were not respondent states in the proceeding before the 
Court. Member state must execute final judgement of the Court only if it is respondent state 
meaning that applicant lodged an appeal before the Court claiming that this particular state 
violated his/her human rights prescribed by the Convention. In this process of execution 
member state must meet the Court’s and the Convention’s standards. But if particular member 
state was not a respondent state it is not mandatory to implement understandings of the Court 
emphasized in final judgement that does not concern particular member state. Nevertheless, 
some member states are continuously analyzing compliance of its legal framework with the 
Convention and understandings of the Court emphasized in all cases regardless of respondent 
                                                 
386 Although the Court does not apply the doctrine of stare decisis, it will follow its previous reasoning for the 
reasons of legal certainty, predictability and equalitiy before the law which are all characteristics of the rule of 
law principle entrenched in the Convention. All deviations from previous understandings must be justified with 
compelling reasons. The Court stated this principle in the case of Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, see: J. 
Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 40), p. 1285. For other analysis regarding the role of precedent in the Court's practice 
see: Y. Lupu, E. Voeten: „The Role of Precedent at the European Court of Human Rights: A Network Analysis 
of Case Citations“ Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Conference Proceedings, 2010, available at: 
https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.hr/&httpsredir=1&article=1016&co
ntext=pnconfs_2010 (12.04.2019.) 
Also: M. Mowbray: „An Examination of the European Court of Human Rights’ Approach to Overruling its 
Previous Case Law“, Human Rights Law Review, vol. 9, No. 2, 2009, p. 179 – 201. 
The fact that the Court follows its previous case law is visible in our analysis given the fact that the Court in the 
case of Croatia as well as the France and the Netherlands rulled that disciplinary proceedings fall under the scope 
of applicability of Art. 6 par. 1 of the Convention (cf. case of Olujić v. Croatia, supra, p. 181 and case of Engel 
and Others v. the Netherlands from 1976, supra, p. 146). For the relevant case in France see: supra, p. 209. 
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state.387 If member states will tend to comply to the Court’s understandings regardless the fact 
that they were respondent states or not, this will ensure stronger horizontal level of 
harmonization and enhance adaptability of all system.  
Given the fact that judgements of the Court have influence on all courts in domestic 
judicial hierarchy, individuals in regular domestic judicial proceeding could state that 
particular understanding of the domestic court is in collision with the judicial practice of the 
Court and the Court’s understandings regarding particular provision of the Convention. Such 
understandings of the Court for domestic courts are not mandatory but, in that case, domestic 
judicial hierarchy risks the Court’s judgement that there has been a violation of the 
Convention. All domestic courts must take into account the Court’s case law in any case 
where “Taking into account means that the courts have to seriously consider the ECtHR’s 
judgements and decisions and, if they do not comply, give convincing reasons for their 
attitude.”388 For this reason domestic authorities must secure translation of the Court’s 
relevant case law and disseminate it through judicial system so that domestic courts can be 
informed about position of the Court in relevant area in order to avoid (ultimately) the Court’s 
judgement. To conclude, although the Court’s case law does not have direct effect in 
particular national case before national judicial authority it is visible that individuals 
concerned can invoke the Court’s case law in particular proceeding where respective case law 
of the Court must be considered. If domestic courts fail to abide the Court’s case law and 
standards in similar case, violation of the Convention could ultimately be determined. With 
same argumentation we can determine that advisory opinions of the Court rendered pursuant 
to the Protocol No. 16 to the Convention will have same effect on judicial authorities which 
have not demanded advisory opinion pursuant to the Protocol No. 16 to the Convention. It can 
be reasonably determined that such advisory opinions (although not binding) will also be 
considered in any cases concerned regardless the fact which supreme court or constitutional 
court of member state formally submitted demand for advisory opinion. In case that such 
practice really occurs, such advisory opinions will also be catalyzer of harmonization process 
                                                 
387 „Even though states that are not directly connected with Strasbourg judgements do not necessarily have to 
comply with them, more and more states in fact do try to avoid a potential sentence from the Strasbourg Court 
by conforming to its case-law. Therefore, the authority of the cases of the Strasbourg Court plays a significant 
role, at least de facto, even for those states that are not party to a dispute. French court follow this overall 
tendency. 
....  
Since the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights reflects the present understandings of the rights 
under the Convention, it must be taken into account irrespective of whether the Court's judgements are directed 
against Germany or another state.“ – J. Gerards, J. Fleuren, op.cit. (footnote 2), p. 174 and 206. 
388 Ibid, p. 207. 
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and will decrease the amount of cases before the Court. In ideal type the individual will 
invoke particular advisory opinion of the Court in particular case before domestic court where 
domestic court will apply the Court’s reasoning and in which case proceeding before the 
Court will be unnecessary. But practice according to the Protocol No. 16 still yet to be 
established.  
Finally, we stated that particular constitutional law is constitutional law by all 
theoretical characteristics and that is particular given the fact that it is evolving in one new 
legal environment (interactions and dialogue between the Court and member states). For 
effectiveness of the concept it is of outmost importance that final judgements of the Court are 
fully and properly executed in national legal orders and that member states, in general, tend to 
rectify infringed human rights. But in what particular manner member state will ensure 
execution of final judgement of the Court is solely on member state. Member states have 
margin of appreciation in the execution process and can choose freely among various possible 
solutions.389 The most important solution is reopening the case pursuant to the final 
judgement of the Court where violation of the Convention has been determined. Nevertheless, 
it is not mandatory for member state to reopen the proceeding in any case where the Court has 
found violation of the Convention. It must be noted that reopening of the proceeding has 
direct effect on the finality of judgements of domestic courts which is equally important 
demand deriving from the rule of law. In order to achieve uniform approach in this matter, the 
Committee of Ministers adopted recommendation that reexamination of particular case should 
be adopted only in such cases where restitutio in integrum is practically only possible solution 
to rectify infringed human right prescribed by the Convention.390 Although it can be 
                                                 
389 But are also limited in particular cases. See supra, p. 158 (footnote 231).  
390 Bearing in mind, however, that the practice of the Committee of Ministers in supervising the execution of the 
Court's judgements shows that in exceptional circumstances the re-examination of a case or a reopening of 
proceedings has proved the most efficient, if not the only, means of achieving restitutio in integrum, 
I.          Invites, in the light of these considerations the Contracting Parties to ensure that there exist at national 
level adequate possibilities to achieve, as far as possible,  restitutio in integrum; 
II.         Encourages the Contracting Parties, in particular, to examine their national legal systems with a view to 
ensuring that there exist adequate possibilities of re-examination of the case, including reopening of 
proceedings, in instances where the Court has found a violation of the Convention, especially where: 
i.          the injured party continues to suffer very serious negative consequences because of the outcome of the 
domestic decision at issue, which are not adequately remedied by the just satisfaction and cannot be rectified 
except by re-examination or reopening, and 
ii.         the judgement of the Court leads to the conclusion that 
a. the impugned domestic decision is on the merits contrary to the Convention, or 
b. the violation found is based on procedural errors or shortcomings of such gravity that a serious doubt is cast 
on the outcome of the domestic proceedings complained of.“ - Recommendation No. R (2000) 2 of the 
Committee of Ministers to member states on the re-examination or reopening of certain cases at domestic level 
following judgements of the European Court of Human Rights, available at:  
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805e2f06 (12.04.2019.) 
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considered as severe attack on the principle of res judicata, great number of member states 
introduced some kind of reopening of the proceeding (whether criminal, civil or other) upon 
the final judgement of the Court (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Slovenia etc.).391 Although 
the most important, motion on retrial or reopening of proceedings upon the final judgement of 
the Court is not the only possible solution how member state can rectify infringed human 
rights. Member states in order to fully execute final judgement of the Court can also speed up 
or finish the procedure that was the ground for application, can order immediate release of 
prisoners if application has been lodged on this ground, can modify final judgement with 
administrative measure such as pardon, clemency or non-execution of judgement, can grant 
special refunds, can amend disputable legislation or change disputable judicial and/or 
administrative practice etc.392 In any case and whatever special method of execution of final 
judgement of the Court particular member state accepts, ultimately legal understandings of the 
Court will enter in domestic legal reality and will secure protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms pro futuro. For this reason, the theoretical concept of the particular 
constitutional law can be considered practical as well as theoretical.  
  
 5.3. The role of the European Court 
 
 In the process of rounding up a new theoretical overview of the Court’s impact in 
national legal orders of the Council of Europe member states, it is methodologically necessary 
to further examine the position or the role of the Court in such new theoretical system of 
particular constitutional law. We have determined that particular constitutional law is a 
totality of all norms and principles which derive from the Convention and other affiliated 
legal sources (e.g. the Rules of Court) and are expanding national scope of applicability of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. This expanding is based upon the judicial practice of 
the Court given the fact that the Court is that judicial authority which ensures wider or 
                                                 
391 J. Omejec, op.cit. (footnote 41), p. 319 (footnote 505). Croatia introduced possibility for reopening of both 
criminal and civil proceeding pursuant to the final judgement of the Court where violation of the Convention has 
been determined. Slovenia on the other hand envisaged reopening of the proceedings pursuant to the Court's 
final judgement only in criminal cases. Regulation regarding which type of proceeding should be reopened 
pursuant to the final judgement of the Court (if any) lies on internal procedural rules of contracting states and 
their political vision on how infringed human right and fundamental freedom protected by the Convention and 
determined by the Court should be rectified. For dillemas in the Court's case law concerning option of reopening 
national proceedings pursuant to the final judgement of the Court see e.g. case of Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal 
(No. 2), Application no. 19867/12 (judgement of July 11th 2017), available at: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-175646 (12.04.2019.).  
392 Ibid, p. 318.  
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broader protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Court stands as the 
international institutional link which combines all national legal orders in one coherent legal 
framework. Without the Court and correlating principles in adjudication process before the 
Court (the principle of autonomous interpretation, principle of subsidiarity etc.) our new 
theoretical concept would not be possible to construct. As it has been previously presented, 
the Court’s autonomous and independent judicial practice secured a broader scope of 
applicability of human rights and fundamental freedoms prescribed by the Convention (which 
are normatively and grammatically similar if not even identical to the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms prescribed by national constitutional texts) and secured protection on 
those social relations which previously have not been deemed protectable by national 
constitutional courts and other courts in regular national judicial systems. With international 
obligation of member state to execute final judgements of the Court, the Court’s legal 
understandings are infiltrating the national constitutional reality securing better level of 
human rights protection in national legal orders in all future cases. All presented cases in 
Chapter IV of the dissertation, and the presented subsequent adjustments in national legal 
order confirm such argument.  
 For all stated reasons, the Court has center role in such theoretical system of particular 
constitutional law given the fact that without the Court and its autonomous jurisprudence such 
concept would not be possible to introduce. Prior to the Protocol No. 11, the Court was 
particularly limited because its compulsory jurisdiction was subjected to the voluntary 
verification of the Council of Europe member states. Entering of the Protocol No. 11 on force 
with correlated compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in all cases regardless of any criterion 
ensured inception of the particular constitutional law. The Court slowly but effectively 
evolved its own practice and assumed its function within the constitutional framework as set 
out in the Convention. With evolution of human rights and fundamental freedoms based upon 
the Court’s actions, such coherent legal framework also evolved and today is commonly 
considered as the most effective universal system of human rights law.  
 Without the Court and its preparedness to set aside any possible national limitations 
(but simultaneously acknowledging all essential and objective distinctions between member 
states within the doctrine of margins of appreciation) this theoretical framework of particular 
constitutional law would not be possible. It is the Court’s sole credit that respective concept 
could be constructed with all substantial and procedural characteristics. The Court made it 
possible for the Convention to become particular Constitution for Europe with better level of 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. What was impossible for European 
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Union was possible for the Council of Europe but only with the Court’s judicial activism. 
European Union could not secure the approval of the European Constitution on referendum in 
France and Netherlands in 2005 but at the same time the European continent has been faced 
with growing constitutional framework based upon the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. And this has been sole achievement of the Court.  
 From this brief presentation it can be determined that the Court with all correlated 
principles which are entrenched in its practice, has a pivotal role in the introduction of the 
particular constitutional law.    
 
 5.4. Activist and national model of classification and categorization 
 
 To conclude our analysis, one more additional characteristic of particular 
constitutional law must be analyzed. In the first Chapter of the analysis we emphasized that 
the Council of Europe member states can be categorized and classified according to one new 
criterion, i.e. level of harmonization with the Court’s judicial practice. In the theoretical 
concept of the particular constitutional law, the Court, as presented, has a center role. The 
Court with its autonomous and independent judicial practice on the basis of autonomous 
interpretation of the Convention’s provisions led to broader protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. The Court has applied the Convention’s provisions on those social 
situations which were not under the protection of national constitutions and national 
constitutional courts. With the process of execution of the Court’s final judgement, such 
expansive legal understandings were also introduced on a national level. But this introduction 
of extensive protection is mainly related to the readiness of domestic authorities on full 
implementation of the Court’s final judgement. This readiness can primarily be determined 
throughout subsequent legislative and jurisprudential adjustments which were undertaken on a 
national level in order to meet the standards demanded by the Court in rendered final 
judgement. The payment of damage awarded by the Court can also point out to the 
commitment of particular member state on full and proper execution of the Court’s final 
judgement. 
The process of execution of the Court’s final judgement is, as stated, everything but 
straightforward and in some cases, we can determine particular opposition to the 
implementation of the Court’s extensive legal understandings. As it is in the case of Italy, 
numerous (systematic) problems were determined in the process of execution of the Court’s 
final judgement. On the other hand, recent controversial constitutional actions in the Russian 
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Federation by the Russian Constitutional Court lead to the conclusion that in Russia the 
process of execution of the Court’s final judgement will be faced with new challenges.393  
From respective analysis we can conclude that in the case of Russia main 
constitutional authorities specifically note that the execution of a final judgement of the Court 
will be subjected to the analysis of conformity with the Constitution of the Russian Federation 
where internal authorities of Russia will decide on such conformity. Such decision can 
ultimately lead to the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on non-
execution meaning that final judgement of the Court cannot be executed in the territory of the 
Russian Federation.394 This clearly violate obligation under Art. 46 of the Convention on 
                                                 
393 “On 6 December 2013, considering the implementation of the judgment in the controversial case Konstantin 
Markin v. Russia, the Constitutional Court held that when a judgment of the ECtHR contradicts a prior ruling of 
the Constitutional Court on the case in question, the Russian Constitutional Court should have the final say in 
the execution of the relevant judgment by the ECtHR. The Constitutional Court explained that when a court of 
general jurisdiction has reopened proceedings in order to implement the judgment of the ECtHR and it cannot 
enforce that judgment of the ECtHR without at the same time disregarding provisions of domestic law, the court 
must suspend the proceedings and request the Constitutional Court to assess the constitutionality of such 
provisions. The Constitutional Court did not directly assess the place of the ECHR and judgments of the ECtHR 
in the Russian legal order; however, it held that when finding the challenged legal provisions to be in 
accordance with the Constitution, the Constitutional Court would determine possible constitutional means of 
implementation of the relevant judgment of the ECtHR within the limits of its competence.  In June 2015, when 
Russia had missed the deadline for submitting an action plan for just satisfaction awarded to shareholders of 
Yukos, the issue of the relationship between international law and national law was raised in the State Duma. 
Ninety-three Russian deputies asked the Constitutional Court for a clarification as to the constitutionality of 
several pieces of legislation, including the federal law titled ‘On Ratification of the ECHR’ and the federal law 
‘On International Treaties’. The deputies claimed that the contested regulations included provisions 
unconstitutionally obliging Russian authorities to implement the judgments of the ECtHR even when they are in 
conflict with the Russian Constitution. According to Valery Zorkin, one of the reasons for this request was the 
judgment of the ECtHR in the case Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia. In its judgment of 14 July 2015, the 
Constitutional Court held that the contested provisions were not actually unconstitutional. The Constitutional 
Court also explained that, in accordance with Article 46 of the ECHR, Russia ‘recognized ipso facto and without 
special agreement the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights as obligatory’ and that the ECHR 
was an integral part of the Russian legal system. However, despite those statements, the Constitutional Court 
concluded that, although the Russian Constitution and the ECHR are based on the same basic values, in the 
event of a contradiction between the two with respect to the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, preference 
should be given to the Constitution and therefore Russia is not obliged to follow the judgments of the ECtHR 
literally when the enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to Russia’s constitutional values.” - K. Mäger: 
„Enforcing the Judgments of the ECtHR in Russia in Light of the Amendments to the Law on the Constitutional 
Court“, Juridica International; Law Review, University of Tartu (1632), available at: 
http://www.juridicainternational.eu/?id=15646 (12.04.2019.) 
394 See: „Anchugov and Gladkov is not Enforceable: the Russian Constitutional Court Opines in its First ECtHR 
Implementation Case“, available at: http://opiniojuris.org/2016/04/25/anchugov-and-gladkov-is-not-enforceable-
the-russian-constitutional-court-opines-in-its-first-ecthr-implementation-case/ (12.04.2019.) In respective case, 
only nine months after the rulling of the Russian Constitutional Court that execution of the Court's final 
judgement can be refused if it contradicts the Russian Constitution, the Russian Constitutional Court determined 
that the Court's final judgement in the case of Anchugov and Gladkov v. the Russian Federation cannot be 
executed because it violates the Russian Constitution.  
If such standoff between the Court, the Committee of Ministers and the Council of Europe as a unit on one side 
and the Russian Federation on the other side would continue, applicants from the Russian Federation will bear 
the most burden given the fact that their guaranteed human rights will stay merely as a letter on paper and non-
enforceable. Theory already suggested particular solutions regarding respective non-implementation problem. 
Coercive measures are never popular for which reason diplomatic and political approach is preferable. 
„Therefore, it is critical for the ECtHR to avoid issuing judgments that directly challenge the Russian 
247 
 
execution of all final judgement of the Court which fact has also been indicated by the Venice 
Commission.395, 396 Venice Commission indicated that the Constitutional Court can assess in 
what particular and constitutionally conform manner should particular final judgement of the 
Court be executed but it cannot through such proceeding decline execution of final judgement 
of the Court on the ground of non-conformity with the Russian Constitution. Furthermore, 
such radical opposition to the Court comes from member state which has more than a 
thousand final judgement of the Court directed against it from 2014 – 2017 with additional 
7800 pending cases before the Court.397 
On the other hand, in the case of e.g. France we determined that the French legislature 
as well as judiciary tends to spontaneously adjust its practice without raising any concerns 
like in the case of Russia. In the case of Italy, we noted that there are severe problems on the 
execution of the Court’s final judgement in the Italian legal order.  
Such determinations allow us to assess conformity of the Council of Europe member 
states with judicial practice and legal understandings of the Court. In all analyzed cases in 
Chapter IV of the dissertation necessary adjustments have been undertaken, which points out 
to the conclusion that the harmonization process in all analyzed states has actually begun. 
Every time when national legal framework adjusts its provisions in order to meet the 
Convention’s standards reasoned by the Court in its practice, further steps on the 
harmonization had been undertaken. All respective adjustments are constructing particular 
constitutional law and are a part of one higher, broader human rights system based upon the 
Convention and developed by the Council of Europe from normative point of view and the 
Court from judicial point of view. As it is for harmonization between national legal orders and 
the system set out by the Convention and the Court, we can verify that it has begun. But the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Constitution. Instead, the ECtHR and the Council of Europe must employ other means of establishing Russian 
compliance with ECHR norms. The ECtHR and the Council of Europe can achieve this by either issuing 
judgments that find violations stemming from bodies of Russian law other than the Constitution, or by turning to 
other diplomatic and political channels to encourage Russian compliance with ECHR norms. Finally, increased 
engagement with the Russian Constitution, both to ensure that the ECtHR treads carefully and to emphasize the 
Russian Constitution’s broad acceptance and incorporation of international law, will help the ECtHR avoid 
outright conflict with the Constitutional Court and avoid worsening a political standoff between the two courts.“ 
R.M. Fleig-Goldstein: „The Russian Constitutional Court versus the European Court of Human Rights: How the 
Strasbourg Court Should Respond to Russia's Refusal to Execute EctHR's Judgements“, in: Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, 56(1), 2017, p. 218.  
395 See Interim opinion on the amendments to the federal constitutional law on the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session (Venice, 11-12 March 
2016), available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)005-e 
(12.04.2019.) 
396 See Final opinion on the amendments to the federal constitutional law on the Constitutional Court adopted by 
the Venice commission at its 107th plenary session (Venice, 10-11 june 2016), available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)016-e (12.04.2019.) 
397 C. Ribičič: „Izsiljevanje“, op.cit. (footnote 250).  
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level of respective harmonization is not the same for all the Council of Europe member states. 
While particular states tend to spontaneously adjust its legal and political framework in order 
to meet the Convention’s standards other member states are implementing constitutional 
provisions which can and probably will lead to severe practical obstacles for the applicants in 
the process of execution of the Court’s final judgement in domestic legal order. While 
particular states are amending their constitutions in order to meet the Convention’s standards, 
other states have systemic problems in execution of the Court’s final judgements.  
Such variety of possibilities gives us a well founded theoretical ground to categorize 
the Council of Europe member states regarding harmonization with the Court’s judicial 
practice on theoretical level in most general sense. Criterion on categorization can only be 
horizontal and not vertical as explained in Chapter I of the dissertation. In this horizontal 
system of categorization, we can imagine a line where on the one end of this line is a so-called 
activist model and on another end is a so-called national model.  
All of the Council of Europe member states can be placed on this line on the position 
closer to one or the other model depending on internal legislative provisions regarding 
openness of domestic legal framework to the Convention’s system and legal understandings 
of the Court. The higher level of conformity between national and legislative judicial 
framework and the Convention and legal understandings of the Court the more is particular 
member state positioned on this line to the activist model. On the other hand, lesser level of 
conformity leads respective member state to the national model on the other end of the line. 
The activist model is characterized with general legislative and judicial openness to 
the Convention and legal understandings of the Court, preparedness on full implementation of 
the Court’s legal understandings in entire national legal order, reasonable time of execution of 
final judgements of the Court, reliance of domestic judicial and constitutional practice on the 
practice of the Court, intensive consultation of the Court’s practice prior to rulings of the 
court etc.  
On the other hand, the national model is characterized with opposite tendencies, i.e. 
reservations toward the Court’s practice, reliance only on the provisions of national 
constitutional text as ultimate legal source for any dispute which can arise in national legal 
framework, excessive prolongation of implementation of the Court’s final judgement, open 
refusal of highest state’s authority to execute final judgement of the Court, implementation of 
internal legislative provisions which directly contravene to the international obligation of 
particular member state under the Convention on full execution of any final judgement of the 
Court etc.  
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Our theoretical concept of particular constitutional law as presented above is 
theoretically more founded in all the Council of Europe member state which can be 
categorized in the activist model because only in that case the Court really does stand as an 
institutional link which combines all national constitutional orders in to one coherent 
international legal framework. Minor setbacks in implementation of the Court’s legal 
understandings do not have decisive impact on the entire system given the fact that within all 
the Council of Europe member states exist various and extremely diversifiable legal solutions 
regarding relations between national legislative and judicial authorities and the Court. But 
beside that it can be constructed on theoretical level one model of categorization in relation to 
the openness of a particular state to the minimum human rights standard which are reasoned 
and developed by the Court on the foundations of the Convention.  
 
5.5. Applicability of the concept to other supra-national human rights systems 
 
  We defined our new theoretical concept as the particular constitutional law confirming 
its existence on the basis of the Convention. Although and undisputedly the most important 
international human rights framework in the world, respective coherent legal system based 
upon the Convention is not in the same time the only one. In global framework there are 
additional regional human rights systems which are also based upon the universalistic 
approach in relation to the United Nations human rights system and devoted to the protection 
and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms and which also have the 
foundation in international agreement(s). For this reason, we must assess applicability of our 
concept to these human rights systems and determine can this concept be applied in those 
cases and if not - why not. Legal systems which will be subjected to the applicability analysis 
of the particular constitutional law are European Union, Organization of American States with 
correlated American Convention on Human Rights and Organization of African Unity with 
correlated African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
 
  5.5.1. European Union  
  
 Relation between the system based upon the Convention and the European Union has 
multiple interconnected aspects. First of all, the European Union is a separate legal entity with 
separate legal capacity which is independent from legal capacities of its member states. 
European Union is supranational legal and political association on European continent with 
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independent and supranational legal order directly applicable in its member states. European 
Union has undertaken a long way in its development from former European Communities till 
European Union based on the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of 
the European Union.398, 399 
 Furthermore, all of the European Union member states are at the same time member 
states of the Council of Europe.400 Given the fact that the European Union is separate and 
independent legal order which is directly applicable in its member states and enforceable by 
domestic courts, it is clear that European public law as prescribed by the European Union can 
interfere with the system based upon the Convention. The European Union is also (as the 
Council of Europe) organization devoted to the protection and realization of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.401  
 But in the case of the European Union supranational and separate European legal order 
has already been established and confirmed in judicial practice of the European Court of 
Justice since famous case of Van Gend & Loos and Costa v. Enel.402 Institutions of the 
European Union possess authority on law-making which characteristic cannot be found in the 
case of the Council of Europe. Unlike the Council of Europe, the European Union is 
supranational and independent legal order, directly applicable in its member states which is 
evolving on daily basis. Institutions of the European Union (e.g. the European Parliament and 
the European Commission) have competence on creating of European (Community) law and 
supervision over how European law is applied in member states of the European Union. The 
Council of Europe on the other hand does not have such competence and supranational legal 
order in the case of Convention is created on the basis of judicial creativity and activism of 
                                                 
398 The Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (consolidated text, 
Official Journal of the European Union, 2016/C  202/1), available at:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:9e8d52e1-2c70-11e6-b497 
01aa75ed71a1.0006.01/DOC_1&format=PDF (12.04.2019.) 
399 Literature regarding evolution of the European Union from its inception till contemporary time is extensive 
and can be analyzed from various scientific aspects. For brief historical overview on European integration see: 
K. Lenaerts, P. Van Nuffel, R.Bray: „Constitutional law of the European Union“, 2. edition, Thomson/Sweer 
and Maxwell, London, 2005, p. 3 – 21; also: W. Nicoll, T. C. Salmon: „Understanding the European Union“, 
Longman, London, 2001, p. 3 – 21 et seq; also: E. Jones, A. Menon, S. Weatherill: „The Oxford Handbook of the 
European Union“, Oxford, 2012, p. 79 – 181.  
400 It has to be noted that pursuant to the decision of United Kingdom's voters taken on the referendum on June 
23rd 2016, United Kingdom will withdraw from the European Union on March 29th 2019. Respective withdrawal 
from the European Union will be the first in history of the European Union and has become commonly known as 
Brexit. For more information regarding current status on Brexit negotiations between United Kingdom and the 
European Union see: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/brexit-negotiations_en (12.04.2019.) 
401 Pursuant to the Art. 2. of the Treaty on European Union “The Union is founded on the values of respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” 
402 See K. Lenaerts, P. Van Nuffel, R.Bray, op.cit. (footnote 399), p. 14 – 17. 
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the Court. The Council of Europe is not lawmaking international organization but only a 
forum imagined for peaceful solution of potential conflicts where human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are highly positioned. The European Union is lawmaking organization 
and is authorized on passing laws within its competence as prescribed by above mentioned 
Treaties which must be enforced by domestic courts.  
 For the purposes of this analysis we can conclude that the European Union and the 
system based upon the Convention are both supranational legal orders with independent 
obligations of member states to apply their provisions. In the case of the Convention member 
states are responsible for realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms as prescribed 
by the Convention as well as for the full execution of all final judgements of the Court. In the 
case of the European Union, member states are responsible for application of all provisions of 
the European public law which consists of various regulations, directives as well as the other 
provisions of primary European law (The Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union).403 These systems are separate and independent but also 
significantly interconnected and relative complementary.404 The European Union from its 
inception positioned human rights and fundamental freedoms in the very essence of the 
Community law and noted that such rights should be protectable by the European Court of 
Justice.405 By subsequent development in the European human rights arena which went hand-
by-hand between the system based upon the Convention and the European Union, the Treaty 
on European Union specifically pointed out the significance of the Convention for the 
European Union. Art. 6 par. 3 of the Treaty prescribes: “Fundamental rights, as guaranteed 
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall 
constitute general principles of the Union's law.” Such provision recognizes the Convention 
as a matter of the European constitutional law and positions the Convention in its very 
essence. Devotion to the protection of human rights within the European Union also confirms 
Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union which proclaims particular human 
rights that are common for all European Union’s member states but are in the same time also 
very similar to rights recognized in the Convention. For this reason, respective Charter 
specifically points out that “In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to 
                                                 
403 Ibid, p. 665. 
404 See S. Zagorc: „Evropska Unija in Evropska konvencija o človekovih pravicah: preplet varstva človekovih 
pravic“ in: M. Žgur, N. Kogovšek – Šalamon, B. Koritnik (ed.): „Izzivi ustavnega prava v 21. stoletju: liber 
amicorum Ciril Ribičič“, Inštitut za lokalno samoupravo in javna naročila, 2017, p. 121 – 139.  
405 K. Lenaerts, P. Van Nuffel, R.Bray, op.cit. (footnote 399), p. 719. 
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rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the 
said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive 
protection.”406 With respective provision, the Convention has become the very core of the 
European constitutional law and practically the source of European public law. With this 
confirmation member states have double imposed obligation regarding the Convention. First 
obligation on recognition and full protection of the Convention derives from the Council of 
Europe membership and the second one from the European Union membership given the fact 
that the European Union itself positions the Convention in the very essence of the Community 
(European) law.  
 Nevertheless, member states can be faced with challenges regarding their membership 
in the Council of Europe and the European Union. In particular, member states could be faced 
with problem regarding their obligation deriving from the European Union membership. The 
Court noted that membership in the European Union and transfer of powers to the institutions 
of the European Union does not release member states from their obligation to comply with 
the Convention. In other words, membership in the European Union must not have any effect 
on the Convention and obligations of member states which derive from the Convention.407  
 Given the fact that European public law is a separate legal order directly applicable in 
member states but also a part of internal domestic law of its member states, question is can the 
Court review the European public law and assess its conformity with the Convention? 
Furthermore, can the Court determine violation of the Convention on the basis of the 
application of the European public law? This question has been raised in the context of 
developing Community law. Given the fact that the European Union has committed itself on 
full acceptance of human rights, including the Convention, former European Commission of 
Human Rights (prior to the establishment of the Court) has held that an application against the 
institutions of the European Union (former European Communities) could not be submitted 
given the fact that the European Union (or former European Communities) is not a party to 
the Convention. “Since the Community legal order itself guarantees respect for the ECHR, the 
European Commission of Human Rights took the view that a complaint made against a 
Member State which was merely implementing a judgement of the Court of Justice was 
                                                 
406 Art. 52 par. 2 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union (Official Journal of the European 
Union, 2012/C  326/02). 
407 K. Lenaerts, P. Van Nuffel, R.Bray, op.cit. (footnote 399), p. 727. 
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inadmissible.”408 In earlier practice the Court also confirmed that acts of the European Union 
cannot be tested regarding their conformity with the Convention given the fact that the 
European Union is not a party to the Convention. Nevertheless, particular indirect review may 
be performed with assessing the internal act of member state by which a member state gives 
effect to the provision of the European public law against the Convention. In judgement 
Cantoni v. France from 1996 the Court emphasized that is not precluded by the mere fact that 
national provisions were based almost word for word on a Community directive.409 But 
nevertheless, the fact that the European Union is not a party to the Convention nominally 
prevents the Court to assess the European public law in the light of the Convention. “Where 
there is conflicting case law of the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights 
concerning the scope of the ECHR, national (and Community) authorities are liable to be 
squeezed between the primacy of Community law, on the one hand, and their obligation under 
the ECHR, on the other.”410 
 In order to avoid such conflicts pro futuro, the European Union itself decided to access 
as a party to the Convention. Pursuant to the provision of Art. 6 par. 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union: “The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's 
competences as defined in the Treaties.” With accession of the European Union to the 
Convention, provisions of the European public law could be directly subjected to the Court’s 
assessment regarding compliance with the Convention. The European Union has undertaken 
initial steps in order to draft international agreement regarding accession of the European 
Union to the Convention. Draft of the accession agreement has been referred to the European 
Court of Justice for opinion regarding conformity of the accession agreement with the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning on the European Union. The Court of 
Justice rendered its opinion on December 18th 2014 where it stated that accession agreement 
as drafted by the European Commission is not in conformity with the Treaties and should not 
be concluded in a manner proposed by the European Commission until necessary 
amandments to the draft, as explained by the European Court of Justice, would be rendered. 
For such negative opinion of the Court of Justice the European Union hasn’t still accessed to 
the Convention.411, 412 
                                                 
408 Ibid. 
409 Ibid, p. 727 (footnote 316). 
410 Ibid, p. 728.  
411 “In the light of all the foregoing considerations, it must be held that the agreement envisaged is not 
compatible with Article 6(2) TEU or with Protocol No 8 EU in that: 
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 As regard to the subject of our analysis we can see that there are harmonizing 
undertakings within the European Union to unify standards along with the system based upon 
the Convention. Given the fact that member states of the European Union are in the same time 
the member states of the Council of Europe where the Convention is on force, harmonization 
effects should be expanded only on the European public law where the Court should be 
authorized to assess compatibility of the acts rendered by the institutions of the European 
Union with the Convention’s standards. This harmonization process will take full effect when 
the European Union access to the Convention. In the meantime, such assessment of the Court 
will be indirect. After accession of the European Union to the Convention, harmonization 
process (and expansion of the particular constitutional law) will expand on the European 
public law. The Court will then assume direct competence regarding assessment on 
conformity of the European public law with the Convention. In this moment European public 
law is particular and independent coherent legal system which derives from actions of the 
European Union. It is interconnected with the system based upon the Convention given the 
fact that member states of the Council of Europe are in the same time member states of the 
European Union. Furthermore, provisions of European (primary) public law made on 
numerous occasion references to the Convention and the system based upon the Convention 
as particular model or ideal type in which human rights should evolve in European legal 
                                                                                                                                                        
–      it is liable adversely to affect the specific characteristics and the autonomy of EU law in so far it does not 
ensure coordination between Article 53 of the ECHR and Article 53 of the Charter, does not avert the risk that 
the principle of Member States’ mutual trust under EU law may be undermined, and makes no provision in 
respect of the relationship between the mechanism established by Protocol No 16 and the preliminary ruling 
procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU; 
–      it is liable to affect Article 344 TFEU in so far as it does not preclude the possibility of disputes between 
Member States or between Member States and the EU concerning the application of the ECHR within the scope 
ratione materiae of EU law being brought before the ECtHR; 
–      it does not lay down arrangements for the operation of the co-respondent mechanism and the procedure for 
the prior involvement of the Court of Justice that enable the specific characteristics of the EU and EU law to be 
preserved; and 
–      it fails to have regard to the specific characteristics of EU law with regard to the judicial review of acts, 
actions or omissions on the part of the EU in CFSP matters in that it entrusts the judicial review of some of those 
acts, actions or omissions exclusively to a non-EU body. 
Consequently, the Court (Full Court) gives the following Opinion: 
The agreement on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is not compatible with Article 6(2) TEU or with Protocol (No 8) 
relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the accession of the Union to the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.“ – European Court of Justice, 
Opinion No. 2/13 of December 18th 2014, available at:  
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=160882&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=l
st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=317837 (12.04.2019.) 
412 For current status regarding accesion of the European Union to the Convention see: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-area-of-justice-and-fundamental-rights/file-completion-of-
eu-accession-to-the-echr (12.04.2019.) 
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area.413 But in the meantime these two legal orders remain separated although significantly 
interconnected. After accession of the European Union to the Convention full harmonization 
process will begin. Such harmonization will be on horizontal international level (between the 
European Union and the Convention) given the fact that horizontal and vertical national 
harmonization is already been conducted by the Court. But until that time, it is plausible that 
the Convention’s standards have been recognized by the European Union and are consulted in 
the practice of the Court of Justice.414  
 Finally it also must be noted for the context of our analysis that Art. 53 of the Charter 
of fundamental rights of the European Union also prescribes the possibility for member states 
to grant higher level of protection of human rights than the level set out in the Charter.415 
Such provision in particular means that European Union member states are entitle to grant 
more level of protection like they are entitle to recognize more level of protection than level 
set out in the Convention.416 But in the case of the European Union such higher level of 
                                                 
413 See e.g. already mentioned Art. 6 par. 3 of the Treaty on the European Union or Art. 52 par. 3 of the Charter 
of fundamental rights of the European Union. 
414 See e.g. case Aranyosi and Căldăraru (joined cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU) where the Court of Justice 
invoked the Convention and the Court's practice regarding extradiction on the basis of the European arrest 
warrant and practically applied the Court's standards. Respective judgement is available at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=175547&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=l
st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=346858 (12.04.2019.) 
Implementing the Court's standard in interpreting of the European public law the Court of Justice has also 
invoked in recent cases regarding asylum (C.K. and others v. Slovenia, case C-578/16 PPU, judgement of 16th 
February 2017). The Court of Justice noted: „It must be recalled that the prohibition of inhuman or degrading 
treatment laid down in Article 4 of the Charter corresponds to that laid down in Article 3 of the ECHR and that, 
to that extent, its meaning and scope are, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, the same as those 
conferred on it by that convention. It follows from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating 
to Article 3 of the ECHR, which must be taken into account when interpreting Article 4 of the Charter (see, to 
that effect, judgment of 21 December 2011, N. S. and Others, C‑411/10 and C‑493/10, EU:C:2011:865, 
paragraphs 87 to 91), that the suffering which flows from naturally occurring illness, whether physical or 
mental, may be covered by Article 3 of the ECHR if it is, or risks being, exacerbated by treatment, whether 
flowing from conditions of detention, expulsion or other measures, for which the authorities can be held 
responsible, provided that the resulting suffering attains the minimum level of severity required by that article 
(see, to that effect, ECtHR, 13 December 2016, Paposhvili v. Belgium, CE:ECHR:2016:1213JUD004173810, § 
174 and 175).“ – par. 67 and 68 of the judgement. Available at:  
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=187916&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=l
st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=343665 (12.04.2019.) 
Referral of the Court of Justice to the practice of the Court has been determined on numerous occasions. Theory 
of the constitutional law already confirmed that these two courts are pillars of common European enterprise 
regarding human rights law. See: S. Douglas-Scott: „A tale of two courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the 
growing European human rights acquis“ in: Kluwer Law International, Common Market Law Review, 43 
(2006), p. 652. 
415 “Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union law and international 
law and by international agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are party, including the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member 
States' constitutions.“  
416 Art. 53 of the Convention prescribes: „Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or 
derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any 
High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a party.“ 
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protection must be in conformity with the principle of effectiveness of the European public 
law. Ultimately, minimum standards according to the Charter can prevail even over higher 
national standards if national standards would question effectiveness of the European public 
law.417  
 For the conclusion we can emphasize that our theoretical concept of particular 
constitutional law can be applied in the case of the European Union given the fact that 
harmonization process between systems based upon the Convention and the European public 
law is already visible. The Court of Justice has occasional references to the practice of the 
Court and to the Convention and undertakes all necessary actions in order to apply European 
public law in the light of the Convention. Furthermore, acts of the European Union have 
reference to the Convention which points out to the conclusion that the Convention is 
considered as model or ideal type for human rights protection. The Convention is framework 
of human rights for the European Union. Finally, the European Union proclaimed its 
obligation to access the Convention which fact will bring European public law to the Court 
and its assessment on conformity with the Convention. This will ensure further harmonization 
of the particular constitutional law with the European public law. Historically it is also visible 
that dealing of domestic courts with legal position of the European public law in general 
hierarchy of domestic law also had beneficial effect on position of the Convention in domestic 
legal order. Practically, by resolving the position of the Community law in domestic legal 
order, domestic courts also verified the position of the Convention.418 
Of course, the European Union tries to secure effectiveness of the European public law 
for which reason will give prime significance to the European public law in any conflict with 
other sources of law. But nevertheless, harmonized application of the European public law 
with the Convention, if such application is possible, will be secured. For all stated arguments, 
we conclude that our new theoretical concept of the particular constitutional law can be 
                                                 
417 Significance and necessity of application of the European public law and standards which are lower than 
national standards prescribed by e.g. national constitution is visible in the case Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal (case 
C-399/11, judgement of the European Court of Justice of  February 23rd 2011) where the Court of Justice 
specifically held that constitutional guarantees regarding proceeding in abstentia which are on higher level than 
one set out in the Charter are not ground to refuse execution of the European arrest warrant. If such conflict 
between higher national standards regarding protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and standards 
set out in the European public law arises, member state must give priority to the European public law and 
disregard national provisions even if such provisions are on the constitutional level. For the reasons of 
effectivenes of European public law, standards prescribed by European public law must be applied even if they 
are on lower level than national one. Judgement of the Court of Justice in the Melloni case is available at: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0399&from=EN  (12.04.2019.) 
418 See: supra, p. 204.  
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applied in the case of the European Union because it has all necessary requirements to expand 
on European public law when the European Union access to the Convention.  
 
  5.5.2. American Convention on Human Rights 
 
 In the case of the European Union applicability of the concept of the particular 
constitutional law was easily established because of the existence of particular beneficial 
factors (simultaneous membership in the Council of Europe and the European Union, general 
openness and reliance of the European public law to the Convention and the Court, explicit 
obligation of the European Union on accession to the Convention, principle of primacy of 
European public law, principle of effet utile etc.). In the case of the European Union the 
particular constitutional law and common standards will expand on the European public law 
when the European Union accesses to the Convention.  
 Now we have to assess can we apply our theoretical concept of the particular 
constitutional law on other regional human rights systems in global context. In other words, 
can we theoretically construct the existence of supranational constitutional order based upon 
international agreement devoted to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
where supranational and independent court is competent to determine violation of its 
provisions and member states are fully responsible for execution of final judgement of such 
international court. On the American continents one particular organization can be considered 
in the context of our analysis. This particular organization is the Organization of American 
States which is international organization of 35 states on American continent devoted to the 
peace and security of the continent, promotion and consolidation of representative democracy, 
promotion by cooperative action economic, social and cultural development of member states 
with democracy, human rights, security and development.419 Fundamental duties of the 
Organization are comparable with duties and goals of the Council of Europe given the fact 
that the Council of Europe is also international organization devoted to the peaceful resolution 
                                                 
419 Charter of the Organization of American States as amended by the Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of 
the Organization of American States "Protocol of Buenos Aires", signed on February 27, 1967, at the Third 
Special Inter-American Conference, by the Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of 
American States "Protocol of Cartagena de Indias", approved on December 5, 1985, at the Fourteenth Special 
Session of the General Assembly, by the Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American 
States "Protocol of Washington", approved on December 14, 1992, at the Sixteenth Special Session of the 
General Assembly, and by the Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States 
"Protocol of Managua", adopted on June 10, 1993, at the Nineteenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 
available at: http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/docs/inter_american_treaties_A-41_charter_OAS.pdf (12.04.2019.) 
More about the Organization is available at: http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp (12.04.2019.) 
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of potential conflicts and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms on the 
European continent.420 For that reason, the Organization of American States also introduced 
supranational legal mechanism in order to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms on 
the American continent – the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: “American 
Convention”). The American Convention was adopted at the Inter-American Specialized 
Conference on Human Rights in San José, Costa Rica, on November 22nd, 1969 and entered 
into force on  July 18th 1978.421 After entering on force, two additional Protocols have been 
adopted in order to amend provisions of the American Convention. First was Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (so called the Protocol of San Salvador) which was adopted on November 
17th 1988 in San Salvador, El Salvador and entered into force on  November 16th 1999.422 
Second additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to abolish the 
death penalty was adopted on  June 8th 1990 in Asuncion, Paraguay. Respective Protocol 
entered on force immediately among those member states that ratified or acceded to it after 
they deposited their instruments of ratification or accession.423  
 In the context of our analysis it is necessary to underline reasons which guided the 
Organization of American States to enact the American Convention. Those reasons are 
substantially similar with reasons that guided the Council of Europe to enact the Convention, 
i.e. strong believes that commitment to the protection and realization of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms is essential for justice and peace in the world and greater unity among 
member states.424 For such reasons, both of the Conventions have similar raison d'être. In the 
light of that fact it could be reasonably expected that the Convention (adopted prior to the 
American Convention) will be particular guidance for drafters of the American Convention. It 
is visible that drafters of the American Convention in preparing of the final text which will be 
adopted in San José took in depth analysis of the Convention’s provision and practically 
                                                 
420 “The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of 
safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their 
economic and social progress. 
This aim shall be pursued through the organs of the Council by discussion of questions of common concern and 
by agreements and common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters and 
in the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.“ – Art. 1 of the Statute of 
the Council of Europe.  
421 See http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm (12.04.2019.) 
422 http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/basic_documents.asp (12.04.2019.) 
423 Ibid.  
424 Cf. Preamble of the American Convention with the Preamble of the Convention.  
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relied on the Convention and took over significant provisions of the Convention as well as 
institutional structure.425  
 The American Convention prescribed human rights and fundamental freedoms which 
have been similar to rights and freedoms prescribed by the Convention (e.g. right to life, right 
to personal liberty, right to a fair trial, right to privacy, rights of the family etc.). Furthermore, 
the American Convention established Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(comparable to the European Commission on Human Rights) and Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (comparable to the European Court of Human Rights prior to entering on force 
of the Protocol No. 11 to the Convention) with comparable functions and competence to the 
Convention’s system prior to the entering on force of the Protocol No. 11 to the 
Convention.426  
 Today’s system based upon the American Convention is, in most significant aspects, 
comparable to the system based upon the Convention prior to the entering on force of the 
Protocol No. 11 to the Convention. The American Convention does not recognize direct 
approach of individuals to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights given the fact that 
direct approach has been provided only to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
or member states. Art. 61 of the American Convention specifically prescribes that only 
member states and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter: “Inter-
American Commission”) have the right to submit the case to the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (hereinafter: “Inter-American Court”). In order to Inter-American Court 
consider the particular case, procedure before the Inter-American Commission must be 
fulfilled. Inter-American Commission serves as filter or barrier for the individual in their path 
to the Inter-American Court. Pursuant to the Art. 44 of the American Convention “Any person 
or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more 
member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing 
denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party.” As it has been 
the case with the Convention prior to the entering on force of the Protocol No. 11, individuals 
must first lodge their petitions to the Inter-American Commission which will consider their 
case if remedies under domestic law have been exhausted, if petition is lodged within a period 
of six months from the date on which the party alleging violation of his rights was notified of 
                                                 
425 Documents of the 1969 Inter-American Conference on Human Rights (travaux préparatoires), available on 
Spanish language at: http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/mandato/Basicos/Actas-Conferencia-Interamericana-Derechos-
Humanos-1969.pdf (12.04.2019.) 
426 For detail historical overview and the origin of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights see: L. J. LeBlanc: 
„The OAS and the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights“, Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague, 1977, p. 41 – 50.  
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the final judgement, if petition concerned is not pending in another international proceeding 
or settlement and that petition contains name, nationality, profession, domicile and signature 
of persons lodging the petition (Art. 46 par. 1 of the American Convention). After lodging the 
petition, the Inter-American Commission will perform procedure prescribed in thr Art. 48 – 
50 of the American Convention. Namely, the Inter-American Commission will request 
information from respondent state after which will examine the matter in order to verify the 
facts and try to reach a friendly settlement between the individual who lodged the petition and 
the respondent state (Art. 48 par. 1f) of the American Convention). If a friendly settlement has 
not been reached, the Inter-American Commission will draw up its report determining the 
facts and stating its conclusion. Report will then be transmitted to the individual and 
respondent state. If, within a period of three months from the date of the transmittal of the 
report of the Inter-American Commission to the states concerned, the matter has not either 
been settled or submitted by the Inter-American Commission or by the state concerned to the 
Inter-American Court and its jurisdiction accepted, the Inter-American Commission may, by 
the vote of an absolute majority of its members, set forth its opinion and conclusions 
concerning the question submitted for its consideration. When the prescribed period has 
expired, the Inter-American Commission shall decide by the vote of an absolute majority of 
its members whether the state has taken adequate measures and whether to publish its report 
(Art. 51 of the American Convention).427  
 From respective provisions we can easily determine that two underlying factors are 
significantly important for the Inter-American Court to hear the case of individuals. First of 
all, the Inter-American Commission must decide to submit the case to the Inter-American 
Court (or member state concerned) and second of all jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court 
must be accepted. Only after those two substantial conditions have been fulfilled, the Inter-
American Court can act and decide whether violation of the American Convention has really 
occurred.428 If the Inter-American Court determines eventually that violation of rights and 
freedoms set out in the American Convention have occurred in particular case the Court shall 
rule that to the injured party must be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was 
violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation 
that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied, and that fair compensation 
                                                 
427 Generally speaking, the proceedure before the Inter-American Commission has four distinct stages: screening 
petitions (stage I), transmitting petitions to governments concerned (stage II), fact-gathering (stage III), 
disposition of petitions (stage IV). More about actions in each stage can be found in: L. J. LeBlanc, op.cit. 
(footnote 420), p. 98 – 105.  
428 Such organization corresponds with the system based upon the Convention prior to the Protocol No. 11. See 
supra, p. 126 – 129 of the dissertation.  
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be paid to the injured party (Art. 63 of the Convention). Judgements of the Inter-American 
Court are final and cannot be subjected to appeal where the member states undertake to 
comply with the judgements of the Inter-American Court in any case to which they are parties 
(Art. 68 par. 1 of the American Convention). Monitoring of the execution process is governed 
by the Inter-American Court itself.  
 Given the fact that we have underlined structural similarities between system based 
upon the Convention and system based upon the American Convention we also have to assess 
applicability of our theoretical concept of the particular constitutional law to the system based 
upon the American Convention. In other words, is it possible to construct one supranational 
and independent constitutional legal order which is developing among member states of the 
Organization of American States and which development is directed by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights where human rights and fundamental freedoms as prescribed by 
constitutions of member states are grammatically and normatively similar or even equal with 
human rights prescribed by the American Convention?  
 In this analysis first, it is necessary to determine that individuals do not have the right 
on direct access to the Inter-American Court (like it is in the case of the Court). Individuals 
must first lodge their petition to the Inter-American Commission after which Inter-American 
Commission solely decide will respective case be subsequently submitted to the Court 
pursuant to the provisions of the American Convention. And such submission to the Court 
must be against member state which has recognized compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court. Of all of the 35-member states of the Organization of American States, 20 of 
them have recognized compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court.429 In the case of 
the Convention, all of the Council of Europe member states recognized compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to the provisions of the Protocol No. 11 to the Convention 
and individuals have direct access to the Court. In the case of the American Convention, the 
Inter-American Commission serves as filter (or even a barrier) for the individuals to present 
their cases to the Inter-American Court. For this reason, Inter-American Court in 2018 has 
received only 18 new contentious cases from the Inter-American Commission and has 
delivered only 28 judgements (21 of them in contentious cases and seven on interpretation).430 
On the other hand, Inter-American Commission has received in 2018 total of 2957 petitions 
                                                 
429 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2018, p. 9, available at:  
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/informe2018/ingles.pdf  (12.04.2019.) 
430 Ibid, p. 33 and 36. 
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lodged according to the provisions of the American Convention431 which fact clearly indicates 
that of all lodged petitions to the Inter-American Commission only small fragment of cases 
are submitted to the Inter-American Court. This fact prevents the Inter-American Court to 
develop its own significant judicial practice. In other words, the Inter-American Court misses 
its own caseload which could be developed with direct access of the individuals to the Inter-
American Court. All petitions must first go through filter by the Inter-American Commission 
where only small portion of petitions are ultimately submitted to the Inter-American Court. 
From historical development we determined that such development was characteristic of the 
Convention’s system prior to the Protocol No. 11. Only when the Court assumed direct 
competence over violation of the Convention’s provision, the system based upon the 
Convention has evolved and introduced special supranational area of constitutional law. If the 
American Convention should be amended in such perspective, prime barrier to the 
construction of particular constitutional law would be set aside. By increasing the caseload to 
the Inter-American Court, judicial practice would become more develop and would enter in 
domestic legal order of member states in reduced time frame.  
 Nevertheless, it must be determined that the Inter-American Court has achievements in 
the line of protection of human rights and that its judgements led to the revision of domestic 
legal framework in order to meet the American Convention’s standards.432 But apart from 
such plausible statistics, other researches from 2014 indicate low level of compliance with 
final judgements of the Inter-American Court and orders issued by the Inter-American Court. 
But same research also indicated that system is improving.433 Although plausible, such 
                                                 
431 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report 2018, Chapter II, p. 59, available at:  
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2018/TOC.asp (12.04.2019.) 
432 „In addition, during 2018, the mechanism of joint monitoring continued with regard to the following 
measures of reparation: 
• The obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish, as appropriate, those responsible for the gross human 
rights violations in fourteen (14) cases against Guatemala; 
• Measures to identify, transfer and grant title to the lands of three indigenous communities ordered in three (3) 
cases against Paraguay; 
• The provision of medical and psychological treatment to the victims in nine (9) cases against Colombia 
• The adaptation of domestic law to international standards and those of the Convention with regard to the 
guarantee of an ordinary judge in relation to the military criminal jurisdiction in four (4) cases against Mexico; 
• The adaptation of domestic law concerning protection of the right to life in the context of the obligatory 
imposition of the death penalty for the crime of murder in two (2) cases against Barbados; 
• Guarantees of non-repetition in two (2) cases against Honduras concerning protection for human rights 
defenders, in particular environmentalists, and 
• The possibility of exercising the right to decide whether to have biological offspring by access to in vitro 
fertilization in both the private and the public sector, ordered in two (2) cases against Costa Rica.“ 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2018, p. 68. 
433 „There is a widespread concern about the level of compliance with the judgments of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, as can be inferred from the increasing level of attention the topic is obtaining from different 
authors. The comprehensive empirical analysis conducted within this article shows relatively optimistic data. 
263 
 
individual interventions and improvements are not comparable with the system based upon 
the Convention in the light of the fact that the Court in 2018 has received 43 100 new 
applications where 42 761 decisions in total were rendered (2 738 judgements and 40 023 
decisions on inadmissibility). Apart of such extensive numbers, on December 31st, 2018 
additional 56 350 cases were pending before the Court.434 Level of compliance with the 
judgements is on higher level in the case of the Court which is the most important input for 
the construction of the particular constitutional law.435 
 We can conclude that as for the American Convention is concerned our new 
theoretical concept can be constructed but only on initial level of its inception. It is clear that 
there are institutional requirements for the system as a unit (there are institutions and 
procedures which are prescribed by the American Convention), there is existed evolutive 
approach in interpretation of the American Convention436, there are member states that 
recognize compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (20 of 35) and member states (in most general 
sense) tend to implement judgements of the Inter-American Court in domestic legal systems 
in order to meet standards as prescribed by the Inter-American Court.437 Additional beneficial 
factors for the construction of the respective concept of the particular constitutional law in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
While the overall level of full compliance with the Court’s judgments reached an impressive 90% of 
noncompliance by the end of 2012, the article shows that compliance with specific measures ordered by the 
Court is much higher. Nonetheless, the optimistic data regarding compliance is limited to certain measures and 
does not cover all of them. The compliance with the orders concerning the payment of compensation, as well as 
the orders regarding the public acknowledgement of the States’ responsibility is relatively high. Conversely, the 
measures ordering criminal prosecution and the amendment of domestic legislation show a much lower level of 
compliance. On the other hand, the comparative analysis of the degree of compliance with the Court’s orders is 
interesting, as it shows that during the last years the States have improved their level of compliance with the 
judgments. The data provided in this article illustrates that the percentage of compliance with every measure 
under analysis is higher than it was four and a half years earlier. Therefore, there is another reason for 
optimism, as the attitude of the States towards the Court’s judgments has improved.“ D.A. Gonzalez-Salzberg: 
„Do States comply with the compulsory judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights? An empirical 
study of the compliance with 330 measures of reparation“, op.cit. (footnote 371), p. 26 – 27. See also: D. 
Rodríguez-Pínzon and C. Martin: „The Inter-American human rights system: selected examples of its 
supervisory work“, in: S. Joseph and A. McBeth (ed.): Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law, 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., UK, 2010, p. 353 – 388.  
434 European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2018, p 167, available at:  
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2018_ENG.pdf  (12.04.2019.) 
435 Cf. p. 162 (footnote 238).  
436 “In the area of jurisprudence, this year we have continued to rule on innovative issues, as well as reinforcing 
important international human rights standards. Thus, we have been able to reaffirm our jurisprudence on 
several topics, such as forced disappearance, crimes against humanity, violence against women, political rights, 
the right to work, and the right to health and, for the first time, established a State’s responsibility for violation 
of the principle of progressivity. We should also emphasize the new inter-American standards in relation to the 
mechanism of asylum and its recognition as a human right, to pardons, to the obligation of enhanced due 
diligence and special protection in investigations and criminal proceedings based on sexual violence against 
children and adolescents, as well as State responsibility for acts of sexual torture by a non-state agent.“ – Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2018, Foreword of Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot, 
President of the Inter-American Court, p. 6. 
437 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2018, p. 90 – 92.  
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case of the Inter-American Court is the fact that the Inter-American Court is witnessing 
achievements of the Court in contemporary time in the field of human rights protection. Given 
the fact that both of them are devoted to the protection of human rights we can expect further 
interactions between the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Court regarding 
achievements and improvements of minimum standards across the globe. Initial steps have 
already been registered.438, 439  
 But on the other hand, only small number of cases is referred to the Inter-American 
Court for consideration for which reason judicial practice of the Inter-American Court is still 
modest (as it has been the case with the Court prior to the Protocol No. 11 to the Convention). 
If the American Convention should be amended so the Inter-American Court could assume 
direct competence like the Court itself, we would probably (ceteris paribus) witness 
expansion and confirmation of new supranational legal order of constitutional significance 
within particular number of member states of the Organization of American States. But until 
that time really modest jurisprudence of the Court prevents such development in the line of 
the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms within the Organization of 
American States. Finally, it also must be noted that openness to the international law and 
commitment to the rule of law and to the democracy as well as to the human rights protection 
in general political environment in one particular state are equally important demands that are 
beneficial to the development of the particular constitutional law.440 All these conditions must 
be met in order to construct particular constitutional law because member states and their 
openness and reliance on enhanced human rights protection scheme as presented by the 
supranational court is equally important demand in construction of supranational legal order 
of constitutional meaning. In this moment it cannot be predicted would member states of the 
Organization of American States execute all final judgements of the Inter-American Court if 
the Inter-American Court would achieve statistics of the Court. Nevertheless, if member states 
would accept such activistic approach of the Inter-American Court in the line of protection of 
                                                 
438 See C. Domínguez: „Inter-American Court of Human rights and European Court of Human rights. From 
observation to Interaction on Human rights“, in: Y. Haeck, O. Ruiz-Chiriboga, C. Burbano Herrera (ed.): „The 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Theory and Practice, Present and Future“, Intersentia, 2015, p. 739 – 
753.  
439 In November 2018 joint public seminar of the Court and Inter-American Court of Human Rights has been 
organized in Strasbourg on the optimization of a methodology in adjudicating large-scale human rights 
violations. Various topics have been analysed and discussed between judges of the Court and Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights which clearly points out to the conclusion that the Court and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights are becoming joint authorities in global human rights framework. See: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Seminar_Inter_American_Court_20181109_ENG.pdf  
440 See supra, p. 225 - 226.  
265 
 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, the concept of the particular constitutional law could 
be constructed.  
 One additional characteristic in which the system based upon the American 
Convention and the Convention differ is the fact that execution of final judgements of the 
Inter-American Court is monitored by the Inter-American Court itself and that the Inter-
American Court accepted really wide set of measures which must be undertaken in order to 
close stage of monitoring compliance with the judgement of the Inter-American Court.441   
This fact in the same time means that Inter-American Court has one additional competence 
(monitoring compliance with its judgement) beside the adjudication function which  
competence also complicates functions of the Inter-American Court due to the enormous 
proliferation of cases at monitoring stage.442  
 Although equipped with additional competence on monitoring compliance with its 
own judgements as well as with autonomous set of measures which can be ordered to the 
contracting states in order to rectify infringed human rights guaranteed by the American 
Convention, lack of own caseload in relation to the non-compliance with judgements prevent 
construction of the concept of the particular constitutional law in the case of the American 
Convention. 
 
  5.5.3. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
 Final (international) regional human rights system which will be subjected to the 
analysis of applicability regarding the particular constitutional law is African human rights 
system based upon the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter: “African 
Charter”) which has been concluded within member states of the Organization of African 
Unity. As it has been the case with the Council of Europe and the Organization of American 
                                                 
441 Even wider than it is in the case of the Convention. „To understand the wide range of measures ordered by 
the Court, they can be grouped into the following six different forms of reparation: restitution, rehabilitation, 
satisfaction, guarantees of non-repetition, compensation and reimbursement of costs and expenses, and 
obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish, as appropriate.“ Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Annual Report 2018, op.cit. (footnote 432), p. 65 (footnote 64). These set of measures are generally wider than 
those (general and individual) which occur in the case of the Convention in order to rectify infringed human 
right and fundamental freedom prescribed in the Convention and determined by the Court. See supra, p. 225.  
442 „Monitoring compliance with the Court’s judgments has become one of the most demanding activities of the 
Court, because each year there is a considerable increase in the number of cases at this stage. Numerous 
measures of reparation are ordered in each judgment and the Court monitors, rigorously and continually, 
prompt and cumulative compliance with every reparation ordered. When assessing compliance with each 
reparation, the Court makes a thorough examination of the way in which the different components are executed, 
and how they are implemented with regard to each victim who benefits from the measures, because there are 
numerous victims in most cases. Currently, 208 cases are at the stage of monitoring compliance65 and this 
entails monitoring 1,140 measures of reparation.“, Ibid, p. 65.  
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States, Organization of African Unity is also regional international organization devoted to the 
protection of peace as the greatest value of all mankind, universal approach to the human 
rights protection and eradication of substantial inequalities between member states.443 
 Organization of African Unity consists of the Continental African States, Madagascar 
and other Islands surrounding Africa (Art. 1 par. 2 of the OAU Charter). In the light of clear 
commitment to the human rights protection, the Organization of African Unity has also 
presented fundamental supranational human rights legal instrument comparable to the 
Convention and to the American Convention. This instrument is the African Charter which 
has been adopted on June 27th 1981 and entered on force on October 21st 1986. The African 
Charter is also known as the Banjul Charter.444 As it has been the case with additional two 
regional human rights instruments presented above, the African Charter also proclaims, on the 
basis of universalistic approach to the human rights protection, particular inalienable human 
rights which must be recognized to every human being.445 According to the African Charter 
                                                 
443 The Preamble of the Organization of African Unity Charter states:  
„We, the Heads of African States and Governments assembled in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,  
Convinced that it is the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny, 
Conscious of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of 
the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples, 
… 
Inspired by a common determination to promote understanding among our peopleand cooperation among our 
states in response to the aspirations of our peoples for brother-hood and solidarity, in a larger unity 
transcending ethnic and national differences, 
… 
Convinced that, in order to translate this determination into a dynamic force in the cause of human progress, 
conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained, 
… 
Persuaded that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the 
Principles of which we reaffirm our adherence, provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation 
among States,  
Desirous that all African States should henceforth unite so that the welfare and wellbeing of their peoples can be 
assured, 
Have agreed to the present Charter.“ – Preamble of the Organization of African Unity Charter, available at:  
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf  (12.04.2019.) 
444 The African Charter, available at: http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/banjul_charter.pdf 
(12.04.2019.) 
445 Preamble of the African Charter states:  
„The African States members of the Organization of African Unity, parties to the present convention entitled 
"African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights", 
… 
Considering the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which stipulates that "freedom, equality, justice 
and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples"; 
… 
Recognizing on the one hand, that fundamental human rights stem from the attributes of human beings which 
justifies their national and international protection and on the other  hand that the reality and respect of peoples 
rights should necessarily guarantee human rights; 
… 
Reaffirming their adherence to the principles of human and peoples' rights and freedoms contained in the 
declarations, conventions and other instrument adopted by the Organization of African Unity, the Movement of 
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every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of human rights recognized and guaranteed 
in the African Charter without any discrimination whatsoever where contracting states must 
ensure effective realization of rights recognized in the African Charter (Art. 1 and 2 of the 
African Charter). Human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized and protected by the 
African Charter are comparable to the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by 
the Convention and the American Convention.446 These rights are e.g. the right to life (but 
without expressive abolishment of the death penalty in any case), the right to liberty and to the 
security, the right to have his cause heard (comparable to the right to a fair trial), the rights for 
family etc. (Art. 4, 6, 7 of the African Charter et. seq.). The African Charter is also interested 
given the fact that beside human rights which must be guaranteed to every individual, it also 
imposes duties to the individuals. Such duties are e.g. duties towards family and society, the 
member state and other legally recognized communities and the international community, 
duty to respect and consider his fellow beings without discrimination etc. (Chapter II of the 
African Charter).       
  In order to secure protection of proclaimed human rights the African Charter 
introduced the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter: “African 
Commission”)447 which will be mandated to ensure their protection in Africa.448 Regarding 
respective protection, the African Charter’s main procedural mechanism in due aspect is 
founded on state to state communications to the African Commission. Art. 47 of the African 
                                                                                                                                                        
Non-Aligned Countries and the United Nations;  
 
… 
Have agreed as follows…“ 
446 Which fact is clear confirmation that drafters of the Convention, the American Convetion as well as the 
African Charter had inspiration in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For this reason, the Declaration is 
really the starting point of universalistic approach in human rights protection in contemporary time which had 
influence on global scale.   
447 For more regarding actions of the African Commission see: E. A. Ankumah: „The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples' Rights: Practice and Procedures“, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 1996.  
448 Art. 45 of the African Charter prescribes:  
„The functions of the Commission shall be: 
1. To promote Human and Peoples' Rights and in particular: 
(a) To collect documents, undertake studies and researches on African problems in the field of human and 
peoples' rights, organize seminars, symposia and conferences, disseminate information, encourage national and 
local institutions concerned with human and peoples' rights, and should the case arise, give its views or make 
recommendations to Governments. 
(b) To formulate and lay down, principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and 
peoples' rights and fundamental freedoms upon which African Governments may base their legislations. 
(c) Co-operate with other African and international institutions concerned with the promotion and protection of 
human and peoples' rights. 
2. Ensure the protection of human and peoples' rights under conditions laid down by the present Charter. 
3. Interpret all the provisions of the present Charter at the request of a State party, an institution of the OAU or 
an African Organization recognized by the OAU. 
4. Perform any other tasks which may be entrusted to it by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.“ 
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Charter specifically prescribed that if a contracting party has good reasons to believe that 
another contracting party has violated the provisions of the African Charter it may draw by 
written communication the attention of that contracting state to the matter. If within three 
months respective issue is not settled, either contracting state may submit the matter to the 
African Commission (Art. 48 of the African Charter). The African Commission will conduct 
its proceeding and obtain all necessary information regarding stated violation of the African 
Charter. If amicable settlement will not be reached, the African Commission will prepare a 
report stating the facts and its findings and communicate its report to the states concerned and 
to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (mail political assembly of the 
Organization of African Unity comparable to the Parliamentary Assemble of the Council of 
Europe). 
 Nevertheless, the African Charter also prescribed the possibility for the African 
Commission to consider other communications except state to state. Pursuant to the Art. 55 of 
the African Charter, before each session the African Commission makes a list of the 
communications other than those of state parties where the African Commission with simple 
majority of its members decide will such communication be considered. Such communication 
other than state’s communication can be considered if additional conditions are met (e.g. the 
communication is not anonymous, the communication is not written with offensive and 
insulting language, the communication is sent after exhaustion of all local remedies etc.).449 If 
communications reveal the existence of a series of serious or massive violations of human and 
peoples’ rights, the African Commission can only draw attention of the Assembly of the 
Heads of State and Government to these special cases. The Assembly than can request that the 
African Commission take in-depth study of such cases and make a report, accompanied by its 
findings and recommendations (Art. 58 of the African Charter).  
 From these provisions of the African Charter we can determine that mandate of the 
African Commission is predominantly a political one with the meaning that the African 
Commission can only (in most general sense) supervise realization of human rights protected 
by the African Charter and make reports with recommendations if violation of human rights 
really occur. Although there is particular possibility for the African Commission to institute 
provisional measure, analysis regarding compliance of member states to the decisions of the 
African Commission indicate low level of compliance. From the 44th Activity Report of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights which covers the African Commission’s 
                                                 
449 Art. 56 of the African Charter. 
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activity period from November 15th 2017 till May 9th 2018 it is clear that the African 
Commission is considering only 232 pending cases and that general level of state’s 
compliance is unsatisfactory.450 Even if we would like to construct supranational 
constitutional order on the basis of actions of political organ like the African Commission, 
general low level of compliance of contracting states to its decisions is not environment which 
can facilitate such construction. Openness to the exogenous factors which ensure protection of 
human rights on one additional qualitative level is general condition for construction of 
supranational legal order from the theoretical point of view.  
 In order to secure higher level of protection of human rights in Africa, Protocol to the 
African Charter on establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(hereinafter: “African Court”) has been concluded within the Organization of African Unity in 
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in June 1998 and entered into force on January 25th 2004.451 The 
African Court has been imagined as complementary body to the African Commission in 
human rights protection in Africa.452,453 Its jurisdiction extents to all cases and disputes 
submitted to it which concern application and interpretation of the African Charter, respective 
Protocol but also any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned 
(Art. 3 of the Protocol). From this provision we can determine that the African Court has in 
fact higher level of jurisdiction in comparison with the Court or the Inter-American Court 
given the fact that those two international judicial authorities have jurisdiction only in relation 
                                                 
450 „The level of compliance by State Parties with the Commission’s Decisions, Requests for Provisional 
Measures and Letters of Urgent Appeal is relatively low, as evidenced by the following information…. During 
the reporting period, the Commission did not receive any information regarding the implementation of its 
decisions in accordance with Rule 112 of its Rules of Procedure of 2010… . During the reporting period, the 
Commission did not receive any responses on the five (5) Requests for Provisional Measures which it issued to 
State Parties as indicated in the table on Communications in paragraph 21 above…“ - 44th Activity Report of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, p. 10 – 11, available at: 
http://www.achpr.org/files/activity-reports/44/actrep44_2018_eng.pdf (12.04.2019.) 
451 http://en.african-court.org/index.php/12-homepage1/1-welcome-to-the-african-court (12.04.2019.) 
452 „The Court shall, bearing in mind the provisions of this Protocol, complement the protective mandate of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission") conferred 
upon it by the African Charter on human and Peoples' Rights (hereinafter referred to as "the Charter").“ – Art. 
2 of the Protocol to the African Charter on the establishment of the African Court, available at: http://en.african-
court.org/images/Basic%20Documents/africancourt-humanrights.pdf (12.04.2019.) 
453 For critical evaluation of the human rights system in Africa (regarding its effectiveness) see: M. Mutua: „The 
African Human Rights System: A Critical Evaluation“, prepared for United Nations Development Programme, 
Human Development Report 2000 (2000). Available at:  
https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/other_scholarship/16 (12.04.2019.) See also: M. Killander: „African 
human rights law in theory in practice“ in: S. Joseph and A. McBeth (ed.): Research Handbook on International 
Human Rights Law, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., UK, 2010, p. 388 – 414.  
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to the (Inter-American) Convention but not also over the application of other human rights 
instruments which have been ratified by states concerned.454 
 Right to address the African Court is prescribed in the Art. 5 of the Protocol where 
individual applications to the Court cannot be find. Right to access to the African Court is 
reserved for the African Commission which can refer its case to the African Court (like in the 
case of the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court), the state party which 
has lodged a complaint to the African Commission pursuant to the provisions of the African 
Charter, the state party against which the complaint has been lodged at the African 
Commission, the state party whose citizen is a victim of a human rights violation and African 
Inter-Governmental Organizations. However, the Court may entitle relevant Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) with observer status before the African Commission as 
well as the individuals to institute their case directly to the African Court but only if separate 
declaration on such competence has been made by state concerned. If such separate 
declaration has not been made, the African Court cannot accept cases from NGO’s or 
individuals (Art. 5 par. 3 in relation with Art. 34 par. 6 of the Protocol). The African Court 
emphasizes that of 30 member states to the Protocol on establishment of the African Court 
only 8 of them made such declaration which means that individual applications can be lodged 
only from 9 member states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, 
Malawi, Tanzania and Republic of Tunisia).455 
 If any of submitted application (individual or other) will be considered admissible 
pursuant to the provisions of the African Charter, the African Court will conduct proceeding 
and deliberate its judgement which is final and not subjected to any appeal (Art. 28 of the 
Protocol). As it has been the case with the Convention and the American Convention, the 
Protocol on the establishment of the African Court also prescribes international obligation of 
member states to execute all final judgements of the African Court.456 
                                                 
454 Art. 32 of the Convention regarding jurisdiction of the Courts prescribes: „The jurisdiction of the Court shall 
extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto 
which are referred to it as provided in Articles 33, 34, 46 and 47.“ 
In the case of Inter-American Court we can find jurisdiction over interpretation of other human rights instrument 
in the American states. Art. 64 of the American Convention prescribes: „The member states of the Organization 
may consult the Court regarding the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the 
protection of human rights in the American states. Within their spheres of competence, the organs listed in 
Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization of American States, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, 
may in like manner consult the Court.“ 
455 http://en.african-court.org/index.php/12-homepage1/1-welcome-to-the-african-court (12.04.2019.) 
456 „The States parties to the present Protocol undertake to comply with the judgment in any case to which they 
are parties within the time stipulated by the Court and to guarantee its execution.“ – Art. 30 of the Protocol.  
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 Unfortunately, reports of the African Court on non-compliance with its judgement 
reveal non-effectiveness of the system as well as low number of applications made to the 
African Court (in comparison to the e.g. the Court). Most relevant report on the activities of 
the African Court is for the year 2018 and covers the period from January 1st to December 31st 
2018. Respective report indicates that only 140 cases are pending before the African Court 
with one additional request for advisory opinion. In the same period, the African Court 
delivered 17 judgements and was seized with 29 new cases.457 Although dealing with such 
small number of cases, there are underlying structural deficiencies in execution of the African 
Court’s judgements which fact cannot secure effectiveness of the system which is one of the 
substantial characteristics of particular constitutional law.458 Small deviations cannot 
challenge the effectiveness of the system but in the case of the African Court we see small 
number of member states which have made declaration regarding competence of the Court 
over individual applications (only 9 of them).459 Furthermore, only small number of cases are 
heard before the African Court which points out to the conclusion that the African Court, like 
it is the case with the Inter-American Court, is missing its own caseload which will facilitate 
the construction of supranational constitutional system. And for the conclusion, small level of 
                                                 
457 “ From 1 January to 31 December 2018, the Court was seized with twenty-nine (29) new cases. Since its 
establishment therefore (2006, stipulated by author), the Court has received a total of Onehundred and ninety 
(190) Applications in contentious matters and thirteen (13) Requests for Advisory Opinion. The Court has a total 
of one-hundred and fourty (140) Applications and one (1) Request for Advisory Opinion pending before it. 
Overall, the Court has rendered decisions and opinions as follows: 
i. Judgments on the merits 28 
ii. Rulings on admissibility 07 
iii. Rulings on jurisdiction 20 
iv. Judgments on Applications for Review 03 
v. Judgments on Interpretation of Judgment 03 
vi. Judgments on Reparations 05 
vii. Advisory Opinions rendered 12 
viii. Orders for Interim Measures 26 
ix. Rulings on Preliminary objections 02 
…. 
During the same period, the Court delivered seventeen (17) judgments and deferred 140 Applications and 1 
Request for further consideration.“ - Activity Report of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(AfCHPR) for 2018, p. 4, available at:  
http://en.african-court.org/images/Activity%20Reports/Activity%20report%20January%20-
%20December%20%202018.pdf  (12.04.2019.) 
458 „Another major challenge the Court faces is the non-compliance with its judgments and orders. To date, the 
Court has rendered 28 judgments on the merits that established violation of the provisions of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights or other international human rights instruments, and in conformity with Article 
27 of the Protocol, made orders on how these countries should remedy the violations. Apart from Burkina Faso 
which has fully complied with the judgments of the Court, the other countries against which the Court has found 
a violation have either partially complied (Tanzania) or not complied at all (Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Libya, Mali 
and Rwanda)“ Ibid, p. 59 – 60. 
459 For all challenges that the African Court is facing in contemporary time see: A. Mohammed: „African Court 
on Human and Peoples' Rights: Challenges and Opportunities in Protecting Human and Peoples' Rights in 
Africa“, Omniscriptum Publishing Group, Latvia, 2010. 
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compliance with the judgements and other decisions of the African Court (e.g. orders for 
provisional measures) as well as with the African Commission cannot secure establishment of 
effective constitutional system which are all characteristics of our new theoretical concept 
constructed in the case of the Convention.  
 As for the conclusion regarding applicability analysis of our new theoretical concept to 
other regional human rights system based upon the universalistic approach in human rights 
protection we can conclude as following. All of analysed systems have institutional 
requirements to be considered as foundation of particular supranational legal order. They all 
are regional organization devoted to the protection of peace and human rights with their 
effective realization. They all have basic source of law, particular international agreement 
based upon universalistic approach in human rights protection and devoted to the protection 
and realization of human rights. Such systems also have supranational judicial authority with 
jurisdiction over interpretation and application of basic source of law. Judgements of this 
authority constitute international obligation of member states on their full execution in 
domestic legal order.  
 But on the other hand, one of analysed system is extremely interconnected with the 
system based upon the Convention (the European Union) given the fact that member states of 
the Council of Europe are in the same time member states of the European Union, that legal 
order of the European Union in judicial reasoning is relied as much as possible on the system 
based upon the Convention and that the European Union as unit will within reasonable time 
accede to the Convention. For this reason, in the case of the European Union harmonized 
approach in construction of particular constitutional law is possible.  
 In the case of the American Convention and the Inter-American Court we can 
determine that this system does not possesses two main features of the system based upon the 
Convention – it does not have direct access of the individuals to the Inter-American Court for 
which reason its own judicial practice, although innovative and effective, is still modest and 
practically controlled by the Inter-American Commission. Inter-American Commission is 
competent to decide which particular case will eventually be referred to the Inter-American 
Court. From historical point of view, we determined that such modest practice of the Court 
has also been the case prior to the entering on force of the Protocol No. 11 to the Convention. 
Only after Protocol No. 11 and general establishment of the direct access to the Court by the 
individuals, the Court has assumed its contemporary position. If the American Convention 
would be amended in such manner, we would probably witness construction of supra-national 
constitutional legal order within the Organization of American States. But nevertheless, right 
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to a direct access to the Inter-American Court and proliferation of its own caseload is not the 
only condition in construction of supranational legal order of constitutional significance. 
From earlier analysis it can also be concluded that general openness to the evolutive judicial 
practice in human rights protection and willingness to implement final judgement of the Court 
is equally important for the supranational systems to be considered as effective. And these 
conditions are political ones and not judicial. Only in harmony of those two conditions and 
effective and continuous interactions between states and supranational court our new 
theoretical concept can be constructed. 
 In this point we cannot determine would Inter-American Court serve as the Court in 
contemporary time if its caseload would increase like in the case of the Court and if all 
individuals would be granted direct access like in the case of the Convention. In such case 
opposite tendencies could also occur where particular member states of the Organization of 
American States would “close” their legal systems and try to avoid influences of such evolved 
Inter-American Court. But such tendencies have foundation in political process within each 
member state which cannot be predicted in this time. But nevertheless, general institutional 
requirements are prescribed and are existing. It is up to the member states to decide within 
general political process will they develop their human rights framework toward the most 
advanced supranational human rights system worldwide (which is rounded up in one coherent 
legal framework named particular constitutional law) or will retain on national(istic) positions 
where domestic judicial authorities are final and supreme for all individuals that reside on 
their territory.   
 In the case of the African Court identical objections can be raised like in the case of 
the Inter-American Court. The African Court misses its own caseload and individual 
applications to the African Court are possible but only from 8 states where non-compliance to 
the African Court’s judgements is a recognized matter highlighted by the African Court itself. 
With such strong objections and limited institutional requirements, particular constitutional 
law as one supranational legal framework of constitutional significance cannot be constructed 
in this time.  
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6. CONCLUSION  
 
 The analysis presented in this dissertation has been devoted to systematically present 
significance as well as the impacts of the Convention and the Court’s judicial practice in 
contemporary time. Within the effects and impacts of the Convention in member states we 
were trying to round-up one coherent legal framework of constitutional meaning that exists in 
European human rights framework. This framework is evolving continuously on the basis of 
interaction and communication between the Court and member states. Openess of the Council 
of Europe member states to the international law and acceptance of broader scope in human 
rights protection as imposed by the Court led to the de-nationalization of the contemporary 
constitutional law and introduction of the particular constitutional law.  
 In order to verify basic hypothesis as well as all main thesis the dissertation has been 
divided in five main chapters. In the first chapter we have set up theoretical as well as the 
methodological foundations of our research. We have indicated that contemporary 
constitutional law, as main legal branch of public law, is dominantly oriented within the 
borders of one state. Each contemporary state entrenches its own political and legal 
foundations in various rules and principles that are codified in one political and legal 
document of supreme significance (the constitution) or in set of rules and principles 
disseminated throughout all of the legal system. Common characteristic of such rules and 
principles that govern matter of constitutional meaning is predominantly their national 
orientation, i.e. that such rules and principles are evolving within one (national) member state 
without stronger or even any exogenous (international) influence. Constitutional law, as 
fundamental legal branch within one state or state’s law, until contemporary time has been 
closed within national state’s borders and has been evolving on the basis of national 
constitutional actors. Any influences or inspirations from other prominent states could only be 
on voluntary basis. But with the Convention and full implementation of supervisory 
proceedings pursuant to the Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, inception of de-
nationalization of the constitutional law has begun. In order to present such de-nationalization 
and introduction of one supra-national and coherent legal framework of constitutional 
meaning we took the Convention and the Court to the closer analysis.  
 In Chapter II of the dissertation we indicated substantial and procedural parts of the 
contemporary constitutional law. On the basis of contemporary scientific and scholar’s 
analysis we indicated main substantial areas that are governed by the contemporary 
constitutional law. These substantial areas are human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
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their protection, organization of state’s authority and relation between the state and non-state 
subjects. These three areas are main parts of contemporary constitutional law that are 
subjected to its regulation. One of key aspect in the analysis of any legal branch is 
determination of legal sources, i.e. enacted and binding rules that are contained in various acts 
with different legal significance. In the case of the constitutional law we have verified that 
such legal sources can be found in a constitution as one particular legal act of supreme 
political and legal significance as well as in other sources on legislative or sub-legislative 
level. Norms and rules that regulate matter of constitutional law can also be found in 
international agreements which argument we have utilized in the context of our analysis. 
From procedural point of view, norms and rules that regulate procedures regarding realization 
of substantial constitutional law also can be found in international agreements from which fact 
we concluded that norms and rules that regulate constitutional law from substantial and 
procedural point of view can have trans-national character. On the basis of substantial and 
procedural verification of contemporary constitutional law and encompassed legal sources, 
Chapter II of the dissertation also analysed the possibility of internationalization of 
contemporary constitutional law. We have presented on the basis of contemporary scientific 
literature that internationalization of constitutional law has already been verified in 
contemporary researches. Such internationalization was possible primarily in the line of 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms given the fact that international 
agreements that protect human rights and fundamental freedoms have similar substantial, 
normative and grammatical context as human rights and fundamental freedoms protected in 
national constitutional text of modern liberal states. Overwhelmed universalization in the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms on the basis of revealed atrocities 
committed in the World War II led to the process of unification of substantial content of the 
most important human rights and fundamental freedoms (primarily with the Declaration and 
the Covenants). With such universalistic approach in the line of human rights protection 
international community tried to secure uniform and common level of human rights 
realization and protection across the globe. Each and every human being should always be 
aware that his/her e.g. right to a fair trial would be equally protected regardless of state in 
which respective right should be realized. But such total universalistic approach, although 
plausible and idealistic, in practice could not be achieved and researches indicated that 
internationalization of the human rights and fundamental freedoms has tendency to contain 
itself on regional levels (e.g. European, African, American etc.). Possibilites for convergence 
between two or more constitutional orders are on higher level if these constitutional orders are 
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contained on particular geographical and regional area. These constitutional orders have been 
developed from a historical point of view hand by hand and this fact ensured in contemporary 
time possibility for their convergence. On the other hand, modern constitutional texts of 
majority of states have been written under the influence of constitutional ideas from other 
prominent states (like e.g. the rule of law, separation of powers, principle of checks and 
balances) as well as international agreements devoted to the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms which fact ensured broader area of constitutionality world wide. As the 
result of such process, nearly all modern liberal constitutional states have significant part of 
their constitutions devoted to the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms with 
similar (if not even equal) substantial, normative and grammatical context. This fact ensured 
that internationalization of the contemporary constitutional law could begin. Without the 
Court and supervisory mechanism instituted with the Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, the 
concept of internationalization of constitutional law would only be the fact of legal life and 
further realization of modern human rights and fundamental freedoms (which have similar if 
not even equal substantial, normative and grammatical meaning in majority of constitutional 
texts as well as in the international agreements) would be governed only within one national 
member state. E.g. if the Convention would not be on force in the Republic of Croatia, the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia would be final instance regarding violation of 
e.g. the right on a fair trial. And in such adjudication procees the Constitutional Court of 
Croatia would have its own line of reasoning without (any or significant) impacts from the 
international human rights arena. The fact that the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia 
recognized the right to a fair trial on a constitutional level like e.g. the Republic of Slovenia 
would only be a fact analysed by the scholars but development of substantial aspect of a right 
to a fair trial would be independent and nationally oriented. The Court introduced change of 
such paradigm.  
 Given the fact that the Convention and the Court shifted nationally oriented 
constitutional law toward internationally oriented, in the Chapter III of the dissertation we 
have presented key aspects of the system based upon the Convention. Within the Chapter III 
of the dissertation we have indicated political environment that catalysed introduction of the 
Convention. Within Chapter III we also displayed historical development of the Convention 
and contemporary normative and procedural characteristics of the Convention’s system. 
Given the fact that the Court assumed particular activistic approach in the line of protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, theories regarding interpretation of the Convention 
must have been presented. We have verified normative, grammatical and substantial 
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convergence of the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Convention 
with human rights and fundamental freedoms as guaranteed in national constitutional texts of 
the Council of Europe member states. This fact ensured a possibility for the convergence 
between national and international system. These two systems are not identical but are 
interrelated which fact ensure joint analysis regarding impacts of one system (international 
one) to another (national one). On the other side, possibility for convergence would stay only 
as the possibility of scientific research without significant substantial implications. The Court 
in its practice assumed rather activistic approach and interpreted the Convention on particular 
evolutive level constantly trying to expand the scope of applicability of the Convention’s 
provisions with due respect to the national particularities which must always be consired in 
every proceeding before the Court. If the Court did not assume such activistic position and 
subsequently interpreted the Convention in rather conservative manner, broader human rights 
framework would only be initiated on national level. Such broader human rights framework 
on national level maybe would serve as inspiration to other constitutional systems but most 
certainly would not be on this level which has been provided by the Court. Activistic 
approach and evolutive interpretation of the Convention assured its position within the centre 
of the European constitutional architecture. But on the other hand and considering that the 
Council of Europe member states are 47 as similar but simultaneously as different states, the 
Court also recognized the fact that national particularities must be considered in proceedings 
before the Court. This consideration become known as the doctrine of margins of appreciation 
in which the Court will consider national particularities as something that must be 
acknowledged. Member states are primarily responsible on realization and protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms that are guaranteed by the Convention and member 
states must enjoy the area of free judgement in their regulation. But any such regulation must 
not exceed limits acceptable to the very foundation of the Convention’s system and such 
limits are determined by the Court. Given the fact that activistic approach of the Court in the 
line of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms with evolutive interpretation of 
the Convention and recognition of particular national characteristics is of paramount 
importance for our new theoretical concept, in Chapter III brief presentation on theories 
regarding interpretation of the Convention as well as the concept of margins of appreciation 
has been included. Any activistic approach and evolutive interpretation of the Convention 
would also be pure fact if member states would not comply with final judgements of the 
Court. Proper and full execution of all final judgements of the Court is second underlying 
factor that ensures effective realization of the Court’s judgements in national practice. In most 
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general terms, liberal political surroundings in the majority of the Council of Europe member 
states and general openness to the evolutive application of the Convention in the line of 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as presented by the Court in its judicial 
practice is equally important demand for construction of supranational constitutional order. If 
member states would openly refuse to properly execute final judgement of the Court, any 
activistic approach in the human rights framework would stay ineffective. Although diversed 
political situations across the Council of Europe member states can not secure effectiveness of 
the system in each and every situation disputable from the aspects of the Convention, 
generally speaking (which is also confirmed in Annual Report from the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe) member states tend to comply with all final judgements 
of the Court and will in the process of execution undertake all necessary measures (on 
judicial, legislative or administrative level) in order to properly execute final judgement of the 
Court. Finally, this is international obligation of member state pursuant to the provisions of 
the Convention which is international agreement. In the process of execution and effective 
rectification of infringed human right, common standards are evolving. For this reason, 
member states are, again, equally important as the Court in the construction of common 
standards which standards we are addressing as the particular constitutional law. For this 
reason also, Chapter III had to present the process of execution of final judgement of the 
Court. 
 In Chapter IV we took closer analysis on common standards design within six member 
states of the Council of Europe where majority of selected states have already been in the 
analysis regarding relation of their internal legal order with the Convention. With case-law 
analysis we have tried to verify, in concreto, that final judgement of the Court will lead even 
to the revision of national constitutions, if necessary, in order for the state to fulfil its 
international obligation pursuant to the provisions of the Convention. In Chapter IV presented 
case-law analysis has clearly shown that member states will comply to the Court’s final 
judgement and undertake all measure on all levels (even constitutional if required) in order to 
meet the Convention’s standard as demanded by the Court. With each proper execution of 
final judgement of the Court national legal framework of the Council of Europe member 
states is becoming more and more similar which fact ensures introduction of common 
standards in the area of European constitutionality. These common standards that are evolving 
on the basis of interaction between the Court and member states, as one coherent legal 
framework, is the particular constitutional law. Of course, introduction of common standards 
cannot be and is not straightforward and there are particular obstacles, reservations and 
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opositions to the Court and its activism. Nevertheless, such occasional derailments do not 
question effectiveness of the system as a unit which could endanger introduction of the 
particular constitutional law.  
 On the basis of theoretical as well as practical confirmation that the system based upon 
the Convention is effective and is realized in practice, in the Chapter V of the dissertation we 
have systematically presented the concept of the particular constitutional law as theoretical 
idea. We highlighted substantial and procedural aspect of this coherent constitutional 
framework that is evolving on the basis of the Court’s activism and readiness of the Council 
of Europe member states to fully execute all final judgements of the Court. In the same time 
we presented that overflow of the Court’s legal understandings regarding the Convention is 
really taking place and throughout the process of execution of final judgements of the Court is 
entering in domestic legal order. In order words, harmonization of legal orders of the Council 
of Europe member states under the influence of the Court is effective and is evolving 
practically on daily basis. Logically it can be expected that within 47 member states of the 
Council of Europe there will be different level of acceptance of the Court’s evolutive and 
activistic approach in the line of human rights protection. Some member states will be more 
open to such approach and will accept greater level of harmonization with the Court’s practice 
(on legislative, judicial, administrative and other levels of national regulation) where other 
member states would retain on dominantly national orientation in the line of human rights 
protection or even dirtectly oppose to the Court and its evolutive approach. Within such 
possibilities, Chapter V presented possible activist and national position regarding level of 
harmonization with the practice of the Court. Finally, and after rounding up all verifiable 
arguments in one system, Chapter V also introduced analysis regarding applicability of the 
concept to the other regional human rights systems. The Council of Europe, the Convention, 
the Court and the Committee of Ministers are important human rights factors in contemporary 
time but are not also the only one(s). On global level there are additional human rights 
systems comparable to the system based upon the Convention or even systems where the 
Convention served as ideal type in their introduction. In this applicability analysis the concept 
has been applied to the European Union, the Organization of American States with correlative 
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and the Organization of African Unity with 
correlative African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. After brief presentation of this 
regional human rights systems reasons for (non)applicability of the concept of the particular 
constitutional law have been presented. In the case of the European Union severe 
interconnections have been determined between order established with fundamental treaties 
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on the European Union and the Convention. First of all, all of the European Union members 
are in the same time the member states of the Council of Europe. Secondly, the European 
Union as special legal entity proclaimed its obligation on accession to the Convention. 
Thirdly, the Court of Justice in its practice is considering application of European public law’s 
provisions in a manner uniform with the Convention and the Court. Legal understandings of 
the Court regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms as prescribed by the Convention 
are becoming common standards for the European Union. In the case of the European Union 
we have to recognize the principle of effectiveness of the Union’s law which fact means that 
in collision of the Union’s law and the Court or the Convention, preference must be granted to 
the Union’s law in order to secure its effectivity. But on the most general level, uniform 
application will be secured which fact indicates applicability of the system on the level of the 
European Union. Such harmonization will be on even greater level when and if the European 
Union accedes to the Convention. For other two regional human rights systems (American 
and African in general terms) applicability analysis has shown that supranational legal order 
of constitutional meaning on the basis of harmonization could not be constructed. Although 
very similar with the system based upon the Convention, such systems have deficiencies 
which prevent construction of the particular constitutional law. First of all, the direct 
application to the supranational courts is limited or non-existed which fact directly prevents 
that these supranational courts develop its own significant judicial practice. On the other hand, 
and although provided with direct application (in 8 member states) in the case of African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights level of compliance with the court’s judgements and 
orders on provisional measures is very low. In order for the system to be effective and 
evolutive, level of compliance must be on high level where minor setbacks can be tolerated 
(given the fact that ideal type is impossible to achieve). But in any case, small amount of case 
law with even smaller number of cases where judgements are realized, prevent construction of 
the particular constitutional law in such cases.  
 In the end, and prior to the assessment have basic hypothesis and main thesis been 
verified or not, particular additional characteristics of human rights systems on general level 
must be acknowledged. Protection of human rights in contemporary era is not a competence 
of just one authority on national or international level. On national level, all competent 
authorities in proceedings where human rights and fundamental freedoms are considered must 
always take into account provisions of constitutions as fundamental legal source. 
Constitutions must not stay as ideal and theoretical legal sources where only scholars of 
constitutional law and political sciences will analyse their applicability but must be real and 
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effective. In international human rights framework beside the Convention there are additional 
human rights system that are devoted to the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms (e.g. the United Nations, the European Union, Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe with Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights). Proliferation 
of international organizations devoted to the human rights protection lead to the conclusion 
that human rights structure on global scale is not monolith or individual. Instead of individual 
we can determine that human rights arena on global scale is heterarchical where numerous 
international organizations in constant interactions with national authorities in particular states 
are trying to secure peace and protection and realization of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. They all are more or less effective in the line of protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms on national level but are existing factors for which reason we can 
determine heterarchy of institutional factors in human rights protection on international level. 
The Convention and the Court are surely the most significant and the most effective given the 
fact that only this system has introduced effective scheme of human rights protection on daily 
basis with evolutive approach of institutional factors in protection of human rights. On the 
other hand, only the Council of Europe member states have opened their legal systems on 
such level where, in general terms, final judgement of the Court will be carried out without 
significant domestic obstacles in the process of execution. Those two factors are catalyst in 
human rights protection across the globe. But other international factors must also be 
recognized although on lower level of effectiveness (compared to the Convention and the 
Court). 
 Although the most developed and the most effective, the system based upon the 
Convention could also be improved in order to achieve even higher level of harmonization 
with the Court’s legal understandings and judicial practice which is beneficial factor for 
human rights scheme in Europe. First of all, all obstacles to the swift execution of final 
judgement of the Court should be removed in domestic legal orders and internal regulations 
should be amended in order to secure swift execution of the Court’s final judgement. 
Excessive duration of execution of particular final judgement or pilot judgement should be 
avoided, and domestic regulation must be enacted in order to avoid such situations. National 
supervisor of the execution of final judgements of the Court should also be provided with the 
competence on supervision and effective realization of final judgement of the Court in 
national legal order which fact could speed up the process of execution of final judgement of 
the Court. Furthermore, prior to the enactment of national legislature assessment on 
conformity with the Convention could also be undertaken. Such intermediate step prior to the 
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enactment of the legislature would serve as beneficial factor of harmonization which could 
avoid the Court’s indirect determination on non-conformity with the Convention. All this 
national undertakings could lower incremental number of application each year before the 
Court and would secure greater level of harmonization which would also be preventive or 
preemptive (prior to the particular proceeding before the Court). Translation of the Court’s 
judgements on official languages of the member states and their dissemination throughout the 
judicial system is also one factor that could secure better level of harmonization and 
consequently enhancement of human rights scheme in Europe. In order to apply greater level 
of protection as rulled by the Court in its judicial practice or this common standards, judges 
that apply the law must be acquainted with such practice. Greater level of acquaintance with 
the Court’s practice and subsequent rulling pursuant to the legal understandings of the Court 
means lesser level of granted compensations to the individual by the Court and determination 
of the Convention’s violation. All these utilizing factors can be achieved with small additional 
efforts which would have beneficial effects on human rights framework.  
We can witness that the Council of Europe is trying to secure higher level of 
harmonization with the Protocol No. 16 and possibility for highest courts to address the Court 
for advisory opinions. If this possibility really takes effect in practice and highest courts of 
member states really take into consideration such rendered advisory opinions in domestic 
adjudication process this fact would surely enchance the system based upon the Convention. 
Furthermore, effective consideration of rendered advisory opinions in domestic adjudication 
process would lower the number of determined violation before the Court which fact would 
also be beneficial for the Court, the member states but also for individuals. We can only hope 
that the Court will have adequate institutional and other necessary requirements to deal with 
great number of requests for advisory opinions.  
In the light of all stated arguments we conclude that the system based upon the 
Convention is really and effectively the most advanced human rights system in international 
community where the Court serves as institutional provider of enhanced human rights 
framework. On the other hand, member states with general liberal political surroundings 
accepts such evolutive input from the Court and build internal legal and political order on the 
basis of the legal understandigs and judicial practice of the Court. Although faced with 
particular obstacles in the execution process (regarding duration of execution proceeding) or 
even direct opposition to the Court’s final judgements, the system as presented by the 
Convention is effective and has center, primary role in the area of European constitutionality 
and can serve as model type of how international human rights system should be organized. 
283 
 
As it is with any legal systems, this system also can be improved on national and international 
level where particular attempts have already been recognized with the Protocol No. 16. 
Also it has to be noted that effectiveness of the system based upon the Convention can 
be improved with introduction of particular applicant’s competence in the process of 
execution of the Court’s final judgement. In the present system, applicants in whose cases 
violation of the Convention have been determined by the Court don’t have any significant role 
in the execution process on national level. Execution of the Court’s final judgement is 
international obligation of member state and member states autonomously prescribe internal 
remedial actions that can rectify infringed human rights. In case that particular member state 
provides retrial process pursuant to the Court’s judgement, applicants have possibility to 
initiate such retrial proceedings. Unfortunately, deadlines for initiating such proceedings are 
short after which expiration applicants are unable to effectively realize final judgement of the 
Court. E.g. pursuant to the provisions of the Art. 428.a of the Croatian Litigation Act motion 
on retrial on the basis of the Court’s final judgement must be submitted no later than 30 days 
after the Court’s judgement has become final. As it has been presented, judgement of the 
Court is becoming final pursuant to the provision of the Convention for which reason 
applicants must act with excessive caution in order not to miss prescribed deadline for 
domestic retrial process. In case that respective deadline is missed, domestic courts will reject 
motion on retrial and realization of the Court’s final judgement will not take effect. For this 
reason, internal legislation should be amended in order to expand this reduced time frame or 
prescribe that such 30 day deadline begins after the final judgement of the Court has been 
delivered to the applicant. Furthermore, and in case that member states should provide 
national supervisory organ on execution of final judgements of the Court, applicants should 
be able to act hand by hand with such supervisory organ in order for swift execution of final 
judgements of the Court. Finally, it has to be noted that excessive duration in the execution 
process doesn’t have beneficial effect for achievement of common standards and subsequently 
the particular constitutional law. The more time se necessary for member state to execute final 
judgement of the Court, the more time is necessary to achieve and verify common standards 
in the European human rights protection scheme as provided by the Court. And finally, until 
such common standards are not achieved, the Court will contionously determine violations in 
related cases which fact can have significant financial repercussions for member states. As it 
can be concluded, swift execution of all final judgements of the Court and achievement of 
European common standards in human rights protection is in best interest of all included 
subjects, i.e. member states, individual applicants, the Court, the Committee of Ministers etc.   
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 With this conclusive remarks, we can proceed on verification of our basic hypothesis 
and other main thesis and conclude our dissertation. 
 
Basic hypothesis: 
Contemporary constitutional law doesn’t have an exclusive national character given the 
fact that the principles as well as the content of the constitutional norms can have a 
trans-national character - VERIFIED 
 
 By introducing and examining the concept of the particular constitutional law, i.e. one 
coherent legal system that is evolving on international level we simoultaneously verified that 
contemporary constitutional law does not have an exclusive national character. Human rights 
and fundamental freedoms that are unalienable part of the contemporary constitutional law 
can also be regulated and prescribed by international agreements. When such international 
agreements provide supra-national court competent for determination of violation of 
fundamental legal sources in such system where member states comply with reasoning of 
such court and undertake all necessary measures in order to execute final judgements – de-
nationalization of contemporary constitutional law can be verified. Constitutional law till 
modern times have been primarily nationally oriented but change of such paradigm has 
occurred with the Convention and the system based upon the Convention. In order to achieve 
trans-national construction of contemporary constitutional law, first of all there must be 
common constitutional language and the possibility for convergence of national constitutional 
systems (state-to-state convergence and convergence between states and international political 
and legal environment). Given the fact that human rights and fundamental freedoms are the 
key-aspects in contemporary regulation of constitutional law, normative, grammatical and 
substantial similarities between human rights and fundamental freedoms as prescribed in 
contemporary constitutional texts and human rights and fundamental freedoms provided in 
international agreements is the foundation of trans-national construction of contemporary 
constitutional law. On second level, supra-national independent court must be provided with 
possibility for autonomous interpretation and application of fundamental legal sources where 
member states are willing to comply with its reasoning and judgements. If both conditions are 
met (like in the case of the Convention and the Court), it is clear that norms and principles 
that are in the very essence of the constitutional law can be constructed trans-nationally from 
substantial aspect but their effective realization in practice lie entirely on national states. In 
order for such trans-national constitutional law to be effective, national member states must 
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be open to its provisions and inputs where such general openness can be determined in 
member states with liberal political surroundings with great level of commitment to the 
human rights protection. Given the fact that all stated conditions are met in the case of the 
Convention the Court and the Council of Europe, our theoretical basic hypothesis is verified.  
 
Council of Europe member states can be classified according to one new criterion: level 
of harmonization with the judicial practice of the Court - VERIFIED 
 
 If there is one special and independent supra-national judicial authority competent to 
determine violation of fundamental legal sources designated for the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms it is methodologically appropriate to assess level of 
harmonization with jurisprudence of such authority. From the methodological foundations of 
our research we stated that level of harmonization must not be identified with particular socio-
econometric model or scale where e.g. 10 will be total harmonization and 1 no harmonization 
whatsoever. Considering that the Council of Europe consists of 47 member states it is 
practically impossible to construct such scale due to the political, legislative and other 
diversities between member states. But on the other hand, all of those 47 member states are 
trying to secure general liberal political environment which is beneficial for human rights 
protection and evolution (each one with more or less success). 
 Considering the fact that in this time it is not possible to construct socio-econometric 
model of harmonization, our analysis has been positioned on the very beginning of 
harmonization or on the inception of harmonization. We took harmonization on the very 
beginning and tried to assess has the harmonization with the Court’s legal understandings and 
judicial practice already begun. We undertook such assessment with facts like e.g. are legal 
understandings and judicial practice of the Court even considered as authority guidelines or 
even as the source of law in national adjudication process or in national legislatures. In other 
words, we tried to confirm inception of the harmonization process on the very beginning  
given the fact that socio-econometric models are in this time impossible to construct. If 
beginning of such harmonization process (where national constitutional courts or national 
legislatures are considering judicial practice of the Court) has actually begun than we can 
assess is there any additional criteria with which the Council of Europe member states can be 
classified.  
 In this assessment we have to note that from the analysis undertaken in the Chapter IV 
of the dissertation is clear that judicial practice of the Court as well as legal understandings 
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are something that is considered in national legal orders. In the process of execution of the 
Court’s final judgements national authorities translate relevant judgements of the Court and 
disseminate them throughout the judicial system (e.g. Italy), constitutional courts are 
adjusting their practice in order to meet standards emphasized by the Court (Federal Republic 
of Germany) and constitutions as fundamental legal sources of domestic law have been 
amended in order to prevent future violations which have previously been determined by the 
Court (Republic of Croatia). For this reason we conclude and verify that harmonization 
process has actually begun, and the Court’s judicial practice and legal understandings are 
something that is considered within national legal framework. 
 On the other hand in this harmonization process, which is continuous process 
considering the fact that propulsive and evolutive practice of the Court is evolving practically 
on daily basis, all of the Council of Europe member states are not on the same level of 
harmonization. Some member states are generally more open to the Court and its practice and 
other member states are generally more nationally oriented. Some member states are, on the 
other hand, nationally oriented but with determination that their legal system already achieved 
all the Court’s standards and that the system based upon the Convention has only subsidiary 
meaning (e.g. United Kingdom).  
 For all stated reasons level of harmonization can be constructed only on the initial 
level and we can confirm that legal understandings and judicial practice of the Court is 
considered in daily legal life of the Council of Europe member states. Furthermore, member 
states can be classified within the level of harmonization criteria given the fact that those 
member states that openly refuse execution of the final judgement of the Court (like e.g. 
Azerbaijan in the Mammadov case or the Russian Federation with disputable constitutional 
amendments) and generally close their legal systems from international inputs will be put 
closer to the national position on our harmonization line. On the other hand, member states 
that are (more) open to the evolutive reasoning of the Court will be brought on the activist 
position on our harmonization line. The more that particular member state is open to the Court 
and promptly and fully execute final judgement of the Court and rely its national 
jurisprudence and legislature to the Court’s reasoning of the Convention the more respective 
member states will be positioned to the activist position. Opposite tendencies will bring 
member state to the national position. Considering that theoretical classification of the 
Council of Europe member states is possible within the harmonization criteria, stated main 
thesis is verified.  
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Introduction of this new theoretical concept as stated in basic hypothesis is possible 
considering organization of the Convention’s supervisory system (principle of 
subsidiarity, autonomous interpretation of the Convention rights and principles as well 
as the (international) obligation of member state to carry out final judgment of the 
Court - VERIFIED 
 
 The analysis has shown that prior to the entering of the Protocol No. 11 into force, the 
system has been plausible but substantially different. There was no possibility for the 
individuals to lodge their application directly to the European Court of Human Rights, the 
European Commission on Human Rights served as filter of individual complaints and 
numerous additional obstacles have been placed for evolution of European human rights 
framework. The system dractically changed after the Protocol No. 11 entered on force with all 
systemic changes that have been introduced. With positioning the Court on the top of the all 
possible effective legal remedies, it was possible for the Court to create its own and 
autonomous judicial practice and its own legal understandings regarding all aspects of the 
most important contemporary human rights and fundamental principles. By placing the Court 
on the end of legal remedies, the Court assumed first level of importance considering the fact 
that with such position the Court evaluate to particular extent interpretation and application of 
the Convention and national constitutional texts. The principle of subsidiarity which positions 
the Court on the end of all procedures entrenched the Court in the very essence of the 
European human right’s legal framework. On this basis, the Court started to develop its own 
judicial practice as well as legal understandings regarding all substantial and procedural 
aspects of the Convention. In order to secure uniform application, the Court disinfected the 
Convention of any national interpretational inputs that could endanger uniform application of 
the Convention. The Court developed its own autonomous interpretation considering national 
particularities within the doctrine of the margins of appreciation. This fact ensured 
independent life of the Convention and its autonomous development.  
 Of course, subsidiarity, autonomous interpretation, activist position of the Court would 
stay merely as a fact if member states were not willing to comply with the Court’s reasoning 
and execute all final judgements of the Court. The system can be considered effective only if 
final judgements of the Court are realized in practice and if subsequent national legislative 
and judicial developments are considering final judgements and legal understandings of the 
Court in future cases with similar circumstances of the case. In the case of the Convention, all 
necessary requirements have met but nevertheless the role of member states in unavoidable. 
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Without effectiveness (which fact is measured with success rate in the execution process) the 
system would stay merely as particular ideal type of human rights framework which must be 
achieved. Member states are responsible for securing effectiveness of the system and for 
which fact are second factor in de-nationalization process in contemporary constitutional law 
and introduction of the particular constitutional law. Member states are hardware and the 
Court is software of the system. For all stated reasons, respective main thesis is verified.  
 
The (European) Court represents an institutional link that enables introduction of 
particular constitutional law - VERIFIED 
 
 As it has been shown, the Court with its activistic approach secured one particularly 
higher level of contemporary human rights protection. Without such activistic approach, 
development of contemporary human rights would be primarily nationally oriented. But after 
the Protocol No. 11 to the Convention and implementation of the contemporary supervision 
mechanism according to the respective Protocol, the Court become the top of the European 
constitutional architecture that connects all constitutional systems of the Council of Europe 
member states in one coherent unity.  Inputs of the Court in evolutive interpretation and 
application of the Convention and human rights law in general with constant awareness that 
human rights must be practical and not just theoretical, secured introduction of the particular 
constitutional law. In this system the Court serves in adjudication process as national 
constitutional courts with significant distinction that the Court is practically on the top of 47 
legal orders that exist in the Council of Europe member states.  
 The Court is that common characteristic that is shared by the Council of Europe 
member states. The Court is the main institutional provider of the particular constitutional law 
although the role of member states of the Council of Europe must also be recognized given 
the fact that execution process of final judgement of the Court is soley in the hand of the 
member states. In such process member states also enjoy the area of free judgement regarding 
methods by which infringed human rights will be rectified. For this reason the Court is not the 
one and only institutional provider of the particular constitutional law but is the most 
important. Without the (activistic) Court and the Protocol No. 11 to the Convention the 
system would only be another international human rights system but most certainly would not 
be the most advanced in contemporary human rights history. And this has been really sole 
credit of the Court and its commitment to the expansion of human rights protection. 
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